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Post by Diane Merkel on Jun 29, 2007 10:45:43 GMT -6
Many have made comparisons between these two events. Here's an excerpt from a press release about a new book: Little Bighorn & Isandlwana by Paul Williams is a startling new history of how two great soldiers underestimated their enemy, which ultimately led to their devastating defeats.
Two of the 19th century's most enduring legends are the Battle of Little Bighorn and the Battle of Isandlwana. Three years after Custer's troops were defeated, the redcoat troops of Queen Victoria fought to gain control of Zulu lands in South Africa, suffering a stunningly unexpected defeat. Both battles, suggests author Paul Williams, offer a strong case for the dilemma of history repeating itself, as well as a penetrating analysis of two prideful leaders. Press Release: www.prweb.com/releases/2007/6/prweb536340.htm
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Post by westerner on Jun 29, 2007 11:28:48 GMT -6
The danger in such comparisons is that by looking at one battle through the lens of an other you distort both, by playing up minor connecting threads and ignoring the larger differences. The Zulus and American Indians have little in common, so far as I can see, in their manner of fighting. The Zulus, from what I've read, were rather organized, fighting in columns (the "Horn" movement), and were extremely confrontational, daring to charge with great losses. The Indians were anything but. Each man was his own master, but as a group they rarely got in close to an enemy unless their opponent was already running. Individual warriors might charge standing groups of soldiers, like Yellow Nose at LBH, but those incidents were noteworthy because both individual and rare.
A study placing the Little Bighorn in context with other Indian battles of the period, and vice versa with Isandlwana, would be more fruitful I think. I get an impression that this guy just wanted to write about his two favorite battles, and has probably been reading about the two of them too exclusively. Not encouraged by the blurb adding: ''Little Bighorn & Isandlwana is a wholly unique book that details the similarities between these two great battles, while also suggesting parallels with the current war in Iraq,'' which screams armchair.
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 29, 2007 11:47:07 GMT -6
Are we talking about the battle or the causes for it?
There were some similarities between the two battles: ultimatums given, rumors of uprisings and violence, and supposedly invincible modern Western army against native forces leading to shocking defeat.
The reasons for the battle were the same wherever Western Colonial powers went and wanted the land and its resources.
It's the causes that are more important than the battles.
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Post by BrokenSword on Jun 29, 2007 12:15:33 GMT -6
Westerner-
I agree with you 100%, but it doesn't stop with these two battles. Any number of engagements stretching back into antiquity could be compared with either LBH or Isandlwana (personally, I'm still working on how to pronounce that one, even after forty years of effort). The Romans, Egyptians, Babylonians - ALL, have suffered military humiliations at the hands of ‘less advanced’ peoples and their ‘inferior’ cultures and armies. Arrogance along with the inevitable underestimations it fosters are the common denominator. Period.
I haven’t read this book and probably won’t. The equating of either LBH or Isandlwana with the current struggle in Iraq betrays a purpose out of place within a serious study of the stated subject. Doubtless, in my mind, a sophomoric lesson tailored to the vulnerabilities of the layman‘s knowledge of either history or current events. Somewhat like 'The Di Vinci Code'.
M
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Post by BrokenSword on Jun 29, 2007 12:30:09 GMT -6
P. S. -
God bless and protect our friends in England and the UK on this frightening and distressful day. They deserve better.
M
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Post by romulus on Jul 12, 2007 0:58:41 GMT -6
It surprises me that people will comment on a book they have not read. I have read this, and found it most illuminating. As regards the Zulu and Sioux fighting differently, the author points out that on this occasion the Indians inadvertently formed the 'horns of the buffalo' - the braves between the village and Custer forming the 'head' and the braves sweeping up on either side the 'horns'. I can't remember anything about Iraq except for a reference to a 'shock and awe' campaign. Perhaps the reader can fill in the gaps, but the writer did not, the book concentrating on the repetition of history right down to the Reno/Barton commands opening each battle with a similar deployment. But for me the most intriguing part was the analysis of Custer sending Benteen off to the south. The writer puts forward a compelling argument that Benteen was originally never meant to be in the fight because of their feud. And at the end there's a surprise revelation about Custer's presidential ambitions. It's a good read for all LBH scholars.
R
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Post by markland on Jul 12, 2007 1:29:28 GMT -6
It surprises me that people will comment on a book they have not read. I have read this, and found it most illuminating. As regards the Zulu and Sioux fighting differently, the author points out that on this occasion the Indians inadvertently formed the 'horns of the buffalo' - the braves between the village and Custer forming the 'head' and the braves sweeping up on either side the 'horns'. I can't remember anything about Iraq except for a reference to a 'shock and awe' campaign. Perhaps the reader can fill in the gaps, but the writer did not, the book concentrating on the repetition of history right down to the Reno/Barton commands opening each battle with a similar deployment. But for me the most intriguing part was the analysis of Custer sending Benteen off to the south. The writer puts forward a compelling argument that Benteen was originally never meant to be in the fight because of their feud. And at the end there's a surprise revelation about Custer's presidential ambitions. It's a good read for all LBH scholars. R Haven't read the book and am not commenting on the book. The Plains Indian mode of war was rarely frontal attacks. They tried that at the Hayfield and Wagon Box fights and learned from their defeats. Indians, based upon my little readings on the subject, always attempted to penetrate a perceived weak point. If they instigated the "horns of the buffalo", it was in a tribal set-piece battle or it occurred during the dynamics of a flowing Indian attack. Billy
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Post by crzhrs on Jul 12, 2007 7:58:57 GMT -6
Most Western military tactics are similar: flanking, massive frontal assaults, hitting from different directions.
Indigenous People's means of attacks are mostly similar: ambush, feints, traps, hit-and-run, seek out weak points, separate large units into smaller ones to make it easier to defeat.
At the LBH the Indians were caught off guard, but quickly regrouped and took advantage of the 7th's failures, separation of command, and poor terrain for cavalry attack.
Once the element of surprise and offense was lost the 7th quickly disintegrated. The division of command and separation was a key element of their defeat.
And let's not forget to give credit to the Indians for their victory.
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Post by elisabeth on Jul 12, 2007 8:28:20 GMT -6
The difference in tactics possibly reflects the difference in social organisation? The Zulus had a monarchy, and thus top-down direction of their entire force. Hence being able to attack en masse, and hence willingness to sustain casualties the Indians wouldn't and couldn't have stood for. The Indians, by contrast, were operating as autonomous individuals within broadly family groupings. Their tactics were designed to inflict maximum damage with minimum loss. A king can afford to lose a few hundred subjects to win a battle, but a family can't afford to lose even one breadwinner (and loved relative) if it can possibly be avoided.
The similarities on the white side, however, are strong. It would be interesting to know what lessons, if any, the British army thought it had drawn from LBH. In view of the outcome at Isandlwana, possibly nothing but smugness -- "that would never happen to us".
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Aug 9, 2007 12:15:48 GMT -6
I haven't read the book but I am not convinced that there are similarities between the two battles. There are though, similar causes for the two campaigns which led to two quite unexpected tragic outcomes. In each case an aggressive expansionist policy fuelled by the drive to implement economic development led to contrived reasons to wage war against native peoples who were regarded as being wasteful of land and mineral wealth by not exploiting them. The other common factor was racial arrogance. Neither the U.S. Army commands in 1876 nor the British troops under Lord Chelmsford in 1879 anticipated any significant problems in dealing with so-called inferior people armed with inferior weaponry. To my mind there are only superficial points of comparison between the actual battles, but because their names are so well known I guess they have been exploited to sell the book.
"Hunk" Papa
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Post by crzhrs on Aug 9, 2007 12:57:15 GMT -6
Another similar aspect between the two:
Both Western governments gave unrealistic ultimatums knowing full well they would not be accepted, thus "proving" the Natives were unwilling to resolve issues.
The similarities between the two battles may be similar to many other types of wars/battles fought between Western forces and Indigenous people. In the end it was always about taking the land and resources with half-hearted attempts at civilizing the natives.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Aug 10, 2007 4:14:56 GMT -6
crzhrs you are absolutely right and what saddens me most about it is that the so called civilized peoples purport to hold the moral high ground. All morals however, sink to the lowest depths where there is a profit to be made. It is even more apparent now.
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