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Post by fred on Apr 20, 2012 14:39:36 GMT -5
Well, Diane, it seems this space is limited to you and me... but let me try this one.
I am starting work on another idea and I would welcome feedback-- however irreverent-- on the idea and the way it is presented. I have posted a couple of "profiles" of battle participants and they have been well-received as far as I can make out, so I would be interested in knowing if this is worth the effort.
I have put together more than 200 "profiles" of battle participants and contemporaries who had something to say and they all follow the same general format. The entries are excerpts from writings and interviews and they contain the source, as well as some small commentary by me, more in the way of explanation and definition than anything else.
I think things below are fairly self-explanatory; my comments are in yellow. So I would welcome any feedback as to the use of such a book. Essentially, this combines many sources into one and the "profiles" are between 1 page and more than 40.
This one is on 1SG John Ryan of Company M. In real life it is 11 pages long:
1SG JOHN RYAN (M)
1880’s and between 1904 – 1906—Barnard, Sandy, ed., Ten Years With Custer: A 7th Cavalryman’s Memoirs. AST Press, Terre Haute, IN: 2001. [Only the section dealing with the LBH campaign is summarized.]
1. “When Custer went after Indians he himself was always in the advance and looking for his enemy. On the Washita we have found him with the advance scouts on all occasions and watching his enemy himself.” [279]
2. Upon leaving FAL on 17May76, the regiment passed in review in column of platoons. [285] [This agrees with Godfrey.]
3. “All the companies wore broad rimmed slouch hats, some black, others gray.” [285 and 287]
4. [Sandy Barnard writes a footnote: “By this time the route was familiar to the troops, as they essentially followed the trail used by General Stanley’s expedition in 1873 as well as the Black Hills Expedition of 1874.”] [287]
5. Ryan writes that the command spent 5 days camped on the Little Missouri and that Custer’s scout up the river consisted of companies A, B, K, and M. [287] [Actually, they reached the Little Missouri camp on May 29 and left it on May 31. The companies Custer took on his scout were C, D, F, and M. Barnard makes no correction here.]
6. Ryan claims that the camp they made on the Powder River was made at a temporary steamboat landing. [287] [He may have gotten this confused with the camp made at the confluence of the Powder and the Yellowstone: PRD.]
7. Ryan said Reno took companies C, E, F, I, L, and G on his scout. [287] [This is also incorrect; B Company, not G, was the sixth company. Barnard points out this error.]
8. For the move up the Rosebud, each company was given 12 or 15 pack mules. One aparejo [to carry the ammunition] was issued to each company. [288]
9. Ryan says the regiment consisted of “a little over 600 men” when it started up the Rosebud. [288]
10. No trumpets were to be sounded and very small fires only, to be extinguished immediately upon leaving camp. [288]
11. They marched “on a large Indian trail” and passed over a number of old Indian encampments. [288]
12. On the 24th, the men believed they would get a good night’s rest when they moved into camp: “... in the middle of the night” they got orders to saddle up and they “marched until just before daylight, the morning of the 25th…. We halted in a ravine and went temporarily into camp, without unsaddling our horses. We just simply dropped down, threw the bridle reins over our arms and went to sleep….” [288 – 289]
13. [Ryan lumps things together, not accounting for a move, a second halt, or the move to the divide before battalions were assigned.] “It appears that Custer and some of the scouts had gone ahead and got some information in regard to the presence of the Indian camp. After Custer came back, the officers were all called together and he gave his directions about battalion formation. We ate a hearty breakfast….” [289]
14. The pack train consisted of about 150 mules. [290] [As an aside connected to this comment, Ryan mentions that by the time Reno’s command had reached the bluffs, “we had mostly run out of ammunition.”]
15. As they rode down [Reno Creek] LT Hodgson rode the length of Reno’s battalion telling the companies to ride a little off from one another to keep the dust down. [290] [This is an interesting observation, especially in light of the testimony about LT Cooke doing the same thing with the pack train.]
16. Ryan alludes to the “lone tepee,” not as such, but as “a few abandoned lodges, with the fronts of them tied up….” [290] [He also speculated that he thought Custer planned on charging those lodges when he first came upon them. Barnard is intrigued by this, discussing it in a footnote.]
17. By these lodges, they could now see “down through this little valley and see objects ahead of us.” They could not tell whether the objects were buffalos or Indians. [291] [At around 2 miles—1.7 miles from Gerard’s Knoll and the “lone tepee” to the river, then a little more into the LBH valley—this is understandable. It would not be if the “lone tepee” were some 4 miles from the LBH River.]
18. Ryan says this was when Reno got his order and he would be supported, but Ryan admits to not having heard the order given. [291]
19. Reno started down the end of the Reno Creek valley first at a trot, then at a gallop, marching in a column – of – twos. LT Varnum rode ahead, waving his hat. Ryan says this is when Varnum yelled out about the first scalp getting a furlough. [291]
20. The LBH River was about 3 feet deep with some quicksand and a very strong current. [291]
21. When they reached the other side of the river, they “made a slight halt, dismounted, tightened our saddle girths and then swung into the saddles.” [291]
22. The command then came up “left front into line….” Company M was on the right, G on the left, and A in the rear. [291] [This of course is incorrect. G was in reserve initially—see Wallace’s RCOI testimony—while A was to M’s left. Minor, however; they important thing is that M was on the right.]
23. The command started at a trot, then moved to a slow gallop. [291] [This confirms the testimony of others.]
24. Because of heavy underbrush and bullberry bushes along the stream, French ordered Ryan to take 10 men and skirmish along the bushes, off to the company’s right. [291] [In a footnote, Barnard makes the observation that this was Ryan’s clearest description of how he moved downstream along the river.]
25. They moved like this for 1½ to 2 miles before coming “to a piece of heavy timber.” [291]
26. This was when he saw “the first real Indians.” [291] [This fits perfectly with testimony from others along that side of Reno’s advance.]
27. This was when the first shots were fired, shortly before the troops dismounted. Ryan saw some Indians leaving the brush along the river and ride around the timber in the direction of their camp. Ryan claimed he was the first to fire and it was his 10 men who fired on these Indians. [291]
28. “When we got to the timber, we rode down an embankment into the timber and dismounted. This was where the channel of the river had changed and was probably 20 feet lower than the level of the prairie.” [291]
29. From the timber they came up to the higher ground facing the bluffs on the other side of the valley, then formed a skirmish line facing downstream toward the Indian camp. [293]
30. They were in a prairie dog town and some men were kneeling, others lying down. Ryan estimated some 500 Indians coming from the village. [293]
31. M Company was on the line’s extreme left. [293]
32. LT Hodgson trooped the line, encouraging the men to keep cool and fire low. [293]
33. Ryan now says they received orders to fall back to their horses and this was “where” the first man—SGT O’Hara—was shot. He then writes, “We found his head, with the heads of two other men, tied together with wires and suspended from a lodge pole in one of the Indian lodges, with the hair all singed off. We did not find the rest of his body and think the Indians threw it into the river.” [293] [Barnard, in a footnote, says that O’Harra’s body was discovered buried at the Reno – Benteen defense site on the hill, making Ryan’s story about O’Harra’s head apocryphal. He also says that privates Rutten and Wilbur {Darcy} said O’Harra was killed on the skirmish line in the valley.]
34. As they were mounted, Ryan saw that the Indians had completed surrounding the command. This was when PVT Lorentz—number one in the first set of fours—was killed, shot in the back of the neck, the bullet exiting his mouth. He fell from his horse. [293]
35. Ryan claimed Reno said, “Any of you men who wish to make your escape, follow me.” [293]
36. Reno led the retreat from the timber. [293]
37. Some of the fighting was hand-to-hand. [294]
38. It was TMP Charles Fischer (or Fisher) of M Company who tried to save Hodgson. [296]
39. Ryan felt that if Reno had spent even a short time longer in the woods, no one would have escaped. They were outnumbered 10 to 1. [296]
40. The Indians set the prairie on fire. [296]
41. [Barnard, in a footnote, says 3 officers and 29 EM were killed in the valley fight, with another 7 EM wounded.] [296]
42. [Ryan compresses time greatly, having Benteen arrive, then McDougall and the packs, then the departure of Weir.] Ryan writes that he did not see CPT Weir leave the command. [296 – 297]
43. Reno left 2 companies with the wounded and the packs and proceeded north with the remaining five. [297]
44. “We saw at a distance from a mile and a half to two miles parties, whom we supposed were Indians, riding back and forth and firing scattering shots. We thought they were disposing of Custer’s wounded men…” [297]
45. They saw a large herd of ponies at the northern end of the village and a large party of Indians riding toward their camp. [297]
46. Once the troops were back on Reno Hill, “great numbers” of Indians advanced and made several charges. The firing became very heavy, rapid, and general, all along the line and only ended after dark. [298]
47. About midnight they heard a trumpet call, but it was not returned when answered, so they figured it was an Indian. [299]
48. At night, they heard Indians riding back and forth and crossing the river. [299]
49. The fighting on the 26th began when the Indians fired two shots just before daylight. The troops began wondering about where Custer was. [299]
50. The fighting on the 26th was hardest around noon. The Indians advanced and tried to cut the soldiers’ lines. [299]
51. Part of M Company went to Benteen’s assistance. [299]
52. They chased the Indians down the bluffs. Ryan also noted that this area was higher than the rest and if the Indians had managed to cut through, the fight would have been over. [299]
53. PVT Tanner was mortally wounded during Benteen’s charge and Ryan and 3 others put him on a blanket and brought him back to the hospital area where he died shortly thereafter. [300]
54. Ryan tells the story of his rifle—he paid $100 for it—with the telescope and firing on the Indians atop Sharpshooters’ Ridge. [300]
• See the 1909 entry, below, for a description of Ryan’s rifle.
55. As the Indians began moving away, Ryan said it was the largest body of Indians he had ever seen. “… I have seen the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Apaches and Comanches move together in the Indian Territory and in Kansas years before, while campaigning there under General Custer, and I should say there was double the amount move out from this camp.” [301]
56. Ryan specifically mentions several officers as doing all they could to save the command: Reno, French, Benteen, McDougall, Moylan, Weir, and Godfrey. [301]
57. After the Indians moved out, there was a flurry of activity amongst the troops to try to make their positions more defensible. They expected the Indians to return. [301]
58. Ryan said his company had 45 men and 14 were killed, 10 wounded. All the horses in the company were killed except Ryan’s. [301] [One might assume this would have included CPT French’s wounded horse.]
59. The Indians took everything but many of their tent poles. [301]
60. All the extra equipment and weapons of the dead were destroyed. [302] [In a footnote, Barnard indicates that in 1989 NPS archaeologists dug up an area below the Reno-Benteen bluffs and discovered one of these sites.]
61. Ryan identified the area where he thought Custer might have tried to cross [Ford B] and said they found “some of the bodies of his men lying there.” [302]
62. The Custer battlefield was divided into five sections and the company first sergeants were ordered to cover specific areas, identifying and burying the men they found in their sections. Ryan claims to have buried or helped bury George and Tom Custer, Bill Cooke, possibly Bill Reily, and Jim Calhoun. [302]
63. All the men had been stripped except Mark Kellogg and he was identified, partly by the boots he wore. [302]
64. The burials were quite perfunctory with many limbs protruding. [303]
65. Many bodies could not be identified, having lain there for three days. Ryan said the stench was terrible. [303]
66. Initially, they “found two or three together, then probably a dozen, then scattered ones.” [303]
67. “It seems as if the companies made stands at different places and were driven back.” [303]
68. Ryan claims he found no cartridges on the field with the exception of 5 or 6 under Custer’s body. He also said there was absolutely no tack equipment he could see. [303]
69. Custer’s body was found on a gravel knoll and Ryan gives a different description of his wounds. It appears he gets the entry and exit wounds mixed up. [303]
70. Custer was not scalped. [303]
71. Ryan confirmed most of LT Godfrey’s observations as to how Custer was dressed and armed. “General Custer wore a broad brimmed slouch hat, buckskin shirt and pants, and high top cavalry boots. He was armed with a Remington Sporting Rifle that used a brass shell. He also carried in his belt two pistols, one a .45 – caliber Colts [sic] and the other a French Navy, and a hunting knife.” [303 – 304]
72. A body thought to be Tom Custer’s was found near the general. It was horribly mutilated. “The head was smashed as flat as the palm of one’s hand. When we found him, he was lying on his face and hands, split down through the center of his body.” [304]
73. Ryan identified Tom Custer by his “T.W.C.” tattoo. The bodies were already turning black. [304]
74. Ryan said all men but Mark Kellogg had been stripped, but Custer was not scalped. Ryan, CPL Harrison Davis, CPL Frank Neely, and PVT James Severs buried both Tom and George at the foot of the knoll. They dug a grave about 18” deep and wrapped both bodies in canvas, covering the grave with the basket from an Indian travois, then secured it with stones. [304]
75. Ryan described the Deep Ravine episode as “18 or 20 men belonging to Co. E,” who had “fallen back from the river and got into a ravine,” rather than having come down the hill into the ravine. He also said they saw the scratch marks where the men tried to get back out. [305] [Since he claimed they had traveled back up the ravine quite a distance, it appears those men did not get too far down toward the river.]
76. After the battle the troops found flour bags marked “Interior Department” in the debris of the Indian village, proving many of the Indians were agency Indians. [306]
77. Three severed trooper heads were found in the camp. [306]
1908 – 1920—Walter Camp letters and interviews. Hardorff, Richard G., ed., On the Little Bighorn With Walter Camp, El Segundo, CA: Upton & Sons Publishers, 2002. A series of letters between Camp and Ryan.
1. [November 29, 1908, Ryan to Camp] Ryan says M Company deployed its skirmish line “from the timber across toward the bluffs, on the other side of the valley….” [14]
2. Ryan describes the incident where CPT French asked him to rid SSR of the Indian snipers. [14 – 15]
3. French carried an old Springfield .50 caliber, breech-loading rifle. [15]
4. Ryan was the man who identified the body of Tom Custer and he helped in the burials of GAC, TWC, lieutenants Cooke, Calhoun, and probably Sturgis, along with some 45 enlisted men. He picked up the cartridge shells under Custer’s body and cut off a lock of his hair. He sent the lock of hair to Mrs. Custer. [15 – 16]
5. There was a knoll on the banks of the LBH where Reno’s command entered the stream at Ford A. There was no timber on that bank, but considerable underbrush. [16]
6. “You must recollect that Reno had two different lines of skirmishers.” [16] [This would make sense, especially if the line was broken between A and M and M moved out more or less on its own. It is hard to imagine Ryan would say this referring to a simple advance of a single line from one point to another.]
7. M Company “was on the extreme left of the line, and Lieut. Hodgson… was very near to me on the skirmish line… I heard him pass the remark to the men to keep cool and not to get excited, and fire low.” [17]
8. [April 7, 1920, Ryan to Camp] Nothing of additional significance.
1909—From Barnard, Sandy, Custer’s First Sergeant John Ryan, AST Press, Terre Haute, IN: 1996. Ryan, in an August 29, 1909, letter to Walter Camp, wrote:
“At the time I possessed a seventeen – pound Sharp’s telescope rifle, made for me in Bismarck, which cost me $100. I used infantry ammunition, 70 grains of powder, which I procured from First Sgt. Wm. F. Bolton of Co. G, 17th U. S. Infantry, before going out on this trip. I gave him some of our carbine ammunition in place of it” [191].
Undated—Walter Camp notes. Hardorff, Richard G., ed., On the Little Bighorn With Walter Camp.
1. There were special carbine shells under Custer’s body. [182]
2. Mark Kellogg had on his clothing and his boots and was not scalped. [182]
3. Scollin’s body was about half-way between the timber and the river on the retreat. [182]
1923—Graham, W. A., COL, The Custer Myth. Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA: 1953 (2000). From the Hardin, Montana, Tribune, June 22, 1923. Both this article and the one published in the Billings, MT, Gazette, on June 25, 1923, were taken from Ryan’s memoirs, above: Ten Years With Custer.
Graham made a note regarding the inaccuracies in the story related by SGT Daniel Kanipe. It could pertain somewhat to Ryan’s story, as well: “The many inaccuracies in Sgt. Kanipe’s story are characteristic of the accounts of most of the enlisted survivors recounted during the ’20s.” [250]
1. Ryan estimated the size of the commands departing Fort Lincoln: [239]
• Seventh Cavalry: 30 officers, 700 EM.
• A battalion of infantry consisting of units from the Sixth and Seventeenth Infantry, plus a company from the Twentieth Infantry, all totaling about 200 men.
• A battery of 4 guns, 1 brass 24 – pound Napoleon, 1 three – inch Rodman, and 2 Gatling guns.
• About 50 scouts.
• About 150 “teams,” carrying forage, ammunition, and rations.
2. All the companies—at the Fort Lincoln review—wore slouch hats, some black, some gray. [239]
3. [Ryan’s narrative is wrong when he relates their trip and the days they spent in various camps. He is also wrong regarding things like Custer’s scout along the Little Missouri, claiming Custer took A, B, K, and M companies and went for 5 days. In reality, the scout lasted one day and Custer took companies C, D, F, and M. This story was related, however, some 47 years after the fact, so Ryan can be forgiven for some small errors.] [239 – 240]
4. [Ryan also got one of the companies in Reno’s scout wrong. Reno took E, F, C, I, L, and B; Ryan claimed E, F, C, I, L, and G.] [240]
5. On June 22, a little over 600 men passed in review for General Terry, heading up the Rosebud. [240] [Actually, 607 officers and men.]
6. Orders were given for no trumpets and very small fires, to be doused with earth upon leaving camp. [240]
7. About the middle of the night on June 24, officers roused the men for a night march. [240]
8. They marched “until just before daylight on the 25th.” [240]
9. [Despite the very dark night…] They marched very quickly. [241]
10. The pack train consisted of about 150 mules. [241]
11. Ryan comments that it was very fortunate the packs arrived on Reno Hill, “as we almost ran out of ammunition.” [241]
12. As they moved down “through a small valley,” [Reno Creek] they saw a few abandoned Indian lodges with the fronts tied up. [241]
13. When they reached this point, they could see down the valley and they saw objects ahead. They weren’t sure if they were Indians or buffaloes. [241] [This was probably the movement of Indian ponies. The tepees Ryan is referring to here are the ones not far from Ford A, maybe only 1 or 1½ miles away and near the Gerard Knoll.]
14. Ryan now says that this was when Custer gave Reno the order to charge the village, though Ryan did not hear the order given. [241]
15. Reno started down the valley—Reno Creek—in a column of twos, first at a trot, then at a gallop. [241]
16. LT Varnum—“a very brave young officer in command of the scouts”—rode ahead of the battalion. Ryan claimed Varnum swung his hat around and yelled out to the men, “Thirty days’ furlough to the man who gets the first scalp.” [241]
17. They crossed the LBH: there “was a very strong current, and there was quicksand about three feet deep.” After crossing, they made a short halt, dismounted to tighten their saddle girths, then re-mounted. [241]
18. After mounting, the order was given, “Left front into line.” Company M went to the right, G to the left, and A in the rear. [241] [Ryan was probably wrong here with A and G. At the RCOI, LT Wallace said A and M formed in a line, while G was in line, in the rear as reserve. Then G Company was brought up to the left of the line. {RCOI, 22}]
19. They started at a trot, then moved to a slow gallop. [241]
20. Between M Company’s right and the river, there were a lot of bullberry bushes and undergrowth. CPT French told Ryan to take 10 men and form a skirmish line to guard against Indians in the brush. They moved like that for about 1½ to 2 miles until they reached a heavy growth of timber. [241 – 242]
21. By the time the command had reached the timber, Ryan had heard only one shot fired. He thought LT Varnum or his scouts might have fired it. [242] [Varnum mentioned that LT Hare had popped off some shots on the way down the valley.]
22. PVT James Turley (M) could not control his horse and it headed for the Indian camp. That was the last anyone saw of him. [242]
23. “When we got to the timber we rode down an embankment and dismounted. This was where the channel of the river changed and was probably several feet lower than the level of the prairie.” [242]
24. They came up to the prairie to form the skirmish line; some men knelt, others lay down. They were in a prairie dog “town.” [242]
25. This is where the Indians first charged, about 500 of them coming from the direction of their village. [242]
26. The troops fired volleys into them, hitting several. LT Hodgson trooped “the line encouraging the men to keep cool and fire low.” [242]
27. When the Indians couldn’t cut through the troops’ skirmish line, they began moving, single file, toward the left of the line. Many rode on the other side of their horse. [242]
28. As the Indians began closing in on the rear, the order was given to fall back to the timber. This was when SGT Miles O’Harra was fatally wounded. [242]
29. “In the Indian camp after the battle… we found the heads of three of our men tied together with wires and suspended from a lodge pole with their hair all burned off. We did not see their bodies there.” [242]
30. In the timber the order was given to mount. As Ryan mounted, he looked toward the river and saw Indians coming from that direction—“completing the circle”—riding through the brush and laying flat on their saddles. He mentioned this to French, but French mistook the riders for Custer’s men. PVT Lorentz was killed here, shot in the neck, the bullet exiting his mouth. He simply fell forward in his saddle, then dropped to the ground. The Indians were firing at the troops from all sides. Ryan told French “The best thing that we can do is to cut right through them.” [242]
31. Reno, wearing a red handkerchief on his head to replace his lost hat, yelled, “Any of you men who wish to make your escape, follow me.” [242]
32. The order was given to charge and they made their way up the steep embankment to the prairie, fighting in some cases, hand to hand. [242]
33. They went back over the ground they had come, then circled left to the river, trying to gain the bluffs at the nearest point. [242]
34. “In my opinion, if Reno had remained in the timber a short time longer not a man would have made his escape as the Indians outnumbered us 10 to one.” [243]
35. When they reached Reno Hill, they looked back as saw the Indians had fired the prairie. [243]
36. After most men reached the top of the hill—“the companies were formed”—the firing ceased and they were joined by Benteen’s command. “Soon after, the pack train arrived… which was very fortunate, as our ammunition was nearly exhausted…” [243]
37. When they reached Weir Peaks, they saw what they believed were Indians “firing scattering shots,” at what they believed were Custer’s wounded. [243]
38. As they looked downstream, the men saw a very large party of Indians riding toward the Indian camp. “The prairie around the village and the first battlefield was all afire, having been set by the Indians to hide their movements.” [243]
39. When they got back on Reno Hill, the firing became very intense, very rapid, and in some cases, at very close range. [244]
40. CPT French was extremely brave. He carried a Springfield rifle, .50 caliber, breech-loader. [244] [It was called a “Long Tom.”]
41. As dark set in, the firing stopped. [244]
42. At night, ammo and rations were distributed, but the command suffered from lack of water. They also heard a trumpet call and Reno ordered it answered. It was probably done by an Indian trying to draw them out. [244]
43. Just before daylight on the morning of the 26th, two shots rang out signaling the onslaught. The Indians advanced, trying to cut through the troops. [244]
44. Benteen told Reno he needed more men to hold the Indians off and Reno sent French’s M Company. Benteen charged, driving the Indians off. This was around the highest part of the hills [Benteen Hill]. [244]
45. PVT Tanner was badly wounded and Ryan and three men retrieved him from the side of the bluffs, but he died shortly thereafter. PVT Voight, trying to help French’s horse, was shot through the head. They buried Tanner and Voight in the same grave on the hill. [245]
46. Late in the day the Indians’ firing slackened, but there were some shots fired from the high hills to the north [Probably from Sharpshooters’ Ridge]. They were out of the carbine’s range, so French asked Ryan if he could use his Sharp’s .45-caliber telescope rifle. [Ryan had it made for $100 in Bismarck.] That chased the Indians. [245]
47. They watched as the Indians dismantled their village and began moving away. “It was the largest body of Indians that I ever saw move together at one time.” [245]
48. The last shots fired were fired by French and Ryan with their two longer-range rifles. [245]
49. Ryan said his company went into the battle with 45 men . He said 14 were killed [should be 13] and 10 wounded. [246]
50. After Terry’s arrival they destroyed all the extra equipment and weapons, not being able to carry them. They also killed all the horses they thought would not make it back alive. [246]
51. Reno’s men began to head toward the Custer battlefield to bury the dead. “At the end of this bluff there was a ford, and I think Custer attempted to cross at that point to the Indian’s camp, as we found some of the bodies of his men lying there. Those were the first bodies we found belonging to Custer’s command.” [246] [Obviously Ford B.]
52. [Ryan fell hook, line, and sinker for the Curley tale. He even included things I hadn’t heard before: Curley pretending to fight with the Sioux, then escaping.] [246 – 247]
53. Ryan praises Benteen for saving the command. He also touts Dr. Porter’s bravery and Porter’s acknowledgement of the help of LT Mathey in establishing barricades and Fred Gerard in helping with the wounded. Apparently, Gerard had some medical knowledge. [247] [Ryan’s opinion of Mathey may be more in line with the truth than Benteen’s. Benteen apparently thought Mathey was spending entirely too much time among the packs, but then that was his duty at this point and Porter probably needed all the help he could get, especially from an officer.]
54. Ryan said the men all wore high-topped boots. They found almost all the lower parts of the boots near the bodies, the leather upper parts being cut away. [347]
1923—Graham, W. A., COL, The Custer Myth. From the Billings, MT, Gazette, June 25, 1923. Drawn from a work by Fred Dustin, “Some Aftermath of the Little Big Horn Fight in 1876: The Burial of the Dead.”
“The company commanders went in a body over the field, to find the bodies of the commissioned officers. The first sergeants of each troop had orders to advance with their companies over a certain space of the field, burying what men were found, and keeping an account of the number and who they were…. The burials did not amount to much, as we had only a few tools, so we simply dug up a little earth beside the bodies and threw it over them. In a great many instances their arms and legs protruded…. Some of the companies burying those men had no shovels. They had a few axes and chopped down some sagebrush and put it over the bodies. I also saw where 20 or 28 men belonging to Company ‘E,’ Lieut. Smith’s ‘Gray Horse Troop,’… had gotten into a ravine. They traveled into the ravine quite a distance, until it got so steep they could not get out, and we saw the marks where they tried to get out of there, and where afterwards they were shot by the Indians and fell back into the ravine.” [364]
Best wishes,
Fred.
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Post by El Crab on Apr 22, 2012 0:22:32 GMT -5
Wow!Steve... thank you. Thank you a lot, as a matter of fact. If you don't mind adding to that... ... my objective here-- or my goal-- is to combine as many diverse sources into one profile, even if there is some duplication. I have to adjust some of my own commentary-- El Crab suggested this in a different vein, in a different thread-- into something less "opinionated" and more "explanatory." That would allow the reader to make the judgments for himself... though I think some direction may be warranted. Anyway, I am delighted, Steve, that you find it worthwhile and believe me when I say it, I am open to all fair criticism and all suggestions on how it can be made a better effort. Best wishes, Fred. Sounds like the perfect companion piece to the book you already wrote, if you ask me. You're probably right about Hardorff, though. I pulled out one of his books, looking for an example and couldn't find one. I know what I spoke of exists, it's just not as prevalent as I remembered it to be. The one thing I remember that probably triggered this response is something to do with Lame White Man and the location of his attack. While it seems these days that some place the attack against C Company to the south, it is not proven. There are still those who think it was against E Company above Deep Ravine. So I think putting footnotes stating for certain where this attack took place is a bit disingenous. Not because it is incorrect, but because it is not proven. And I'm not sure if it ever can be. Leave it to the reader who bought the book for the sources to decide what to make of it. But regardless, I'm glad you took it to heart. If you're offering the sources as a stand-alone in a book, those accounts should be free of any opinions, even in footnotes. I don't buy those kinds of books for the editor(s)' opinions, I buy them so I may read them without influence and make up my own mind. As far as Camp goes, I think a simple introduction that talks about his methods (and the flaws of said methods) suffices. And I believe most that buy the books featuring Camp's notes already know what they're getting. Again, it's up to the reader to determine what to glean from the information. That's why they bought a source book, right? I hope you get that book done and published, Fred. I'd buy it in a heartbeat. |
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