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Post by elisabeth on Sept 11, 2006 1:21:49 GMT -6
Gordie,
I wonder. You're right, of course, it's more than hard enough trying to figure out what did happen. But the what-ifs must have loomed large in the minds of the survivors. If only I'd done this ... If I'd done that instead, would it all have turned out differently ... And so on. Is it possible that looking at the more practical of the what-ifs could help us with an understanding of the post-battle evasions and obfuscations -- especially the RCOI evidence? If we could be clear in our minds as to what other genuine options they had, but failed to take, it just might help us. (Or might not ...)
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Post by Hostler on Sept 11, 2006 8:45:24 GMT -6
That's the point I was trying to make exactly. Not so much of a what if, but trying to understand what Weir might have been going through after the thing was over. He wanted so badly to help his comrades but over-reacted from the get-go. He may have felt responsible for things that were actually out of his control. I've also always been baffled that Benteen let Weir make the choice at the fork in the trail. Why he didn't ask Martini the correct way to go, and so on. When he didn't ask directions it became a coin flip, and Weir made a decision that may have haunted himself the rest of his life.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 11, 2006 8:55:48 GMT -6
Given there was no reason to think Custer was in particular danger either at the morass or even on Reno Hill, why is Weir credited with, at the time, concern for him? It's just as likely, or more so, that he was worried he himself wouldn't be part of the victory, and not mentioned well in the victory report.
Because he died six months, it's quietly assumed he was consumed with guilt. He drank a lot, he may have been personally thrilled Custer got nailed and felt guilty about that.
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Post by Hostler on Sept 11, 2006 9:49:34 GMT -6
There might not have been a sense that Custer was in particular danger, but Benteen testified at the C.O.I. that when Martin gave him the note from Cooke saying "Come on, be quick, bring pacs" he showed the note to Weir. If neither got any sense of urgency from that, then they were both numb. Also Benteen testifies he ordered the Battalion forward at a trot, so to his credit he at least felt he needed to get up front quick. For whatever reason, Weir got ahead of himself, screwed up, and took the wrong path. If it didn't weigh on his mind later then he truly was numb.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 11, 2006 10:37:50 GMT -6
There is nothing scary in the note; in fact, it's less urgent than the one Kanipe claims he carried ('overland....dropping boxes...'). Custer was West Point and allegedly knew how to give specific orders to remove the need for interpretation. Some military guys to this day see nothing all that urgent about it, and it could easily be interpreted to mean little more than bring the packs as fast as possible (which ain't fast....) and be prepared to pillage big village.
I've said previously that I'd bet virtually every action produces guilt in officers and men about what could have been done better, faster, more completely, and if so perhaps this guy or those guys might have made it. A bunch of interactive 50-50 calls made on a dime that involve the lives of friends or peers has got to be tough to deal with. (I base this solely on reading and conversations with combat vets.) It's a safe bet everybody who survived this battle had that standared issue battle guilt as well. To damn Weir, Benteen, or Reno for this and implying above the norm has no particular basis.
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Post by Hostler on Sept 11, 2006 11:36:54 GMT -6
Yada yada yada..................
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Post by harpskiddie on Sept 11, 2006 12:29:18 GMT -6
Hostler:
I think DC is partially correct. There is no sense of deperation in the note to Benteen. There is of urgency. "be quick ps be quick" does denote a sense of urgency, but not of desperation. My own feeling, and it is just that, is that Weir and maybe others saw more than they cared to admit from their farthest advance. I rather doubt that they could see Last Stand Hill from where they were, because of the dust and gunsmoke, but I think they did see the last of the Calhoun Ridge action. In any event they would have known from the scene before them that Custer's command had not fared well.
Despite the fact that, or maybe because, they could do nothing about it, they, whoever they might have been, would likely feel guilty. I don't know if you have ever been in a situation where you had to abandon a buddy or buddies to their fates , but it is a very rare bird indeed who can do so with anything approaching a clear conscience, regardless of what choice he may have had in the matter.
Elisabeth:
You are probably correct in thinking that exploring some of the "what-ifs" might throw some light on subsequent actions, including the RCOI. For example, why do you think that Fred Benteen was the only officer parading himself atop the "fortifications" on the Hill? My point was that one should concentrate first on determining what did happen, rather than making the sideways excursions paramount.
As Hostler says....yada, yada, yada......
Gordie
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Post by crzhrs on Sept 11, 2006 12:54:23 GMT -6
The note does lack a sense of urgency . . . and Martini himself gave no indication of danger. In fact he told other enlisted men that Custer was about to gain a big victory. Likewise for Kanipe. Both men did not give any indication of Custer being in a desperate fix . . . rather the opposite.
Does that exonorate Benteen . . . no . . . but he sees no sense in making a mad dash through terrain that could hide an Indian ambush either.
As for the separate trail. Benteen moved forward and came upon a converging trail Weir went one way and Benteen the other. Finally Benteen saw Crow Scouts who told him to take the right trail (I think it was that) which led them to the Reno fight.
And what did the Weir Advance see? Years later Edgerly stated he saw the hill black with Indians and shooting at objects on the ground. He realized it was Custer's men. As for what Weir saw he never said. However there was a sergeant next to him who had the same view and was looking thru field glasses. He said it was not Custer but Indians.
Edgerly was a little further ahead and at a different angle . . . he may have had a better view . . . but only gave his opinions of what he saw years later, especially about the Custer dead.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 11, 2006 12:59:20 GMT -6
It isn't "be quick ps be quick." It's "Ps. Bring pacs." The emphasis is on the packs - not 'be quick' - since it is mentioned twice, and because of the obvious speed of the train, is somewhat a contradiction of be quick.
The rest of your scenario is wishful thinking. As is mine. And I did not "admit" to never being in uniform, but stated it forthrightly from the beginning, not under pressure. Never remotely hid it or tried to pass myself off as what I am not, as others on Custer boards do with regularity.
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Post by Hostler on Sept 11, 2006 17:15:29 GMT -6
I suppose everyone reads and interprets things differently, but a note saying"be quick" from the Regimental Commander would surely give me a sense of urgency. Especially when the bearer was riding a wounded horse. I agree that neither Benteen nor Weir knew exactly what had or was, taking place ahead, but if there was no urgency why even bother to send the message? These guys weren't stupid and I'd wager they knew d--n well there were hot times ahead. Also, I can't in my wildest imagination think that Weir was happy that Custer "got nailed".
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Post by harpskiddie on Sept 11, 2006 20:21:49 GMT -6
dc:
I said it was a feeling - if you want to make it a scenario, be my guest. As to the note, I know what it said, just as well as you do, and "admit" does not carry any conotation of having to respond under pressure. Nor does never having served carry any stigma - it was just an aside referencing having to abandon a buddy.
Gordie
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Post by Dark Cloud on Sept 12, 2006 5:42:58 GMT -6
Rather, I'd think a note from the regimental commander saying "bring packs" twice in a short note suggests the location of his concern. He didn't repeat 'be quick' twice as you posted and elaborated upon. In any case, Benteen complied, arriving with soldiers and animals able to attack, and did so at prudent and appropriate speed.
Everyone knew there was a fight in progress because Kanipe had told them and Martini as well, which was the baselilne for consideration, and the fight was going swimmingly by the accounts of both. There is nothing in the note to suggest anything amiss, but rather to make damned sure the Indians don't get the packs, which included Custer's unique ammo (by some accounts and not others) and his horse and goodies.
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Post by harpskiddie on Sept 12, 2006 8:47:23 GMT -6
And Yates had probably asked that his cake be brought up right away.
Gordie
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Post by Hostler on Sept 12, 2006 10:05:15 GMT -6
Hey, never thought about the birthday cake. That was probably the underlying ugency for hurrying the packs forward. Good one!!!
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Post by crzhrs on Sept 12, 2006 10:31:37 GMT -6
I wonder how "fresh" the cake was by the time of the LBH fight . . . it may have been so hard that it would have made a good club to fight off warriors!
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