How much of a surprise was the Indian firepower

[mcaryf]

Elisabeth has started another thread about why Custer did not move. This is partly an idea about that but since it raises a new theme I have started a new thread.

I am beginning to wonder just how much of a surprise the Indian firepower was to Custer and his men.

It is a military fact that the day when cavalry could normally succeed against steady infantry was done by the time of Waterloo over 50 years before LBH. Had the US Cavalry previously confronted large bands of Indians armed with repeaters? The ability to lay down fire with that weapon system is obviously considerable and seriously reduces the possibility of a successful cavalry charge by other than very superior numbers.

We are inclined to say that Ford B was only modestly defended but if at least two of the defenders had repeaters the cavalry would risk heavy losses in a charge.

In RA Fox's book he identifies a position called Henryville as being South of Calhoun Hill. It is called Henryville because of the number of Henry repeater cartridge cases found there. Thus perhaps the cavalry were receiving such a volume of fire from that position that Custer did not think he could move back South to unite with Reno.

The US Civil War in its final stages was starting to lead towards the idea of the empty battlefield where exposed operations, such as cavalry, were not really possible against infantry in reasonable cover. Are we looking at LBH too much as an old fashioned fight when we should perhaps consider the modernity of the weapon systems at least on the Indian side and recognise that Custer's ability to manoeuvre in some diirections was quite heavily constrained? The presumed fate of Company C is a case in point of the vulnerability of cavalry to infantry firepower.

Regards

Mike

[elisabeth]

And the repeaters proved their worth as a cavalry weapon for the Indians, too: all those accounts from the valley fight of Indians laying Winchesters across their saddles and just pumping out continuous fire.

This is quite a question. It seems it was a standard part of the folklore of the Plains, for years before 1876, that the Indians were being equipped with the very best weapons; there's many a sarcastic newspaper piece about the "even-handedness" of the government in this regard, and many officers bewail it in letters home. So it can have been no surprise that they had repeaters. Whether this affected the army's tactical thinking -- that's another matter.

It would be interesting to go back over the Indian accounts, e.g. in Michno, and try to work out who did have repeaters and where they were on the field at any given time. Henryville, as you say, is one place where repeaters were concentrated enough to lay down quite a barrage of fire. For all the traditionally "individualistic" fighting methods of the Indians, they were far from dumb; maybe there were other pockets where those with repeaters massed together. If so, you could be right -- these could have presented an impenetrable wall to cavalry, and could well have shaped Custer's movements ...

[El Crab]

I personally don't think it made that much of a difference. The advantage came in close proximity, and while they could have pumped shots into the soldiers at an alarming rate, the advantage was already achieved. The soldiers did not want the Indians close, regardless of what weapons they used. If they were able to get that close, the soldiers would have been screwed. Outnumbered and unable to keep their field of fire clear? D-O-N-E.

I just can't picture the Indians, while having what they might consider plenty of ammunition, firing at a rate that is sometimes suggested. And while it is an advantage to be able to chamber and fire the next round without reloading, the advantage came from being able to work their way toward the soldiers. Even if they had muzzle loaders, they had an advantage in rate of fire due to sheer numbers.

Plus, we have accounts that the Indians popped up, fired and ducked back down. White Cow Bull said he was firing at soldiers at a fairly rapid pace from his position (thought to be around Greasy Grass Ridge), and those soldiers couldn't have been within range of his Winchester. I just don't think that the repeaters were the reason Custer lost. Custer's troopers didn't have a chance in any close quarters action, regardless of what they faced in weaponry. Overall, they were inferior in hand-to-hand and their tactics would be toast if the Indians, outnumbering them as they did, got in close.

But the real story of Custer's downfall is probably not repeaters, but Indian resolve. Guns didn't decide the battle, Lame White Man's charge and the cutting of the ridge by the Crazy Horse/White Bull group did.

[mcaryf]

I was partly thinking of Reno's "failure" to charge home in regard to this thread rather than the later fighting although it might also apply to the sortie of Company C .

I know there are some who post on here, e.g. Jim, who think that Reno should have continued to charge. I have been doing some rough calculations of what the effect might have been.

Charles Windolph estimated that maybe as many as one quarter of the Indians had repeaters, the archaeology identified 62 individual repeater rifles from shell cases, roughly the same number as the individual cavalry weapons - this is reasonably consistent with the one quarter figure. At Ford B supposedly 2 out of the 10 Indian defenders had repeaters. Thus it would appear that assuming 20% (one in five) would be a realistic conservative number.

Various accounts of Reno's charge suggest that at their final approach there were of the order of 500 Indians between them and the village. In The Custer Myth WAG interprets Herendeen's comment of 200 as meaning that 200 were using firearms.

If we take the 20% figure with repeaters then Reno's men were confronted with possibly 100 repeating rifles. The effective range for these weapons would be from 400 yards downwards. Reno had already galloped a mile or two along the valley floor so I would guess that covering the last 400 yards would take around 1 minute. The Henry had a notional rate of fire of 40 rounds per minute but let us just assume half that. We therefore have 100 x 20 = 2,000 bullets to negotiate in the final 400 yards. The Indians are accustomed to shooting at moving targets (e.g. buffalo) so a 5-10% accuracy rate might be reasonable. from these figures it would appear that most of Reno's men or horses would have been hit at least once before they even reached the Indian line. The cavalry pistols would of course have been useless until the final 10 seconds of the charge so the Indians are not under fire themselves although plainly the threat is approaching.

My own conclusion - it would have made the Charge of the Light Brigade look like a picnic!

Regards

Mike

[Gumby]

I believe you are both correct. The Army tested repeating rifles and non-repeating rifles when it chose the 1873 Springfield. Two of the chief reasons for their choice was the Springfield's accuracy and its range were far superior to any of the repeaters. However, once the repeaters were within the effective range they became the supperior weapons. The Indians had the definite advantage at close quarters both because of rate of fire and superior numbers.

[custerstillstands]

Repeating rifles didn't have a long range and Indians chosed them to be small, because they wanted to shoot while galloping.

It means that rifles weren't a very complicated matter as long as Custer's men could shoot the Indians at long range. And testimonies said that they did. In fact, several Indian charges (by White Bull, Two Moon...) were driven back by heavy fire from Custer's men.

[mcaryf]

Hi CSS

Do you think Reno should have continued his charge into range of the repeaters?

Mike

[crzhrs]

Reno's men had carbines which had far more long-range power than the Indians' Winchesters and would have been able to hit Indians way before the Indians got close.

However, ineffective training for enlisted men, inexperienced Indian fighting, and probably fear resulted in many men firing rapidly and without hitting anything. Fire control was not in place by many officers and there was danger of running out of ammo.

[mcaryf]

Hi Crzhrs

Do you reckon troopers could deploy their carbines whilst at the charge? I rather think they are limited to pistols with an effective range of around 60 yards!

This is why I think Reno was entirely right to stop and dismount when he was within effective range for his weapons but out of range for the Indian repeaters.

I really think that too many posters on this board have a very anachronistic view of the possibilities in this battle. The Indians fought in a reasonably modern way, seeking cover, infiltration and laying down heavy fire to protect key points (e.g. Ford B). It is interesting to think whether Custer also fell into the same trap of thinking that cavalry could be effective against a prepared and well armed opponent. I have read a bit of Ambrose's Custer and Crazy Horse which includes the fact that Custer's cavalry units in the ACW suffered extremely high losses.

The use of Reno to charge a village where Custer already expected some sort of alarm to have been raised; the mounted deployment of Company C in the face of Indians armed with repeaters; the possible mounted attack on Ford B. None of these looks like a good idea against modern weapons.

The cavalry really were mounted infantry, their advantage was in getting from A to B quickly not in mounted shock assaults unless the enemy could be totally surpised e.g. a dawn raid.

regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

Mike:

I should have said Reno's men while charging on horseback would have been using their revolvers, much easier to aim and fire.

However, once dismounted they would have used their carbines . . . it wasn't until Reno fell back to the timber that he lost all offensive advantages and was now in a defensive position where he could have held out a bit longer with proper fire control and discipline.

Still the dense cover and smoke from fires made visibility a problem and with no pomised support from Custer the timber was an area that was vulnerable. As it was several indians were able to infiltrate and fire point blank at a group of men including Reno, with the known results.

Once Reno and Custer stopped any offensive manuvering . . . they lost the battle. Any hesitation when the Indians were caught by surprise meant a turn of events. Once Reno and Custer, either chose or were forced to stop their offensive attack . . . the battle was lost.

[elisabeth]

I'm sure you're right. A defensive manouevre could work fine if you had reinforcements coming up (see Beecher's Island, as it eventually turned out) but not if you didn't.

But ... this really calls the whole thing into question, doesn't it. Reno stops offensive manoeurvring and takes to the timber: could this have been fine IF he'd hung on long enough for Benteen to sweep in as his reinforcement? Or the same with Custer: IF he'd consolidated and entrenched early enough to form a defensive position until Terry came up? It would still have been being rescued, rather than a Glorious Victory, but -- less than disaster?

[mcaryf]

Hi Crzhrs

I know that Reno supposedly achieved surprise but I wonder how much that was actually worth.

Some at least of the Indian band persued from the Lone Tepee seem to have moved onto the valley floor ahead of Reno and were giving warning of his approach. There are also reports of two Indians giving warning slightly earlier than this who had been en route to the Agency. Reno's charge across the valley floor would take 15 minutes or so to actually reach the village from the point where it started and this is possibly the minimum notice the near end of the village had.

Other parts (the sleeping village seen by Custer/Martini) may have had less warning but were not in the event actually attacked. Obviously 15 minutes was not enough to get all the noncoms right away but surely a fair number of Warriors in the Hunkpapa Circle had time to grab a weapon and get ready to resist on foot if necessary whilst others went to get their ponies. There were 40 or 50 in the persued band so it would be a reasonable estimate that at least 200 Indians should be in reasonable shape to mount a defence in front of the village, some mounted some on foot. The estimates of numbers from Reno's officers are much higher than this so I think 200 might be a best case for the cavalry.

If Custer had attacked with his whole strength these initial 200 defenders might have been swept aside but he did not and I think 200 reasonably armed would be enough to have done serious damage to Reno's 120 odd if he had continued his charge.

Thus I agree that some degree of surprise was achieved by Reno but I do not think it was total and 200 or more defenders would be sufficient to oppose the attack that was actually mounted. There was a second chance for Custer at MTC but, I think the spoils there might be some empty tepees rather than anything of great value. Whether or not a real pincer could be achieved with Custer charging through the village plus Reno and Benteen is an interesting speculation but I think there were enough Warriors in total still to regroup and resist a decisive cavalry result.

Regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

Reno's "surprise" may not have been total . . . there may have been enough of a warning to get most of the non-coms out of harm's way and still time for warriors to gather in Reno's front to at least give him something to think about . . . so it's possible the surprise was not as overwhelming as it was claimed.

Still Reno had to cross a river and charge a wide open area for more than 2 miles, so in addition that would give warriors time to gather in a show of opposition.

The numbers he opposed ranged from 400-1,000, regardless 400 would have been formidable and without any sign of support Reno must have felt he had no option other than to stop, form skirmish lines and try to force his way in slowly, but lack of training, rapid firing by inexperienced men and Indian determination forced Reno back and thereby lost his offensive capability.

Either way, Reno with 3 companies could not make a dent in the "surprised" village and Custer with 5 companies apparently could not even cross the river to be a real threat, even with Indians "napping."