"B, C, I" -- implications?

[elisabeth]

I don't want to divert Shan's thread by posting this there, since it's nowhere near a theory yet. (And indeed that's another of the things that keeps a lot of us from posting any battle theories, I think -- managing to fix on a "my theory" that stays intact for more than two minutes at a time. You think for a second or two that you may have got the picture, then along comes another snippet of information that turns the whole thing upside-down ...)

Anyway -- here are the two snippets du jour. I'm still struggling to get my head around the possible implications, and would appreciate help from anyone who can see them more clearly than I.

I've just recently got hold of the James Hutchins [Army and Navy Journal book. It gives all the A&NJ news reports, editorials, correspondence etc., on the 1876 campaign and its aftermath in chronological order, so that you can see the story and the general understanding of what happened evolve. Quite fascinating.

The first thing that gave me pause was its official listing of the make-up of Terry's command. Here we see Keogh's battalion clearly stated as being Cos. B, C and I. This is nothing new, of course. But it does make you stop and think a bit. So many of the more recent battle scenarios have been based on the assumption that Co. L was part of Keogh's command -- that the demands of seniority caused Custer to transfer L to him as a replacement for the missing B. Since the three companies were together on Battle Ridge, it's not unreasonable. However, this has now become the bedrock on which the idea of an intentionally-deployed line -- L holding Calhoun Hill, C covering the rest of the ridgeline, with I as some kind of reserve -- is founded. If we were to consider for a moment the possibility that L was in fact part of Yates' battalion, this might shake things up considerably. The narrative then has to change. To what? Any of the following could be feasible:

1) It's C & I (as per seniority) who make the probe to MTF. Custer with E & F continues north, leaving L to cover the Keogh battalion's backs. By the time C & I withdraw, Custer has gone too far to get back and consolidate with them; they can only do the best they can where they are, on Battle Ridge.
2) As per DC's scenario, it's a promiscuous rout from the ford; the hapless L are posted as rearguard; C & I are the last in line on the run for LSH, and are stopped in their tracks before (most of them) can get there.
3) It's slightly more organised than that; L is again deployed as rearguard while the rest of the command presses on north (possibly as per the waiting-for-Benteen scenario?); as the numbers coming from Weir Point and MTF build up, it becomes clear they're in trouble; C & I dash back to rescue them and convoy them to the "safety" of LSH; it's too late.
Or ...?
These may all be rubbish, but they may spark off some better option. Just thinking that removing L from Keogh's wing makes the whole thing look a lot more fluid. (And messy. But then clearly it was, to have the outcome it did.)

The other thing that's kind of interesting is the prevalence in the A&NJ (and in private letters too) of the belief that Keogh was the first officer killed. Now obviously no-one was there to see, so it may be pure myth; possibly, it's simply his loyal friends and admirers working on the basis that only his early removal could explain the debacle that ensued. It does seem to be more than that, though: as if there's some reading of the ground and the positions of bodies that's suggested this to them. (The Indian accounts suggest otherwise, but of course those weren't available to them at the time.) Can we divine how they could have reached this interpretation, and what scenario they could have been envisaging? It may get us nowhere; on the other hand, these were experienced military men who knew their stuff, and are unlikely to have arrived at this opinion without some good reason. Even if they're wrong, a look at their thinking might be illuminating, perhaps?

[conz]

Elisabeth,

My model shows how Keogh could have been the first officer killed. It postulates that the first close combat between the Warriors and the Soldiers occurred as Crazy Horse came galloping over the blind side (west side) of battle ridge plop into the middle of I Co, and that Keogh was riding there to get them into some kind of fighting position (too late).

So Keogh is trapped, surrounded by what of his company he could gather, in a hand-to-hand combat before anyone else. At the same time, C Co is fleeing up to Calhoun Hill being closely chased by Lame White Man's bunch, and Calhoun is being pressed by Gall's groups, but they get overrun AFTER Keogh is engaged.

I don't know that this is what the officers you read thought was the model, but it may be the only one that allows this.

As for the division of companies, the one vital piece of evidence against it is numerous Warrior witness accounts, and I believe Martin's and probably the Crows, concerning the "grey horse troop" (E Co) being the one down near the ford, and dismounting there.

Clair

[elisabeth]

We might differ on the direction Crazy Horse attacked from, but apart from that, it's a possibility. Not sure that what we think we know happened would have been in these officers' minds at the time, though -- this would have been July/August 1876. The broad assumption in the early reports and maps drawn by those first on the scene was the "traditional" one: that Custer had attempted to attack at Ford B and been repulsed, after which it was a general retreat to high ground. Most had the retreat splitting in two from Ford B, along the E&F/C, I & L paths we're familiar with, but there were a few variants -- some thinking there was a second attempt to cross at Deep Ravine ford which was then pushed back via LSH, with others (Terry for one) thinking that the Battle Ridge positions represented the Custer command's line of march more or less describing a circle heading back towards the Weir Point direction.

None of these quite explains the Keogh-killed-first scenario, however. He's too far back from the river to have been killed in any attempted crossing, and he can't have travelled from the river to his death site with the leg wound he had; he must have received it close to where he was found. To imagine that no other officer was killed in the supposed retreat until Keogh got to that point is quite a stretch. So I don't know what they were thinking -- unless that Keogh was leading some kind of breakout of the whole command, and that his death blunted it. (Still doesn't explain Co. L's position, though.) Possibly they were simply trying to rationalise the "a rout, a panic" reading, on the grounds that the key to that would have to be Keogh being taken out. If Custer had been killed, at Ford B or wherever, yes, an icon would have gone, and there'd be shock, but Keogh's speciality was rallying demoralised troops; he (they might be thinking) would have re-imposed control. Whereas if Keogh was gone, there'd be nobody to do that. Custer, for all his military virtues, wasn't used to defeats; the way he was found (pace DC), surrounded by officers and family, doesn't suggest a man pitching in with the humble rank-and-file. Maybe that's how their minds were working ...?

Yes, those pesky gray horses. Can't get around those. One other solution, I guess, is that Custer wasn't using wings/battalions at all, but fighting his whole five-company command as one -- companies sent here and there at need. Reno's report, with its suggestion that "Cos. C and I, and perhaps part of E" entered the village implies that this was a distinct possibility. In which case the Co. L question becomes moot.