Post by elisabeth on Jul 8, 2007 3:10:52 GMT -6
A couple of nice pieces on the Barnitz fight here in Tom Goodrich's Wild West blog:
wildwestblogcom.blogspot.com/
Did any of the Indian participants give an account of this fight in later years? It would be most interesting to know the thinking behind it, and whether it was indeed as cunningly planned as it looks.
On the face of it, the Indians had been watching carefully and chosen their moment well. They must have seen the departure of Keogh and the bulk of his troop, escorting Hancock to Denver. According to Major Calhoun, correspondent for the Philadelphia Press, this left Fort Wallace with "only about fifty fighting men, as many civilians, and Colonel Greenwood's little escort of twenty-five coloured troops". This state of affairs led to the first mass attack on the post, on June 22nd, which was fended off by Lts. Beecher and Bell with a loss of four killed and four wounded. On this occasion the Indians succeeded in grabbing a team of mules from the nearby stone quarries, and setting the quarry works and huts on fire.
A couple of days later, Barnitz arrived with General Wright's survey party. While Calhoun had the impression that the Indians "were evidently ignorant of the fresh reinforcement", the way they set about the next attack could hardly have been more tailor-made to take advantage of a fresh troop and officer, green in the ways of Indian warfare. First, they run off a bunch of horses from Pond Creek station -- and run them towards , not away from, the fort. This predictably lures out Barnitz and company. The Indians then mime shock and horror at the sight of this larger force, with much signalling with mirrors back and forth. "All this signalling", wrote Calhoun, "seemed to result in the gradual withdrawal of the attacking party from the immediate vicinity of the fort to a ridge some two miles distant." "Seemed" is probably the right word. It's the classic Fetterman manoeuvre all over again, and Barnitz falls for it hook, line and sinker. Obediently he follows the "retreating" Indians over the ridge -- and instantly finds himself surrounded by the far larger body of Indians that's been lying in wait there.
As we know, by some miracle Barnitz and his men were not massacred; his loss of 6 killed and 6 wounded was quite bad enough, but there were enough Indians to have wiped out his whole command if they'd wanted. (It seems as if the killing of the Indians' leader -- thought by Barnitz to be Roman Nose, but obviously it can't have been him -- may have been the deciding factor.)
The timing, though, is most intriguing. It does look very much as if they waited to pull this ploy until they had "fresh meat" -- knowing that an older frontier hand would never fall for it. Green troops were easier to fight, too; Dr. Bell (from whose New Tracks in North America the above quotes are also taken) remarked that "on horseback the soldiers were no match for the red-skins. Most of them had never been opposed to Indians before; many were raw recruits; and their horses became so dreadfully frightened at the yells and the smell of the savages as to be quite unmanageable". If they'd tried this trick on Co. I, who'd been exposed to Indians almost daily throughout that year, they wouldn't have had that advantage.
It also looks as if it could have been part of a wider plan -- as the Barnitz fight is on the same day as the attack on Custer's wagon train. Which, of course, was returning from Fort Wallace. The post must have been under very, very close observation. If these attacks were co-ordinated, as it appears, there was some pretty smart planning being done by somebody ...
wildwestblogcom.blogspot.com/
Did any of the Indian participants give an account of this fight in later years? It would be most interesting to know the thinking behind it, and whether it was indeed as cunningly planned as it looks.
On the face of it, the Indians had been watching carefully and chosen their moment well. They must have seen the departure of Keogh and the bulk of his troop, escorting Hancock to Denver. According to Major Calhoun, correspondent for the Philadelphia Press, this left Fort Wallace with "only about fifty fighting men, as many civilians, and Colonel Greenwood's little escort of twenty-five coloured troops". This state of affairs led to the first mass attack on the post, on June 22nd, which was fended off by Lts. Beecher and Bell with a loss of four killed and four wounded. On this occasion the Indians succeeded in grabbing a team of mules from the nearby stone quarries, and setting the quarry works and huts on fire.
A couple of days later, Barnitz arrived with General Wright's survey party. While Calhoun had the impression that the Indians "were evidently ignorant of the fresh reinforcement", the way they set about the next attack could hardly have been more tailor-made to take advantage of a fresh troop and officer, green in the ways of Indian warfare. First, they run off a bunch of horses from Pond Creek station -- and run them towards , not away from, the fort. This predictably lures out Barnitz and company. The Indians then mime shock and horror at the sight of this larger force, with much signalling with mirrors back and forth. "All this signalling", wrote Calhoun, "seemed to result in the gradual withdrawal of the attacking party from the immediate vicinity of the fort to a ridge some two miles distant." "Seemed" is probably the right word. It's the classic Fetterman manoeuvre all over again, and Barnitz falls for it hook, line and sinker. Obediently he follows the "retreating" Indians over the ridge -- and instantly finds himself surrounded by the far larger body of Indians that's been lying in wait there.
As we know, by some miracle Barnitz and his men were not massacred; his loss of 6 killed and 6 wounded was quite bad enough, but there were enough Indians to have wiped out his whole command if they'd wanted. (It seems as if the killing of the Indians' leader -- thought by Barnitz to be Roman Nose, but obviously it can't have been him -- may have been the deciding factor.)
The timing, though, is most intriguing. It does look very much as if they waited to pull this ploy until they had "fresh meat" -- knowing that an older frontier hand would never fall for it. Green troops were easier to fight, too; Dr. Bell (from whose New Tracks in North America the above quotes are also taken) remarked that "on horseback the soldiers were no match for the red-skins. Most of them had never been opposed to Indians before; many were raw recruits; and their horses became so dreadfully frightened at the yells and the smell of the savages as to be quite unmanageable". If they'd tried this trick on Co. I, who'd been exposed to Indians almost daily throughout that year, they wouldn't have had that advantage.
It also looks as if it could have been part of a wider plan -- as the Barnitz fight is on the same day as the attack on Custer's wagon train. Which, of course, was returning from Fort Wallace. The post must have been under very, very close observation. If these attacks were co-ordinated, as it appears, there was some pretty smart planning being done by somebody ...
