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Post by shan on Dec 5, 2007 18:21:52 GMT -6
Fred,
nice to see we agree on a few things for once.
You know it's some time since I was on the battlefield, so as I wrote that stuff about the so called ravine running through the valley behind Keoghs position I began to doubt myself, began to wonder if it suited my model of the battle not to have Crazy Horse and his hordes use it, in other words to make it smaller and narrower than it was.
In many ways this pertains to the problem of whether we can trust the memory of those that participated, that blackcloud keeps banging on about.
I was lucky enough to spent 10 days on the battlefield dawn to dusk walking it and making notes, longer than any of those that actually fought in the battle, and yet here I am a few years later, doubting my own memory about a number of landscape features.
Now if I had actually taken part in the battle, and I was sat down before a reporter who wanted to hear my side of the tale, I sure as hell wouldn't tell him that I couldn't remember what happened where and when. We have that luxury, but those guys were under enough pressure without be made to look a fool. Asked your opinion about a nightmare, you may well grab at any word that was passing, or indeed be glad of those that were being put in your mouth.
Having said that I think we can often prise something valuble out of what someone is saying, and even if they are lying, I think that if we probe deep enough we'll find a residue of truth down there somewhere.
As to agreeing, well, I have my reservations about some things, but at this time of night I think I'll hold them in reserve just on the other side of the ridge.
Shan
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 5, 2007 19:04:50 GMT -6
Its always great to discuss the different scenarios that might have played out on Battle Ridge. I agree with Shan that CH did not lead a warparty southward along the ravine behind the Keogh position. I do agree with Steve and Fred that CH went over and beyond East Ridge opposite I Co. after traversing the northern end of LSH. He was able to do this as Custer & Co. were still away off on their north ford venture. Remember, Custer was alleged to have stopped for an extended period of time (about 20 min.) just north of the present Stone House beyond the National Cemetery. There would have been plenty of time for CH to cross this area unopposed to reach East Ridge.
White Bull's version of events is very enlightening now, as he makes it quite clear that CH (and his own) charge against the Keogh sector had nothing at all to do with the Cheyenne charge led by LWM on the western slope of Battle Ridge. Hence, we are talking about two different scenarios here, and no, I do not believe the timing was just perfect or coincidental and that the two charges occurred simultaneously.
I agree with Erkki that the LWM charge came first before the CH/White Bull charge from the eastern ridge. My view is that after shattering and driving C Co. from their position close to GGR, the LWM attack was repulsed by defensive fire emanating from Calhoun Hill and Battle Ridge. This defensive fire allowed many of the remnants of C Co. (including its 1st Sgt.) to reach Keogh's position. It also accounts for the death of LWM and Noisy Walking, who could only have been shot from the summit of Battle Ridge.
Shan's asked why CH/WB would charge down from the eastern ridge into the Keogh position.....it makes little sense to do so if Keogh had his men deployed and facing the eastern ridge. There would have been more native casualties and signs of skirmish fire. As we know, there were not. Thus, my own model has Keogh dividing his company into two platoons. 1st platoon was stationed dismounted on the military crest of Battle Ridge facing west....a position they occupied when C Co. charged down to clear the vicinity of GGR/Calhoun Coulee. It was this platoon, stationed with Keogh himself, who repelled LWM's attack and saved the remnants of C Co. who made their way to the safety of the gully behind his position. The led horses of 1st platoon were kept at the bottom of this gully. 2nd platoon of I Co. under Lt. Porter was stationed in reserve and mounted not far from the led horses.
With Keogh's 1st platoon and Calhoun's skirmish line now facing west and occupied with repelling the charge led by LWM, and with some semblance of confusion reigning in the basin behind Battle Ridge due to the panicked arrival of the C Co. survivors, CH and WB saw their opportunity and led successive charges down into the gully from the eastern ridge. Their objective? To capture or scatter the led horses of I Co.'s 1st platoon. I suggest that it was this subsequent attack on the horseholders of I Co. that caused Keogh to recall his dismounted skirmish line on the western slope of Battle Ridge and charge down into the bottom of the basin to repel this new assault on his horses. He would have been joined there by Porter's 2nd platoon and the remnants of C Co. in a massive hand to hand struggle to stabilize their position and save their horses.
It may well have been at this point that Calhoun attempted to abandon Calhoun Hill and come to the aid of Keogh's embattled Company. Once Calhoun's skirmishers abandoned their position to head north to Keogh's position, Gall and Crow King would be free to attack mounted from the south and SE. It was this action that the troopers from Weir Point witnessed at about 5:20 to 5:40 pm. It explains why the survivors of both C and L companies were found in Keogh's I Co. position, which became the last stand of the Keogh Battalion.
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2007 19:23:21 GMT -6
Shan-- There's your Crazy Horse Ravine (as I understand it to be called), but if the name is wrong then this is at least the ravine we are talking about. So you see, you are correct; memory serves you well. It is very narrow. This picture looks northeast. Calhoun Hill would be behind the photographer, Battle Ridge to the left, and Last Stand Hill to the left front. The ridgeline on the right is where warriors fired from when they fired into the Keogh Sector.Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Dec 5, 2007 19:36:00 GMT -6
Its always great to discuss the different scenarios that might have played out on Battle Ridge. I agree with Shan that CH did not lead a warparty southward along the ravine behind the Keogh position. I do agree with Steve and Fred that CH went over and beyond East Ridge opposite I Co. after traversing the northern end of LSH. He was able to do this as Custer & Co. were still away off on their north ford venture. Remember, Custer was alleged to have stopped for an extended period of time (about 20 min.) just north of the present Stone House beyond the National Cemetery. There would have been plenty of time for CH to cross this area unopposed to reach East Ridge. Yes, Bill, I totally agree. This is a good discussion. Regarding that 15-20 minute wait. I tend to think that was after Crazy Horse had already crossed to that "East" Ridge/"Crazy Horse" Ridge area. I think he intersected Custer's trail. To me, the only real weakness in my own argument is that 20 minute wait, probably occurring while Keogh and group are getting bumped off. The only way I can really justify it-- and I think my argument here is legitimate-- is that the firing in the Keogh Sector was not that great, and Custer thought nothing was really wrong. Is that naive? I don't really know, but then again, I have not put the finishing touches to any of this, so I may yet revise it. As for Lame White Man, White Bull, et al, I will have to let you guys hammer that out. I have read virtually nothing of what they had to say; certainly not first-hand stuff. (It's all been filtered through Greg Michno's work.) So, I will have to go back over that stuff more carefully. I hope that picture helps. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 5, 2007 23:43:50 GMT -6
Its always great to discuss the different scenarios that might have played out on Battle Ridge. I agree with Shan that CH did not lead a warparty southward along the ravine behind the Keogh position. I do agree with Steve and Fred that CH went over and beyond East Ridge opposite I Co. after traversing the northern end of LSH. He was able to do this as Custer & Co. were still away off on their north ford venture. Remember, Custer was alleged to have stopped for an extended period of time (about 20 min.) just north of the present Stone House beyond the National Cemetery. There would have been plenty of time for CH to cross this area unopposed to reach East Ridge. Yes, Bill, I totally agree. This is a good discussion. Regarding that 15-20 minute wait. I tend to think that was after Crazy Horse had already crossed to that "East" Ridge/"Crazy Horse" Ridge area. I think he intersected Custer's trail. To me, the only real weakness in my own argument is that 20 minute wait, probably occurring while Keogh and group are getting bumped off. The only way I can really justify it-- and I think my argument here is legitimate-- is that the firing in the Keogh Sector was not that great, and Custer thought nothing was really wrong. Is that naive? I don't really know, but then again, I have not put the finishing touches to any of this, so I may yet revise it. As for Lame White Man, White Bull, et al, I will have to let you guys hammer that out. I have read virtually nothing of what they had to say; certainly not first-hand stuff. (It's all been filtered through Greg Michno's work.) So, I will have to go back over that stuff more carefully. I hope that picture helps. Best wishes, Fred. Hey Fred. I would be curious to know what has led you to believe that Keogh's battalion was being finished off while Custer waited on the north slope of Cemetery Ridge after his return from his foray to the north ford? I don't see that at all. It appears to me that upon Custer's return to LSH, Keogh's battalion was still operational, as Custer had deployed both F and E Co's. on the western side of LSH, along with most of the horses. Had Keogh aready been wiped out, I think we would have seen more horse barricades thrown up on the eastern slope of LSH along with a deployment of troops facing the threat from the SE. As it was, only a half dozen sorrels from C Co. were found shot down and covering the approach from the east and south at the top of the hill. This would indicate to me that Custer had already returned to LSH, dismounted and taken up a position on the western slopes before the demise of the Keogh battalion. The 10 or 20 survivors of Keogh's battalion then made their way to the temporary haven of LSH. Custer must have been counting on Keogh to cover the eastern approach to LSH, or perhaps even ordered Keogh to pull back and join him there in a defensive stand.
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Post by fred on Dec 6, 2007 3:55:21 GMT -6
Bill--
I yield there.
Probably a bad choice of words or not enough thought. I think your timing is right. I just have not done enough work or given enough thought to that latter part of the battle. Sorry.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on Dec 6, 2007 8:06:25 GMT -6
Can I just ask you lads some questions. Was Custer in control during the battle? Was the positioning of the different troops his work? Was the battle a running battle or fought on foot? How much time had Custer got between the beginning of the Indian attack and the collision of the two forces? Why did Benteen's system succeed while Custer's resulted in a shambles?
Just one observation in relation to the suggestion that the Indians used the terrain to their advantage.Because of the disparity in numbers that battlefield was as flat as a snooker table.
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Post by conz on Dec 6, 2007 13:57:19 GMT -6
Remember, Custer was alleged to have stopped for an extended period of time (about 20 min.) just north of the present Stone House beyond the National Cemetery. There would have been plenty of time for CH to cross this area unopposed to reach East Ridge. Isn't that house within site of Custer Hill? I wish we could stand over a map together...I really can't see many places Custer and Yates' squadron could have gone to the north where either they wouldn't see a couple hundred Sioux/Cheyenne natives chase Crazy Horse around the NORTH side of Custer Hill, or that those same Natives couldn't see Custer's column of 100 or so men lower in the valley to their NW. Yates would have had to travel quite some distance away...and sit there for 20 min?! for that to be able to happen, I think. Good excuse for you to come to Kentucky and show me on my maps. <g> I do believe it was simultaneous, but not by coincidence at all...they were all triggered by C Co's move down toward GGR...that is in perfect consonance with how Native tactics work: they see an opportunity to get close by a gap in their enemy's firepower. I think Crazy Horse went one way (due east), and Lame White Man and others went another (south/southeast). White Bull, of course, did not approach the field as most believe Crazy Horse did...he was on Wier hill area after the Reno fight and went up the east bank, following Custer's trail... ""After soldiers stopped on hill, a bunch of Indians stopped on side of hill, and White Bull stopped there. From where we were standing on side of hill we saw another troops moving from the east toward the north, to where the fleeing camp was moving, and we charged; it was Custer. We went down the east side of the river and we rode straight to Custer. It was three miles from where we left Reno to Custer." – White Bull Do you think Crazy Horse arrived at the Custer field from along the bluffs on Custer's trail? I don't believe Crazy Horse could have crossed Battle Ridge if Calhoun had already repulsed LWM. I think Calhoun needed to be engaged with LWM for CH's mounted men to make it successfully over the ridge into I Co's area. LWM was killed himself while crossing Battle Ridge, right? The problems I see with this model are: - If there was a platoon defending Battle Ridge to the west, I don't think any Natives could have charged up Deep Ravine or Calhoun Coulee. Yet there exists too much evidence that says they did just that...under the noses of carbines on the ridge? I doubt it. - If I Co had a platoon facing east, CH could not have charged them from that direction...the carbines would have shot them down like they did everywhere else. So both ways, I don't see how CH gets to I Co if they have skirmish lines facing a couple ways, and I don't see how Co L falls apart if I Co is overwatching the Deep Ravine approach. I wouldn't say that L Co rescued or provided sanctuary for an C Co Troopers...rather it was the collapse of C Co that doomed L Co, and L Co's fires were made much less effective because of the C Troopers running towards them, intermingled with hundreds of Warriors. Your scenario has Deep Ravine being left uncovered because your I Co platoon moved back east to counter Crazy Horse, who had gotten there by moving between Custer Hill and Yates' squadron. Would they have left that position while trying to cover C Co's retreat? Probably not...they would have been too busy, and the Natives were nearing their position anyway, chasing C Co....the Natives didn't just head for Calhoun Hill...many would move towards Battle Ridge as well. So once C Co moves down the ridge, I don't see how any force that was already positioned on Battle Ridge is going to move...they are stuck there for the duration. I also see no evidence of a skirmish line on Battle Ridge...and they would have fired a LOT of ammo there...it was a "target rich" environment into Deep Ravine/Calhoun Coulee once LWM & Co assaulted C Co. I think the evidence is stronger for nobody on Battle Ridge...but hey...your model, your call! <g> I do agree with this completely, adding the caveat that Lame White Man's horde, moving around Calhoun Hill from the northwest like water flowing around a rock, made Calhoun's position quite untenable except as a "last stand," and instead of following that choice, LT Calhoun decided to lead his company towards first Keogh, and then towards Custer's penant and bugler frantically signalling from Custer Hill at this point. Right about here is also when I think E Co made its charge from the cemetery towards Calhoun Hill, intending the west side of Battle Ridge, and "fell and was pushed" into the deep gully. I think Keogh was still alive and fighting when this happened. Clair
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Post by conz on Dec 6, 2007 14:10:46 GMT -6
Can I just ask you lads some questions. My 2 cents... Hmmmm..."in control?" I think he controlled all that he intended to control, and was able to control. Did he do his job, control-wise? I'd say yes. The job of the commander is to place himself where he is most decisively needed. Usually that is where he can get the information required to make critical decisions. In the age before radio, this is quite tricky...you always have trade-offs. Probably not...he probably just told Keogh to "defend this area from this threat." He probably just told Yates' what he wanted done, not telling either man how to deploy their companies, or which companies to use for what tasks...that is up to the squadron commanders. Reno's was running...Custer's was fought on foot in every single close combat event, I think. While some Warriors were mounted (mostly the Crazy Horse charges back and forth through I Co), most Natives fought on foot as well. Hmmm....I don't see any collision anywhere, except for Crazy Horse's leap over Battle Ridge plunk down into I Co, by "mistake." It would take his men about three minutes to get up over that ridge at a fast gallop uphill. Lame White Man's group was almost amongst C Co when they started their "charge." C Co obligingly came to them.... Because attacking is harder than defending, always. I think Custer's battalion would have fared as well as Reno's if C Co hadn't moved down off Battle Ridge. Don't understand this comment. Had the whole battlefield been out on an open plain, no 2,500 Indians would have gotten within 200 yards of any 200 Cavalry troopers. Clair
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 6, 2007 18:47:05 GMT -6
Can I just ask you lads some questions. Was Custer in control during the battle? According to my view of the battle. yes he was. However, it is important to remember that Custer oversaw the actions of two independently operating battalions, not one battalion of 5 companies. I concur with Clair here in that Custer ordered Keogh to hold his position while he accompanied Yates' battalion to the north ford. It was up to Keogh to deploy his forces to accomplish his mission. Same goes for Yates tho for a lesser extent, as Custer had a tendency (as I see it) to take direct control of this battalion as his HQ was attached to it. Most of the action was fought on foot. Unlike many of the early scenarios of yesteryear, I do not see much of a running fight, unless you want to consider the retreat of C Co. to Keogh's position (or the retreat of I Co.'s 2nd platoon to LSH) as a running fight. I don't understand this question. You mean the time from when the 1st shots were fired at MTF or Blummer Ridge and the final stands of Keogh and Custer? If this is your question, the opening skirmish fire of the Custer command started while Reno was still in the timber position well before 4:00 pm and would have continued at long range until LWM's charge that shattered C Co. which would have occurred (in my view) no earlier than 5:20 pm. Keogh's command would have made their Last Stand within the next 20 to 30 minutes, while Custer would have his about 30 to 45 minutes later. Benteen's system? It was due more to the fact that Benteen organized a closed perimeter defense around that poorly chosen saucer of a hill. One side was protected nicely by the steep bluffs overlooking the river, while the other sides overlooked a relatively open plains with little cover for the hostiles to hide and creep up thru. The great weakness of this position, of course, was that it was overshadowed by the heights of SSR, which accounted for most of Benteen's casualties. Unlike Custer, Benteen was in pure defensive mode and despite being outnumbered nearly as great as Custer, the hostiles would not consider exposing themselves to an open mounted charge over an open prairie that would result in massive casualties. Custer's mistake? His gamble to the north ford, which gained him nothing and further split his command. Keogh's mistake? sending C Co. down to drive the hostiles out of Calhoun Coulee and Deep Ravine. Had both battalions stayed together in pure defensive mode, things would have turned out differently in my view. I understand your thoughts here Wild, but keep in mind, the great disparity in numbers did them no good against Benteen's forces later that day and the next. Neither did it do much good at the Wagon Box fight or at Beecher Island. Terrain does matter a great deal in these battles. Far much more than simple numbers would dictate.
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Post by wild on Dec 6, 2007 19:01:51 GMT -6
Conz Had the whole battlefield been out on an open plain, no 2,500 Indians would have gotten within 200 yards of any 200 Cavalry troopers Are you saying that a concentration of troops would have kept the Indians at bay?Would Custer have known this?and if so do you not find it strange as to why he dispersed his troops such that at any point on his line the Indians had only 40 carbines at most to contend with.
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 6, 2007 20:03:17 GMT -6
Isn't that house within site of Custer Hill? I wish we could stand over a map together...I really can't see many places Custer and Yates' squadron could have gone to the north where either they wouldn't see a couple hundred Sioux/Cheyenne natives chase Crazy Horse around the NORTH side of Custer Hill, or that those same Natives couldn't see Custer's column of 100 or so men lower in the valley to their NW. Yates would have had to travel quite some distance away...and sit there for 20 min?! for that to be able to happen, I think. This entails a more detailed study of what actually happened during Custer's foray to the north ford. If E Co. actually went as far as the Willy Bend's place on the river (ford D-2), this would have given Crazy Horse plenty of time to cross on the north side of LSH without ever having a glimpse of the Custer/Yates battalion. The distance was close to 2 miles. I personally believe that there was an engagement down by the closer ford (D-1) which resulted in the death of the jounalist and the Sgt. Major, followed by a slow retreat, possilby dismounted, to the north edge of Cemetery Ridge (near the Stone House) where they remained for an extended period of time (about 20 minutes). Crazy Horse would have moved behind LSH to reach the East Ridge while Custer was still down on the flats and well out of view. I would love very much to come down for a visit. Especially since Louisville was like a 2nd home to Myles Keogh. One of Keogh's best friends (a doctor) lived in Louisville and would often write up medical excuses to extend Keogh's leave on several occasions. Perhaps elisabeth knows more of this good gentleman and where he might have lived. Of course, I would also be more than happy to meet with you here in NYC should you ever have cause to come here. Fred should be coming up some time this month or next. Its possible, but keep something in mind. If perchance, Keogh's company is attacked down in the swale at the same time that C Co. is routed by LWM's charge, then the panicked troopers fleeing the carnage would of necessity have stopped upon reaching Calhoun Hill and not continued on up and over into the bloody maelstom swirling about Keogh's swale. Since most of C Co. did not apparently stop upon reaching the safety of Calhoun Hill, but continued on to Keogh's position, it leads me to believe that Keogh's position had not yet come under attack. Had C and I been attacked simultaneously, then in all likelihood, we would have seen the survivors of both companies making an attempt to reach the safety of the Calhoun position, rather than LSH. Its possible that it occurred this way, but then I would think more native accounts would have linked Crazy Horses attack alongside of Lame White Man's. But none of them really did. It was always described as LWM's charge, not LWM and CH. Yes, I am in agreement with you on this. Yes, White Bull left the Reno fight via Weir Point and then down across Blummer Ridge then east of Calhoun Hill to a position on the reverse slope of East Ridge overlooking the Keogh sector. No. I think Crazy Horse and his followers crossed at Deep Ravine ford and cut straight east up towards LSH, then swung to the north of LSH and cut down into the ravine/swale behind it and well north of I Co.'s position, then continued on over East Ridge until he met up with White Bull overlooking the Keogh sector down below. This would be true if Crazy Horse charged into Keogh's rear from the west (from Deep Ravine), however, if my theory of his movements are correct, then he would have crossed battle Ridge nearly 3/4 of a mile north of Calhoun Hill. Yes, and from position of his death marker, he appears well out of sight from any firing position on Calhoun Hill to have caused his death, especially moving in a mounted charge on a horse. The only likely place for him to have been shot down from would be directly to his front, a stone's throw from the top of Battle Ridge and nearly directly opposite from Keogh's position. Under ordinary circumstances, I would agree with you here. However, the close proximity of the dismounted C Co. troopers was too great a temptation for the hostiles to resist. When LWM led his charge (mounted) out of the depths of Deep Ravine, they were only looking at shattering the nearby troopers by GGR. I don't think they gave much thought at all to the newly posted platoon atop Battle Ridge over 1/3 mile away (if they even saw them with all the smoke). But I do agree with you that the native charge would have been thwarted by a skirmish line facing west on Battle Ridge, and I do believe that occurred....and that it caused the death of LWM and the other native casualties found just below that position on the ridge. In my model, I Co. did not have a skirmish line facing east. Their led horses were being held near the bottom of the swale while I Co.'s 2nd platoon remained mounted nearby in reserve. I do think that Keogh would have deployed about 2 squads (8 men) of dismounted skirmishers to return and suppress fire from the Eastern Ridge, and for a while would have kept the natives from closing in from that direction. What changed everything, in my version, is the sudden arrival of C Co. retreating in panic into the swale by the led horses. During this time of confusion, 1st platoon and Keogh himself would have been occupied on the western slope of Battle Ridge repelling LWM's charge, just as Calhoun's skirmish line swung west to do the same. While this confusion and action was taking place, it gave an opportunity for Crazy Horse and White Bull, looking down into the confusion going on below and realizing that both Calhoun and Keogh's 1st platoon were heavily engaged in repelling the mounted attack by LWM, to charge down into the swale for their bravery runs and a subsequent attempt to capture the led horses.
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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 6, 2007 20:09:53 GMT -6
Conz Had the whole battlefield been out on an open plain, no 2,500 Indians would have gotten within 200 yards of any 200 Cavalry troopersAre you saying that a concentration of troops would have kept the Indians at bay?Would Custer have known this?and if so do you not find it strange as to why he dispersed his troops such that at any point on his line the Indians had only 40 carbines at most to contend with. I would agree that a concentration of troops would have kept the Indians at bay (pretty much as we saw happen on Reno Hill), and of course Custer would have known this, however, it is important to realize that it was never Custer's intention to keep the Indians at bay. Custer was doing all he could to win this battle, which is why he made the mistake of dispersing his troops in an attempt to strike the Indians from multiple locations. Unlike Reno and Benteen, Custer was not thinking defensively at this battle until it was too late to do otherwise. I don't think he ever realized that would be forced to fight it out with only 5 companies out of 12.
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Post by conz on Dec 7, 2007 8:18:34 GMT -6
Conz Had the whole battlefield been out on an open plain, no 2,500 Indians would have gotten within 200 yards of any 200 Cavalry troopersAre you saying that a concentration of troops would have kept the Indians at bay?Would Custer have known this?and if so do you not find it strange as to why he dispersed his troops such that at any point on his line the Indians had only 40 carbines at most to contend with. It was not Custer's job to defend himself, remember. His job was to ATTACK the Natives, and kill enough of them to force them to surrender to the reservations. Custer's mistake was to not see that his mission was botched (by Reno, in my judgment), so he should have called it off, rallied his regiment for defense, and tried again another day. But Custer, like most West Pointers, and most cavalry officers, was not about to give up on a mission easily. So he waited just a few minutes too long to give up on his mission, and that allowed a tactical mistake to be made in his 'hasty defense' on Calhoun Hill that resulted in the destruction of his command. To both fail your mission, AND lose so much of your command, is a great sin. For this Custer is to be condemned...and he is in military instruction. It is a great example of carrying boldness and gambling to excess...but only SLIGHT excess, mind you. The Army still wants bold and gambling officers...we just want them to WIN when they do it. <g> That is what makes LBH such a great discussion for young and old professional Soldiers. Clair
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Post by elisabeth on Dec 7, 2007 10:16:08 GMT -6
keogh,
For your Louisville trip: Dr. Ouchterlony's address was 215 Fourth Street. I think it's still there. I'm sure I came across a website once that said it was open to the public as a museum -- but I've never been able to re-find it since, so who knows. Keogh also stayed at the Galt House on occasion, at least during the war if not after. That's been rebuilt as a modern glass block now, however, so may not seem so much like hallowed ground.
You mentioned earlier that the Co. C foray was a tactical mistake, and I'd love to see more discussion of this. If it all happened as per current theory, it certainly turned out disastrously. (I say "if" because it's a comparatively recent entry into the canon.) Was it an error in its conception, though? Or only in its execution? We see Benteen doing much the same sort of thing on Reno Hill with great success: a sudden charge that repulses warriors who are getting too close. So was it (a) a dumb idea from the start? (b) something that should have worked, but was loused up by whoever led it (e.g. Harrington, or one of the NCOs)? or (c) something that should have worked but for the unfortunate arrival of LWM?
And if (c), was this foreseeable? Or do we have to assume that LWM and force were too well concealed to be a factor in its planning? If the former, it's a mistake; if the latter, it's less error than bad luck. In a way, it's immaterial, but it perhaps goes to assessing whether command was calm and competent at that point or not.
Re the bravery runs: there are accounts (I think White Bull himself says this) of soldiers trying extremely hard to shoot him, but missing. This means that wherever we think these took place, there were soldiers stationed to fire in that direction. (Which is logical anyway: no point in a bravery run against no opposition.) Seems likely -- I think -- that there were squads or platoons covering all directions.
And, re physical evidence on Battle Ridge: yes, the road would account for a lot. But also ... this could well have been the most heavily scavenged area on the day. It was hand-to-hand fighting, thus in the Indians' view the site of the "real" fighting; more of Keogh's possessions were recovered later than of anyone else's, implying that Indians had ample leisure there; if our understanding of the flow of battle is correct, some time elapsed between the end of Keogh's battalion and (a) the end of the LSH contingent, (b) any reaction to the Weir Point advance. So it could be that if there was any point on the field where spent cartridges were going to be policed up for re-use, this would be it. Unlikely indeed that lack of physical evidence is conclusive.
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