Clues from the Washita re: Custer at LBH

[alanw]

Any clues from the Washita regarding Custers actions at LBH?

1. Custer split his command, as he was to later do at LBH

2. At Washita Benteen was initially held in reserve, till it was clearer how battle panned out, but was soon called into action

3. Custer attacked Washita without knowing true size and number of warriors. It materialized that there were in fact several villages and many warriors, although Custer took some convincing by Godfrey to the true extent of the number of warriors.

4. Most interestingly, although I know Custer had Indian captives, he was somewhat reluctant to engage the new arrivals.
He would have had more troops under his direct command at Washita and faced less hostiles. Therefore how reluctant must he have been to attack at LBH once he was aware of number of warriors there

Alan

[Dark Cloud]

That's misleading. There were various villages miles away from the specific one of Southern Cheyennes Custer was after. They were not camped together in any sense. Relatively near. Custer outnumbered the village he was after, which he caught by surprise at dawn.

[alanw]

That's misleading. There were various villages miles away from the specific one of Southern Cheyennes Custer was after. They were not camped together in any sense. Relatively near. Custer outnumbered the village he was after, which he caught by surprise at dawn.

Sorry if the distance was misleading, but the proximity was enough to alarm Godfrey, who noticed large numbers of warriors covering the distance in good time. It still seems from testimony that Custer was unaware there were other villages even miles from Washita - certainly not containing large quantities of hostiles.

Still I suppose Custer 'knew' by taking captives it would nullify the threat of other warriors.

Alan

[Dark Cloud]

I don't know that he knew that at all, or even if it were true Indians honored hostages from other tribes held by soldiers. Ben Clark, his scout, apparently suggested making a move towards the other villages in a bluff, pulling the captives with them, and the Indians retreated. But Custer had hardly killed all or most of the warriors in BK's village, and whether or not anyone besides southern Cheyenne did more than watch long distance shooting can't really be known. Their ponies were starving like themselves, and unlikely fit to take on the 7th.

But the episode calls into question the whole captive issue. If hostages were viewed as precious by the Indians, why was Custer concerned at all? He had them. Just march off. If hostages weren't all that valuable, and Custer knew it, a large fantasy of LBH theory falls apart. I've never been convinced hostages were the silver bullet; rather, they were a tarbaby for the supposed hostage holders surrounded by greater numbers. I cannot imagine Gall, having lost his wife and kids, giving a rat's behind. He was gonna get him some wasichu blood and a lot of it. Some Cheyenne babes get hurt? That's life.

[crzhrs]

Other than dividing the command there were many differences between the Washita & LBH.

1: Late Nov. with snow on the ground

2: Dawn attack while Indians were asleep

3: Level ground

4: Pawnee scouts were far more aggressive in their action than the Crows & Rees

5: It was Black Kettle and not Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse, Low Dog, Crow King, Gall, etc.

[alanw]

crzhrs

Other than dividing the command there were many differences between the Washita & LBH.

Sorry crzhrs, I really should be clearer with my posts. I meant what similarities were there between Washita & LBH and what clues were there generally from Washita as too Custer's intended/surmised/actual actions at LBH.

Alan - aka W W Cooke

[crzhrs]

A surprise attack on an Indian village was the Cavalry best chances of success. However, that surprise was best applied at a dawn attack, preferrably during winter when Indians were usually camped in permanent villages or stayed longer in one place.

Dividing the command and hitting the camp from SIMULTANEOUS attacks would give Indians few directions to run resulting in many casualties or forced into surrender.

All these factors may have resulted in a costly victory at the LBH, but it was not summer, it was not a dawn attack, and the divided commands were to separated for simultaneous attacks or even to support one another in critical moments.

Again, I go back to the military's phobia of Indians running costing Custer to make decisions at the LBH which bore little resemblance to the factors at the Washita (other than the surprise attack at the lower end of the village which was quickly countered due to it being mid-afternoon). Custer's plans were made on the fly and by the time he, Reno, & Benteen realized what they were up against the die had been cast for the LBH debacle.

[PhillyBlair]

Alan, I agree with crzhrs regarding the differences, but I also believe you're right to bring up the similarities. We need to remember just how little experience Custer (or anyone) had in fighting Indians. Washita was a huge piece of that experience, and almost certainly had to play into Custer's thinking. To me, the whole campaign had Washita in mind in planning the multi-pronged attack and attempting to have one wing run Indians toward the other. The army was certain they would find satellite villages, and they would flee. At LBH, I believe Custer was using Benteen to avoid another Major Elliott political disaster. If there were satellite villages, he wanted to know right away. Also, I can't help but consider that Elliott was on his mind when his casualties began to mount. Could he ever have made a run for it, or did he need to guard his wounded no matter what? All of this stemmed from Washita.

[Dark Cloud]

Elliott was going up on charges at the time of his death for shooting deserters. Had it gone to trial of some sort, who would he have referenced for an alibi?

[PhillyBlair]

So his death was intentional?

[AZ Ranger]

A Brevet or a coffin

[PhillyBlair]

No, my question was -- was he abandoned intentionally? Or am I misinterpreting the issue regarding the charges?

AZ -- that has always been a nice phrase, but when push comes to shove, I wonder how many soldiers actually thought that way in the field? I know there are many brave vets who post here. Can anyone who has served testify to going into battle with that mindset? Did a star, brevet or medal mean more to you than your life (or the lives of your brothers in arms) at any point?

[AZ Ranger]

While the turmoil was at its height, Major Elliott, seeing a group of Indians escaping down the valley, called for volunteers to make pursuit. Sergeant Major Walter Kennedy and eighteen other men responded. As the detachment moved away Elliott turned to Lieutenant Hale, waved his hand, and called cheerily:

"Here goes for a brevet or a coffin!"

[AZ Ranger]

Can anyone who has served testify to going into battle with that mindset? Did a star, brevet or medal mean more to you than your life (or the lives of your brothers in arms) at any point?

The answer to your question which really restricts the nature of what I believe happens is I don't know. Major Elliot didn't say it before the battle but during. If your asking for a Vet that has personally done that then it is limited to those that got the Brevet. Have I seen or participated in similar behavior that in hindsight that resulted in either the answer is yes. Private Cool, his real name, said "Are we marines or ... "although not the same words it was honor or death and a private wasn't going to get a brevet.

Fred or other officers if present maybe could speak for some that would risk themselves and their troops on a high risk mission. It seems to me a mute point if you look at the Brevet and medal winning examples in the 7th cavalry.

AZ Ranger

[elisabeth]

Blair,

Not sure if this helps (and I certainly can't speak as a "brave vet"!) but there's a nice paragraph on this in SOTMS. Connell says re the brevet-or-coffin line: "Whether this exit line occurred to him spontaneously or whether he had rehearsed it is not known, but it does recall similar epigrams. Colonel Bennet Riley, for instance, told Jefferson Davis that he would win a yellow sash or six feet of Mexican soil. Brigadier William J. Worth called to Zachary Taylor at Monterrey that he would have a grade or a grave. Navy Lt. William Barker Cushing was heard to say when he went off to sink the Confederate Albemarle: 'Another stripe or a coffin'. No doubt such sentiments have echoed across battlefields from Philippi to Guadalcanal and beyond."

Whether the motivation really was that ambition meant more than life itself is another matter. Maybe it was simply a good way of psyching themselves up?

Intriguing idea re Elliott being deliberately eliminated! Some have suggested that Hamilton's death was the result of a failed attempt to frag Custer ... and Benteen said something cryptic about Custer trying to get him killed at Washita ... so perhaps there was a lot of it around!

Hmmm. Do you think Reno could have thought he was being Elliotted in more ways than one? Not just abandoned, but deliberately sent on a suicide mission? He was scoring high on the Custer displeasure chart at the time, after all ...