Whitestone Hill and LBH

[lbhdan]

I’m fascinated by unexpected connections…and love to learn new things (which is one of the reasons I’ve been lurking on this board for the past year or so: I’ve learned a lot from you all…thanks!).

I recently read Michael Clodfelter’s “The Dakota War: The United States Army Versus the Sioux, 1862-1865” and was intrigued by his account of the battle of Whitestone Hill. According to Clodfelter, Major Albert E. House’s advance command of 300 men more or less stumbled into a very large Sioux encampment, and was quickly surrounded by 1500 or so Sioux warriors. As Clodfelter puts it, “Without thoroughly scouting the village to determine the size of his target, [Major House] had advanced against the encampment and nearly delivered his men into disaster.”

(Sounds very familiar, doesn’t it?)

But, just as House’s cavalrymen were expecting the worst, “an ominous quiet settled over the battlefield.” This pause in the battle, says Clodfelter, was a decision by Santee Sioux war chief Inkpaduta “to give his warriors time to paint…themselves for the great victory that was in the offing.” It also would give the women time to prepare a great celebratory feast.

Clodfelter says: “Just a short time before, House’s men had launched a surprise attack on the Indian village, forcing the natives to defend themselves without benefit of their ritual preparations. Now they had seen that the attacking battalion was small in numbers and ripe for annihilation, and so they wanted the opportunity to complete what might become the greatest Sioux victory ever” in a well-prepared, “resplendent” fashion. So, they paused before striking.

Clodfelter goes on: “But now, granted a second chance by Inkpaduta’s decision to…delay victory, the battalion commander [House] took advantage of these precious minutes and escaped the fate (and, ironically, the immortality) of Fetterman and Custer by dispatching the battalion guide to Sully’s main column ten miles to the north. Just as the Santee Sioux and their Teton allies…were ready to carry out the rush that would overwhelm House’s men, the rest of Sully’s brigade arrived on the darkening scene…”

We know that Sitting Bull and other Lakota were involved in the battles of the Sully-Sibley campaigns of 1863-65. We also know that Inkpaduta and other Dakota were present at LBH. Did thirteen years of repeated tellings of the story of “the one that got away” contribute at all to the overwhelming and *immediate* reaction by the Indians at LBH?

And I suppose a corollary question might be, did the (no doubt) similarly-repeated tellings of House’s story of his near miss resound at all in the minds of the men of the Seventh as they approached a camp of unknown size?

[westerner]

Supposedly Crazy Horse was late getting into LBH because his preparations took so long. Despite that corollary, I have to say that Clodfelter's story of the Sioux charcoaling up the barbecue while 300 soldiers whistled inconspicuously in the middle is pretty hard to believe. My confidence is not raised when I pull out Michno's book on Indian wars and find a completely different version of events, even though he cites Clodfelter as to the booty taken. His story based on a book by Langdon Sully (a descendant of the general?), Michno says that House sent a courier to Sully urging him to come quick, while he stalled for time by opening up a parley with Inkpaduta. Which amazingly Inkpaduta humored, apparently not having read up on Harney and Blue Water Creek. No mention of stoked bonfires or warpaint.

Michno's version has the advantage of making sense, but I don't know anything about it other than what I got from there and what I got from you. In either version it's an interesting story, and I'd enjoy knowing the real deal, whatever it was.

[lbhdan]

Yes, Michno paints a bit different picture, doesn’t he. I’m not sure what his source is, because the book he cites, “No Tears for the General,” by Langdon Sully (yes, he’s the General’s grandson), is mostly a compilation of General Sully’s letters and reports. The section dealing with the House incident is taken directly from the General’s Official Report, and doesn’t mention a reason for the delay in the Indian attack.

Major House, in his Official Report, states: “While these things were being done [i.e.: the disposition of his forces], the chiefs came in under a flag of truce and attempted a negotiation. They offered to surrender some of their chiefs; but as [House] did not know who was entitled to speak by authority, he demanded the unconditional surrender of all. This the Indians refused to do, and…they placed themselves in battle array.”

Clodfelter, who cites “The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies” as his source, says “the men of the Sixth Iowa [House’s Battalion] were startled by a sudden proposal for a parley shouted from the warrior ranks.” He repeats House’s description of the demand for unconditional surrender, then says “Convinced that the parley was only a diversion to cover preparations for a grand assault, House broke off the negotiations and returned to his battalion.” He later says that “White veterans of the Battle of Whitestone Hill later testified that the parley and respite from combat was a ploy by…Inkpaduta to give his warriors time to paint…themselves.” Clodfelter’s source for this “testimony” is unclear.

[harpskiddie]

If you go to the Northern Plains Indians section, you will find a thread on Whitestone Hill, with several interesting contributions and links to the official reports. Well worth the visit, since you both seem to be interested in the event.

Gordie,
whistle me up a memory; whistle me back where I want to be; whistle a tune that'll carry me to Tombstone Territory.....................................................blabber blabber...........................

[westerner]

Thanks to lbhdan and harpskiddie for their added contributions. I've just read the reports by Sully, House, etc., at the Cornell page that Billy Markland linked to, and I think Clodfelter has squirted more purple on his page than needed to be there. It's pretty clear from these documents that there was no lurid purpose on the part of the chiefs in holding off the attack. The village was divided on the issue of whether to fight the troops, as it contained both hostiles and people who considered themselves "friendlies" and were accepted as friendlies by the troops. In his report, Sully mentions sighting a chief he knew to be friendly during the fighting whom he placed under protection, along with the chief's entourage. House's report, in the passage quoted by lbhdan, also mentions this division among the Indians.

Clodfelter's story that House's troops were about to be rushed and annihilated when Sully rode upon them does not square with the information in House's report. House says he had begun to move against the Indians when "they placed themselves in battle array," at which "the enemy retreated precipitately, abandoning everything except their ponies." It was then, "while we were thus following and scattering the enemy," that Sully's units began arriving in support. The other reports agree that the Indians were retreating at the moment House's relief arrived.

The Indians getting into battle array prior to House advancing is probably the kernel of history in Clodfelter's story of an ominous pause for the sake of daubing warpaint, but the assertion that such was the purpose for the delay is probably just enlisted men's camp talk that Clodfelter picked up somewhere. If true, there's no reason why these officers wouldn't mention it since it puts gloss on their victory and disposes of the charge that well-meaning friendlies were killed along with the hostile raiders.

Reading these reports, if Whitestone Hill affected anyone's thinking at Little Bighorn I think it would have to have been on the cavalry side. House advancing against 1500 Sioux warriors in afternoon daylight, with just 300 men, and the warriors formed up in battle array retreating in panic - must have stuck in many cavalrymen's minds. Had to. I wonder if this is what the common belief that Indians would run comes down to.

Thanks for bringing this up.