Custer's Distance from the Packs

[mcaryf]

I have constructed 4 Google images to show roughly the relative positions of Custer's column, Reno, Benteen and the Packs at 30 minute intervals from 1530 until 1700. I then measured the straight line distance between Custer and the packs at each time. I leave you to draw your own conclusions about whether he was really expecting the packs to catch up with him.

Sorry about this having some trouble with my images!

1530 Distance 5.9 miles




1600 Distance 4.98 miles




1630 Distance 4.47 Miles




1700 Distance 5.39 miles

[PhillyBlair]

Mike -- great stuff as usual. Thanks. Very interesting.

[Dark Cloud]

The distance as a bird flies is deceptive. If you look at the B photos, to take a train of mules straight 'overland' would have been a disaster beyond recall and exhausted and destroyed the train. This assumes they knew where Custer was or had any choice but to follow his trail. You have to follow the grain of the land with pack animals.

[PhillyBlair]

Agreed. This is why I've never bought into the argument that Custer knew the packs would arrive shortly. Boston's report had to be troubling to Custer, assuming he didn't already know the extent of the distance already.

DC -- You're sharp on this stuff -- have you ever calculated just how long it might have taken the packs to get to Custer? Let's say to the Calhoun sector as a middle point.

[elisabeth]

That would be a useful calculation. On the other hand, if Martini's to be believed, at the time Custer sent the "bring packs" message all the signs were that he was about to charge through the village virtually unopposed. So whatever his later wishes may have been, at that moment he's unlikely to have meant "bring them to where I am now"; more likely, "bring them to the general vicinity". (Maybe that's why he gave Benteen the responsibility for them -- knowing he was experienced enough to read the situation when he arrived and put them wherever was most sensible in the light of the the state of the battle at that time. As it could be argued he did.) He might at that stage have visualised them stopping either on the flats before Ford A, or up on the bluffs.

Actually, I'm beginning to incline towards your idea of a possible third messenger. Once Custer realises Reno's retreated, and starts moving north himself, the situation with Benteen/packs is totally different from what it was when he sent the Martini order. He'd almost have to try to countermand or change it -- unless he's still relying on Benteen's common sense to do the appropriate thing for the changed situation.

[Mike Powell]

Mcaryf,

Your work with Google is impressive. For my simple mind if a picture is worth a thousand words, a 3-d map is worth 10 times that. Even though DC's point on direct line distance not being the most applicable is something I think all readily agree, setting a visual framework does wonders for many of us. I am interested in attempting to reconcile your plottings with Gray. the table below is my starting point. First I assume you and Gray are on the same clock, then post in the miles as at 3:30 and 4:00. Gray's miles are Custer Route Miles From Lone Teepee (which he makes as 8 route miles west from the Divide). Custer To packs as I show it is of course the subtraction of Gray's miles for the Packs from his miles for Custer. So far so good, except the results in Custer Route Miles are too close to your straight line distance miles. I did this fairly rapid and may have blown something, but would like to go further. Could you provide more info on where your plottings for Custer and the Train are at the times in question. I might be able to guesstimate the location of MTC, Lone Teepee, etc in GE, but I'd trust your info over my guesses.



As to the question of how long for the packs to close with Custer, Gray calculates their speed at 3 mph from the Divide forward, but shows the ammo packs sprinting the last mile and 1/4 to Reno Hill at 4.5 mph. I think any way you look at when Custer or whoever commands the battalion makes the decision to move Northwest from MTC and opens the distance to the packs and all other elements of the command, rather than turning back southeast and closing the distance, all bets for survival are off.

Perhaps AZ Ranger could opine on mule speed. Always nice to ground anything in reality.

[mcaryf]

Hi Mike and DC

I include below an illustration of distance from Lone Tepi to Reno Hill and the probable actual route that for example Benteen took.
John Gray uses a uniform figure for all units as the distance between points and his for Lone Tepi to Reno Hill is 4.75 miles. Well the Google distance measure on the straight line as shown is 4.77 miles whilst the probable Benteen route path is 5.27 miles.

I take Lone Teoi as being opposite mouth of S Reno Creek which is Gray's assumption.

Thus it seems in this case at least that Gray was using a straight line measure, I guess off a map.

I deliberately chose different points of view for my 4 images above so you could see when the straight line might be a doubtful approach. For example the 1600 shot shown from Custer's perspective shows Cedar Coulee and you can see that it has diverted him further from the village - and obviously demonstrates that he sometimes cannot go in a straight line.

I think, however, that it does illustrate the point that he was pretty well moving away from the packs as fast they could reasonably catch up with him.

Regards

Mike

[Dark Cloud]

Custer would not have moved east and north willingly. He'd seen the village from Weir and environs, this absurd notion he'd feint a threatened attack and then move to indefensible land to wait can't be denigrated enough. He was driven there against his will, and any messenger south was a no go after he made contact. Trying to construct a text book military reason for every move in order to elevate Custer has the opposite desired effect. He sounds like an idiot when these things are trotted out.

It's not like every ammo mule was brought forward. To hurry them required a horse each to drag them to speed. Hare's message only brought a few of the ammo mules forward, perhaps only one, I can't recall.

Although most grok this, Gray doesn't contend a perpetual uniform speed, he is in no way saying the mules all marched at 3mph, but that with stopping and running to catch up and all between, the mule train averaged 3mph straight line on a map, not just that day, but most. When he postulates a speed, if it's possible and falls roughly at what a reasonable gait would be for a horse, then he goes with it, not feeling the need to point out that soldiers might run up a hill and walk down the other side which offers a speed not incompable with a trot which they might do on the flats as well. The real distances covered by the 7th that day are way more than a flat map point to point suggests.

I don't know how Google tabulates distance, but if it factors in the land, it will give greater distance than a flat map. I don't think it does, though.

[Mike Powell]

Mike,

I agree that Gray's 4.75 mile Lone Tepee-Reno Hill is straight line. I hit your 4.77 with GE and that confirms with Montana Atlas and Gazetteer. Somehow I'm still measuring a smidge over 6 miles on a cut and paste of two USGS 7.5 Minute Series (which leaves my blood a little cold). May I ask what your GE measure from Lone Tepee to Divide Marker gives? I'm at 7.1 miles, with concerns about my placement of the Divide Marker. I'd like to compare a solid GE figure to Gray's 8 miles.

Thanks,

Mike P

[mcaryf]

Hi Mike

If you try to follow the course of Reno Creek from the Divide to Lone Tepi then I get 8.02 miles which I am happy with. I can understand that John Gray would not know the various routes taken from LT to Reno Hill by the different units so I guess he compromised with a straight line measure.

To be brutally honest I find John Gray's work to be consistently suspect whenever he is trying to find a reason to criticise Benteen. Making the route from LT to Reno Hill apparently shorter than it is supports his criticism of Benteen's tardiness whilst when Custer does the same route there is a water halt at North Reno Creek so no fair comparison.

I cannot remember, Mike, if you were active on the board when my Google Earth paper re Benteen's mission to the left was being discussed. In that I reckon I found pretty convincing evidence that Benteen and the packs were later at the Morass than John Gray allows. Thus I find Gray's criticism of Benteen delaying between the Morass and the LT quite unfounded. Also when I investigated his use of evidence for a messenger being sent from Reno Hill to the packs it seemed to be very suspect again. It is a shame because a lot of his research is excellent, he just seems to have a bias against Benteen that impacts his judgement.

Hi DC

I do not agree with your estimate that Custer was driven from MTC to his final death at LSH. The pattern of bodies seems to be against that - if he was driven there would be more near MTC. The theory I currently favour is that Custer was not actually expecting that the Indians would come out and attack him (this was his final misjudgement) and that his manoeuvres were an attempt to convince the Indians that any movement to the East was blocked. He would not, in my view at this stage, be expecting Benteen to rush round to the East as well. He knew how fast the packs could travel rather better than most people on this board. My guess is that he wanted Benteen, the packs and hopefully Reno's remnants to be in position to deter the Indians from moving South. Thus with East and South blocked and the Big Horn in flood to the West the Indians are likely to move North which would fit in with Terry's plan.


Regards

Mike

[AZ Ranger]

One would hope the ammunition was on the best mules of the string. It is harder to move much faster than a trot because you are carrying dead weight and not a rider which can help a horse or mule by moving and shifting weight. As to speed of a few mules rather than the whole pack train it would be expected to be faster. Without knowing the weight of the ammo boxes and the size of the mules and condition of the animals on that day the average speed for a trot should be about right.

Looking at the maps the quickest way for the mules is to get in the valley and head toward the village. I would agree with DC those ups and downs wear out the mules more than the actual difference if flattened out and will require stopping to blow(rest).

If Custer thought Reno was staying at or near the village and he was riding through it, then the quickest way for the ammo along with the supporting troopers and Benteen would be to all converge on the village not from going to Custer cross country but by following Reno and meeting Custer in the village.

AZ Ranger

[Dark Cloud]

WHAT pattern of bodies? What are you basing that on mcaryf?

Contact does not necessarily mean bodies would be there. So close the village, they may have been dragged into the camp or elsewhere or dumped in the river to float away. I don't know, just saying.

And, if what I suspect happened is true, an early shot wounding a Custer would explain it as well. I cannot believe any cavalry officer would willingly go to where Custer and Keogh went, either on 'the offensive' or to be without cover on raised ground to fight on foot, surrendering all mobility.

Second, I really think you (and everyone) needs to have an Afternoon Activity of descrambling the markers as they are to what 1877 photos and 1879 testimony actually show and say. There's much variation possible, of course, but for the point that doesn't matter. It looks very different without the 20% spurious, the 28 plus or minus out of sight in the gully of your choice, and the remaining markers spread out, some threading down the road to Keogh and others up around the monument, with Reed and Boston far down where McGuire marked them. The image of that compact grouping is hard to shake, and it isn't remotely representative of the reality as described and gives a false impression of a coherence not at work. Custer was found at the apex of an arrow, which is absolutely NOT where an organized defensive position would place him.

[mcaryf]

Hi DC

I am not basing what I think on the markers more the comments of the first men over the ground who said there were no bodies down near the MTC Ford so it did not look as if there had been a battle there. It is hard to imagine why Custer would be driven to LSH from the MTC area unless there had been some major fight there,. This means he must have moved to a large extent of his own volition. The vast majority of the Indians had to get over the river from the West side to fight him thus he had to have a choice to go North or South and if he was under lots of pressure the obvious route to choose is South where he has both some idea of the ground and that his support would come from that direction.

Regards

Mike

[blaque]

Mike,

As to possibility of a fight in the MTC area, remember that besides the Indian accounts we also have Thompson’s account about a dismounted line of troopers making a fighting withdrawal from the bluffs overlooking the MT/DC ford, as well as Server’s & Sheridan’s statements that they saw 3 or 4 dead bodies/empty graves on that very place. May be the reason why that retreat did not leave a string of dead along the route was that Custer (or whoever commanded there) chose to retreat northwards before the mounting pressure coming from other directions became unbearable.

[mcaryf]

Hi Blaque

I think my point still stands that the main pressure such as it was would be coming from the village area across the river, thus Custer should have had a choice whether to move North or South.

The line from RA Fox etc is that there was not much pressure anyway. So it is either not much pressure or pressure from the West both of which give Custer the choice as to which way he moves.

Even if there were four bodies that is still not an indication of a hard fight - less than 2% casualties.

Regards

Mike