A TACTICAL STUDY OF THE BIGHORN CAMPAIGN

[bigpond]

By COLONEL T. M. COUGHLAN, U. S. A., Retired

From THE CAVALRY JOURNAL, January-February, 1934

www.rootsweb.com/~nalakota/wotw/military/tacticalstudy_wotw033034.htm

[weir]

A little critic of the article conclusion :

The division of the command into four columns none of which was within supporting distance of any of the others and entirely without inter-communication of any kind.
That's false. Historians conclude on the exact contrary. See Michno (4,294), Fox (314-315)...

Absence of a plan of battle. a remark too ridiculous to argue against

Lack of any communications whatever.
Colonel Coughlan just forgot Sergant Kanipe (Custer-MacDougall), Trumpeter Martini (Custer-Benteen) and Privates Mitchell and MacIlargy (Reno-Custer). Custer is said to have showed himself from Weir Point to Reno's men while they were fighting in their first skirmish line.

Inadequate reconnaissance. Benteen was sent to make a reconnaissance in force. Custer was in a hurry.

Underestimating strength of enemy. Custer waited for 1000-1500 warriors. There were 1500 warriors at LBH. No underestimation.

Custer's actively commanding a part of the force, thereby losing control over the greater portion of his command.
No kidding ? He sent Keogh and kept for himself the left wing. Yes, it is true that after 2h30 of fighting against seven to one, he was overhelmed... Is that a tactical error... Colonel Coughlan made no comments about the 2/3 of the outfit which dind't answer to the call... Not by Custer's fault.

Failure to keep his promise of support to Reno and subsequent failure to apprise the latter of the change in his maneuver. Is that a joke ? And the reciprocity ??

This article doesn't worth a clue.

[bigpond]

Different name,same old song

[weir]

All what I wrote is known. Maybe not by you, but by LBH scholars.

[alfuso]

West: I think Pennington puts a lot of that rot to rest, too.

Big Pond: some would have us believe that a competant commander of horse, who knew as much as any of his contemporaries about Indian fighting (he got within attacking distance of an Indian village in summer. Something rarely done by the Army before, let alone an entire regiment) and all of a sudden forgot everything he ever knew about commanding?

Uh uh.

alfuso

[weir]

alfuso said:

West: I think Pennington puts a lot of that rot to rest, too.

Big Pond: some would have us believe that a competant commander of horse, who knew as much as any of his contemporaries about Indian fighting (he got within attacking distance of an Indian village in summer. Something rarely done by the Army before, let alone an entire regiment) and all of a sudden forgot everything he ever knew about commanding?

Uh uh.

alfuso

The conclusion of the official history of LBH at the time was : the battle was lost before it began.
This story had a real use : it says to the reader to study the decision of the attack instead of the unfolding of it.