June 22: Garryowen

[fred]

This was it. This was the beginning. Custer had his orders and the Seventh United States Cavalry was on its way to its date with... a helluva lot of Indians!

Here is what Custer was told:

Camp at Mouth of Rosebud River
Montana Territory, June 22, 1876
Lieut. Col. Custer, 7th Cavalry

Colonel:
The Brigadier General commanding directs that as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, of course, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so, the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you should see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Horn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn towards the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the possibility of escape of the Indians to the south or southeast by passing around your left flank. The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point it will cross the Yellowstone and move up as least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible.
The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock’s Creek, and that you should endeavor to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon’s column, with information of the result of your examination. The lower part of the creek will be examined by a detachment from Colonel Gibbon’s command. The supply steamer will be pushed up the Big Horn as far as the forks if the river is found to be navigable for that distance, and the Department Commander, who will accompany the column of Colonel Gibbon, desires you report to him there not later than the expiration of the time for which your troops are rationed, unless in the meantime you receive further orders.
Very respectfully, Your obedient servant,

[Signed] E.W. Smith, Captain, 18th Inf., AAAG

These orders have prompted much acrimony and we want to try to avoid re-hashing the same old arguments here. It would be a more interesting debate if we compared this set of instructions to the ones issued to Major Reno. It would also be interesting to discuss the efficacy of the specifics contained in these orders, i.e., why the move to Tullock's, why all the way up the Rosebud, why not follow the trail? What was in Terry's mind and did he relay that mind-set to his flamboyant colonel?

What, then, happened? Where did Terry and Gibbon go? What did the Seventh do that first day on the Rosebud? What did they see and how did the regiment's senior officers interpret those visions? Maybe even more important, certainly from an on-going historical perspective, how did the junior officers interpret those signs?

What would or should happen next?

[crzhrs]

The evening of June 22 Custer told his assembled officers that he expected they might face a warrior force of up to 1500, and if he got on their trail he would pursue, even if beyond the 15 days for which they were rationed.

["Hunk" Papa]

I would have thought that we must also factor in what was discussed during the June 21st conference that is not contained in Custer's written orders. It is relevant because we have the writings of Herendeen for example, who was called into the conference, and Gibbon and Brisbin who were there too, plus there were no written orders for Gibbon, so clearly the Montana Column was operating without the apparent strictures contained in the orders to Custer.

[crzhrs]

June 22:

The command made camp at the base of a steep bluff and at sunset Custer had officers call. Godfrey recalled "it was not a cheerful assemblage; everybody seemed to be in a serious mood, and the little conversation carried on, before all had arrived, was in undertones."

Godfrey goes on: "He (Custer ) took particular pains to impress upon the officers his reliance upon their judgment, discretion, and loyalty."

Custer suggests the 7th might meet at least 1,000 warriors, reinforced by perhaps an additional 500 young men from the agencies. If any Indian force could defeat the 7th, Custer explained, it would be able to whip a much larger force, and a reinforcement of 4 companies would not save the regiment. He rationalized "outside" reinforcements would cause disharmony, jealousy, and friction. (apparently he didn't think Benteen or anyone else in the command would be a factor in that regard)

Custer was willing to listen to suggestions but would take action against insubordinate grumblers. According to Edgerly, Benteen asked if Custer had ever known of any criticism or grumbling from him. Custer replied, "No, I never have, nor on any other (campaign) on which I have been with you."

A number of officers felt uncomfortable with Custer's mood and willingness to accept suggestions. Wallace especially felt concern and later told Godfrey he thought Custer is going to be killed.

____

If Custer was trying to motivate his officers, the meeting seems to have done the opposite. Would that gloom & doom atmosphere play a part later on?

["Hunk" Papa]

Custer's last dispatch to the New Rork Herald is written on this morning and says in part that "Yesterday, Terry Gibbon, and Custer got together, and with unanimity of opinion decided that Custer should start with his command up the Rosebud valley to the point where Reno had abandoned the trail, take up the latter and follow the Indians as long and as far as horse flesh and human endurance could carry his command.....
Gibbon's command has started for the mouth of the Big Horn. Terry, in the Far West, starts for the same point today, where, with Gibbon's force and the Far West.....he will push up the Big Horn as far as navigation of that stream will permit....."

Here again the course for the Montana Column is plainly stated as 'up the Big Horn.'

Also written on this morning or the previous evening but not published until July 8th, is another dispatch for the same newspaper, almost certainly authored by Major Brisbin, which says, again in part, "A consultation was held......and there General Terry definitely fixed upon the plan of action. .....It was announced by General Terry that General Custer's column would strike the blow and General Gibbon and his men received the decision without a murmur.."

The article enlarges on the reason for Terry's decision and includes the words "...so it was decided that Custer's men, as usual, were to have the post of honor..."

There is no mention of any coordinated attack between the two columns.

The Montana Column marches 29 miles 'and made a pleasant camp on the bank of the Yellowstone at 5.30 p.m. ....We expected the steamboat to pass us today, but it has not appeared.' [Bradley:Journal page 145]

[AZ Ranger]

Shavetails and Bell Sharps
The History of the U.S Army Mule
By Emmett M. Essin

The next day 13 of Reno's mules broke down completely.

["Hunk" Papa]

The Far West

From Willert's LBH Diary page 221 - '...the Far West - with Terry, Col. John Gibbon and Major James Brisbin on board - commenced its laborious push up the Yellowstone River toward the Big Horn. Gibbon recalled: "...A very heavy cold wind was blowing from the north, and our steamer did not start until 4 o'clock in the afternoon...."
The Far West steamed upriver through the late afternoon and into the evening - at probably no more rapid a pace than 4.2 miles per hour agains the strong current. Terry had been hopeful of making contact with the Montana Column proceeding up the north bank - however, bucking the powerful current of the flooded Yellowstone slowed their progress considerably, and Gibbon wrote: "..near dusk...we tied up for the night and rook in wood." The hour was 8.15 p.m.. The Far West had probably only proceeded about 17 miles.'

Terry is already behind schedule.

[clw]

from Command and General Staff College..

"Terry's written orders provided full latitude for Custer to diverge from them; paradoxically, they also enumerated a specific set of instructions for Custer to follow. Whether Custer disobeyed orders is a controversy that continues to this day. Terry's orders directed Custer to ascend the Rosebud and follow the trail of the Indians. If the trail diverged from the Rosebud to the west, he was, nonetheless, to continue up that creek to ensure that the Indians would not escape to the south. Near the headwaters of Rosebud Creek, Custer was to cross the divide into the Little Bighorn River drainage. Meanwhile, Gibbon's force was to move up the Yellowstone River, turn south up the Bighorn, and establish itself at the mouth of the Little Bighorn."

[Gerry]

Recently I made a trip up the Rosebud Creek. Maybe some of you may like a look at the June 22 camp. If you wish to follow along you may view this page. These are the same views the 7th viewed as they traveled.

Pvt. Peter Thompson said,"A very solemn feeling seemed to settle down upon the men for this time. Numbers of us felt that when Custer took active charge of the expedition thee would be no more funny work. He meant business. Some of the men knew by previous experience that when Custer turned himself loose, he made things hum. .....we started from the Yellowstone River on the afternoon of the 22nd of June.... We traveled about fifteen miles that afternoon, then moved into camp. Orders were given that no bugles were to be blown, no firing of guns, and no straggling were to be allowed....All through that hard campaign the unbroken prairies and hills were as bare of human habitation as an iceberg is of grass."