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Post by mwkeogh on Dec 6, 2007 22:07:59 GMT -6
DeRudio and Varnum are the only unbaised ones on this list. And McDougal didn't comment on whether Reno should have stayed in the woods...I would take his word, too. But Gen'l Godfrey is the most important opinion of all... Clair-- I think it's late in the afternoon and you have had one sour mash too many. DeRudio, not biased? He couldn't stand Reno. LT Mathey was recalled to testify on Friday, February 7, 1879. He was asked to repeat some conversations he had with other officers about the fighting in the timber. He said one officer had remarked, “If we had not been commanded by a coward we would have been killed.” [551] When asked to state who it was, Mathey replied, LT DeRudio said it in the summer of 1878. [552] Here is a note I made when I read DeRudio's testimony at the RCOI. As far as I can recall, it is the only note of its type I made: "NOTE—It is clear from the testimony that there was a considerable amount of antagonism between DeRudio and Reno’s counsel." That translated directly to DeRudio's feelings about Reno. And despite Benteen's opinion of him, I'm not so sure I am all that ready to discount Myles Moylan, either. And McDougall and Godfrey weren't there, so their opinions are not a whole hell of a lot better than yours or mine. And what about Hare and Wallace? As far as I know, no one ever said a bad word about either of those two except Jack Pennington, and Pennington doesn't say anything nice about anyone. You count DeRudio as unbiased and Hare biased? Put the cork back in, Clair. Best wishes, Fred. But to be fair Fred, Benteen was not there in the timber either. In any case, Edgerly also claimed to have overheard a conversation between Benteen and Weir at the LBH where both expressed the opinion that Reno's biggest mistake was in leaving the timber. Edgerly felt the same way in a private letter he sent years after the battle. As far as the testimony given at the RCOI, we should also add the views of the two men who had the greatest experience in fighting Indians: Girard and Herendeen. Both felt the Reno should have remained in the timber and could have been defended for many hours. Even Benteen, at the RCOI, claimed the position could have been held for 5 or 6 hours. And we also know that Captain French regretted not putting a bullet into Reno had he known he was about to abandon the timber position. (DeRudio's alleged comment is kind of funny in a way. I think he might have said this in jest.) |
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Post by fred on Dec 7, 2007 7:10:57 GMT -6
But to be fair Fred, Benteen was not there in the timber either.... As far as the testimony given at the RCOI, we should also add the views of the two men who had the greatest experience in fighting Indians: Girard and Herendeen. Both felt the Reno should have remained in the timber and could have been defended for many hours. Even Benteen, at the RCOI, claimed the position could have been held for 5 or 6 hours. And we also know that Captain French regretted not putting a bullet into Reno had he known he was about to abandon the timber position. No, you are right about Benteen, but I put it up there because of who he was, more than anything else. I also think you may be overstating the business with Tom French. I think French's comments pertained more to Reno's overall performance and the way he left the timber, rather than the fact he did leave the woods. Or am I wrong there? As for Gerard and Herendeen, I rather discount them here because they were not military men, per se. That's not a "shot" at them, but someone brought up an interesting point somewhere on these threads, that civilians don't necessarily see a situation in the same way a military officer views it. A civilian is more likely to think of a one-on-one or a two-man "show," while an army officer looks more toward maintaining cohesion. That's an important distinction and it is part of training that a civilian doesn't go through. It's certainly not a knock on civilians, not at all, it's just a different mind-set. From what I read about the description of these particular woods, i.e., Michael Sheridan, John Gibbon, LT Maguire, Doc Porter, and many of the battle participants, this timber was not easily defensible by a larger group of people. It also helps explain why small pockets of men, e.g., Herendeen's group, were able to evade or escape the encroaching warriors. It was dense. Maybe too dense. That leads to separation: think of a 40-man organization; that leads to lack of, or loss of, communications. That's when a military unit ceases to act as it was designed to act. As for DeRudio's comment... you may be right as well. But remember the old saw: where there's smoke, there's... [DeRudio]. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by conz on Dec 7, 2007 7:52:32 GMT -6
Fred,
As far as what opinions are most valid concerning the proper military theory to use here, the guilt-ridden survivors of Reno's command may not be the best authorities for determining whether Reno should have stayed in the timber, or left. They left, so they had made their decision...they followed Reno. For them to admit otherwise would taint both them, their self-respect, and their command. To say it was wrong was to further burden them with the destruction of Custer's battalion, much moreso the deaths of their own men running from the timber. You think any of these officers had an unbiased view of that decision, and took "military theory" into much account when they testified in court?
I find it FAR more credible when any one of these guys goes against that pressure, and says that Reno should, or even could, have stayed in the timber. And one who would say that probably WOULD be very antagonistic towards Reno, don't you think?
I'm most proud of the men who testified against Reno and his battalion of the 7th CAV, officer and enlisted (several veteran NCOs condemned Reno as well, right?).
I think Gen'l Godfrey has an excellent reputation within the Army for his tactical eye and judgment on theory, so that is why I believe him the most. He was close enough to know the action, but far enough removed not to be caught up in any guilt complex over the timber question.
But as I said, officers did come down on both sides of this issue, so I think any choice we make today has enough footing to be cogent.
Clair
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Post by fred on Dec 7, 2007 8:46:03 GMT -6
Clair--
This event is like these boards. The participants in the battle are like participants on these boards and I think you make the same mistake: over-analyzing. The facts are simple because they are just that, facts. Not many people liked Reno very much. He was a changed man, embittered, unhappy, and probably very much displeased with life once his wife died. He was an average joe, trying to be seen amongst the "towering trees" of reputation in the post-Civil War era (sorry for the metaphor). It's that simple. He was liked by some, he was disliked by others, but mostly, he was not even thought of.
The officers in the regiment told the truth, for the most part. And what was fudged was fudged out of respect for... whatever... and out of not a little pity and empathy for the man. It's no more than that. If any slack was given, it was because these guys realized two things: (1) they were alive "this" day because of Reno, however he may be criticized. If he had stayed in the woods, they would have all died. On the 25th or on the 26th, machte nichts. Benteen may have moved on to help a dead Custer and himself have been chased all over hell's half-acre. And, (2) Reno was human, he was decent, he was one of them. That alone deserved a little leeway. You would do it, I would do it, anyone here would do it. ... Well, almost anyone. It's called compassion and even men like French and Benteen had it. Ask one of the women on this site. They have it in abundance; that's why women are better than men in almost everything.
As for Godfrey, please, I respect him and like him as much as the next guy, but don't lionize him. He didn't do any more than anyone else there and he never proved to be half the soldier Benteen was, general or no general. "Generals" don't impress me. I saw too many of them in Vietnam and I see too many of the idiots in Iraq (e.g., Sanchez, Franks, and that National Guard bimbo involved at Abu Ghraib). I also see too many of the good ones cashiered (e.g., Taguba, Shinseki).
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by wild on Dec 7, 2007 9:35:44 GMT -6
Reno command firing 2 rounds per man per minute has less than 60 minutes life expectancy.
The timber fragments his command and blocks his view and inhibits his control.
The failure of any section of his line will result in the entire position being compromised.
And was the timber not fired?
There was nothing to be achieved by remaining and his only obligation was to save he lives of his men.And how he did that is entirely his call
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Post by conz on Dec 7, 2007 9:37:30 GMT -6
This event is like these boards. The participants in the battle are like participants on these boards and I think you make the same mistake: over-analyzing. The facts are simple because they are just that, facts. Not many people liked Reno very much. He was a changed man, embittered, unhappy, and probably very much displeased with life once his wife died. He was an average joe, trying to be seen amongst the "towering trees" of reputation in the post-Civil War era (sorry for the metaphor). It's that simple. He was liked by some, he was disliked by others, but mostly, he was not even thought of. Yeah...I like that. Like MOST of us officers, except that most of us are well-liked by our peers at least, even if (and maybe partially because) we don't tower above them. <g> Oh, I certainly believe that they told the truth as they judged it. I was just commenting upon WHY they believed what they did. I'm not one of those who cast many aspersions on officer's testimony at the RCOI...the "facts" are different from the "opinions" of the various officers, and why those opinions may have existed. The question here, I think, is which opinions WE should judge as being the most credible, and worthy of teaching the next generation... Agree on both accounts. <g> But my focus is on lessons learned for the future, you understand...not being fair or compassionate. I guess that's why even though my name is Clair, I'm not a woman. <r,d & g> Gotcha. Here's a bit on Godfrey: Born at Kalida, Ohio, October 9, 1843, he served as a Private, Company D, 21st Ohio Volunteer Infantry from April 12, 1861. He subsequently entered West Point and graduated in the Class of 1867. He was commissioned Second Lieutenant, 7th United States Cavalry, June 17, 1867 and was promoted through the grades to Brigadier General, January 17, 1907. He was breveted Major, February 27, 1890, and awarded the Medal of Honor for "most distinguished gallantry" at Bear Paw Mountain against Chief Joseph and the Nez Perce Indians, September 30, 1877. He served in all the campaigns and Indian fights of his regiment, under Lieutenant Colonel (Brevet Major General) George A. Custer, until Custer's death. He originated the Cossack and Rough Riding maneuvers for the Army Cavalry and was a member of the Board which devised drill regulations for Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry for the Army. He served in Cuba during the Spanish-American War and in the Philippines during the Insurrection there. He was retired by operation of law on October 9, 1907. He was also Senior Vice Commander in Chief of the Loyal Legion of the United States and was a 32 degree Mason. He was the author of "Cavalry Fire Disciplines," "Custer's Last Battle," "Some Reminiscences, Including An Account of General Sully's Campaign Against The Southern Plains Indians," "Some Reminiscences Including The Washita Battle of November 26, 1868." He died on April 1, 1932 and was buried in Section 3 of Arlington National Cemetery. His second wife, Ida D. Emely Godfrey (1856-1941), whom he married on October 6, 1892, is buried with him. Clair |
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Post by fred on Dec 7, 2007 9:57:42 GMT -6
Like MOST of us officers, except that most of us are well-liked by our peers at least, even if (and maybe partially because) we don't tower above them. <g> And Clair, I agree with you about Godfrey. I think he was a fine, up-standing man and officer. We all seem to have our favorites in this affair, and Godfrey is one of mine. I believe he was courageous and competent. (Plus, he left behind a lot of good reading material.) He is among my favorites: Harrington, Benteen, Varnum, and Hare, especially. I just don't think he should be believed above everyone else. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by shan on Dec 7, 2007 10:38:38 GMT -6
Conz
I tend to agree with Fred on this. Your posts are interesting, but you seem to view everything and everybody as if they straight out of some military manuel. To me your soldiers seem to be automatons that have no other thoughts and feelings other than obey orders. Apart from the fact we are talking about men living in another century, men with very different ideas about sacrifice, the army, and indeed about the country they were serving.
Are you telling me that men don't panic today? Okay, maybe we have no contempory stories of men surrounded and massacred to refer to as examples, but it seems to me there are plenty of stories of men shooting and killing people who obviously didn't merit killing, purely because they panicked.
Although I have no military experience I've known a number of soldiers, amongst them my father and several uncles, and they exhibited all the same foibles and failures as the rest of us, as well as the bravery which so concerns you. Why do some people on the board have such an abhorrence of the word panic when it comes to this battle? No ones saying that every man jack was afflicted in this way, but to deny that there were a number that were, seems to me to deny human nature.
Likewise this constant picking over every word that anyone involved in the battle had to say. If they deviate even slightly from what was said weeks, months, even years before, we pounch on them and infer that the man must be lying. Just think about ones own behavior for a minute, even when writing on this board. We tend to pick and choose what we say according to whom we're talking to. With some people we say exactly what we think, with others we hedge our bets. Others still cause us to deny what we know, and yet others somehow draw us into becoming boastful or maybe cause us to lie. How does one pick the truth out of all this? Well, given that we can never meet these people face to face, all we can do is read between the lines.
Given that, why so many people want to return again and again to what Reno or Benteen said, as if there is one gleaming kernel of truth hidden away amongst the words, is a mystery to me. They said what they said at the moment they said it. It may or may not have been the truth, but equally, it may have been said as a piece of pure theatre. Whichever it was, all we have the words on the page, written words without any sly inflections, wry grins or winks to give us a clue.
In some ways feel the same about the constant need to fix where each company was at any given moment in time. Firstly, Custer seems to be a man who made things up as he went along, a man not terrible fixated in doing things by the book. But more importantly, this was a fluid situation that deteriorated on several fronts, almost all of them at the same time. How much going by the manual was there when Reno decided to leave the timber? Towards the end of the Custer fight much the same must have applied to Custers force.
This is a guessing game we all enjoy, but in the end, all we can go on is the placement of the bodies and the Indian testimony, which you believe or not according to your whim.
Shan
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dcary
Junior Member
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Post by dcary on Dec 7, 2007 12:38:39 GMT -6
My feeling has been that Reno’s retreat – for whatever reasons or combination of reasons it was done -- was not a wrong action, but was certainly not carried out well. Which resulted, in all probability, in more casualties that might otherwise have been taken. This is nothing new.
But I severely question how long Reno could have held out in the timber. 100 rounds of carbine and 24 of revolver ammo was all they had at the max – and although one participant felt they had enough for 4-6 hours, why then did a different one (I think Wallace) say he remembered the skirmish line sending back for the reserve ammo? And why, when the Benteen-Reno junction was made, did many of Benteen’s men share their ammo with Reno’s because they were quite low? In the “4-6 hours” scenario, one has to allow for the fact that they needed to conserve ammo for a possible breakout and that this severely shortens how much you can use to stay in the same place. You can’t fire it all off and expect to get out alive.
I realize that different men will fire faster than others, that some ammo was probably lost in the retreat, etc. This means, I think, one can’t take any one participant’s word for how much was left overall. Or how long Reno could have held out.
I don’t know how the Army determined how much ammo the expedition was to take along, but the packtrain, it should be noted, carried no Mother Lode of resupply – only about half again as much as the troops carried themselves. I think this is a really cheesy amount since the seventh were venturing quite a ways from its own resupply.
The Indians as it was besieged the Reno-Benteen position for a full day, although there appears to be a gap from the end of the retreat until the retreat from Weir Point. Had Reno stayed in the timber, I feel sure the Indians would have besieged him after GAC was wiped out. 4-6 hours is not 24 and he would certainly have run out of ammo.
He would have been besieged because he was so close to the village.
And Benteen would have to pull it all out of the fire in a maneuver known to be quite difficult, “sortie to relief.”
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Post by fred on Dec 7, 2007 12:42:24 GMT -6
Shan--
Beautifully, beautifully said. One of the best posts I have ever read on these boards.
I completely concur and can only add, that is why I have been so insistent upon emphasizing "context" when reading something like the RCOI. Almost any piece taken out of the whole, loses some of its force and its import. It is also why I am so insistent when I talk about "flow" and "simplicity." The key word, if I had to choose one word for this entire event, is "fluid." The whole day's worth of actions were driven off that one word and when you have that type of situation, the simplicity and the flow of events are generally pretty linear. (And I don't mean physically linear, either.)
The emotions of 1876 were no different than they are today, so you have caught that thunder, as well. The more I read over time, the more I realized that Indians are no more heroic than anyone else; nor are they any less. Maybe they were driven more because of their environment-- which is always the key shaper, in my opinion-- but their heroism stood no taller than the white man's. Their caution during this battle echoes the actions of so many soldiers. The only real difference was that the Indians held certain advantages that allowed them to appear more heroic or more determined and the scales tipped in their favor. And make no bones about it, it is all environment. I say this all the time when I talk to friends about Vietnam or Iraq: you cannot make a fifth-generation soldier out of a first-generation fighter. That's environment, and while that specific analogy doesn't apply to the LBH, its genesis does.
Panic is always a dirty word when discussing military affairs or events. It tends to denote cowardice, though in reality, the two are as different as man and woman. Soldiers do not like to hear things like that, for once impugned, the stain is never fully washed away, and so it is avoided. It was my biggest fear the first time I set foot in Vietnam. I was more afraid of myself than I was of the VC or the NVA. Fortunately, things worked out for me and I learned more about myself in less than a year there, then I had before, or have since. I look at myself today and I hope I have the character now that I had then. I surround myself with pictures of those days and whenever things are going badly, I glance at them and realize what I had been through. They tell me what I am. Sometimes, we view that as weakness, but it is within all of us, and I am sure it was in those men of 1876, the survivors and those who were not as fortunate.
I don't see any of the leading figures as bad men or men who tried to lie, tried to cover the truth. I see them only as humans who tried to remember and at the same time tried to forget. It was the Whittakers and the Libbies and the media, the Camps, the Grahams... and even us... who wouldn't allow them that small pleasure. We made them into more than they really were-- just simple men, simple soldiers, men just like us, no different, and now we condemn some, for being just like we are. We condemn some because we can still dream.
Shan, I cannot get over it. Beautifully done. My hat is off to you.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by conz on Dec 7, 2007 13:10:15 GMT -6
I tend to agree with Fred on this. Your posts are interesting, but you seem to view everything and everybody as if they straight out of some military manuel. To me your soldiers seem to be automatons that have no other thoughts and feelings other than obey orders. Apart from the fact we are talking about men living in another century, men with very different ideas about sacrifice, the army, and indeed about the country they were serving. Sure...although I'm not sure Fred is going as far as you go here. But true...I'm more interested in the teaching points than understanding the emotional traumas of our subjects. One goal of military instruction is to teach what is right in spite of any emotions or personalities involved. That never works out in real life, and we don't expect it to, but we do expect all Soldiers, officers and enlisted alike, to know the standards they will be held up against. Even if that is difficult to "humanly" achieve. Oh, we panic plenty today...in equal proportion, I think, to the Soldiers of that day...no more and no less. And 95% of the men are scared...being scared is not a problem as long as all do their jobs. But "panic" is a much more insidious condition that the military is quick to jump on and try to stamp out. Preventing it is one of the most important jobs of the professional NCO and officers, and they do it very well. Panic does happen, but it is not "automatic," and shouldn't be assumed. So if we think there are signs of panic here, we should identify them and dissect it, like a professional. We can't and shouldn't assume there was any panic. Being scared is normal...panicking is abnormal and doesn't happen THAT often. You don't hear that many stories about panic. Plenty about being scared, but shaking it off and still doing the right thing. Sometimes a vet will admit that he "panicked" for a short time, then got his wits and went on with his duty. After an initial such episode, it won't happen to that individual as often. That's why combat veterans don't often panic, personally. Once you "see the Elephant" as they say, you learn to deal with that personal trauma. A Soldier who repeatedly panics after his first experience, though, is in for a lot of trouble from his mess mates and NCOs. Yes...I think we always need to take this into consideration, for American and Native witnesses/interpreters. Well...I think words are important. If one set of statements seems to be contrary in some way to a later set of statements, that means something. We can't always know why, but I believe that there is a REASON for every little word people say, whether they know it or not. Any psychologists out there? <g> To be sure. In the absence of other evidence though, we rely on models of how things "normally" or are "supposed" to happen. That is rather how a combat unit fights, anyway...they do things the way they are trained, and tend towards the same habits each time barring something to force them into a different mode. Yes, but it is amazing how much we CAN fairly rely upon because there are simply not many different ways it could go down. Not in the exact placement of the companies, of course, but we have them fairly well confined in a limited space, and have the U.S. casualties fairly well pinned down for a big battle. We even still have that little scrap of paper Cooke wrote Custer's note on to Benteen! Some things you just can't make up....<g> If we didn't have that paper, nobody would believe that note, eh? Clair |
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Post by fred on Dec 7, 2007 14:59:12 GMT -6
My feeling has been that Reno’s retreat – for whatever reasons or combination of reasons it was done -- was not a wrong action, but was certainly not carried out well. Which resulted, in all probability, in more casualties that might otherwise have been taken. This is nothing new. But I severely question how long Reno could have held out in the timber. 100 rounds of carbine and 24 of revolver ammo was all they had at the max... I completely concur. When you add to that the fact there were reports of Indians firing the brush as well as Indians infiltrating the timber-- after all, Bloody Knife got hit while they were in the middle of the glade and I seriously doubt it was a stray shot!-- it was time to leave. If you wanted a fiasco, picture this: Custer downstream, Reno in the timber, and Benteen sitting on Reno Hill, with the dust cloud from the packs about a mile or two in the distance. A trail clearly leads north, there are clearly troops in the woods in the valley (surrounded by redmen)... now what? And "dcary": very nice post. Best wishes, Fred. |
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Post by wild on Dec 7, 2007 16:25:33 GMT -6
My feeling has been that Reno’s retreat – for whatever reasons or combination of reasons it was done -- was not a wrong action, but was certainly not carried out well. Which resulted, in all probability, in more casualties that might otherwise have been taken. This is nothing new.
There are times when anything other than taking to your heels is a waste of time.
Nothing was going to give those troopers a chance except headlong flight.
Would this action result in panic ?most certainly.
Organisation was going to waste time ,rearguards were going to get the chop and a column was only going to move as fast as the weakest horses.It was everyman for himself and survival of the fittest.Not pretty,no paintings in the officers mess but a lot more men would live to fight another day
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Post by mcaryf on Dec 7, 2007 18:12:25 GMT -6
I am somewhat ambivalent about Reno's move from the timber. I would quite like to criticise him and say it was not well done but I am reluctant to do so because I am not sure that any better outcome would automatically result.
It is undoubtedly true that quite a few men were left in the timber because Reno failed to have a trumpeter sound some sort of order. However, could I put my hand on my heart and say that more of those who were left would have survived? In practice a fair number seem to get to safety later that day and some on a subsequent day. If they had joined the mayhem at the river would that have been a better or worse opportunity to survive?
Equally the "charge" was somewhat chaotic but DC keeps asking for a better formation and no-one gives him one, indeed the all enveloping dust was probably the best defence for the troops further back in the column. The river crossing was not well covered but there were already warriors on the right bank and up the bluffs who needed to be dislodged urgently so a pause at the river could have been fatal.
I am sure Reno did not plan for all these beneficial effects but what he provided was a pretty quick decision from which some of these benefits directly flowed.
Some will disagree with me but personally I think Custer was pretty well doomed by his own decision to go so far North and after that it made little difference what Reno did. However, with respect to Benteen and the pack train I beleive Reno's actions resulted in a very much more posaitive outcome. Thus overall I did not much like what Reno did and I do suspect that he did panic but the outcome did result in a better overall result for the army.
Regards
Mike
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Post by fred on Dec 7, 2007 19:05:02 GMT -6
Mike--
I think your assessment sums it up perfectly.
Best wishes,
Fred.
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