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Post by fred on Oct 16, 2007 5:54:03 GMT -6
As the column proceeded up the Rosebud, the regiment encountered unmistakable signs of its prey. Some of the men-- Marcus Reno and six companies-- were familiar with what was being seen. That is, until somewhere around 2:30 to 3 p.m., when the column passed the southern-most point reached by Reno's scout. Now it was all new. Camp after camp... a widening trail... signs everywhere, disagreement among the scouts...
Everyone assumed these camps were simply consecutive locations of one village and not possibly separate villages, all ultimately moving in the same southerly direction. Reno worried about this, but apparently was the only one who did.
“The trail in some places was at least 300 yards in width and deeply worn. The scouts said that it had been made by about 1,500 lodges, and since there were doubtless other trails, they agreed that it proved that enormous numbers of Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes had left the agencies to join Sitting Bull. But the officers, misled by the report that there were only five to 800 warriors in the hostile bands, missed the significance of the trail entirely and persisted in believing that these large camps—they were from 1/3 to 1/2 a mile in diameter—were a succession of camps of a single band, rather than what they were, the single camp of several large bands together.” [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 259]
What was the significance of all this? How many Indians were there? And maybe most important of all, how did what these men were seeing tie in with their beliefs and the intelligence reports they had received all year long!
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Post by fred on Oct 16, 2007 5:59:16 GMT -6
“‘Here’s where Reno made the mistake of his life. He had six troops of cavalry and rations enough for a number of days. He’d have made a name for himself if he’d pushed on after them.’” Remark made to Charles Varnum by George Custer. [Varnum in Willert, LBH Diary, p. 227] Benteen said the village was “immense.”
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by crzhrs on Oct 16, 2007 9:33:15 GMT -6
Terry had given Custer his "instructions" with the caveat of doing as he saw fit.
Custer may have felt he had carte blanch to make his own decisions determined by HIM not someone miles away without any knowledge of what was taking place.
Of course Terry had wanted some type of lines of communication opened, thus the instructions of scouting Tullock's Creek and sending Herendeen back with intel.
Custer decides Tullock's Creek is not worth scouting . . . OK . . . however, Terry is waiting for some info . . . any info as to what was going on.
No word was ever sent back to Terry and Custer continues on knowing he was hot on a trail of one of the largest villages ever known on the plains.
He had already refused more men, the gatlings, and believed the 7th was fully capable of dealing with any number of Indians.
It's like when the Ice Cream truck bells go off . . . kids lose their minds and run crazily after it, impervious to the dangers of on-coming traffic.
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Post by elisabeth on Oct 16, 2007 10:14:06 GMT -6
There's a case for it. He'd already given hostages to fortune with his public denunciation of Reno for not striking when he could (which I guess we ought to enter in its due place in the chronology) and before that, outside this time-frame, his scathing stuff about Sully in My Life on the Plains -- marching his troops to the top of the hill and marching them down again. He was committed publicly at this point. (Terry, presumably, could know nothing of his newspaper report about Reno, and thus too little of his mindset.)
Add to that ... Reno's report of around 400 lodges. Consistent with everything they've seen/heard before. Yes, I do think he's misreading the signs. The scouts are telling him otherwise; Benteen claims to have read the signs correctly; other senior officers may have too; but it does look as if he's discounting all that. 400 lodges is still a "big village" by comparison with anything he's ever fought before. Yet it's feasible. If he thought Reno could tackle it with 6 companies, he'd certainly think he could tackle it with 12. It does look rather as if he was dismissing as nay-sayers any who suggested the village could have grown.
If he'd had the 25th to reconnoitre, he might have changed his views. But as of now, thinking he knows what he's up against, it could well be that he feels confident enough to plough ahead and do what he thinks Reno should have done ...
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Post by crzhrs on Oct 16, 2007 15:34:56 GMT -6
After the previous night's officer's call the command headed out. There now seemed to be more of a pall over the command. No more horseplay with among the Custer relatives. The entire command seemed to be silent and was spread out to avoid kicking up too much dust. The command was riding parallel to the Rosebud and following the southbound trail Reno had discovered. Dr. DeWolf wrote: "Find large deserted camps . . . the valley completely barren . . . an enormous number of horses passed about 10-20 days ago.
The command crossed the river and finished the march of June 23 after 33 miles.
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Post by elisabeth on Oct 17, 2007 10:29:03 GMT -6
There's evidence -- inevitably hearsay -- of Custer discounting the numbers they were to face. (Officers' Call, June 22nd, "1500 warriors"; the "damn sight of good to hang you" remark; the "get through them in one day" remark to Bloody Knife.) Agree, we're not at "disobeying orders" yet, if at all. Just trying to chart his mindset. (I think.)
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Post by woggiedoug on Oct 17, 2007 11:52:55 GMT -6
"If he thought Reno could tackle the it with 6 companies, he'd certainly think he could tackle it with 12"
Custer has said publically and in print that a force half the size he commanded should have attacked he's already talked himself into a corner.
If he didn't attack then he'd have been the target for similar criticism.
But on the ground Custer has the chance for fresh information so perhaps the real questions are:
'was Custer open minded enough to listen to the scouts?'
'who within his officers did he listen to and how knowledgeable were they?'
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 17, 2007 14:47:06 GMT -6
There is no doubt that Custer was confident that his Regiment could deal with any force of Indians it came across. In fact all the commanders from Sheridan on down, were confident that any of the column's in the field could handle whatever numbers of Indians they met. so confidence alone cannot be a decisive factor in gauging whether or not Custer had already committed on this day to go it alone. Custer did listen to his scouts but he simply did not share their fears, probably believing that it was a natural fear of their traditional enemies the Sioux. There is no evidence that since his request for suggestions at the June 22nd night camp Custer had sought the opinions of any of his officers. He was much more likely to have asked Boyer or Reynolds for input.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 18, 2007 8:15:49 GMT -6
Horse, my Reply #16 says that Custer would have more likely asked Boyer and Reynolds for 'input'. I specifically did not call it advice because Custer does not appear to have ever asked anyone for advice. The fact that he may have questioned the two named scouts and perhaps Gerard is not to say that he would acknowledge they might be right. Custer was in charge and with his ego had to be seen to be in charge so whatever decisions he made, even if based on their information, would seem as if he alone had deciphered the signs. As I mentioned in the same Reply, I believe that Custer did not share the fears of his Indian scouts about the Sioux/Cheyenne numbers, but he did not want them spooked by Boyer's misgivings, which may account for his shortness with the half-breed.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 18, 2007 8:24:37 GMT -6
clw, I suggest that Custer's predatory instincts were an integral part of his martial character and did not kick in on this day because of the Indian signs. The stalk would therefore logically have started as he left the mouth of the Rosebud. His CW policy had always been to attack, so it would be naive to expect that he adopted any different viewpoint because he was likely to be in a fight with Indian warriors. The issue here is still whether there is any evidence that on this day he was primed to attack at the expense of disobedience. I have not found any.
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Post by crzhrs on Oct 18, 2007 8:44:40 GMT -6
From Godfrey:
June 23: Eight miles out we came to the first of the Indian camping-places. It certainly indicated a large village and numerous population. There were a great many "wickiups" (bushes stuck in the ground with the tops drawn together, over which they placed canvas or blankets). These we supposed at the time were for the dogs, but subsequent events developed the fact that they were temporary shelters of the transients from the agencies. During the day we passed through three of these camping-places and made halts at each one. Everybody was busy studying the age of the pony droppings and tracks and lodge trails, and endeavoring to determine the number of lodges. These points were all-absorbing topics of conversation. We went into camp about five o'clock; having marched about thirty-three miles. _____________ All signs are indicating the command is closing in on the village and it appears to be large . . . the village that may contain the hostiles . . . the ones the military is aiming for to defeat and force them to reservations. What was Custer's mind set at this time? I couldn't find anything about how he was acting up to this point. He seems to be in control.
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Post by conz on Oct 18, 2007 11:03:41 GMT -6
I don't understand all this talk about "waiting" for other forces, or "worrying" about the size of the village.
All indications concerning decision-making here to me are that: 1) Custer was NEVER supposed to "wait" for anybody to attack a village if he could catch one, and 2) numbers are immaterial to any such decision.
I have read no evidence that any military man said that the size of the targeted village made any decision-making difference.
And I don't see any connection between columns "cooperating" with each other and a requirement to physically meet other forces on the battlefield.
So how do either of these things...cooperation or enemy numbers, affect Custer's decisions during this time period?
Is there any reference at all that if Custer found signs that the Native force was so large that the 7th Cavalry couldn't handle it alone, that they should back off and go join some other column before attacking it?!
Clair
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 18, 2007 15:20:26 GMT -6
Conz, the points you raise are directly related to Custer's orders and on June 23rd those orders are only relevant if Custer can be shown to be already in breach. There is no such indication and I would suggest that your questions are more pertinent to June 24th and 25th when his decisions will bring his orders sharply into focus.
Hunk
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Post by conz on Oct 19, 2007 8:24:59 GMT -6
What was the significance of all this? How many Indians were there? And maybe most important of all, how did what these men were seeing tie in with their beliefs and the intelligence reports they had received all year long!I'm sure all the officers knew that there was a large group of Indians. No larger, however, than the Army had seen before in its campaigns...villages of 1,000 lodges or more had been seen many times on the warpath in the past couple decades. The only value in discussing intelligence is how it relates to any decisions to be made. So my point, again, is...who cares? What decision is going to be based upon the size of the village? If it is found to be 400 lodges or 1,400 lodges, how would that change any decisions Custer & Co is going to make at this point? My position is none at all...while interesting, such information is not important (we say "relevant") to any Army decisions to be made by Custer's command. If they had absolutely no information on the size of the village at all, nothing would change. If they had perfect information, or if they had inflated numbers, say, that the village had 2,000 lodges, still, nothing about LBH would change, either this day, or any day previous to the 22nd or thereafter. Now where it might have impact would be on Terry's or Sheridan's original resource allocations prior to the campaign beginning, but even that is a stretch. Clair
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Post by elisabeth on Oct 19, 2007 9:29:39 GMT -6
It might take us back to the 21st, though. For instance, if the true numbers had been known, would Terry have been so easily persuaded about Brisbin's cavalry and the Gatlings?
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