May 27: Discoveries

[fred]

Of all the pre-June days spent on the campaign, this day may have been the most important of all, especially for the Dakota and Montana columns.

How did the discovery of Indians affect the strategy of the campaign?

[fred]

May 27: Overnight rain (bad news); no more dust (good news). Early-morning fog, warming up and clearing. Pleasant winds out of the west. The Little Missouri badlands are reached. Bad grass, little wood, miserable water. Custer had the band serenade the troops. 17 miles.

[fred]

May 27, 1876—Dakota Column--4:30am—On the march. The rain from the night before had done away with much of the dust, but an early fog obscured landmarks and the column got lost looking for the Davis Creek valley entrance into the badlands. This route would take them to the Little Missouri.

1pm—After fog lifted, Custer spotted the Sentinel Buttes, thereby correcting his bearings. Looking for the Stanley trail from the Yellowstone Expedition of 1873. It was the only trail through the badlands.
* Warm and clear with pleasant westerly winds.
* Reached the badlands, the Mauvaises Terres. [See Willert, LBH Diary, p. 55] Days getting much hotter and the horses having some difficulty with wild cactus.

2pm—Entered the long narrow valley of Davis Creek.
2:25pm—After marching about 17 miles and 1 mile into the valley, they went into camp.
Head of Davis Creek Camp, #11. (Now about 151 miles from FAL, though some of it is now back and forth.) Camp set up about 6 miles south and 1 mile west of present-day Fryburg, ND.
* Poor quality grass, sparse cottonwoods, water was highly alkaline.
* Custer had the band play for the troops.

Montana Column—5am—LT Bradley sets out on another scout to see what has become of the Sioux camp (the Sioux seemed to have abruptly disappeared). Gibbon was extremely concerned that the hostiles had possibly moved east. Bradley takes his mounted infantry (13 troopers), Tom LeForgé, and 5 Crows (Curley, White Man Runs Him).
* Bradley heads south toward the Wolf Mountains, crossing some open country “which they found strewn with recently killed buffalo and laced by hundreds of pony tracks.” [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 157]
* Approaching the lookout point from the earlier scout (14 miles out), they found the warrior trail seen by the Crows on the 19th. It led toward the lower Rosebud. Concluded that these warriors had been the vanguard of the “leisurely” movement of the entire village from the Tongue to the Rosebud. [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 157]
* Bradley finds an immense 400-500-lodge Sioux camp (8 miles distant) on Rosebud, 18 miles from Gibbon’s base camp below Rosebud’s mouth. It appeared to be spread out over a distance of some 2 miles [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 154] Bradley and his “hard-riding infantry detachment had earned the sobriquet, ‘The Shoo-flies.’” [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 157] This camp was now only about 18-20 miles from Gibbon. “ ‘The fact that they had moved down within easy striking distance…’ Bradley observed, ‘seemed to prove that they held us in no awe.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 57] Before Bradley could have each of his soldiers ascend the peak and peer into the valley to see the village—for verification—some of his scouts spotted villagers driving some ponies as if they had spied the Crows. Reluctantly, Bradley and his men withdrew and he led them on a hard ride back to the Yellowstone. CPT Clifford had boats waiting to ferry them across.

“Obviously, such movements (of the Sioux) so near the Montana column meant it stood in little awe of the troops it had been raiding…. The information Bradley reported at this time was the most valuable Indian intelligence discovered during the campaign. It established the present location and direction of movement of the consolidated force of winter roamers.” [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 157-158]

* Bradley estimated the village at about 800 to 1,000 warriors. LT Roe, however—who was not with this scouting party—later expressed the opinion that there were between 1,500 and 2,000 warriors in this particular village. [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 154, FN 33, referencing Roe, Custer’s Last Battle, p. 2] Roe may have been correct for even Stewart claims more and more Indians were joining, so the camp had to be growing over this period.

11:30am-Noon—Bradley returns to base camp with news. As usual, his report was greeted with skepticism.
At dark—Gibbon sends dispatch (mentioning Bradley’s report almost as an afterthought) with PVTs William Evans (Stewart claims it was PVT Bell) and Benjamin Stewart (E/7I) and scout John Williamson, downriver to Terry (150 river-miles away). Bradley said the one trooper was James Bell, rather than Evans, but since Evans was awarded the Medal of Honor for his efforts, Bradley was obviously wrong. Gibbon’s decision not to attack the Sioux village—if he even fully believed Bradley’s report—was based on several factors: (1) His orders were to keep the Sioux south of the Yellowstone and attack only if certain of success. (2) He was still smarting over his failure to get his force across the river several days earlier and the Yellowstone was even higher now. (3) He was extremely concerned about his supply train and even now was contemplating sending 2 more companies back to reinforce its escort, further reducing his offensive force.
* These reasons were all valid, but what is incomprehensible is Gibbon’s failure to fully believe Bradley, follow-up at least, on his discovery, and report it to Terry. Part of Gibbon’s hesitancy to fully believe Bradley may have stemmed from the fact Terry had expected the Sioux to fight him on the Little Missouri. This belief had to have been communicated to Gibbon much earlier.

At dark—Gibbon sends CPT Ball (H/2C) and CPT Thompson (L/2C) down the north bank of the Yellowstone to the Tongue to check for any Sioux crossings and to provide moral support for the 3 couriers.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

A typical officer's tent...



Best wishes,
Fred.