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Post by michigander on Apr 30, 2006 13:14:12 GMT -6
here I agree. But I see not blame on it, just natural with the knowledge he had of the events. After all he was there to prevent the fleeing of indians (that we know didn't flew at all). He had not to think defensive.
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Post by El Crab on Apr 30, 2006 14:03:18 GMT -6
It certainly fits with his reaction on getting all those "the Indians are all before me" messages from Reno; he sees the Indians' willingness to fight as an opportunity, not a danger. So, Custer dashes off north, thinking -- what? That he can get behind the warrior force responding to Reno, and attack it from the rear? Or can drive south through the village, destroying everything in his path? Then, sees the size of it, and switches plans to making a demonstration along the ridges to draw warriors out ... Do you see him as thinking he can win an outright victory in a pitched battle on broken ground? Or just hold them long enough for something else to happen, be it Benteen from the south or (eventually) Terry from the north? shatonska, michigander: the problem with going back to the south is that he then no longer threatens the village. If he waits there, yes, the regiment can consolidate, and the 7th would get out in (more or less) one piece; but the Indians are free to pack up and disappear. It might funnel them north towards Terry -- who might or might not be able to survive a clash with them -- but more likely they'd just scatter, and the whole thing would be an abject failure. They'd have to start all over again, tracking them down band by band. If he'd realised the trouble he was in, it would have made sense to fight his way south. But it seems clear he still thought he could achieve something. The difficulty is figuring out just what that "something" was! Found it. I think its clear my writings are in lower case, while Michno's response is in brackets and in CAPS.
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Post by elisabeth on Apr 30, 2006 22:22:00 GMT -6
Crab, great exchange.
Now I get it. I'd originally read your "moving to the north" as Custer's general decision to go north of Reno. This clarifies that you meant his move way north, the Cemetery/Ford D excursion -- yes? That he's looking to draw them into a pitched battle on the flats? Interesting idea.
So, in this scenario, how do you see the Right Wing's deployment? (Because that's what's bugging me, and what set off this thread.) Is it that a) if all hell hadn't broken out, they'd have gone on to join Custer in the north, forming a five-company front against the Indians on the flats? Or b) that we're mistaken in thinking they were posted on Battle Ridge, and that what really happened was -- as some early observers suggested -- that they were killed in line of march towards this northern battleground?
Your scenario, with Custer actively on the offensive, certainly fits his known character better than mine, which has him more passively offensive.
In mine, he's just pinning the Indians down to buy time. A lot of people would probably say that's against his nature. And that deliberately planning to share the battle honours with Terry/Gibbon is even more so. (Though he wasn't always mindlessly gung-ho; he was quite unembarrassed about being rescued by Stanley on the Yellowstone, which was a slightly similar situation -- holding off a larger force of Indians in a stalemate fight until his reinforcements could come up ...) However, I still think it might be one of the possibilities?
The "waiting fight" suggestion, for me, would explain several mysteries: a) his apparent failure to exploit surprise; b) his continuing offensive posture even when aware of the number and temper of the enemy; and c) his otherwise baffling use, or non-use, of Keogh's battalion. This is three-fifths of his force, under a man he knows, from their shared CW exploits (they fought in many of the same battles, remember), to be as ferocious and aggressive as himself. Is it credible that he'd use him only as a kind of glorified parking attendant, to usher Benteen onto the field? Three whole companies, doing nothing, just to wait for three more companies? There has to be more to the Battle Ridge deployment than just "waiting for Benteen".
So ... could this "waiting fight" notion be one possible scenario?
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Post by El Crab on May 1, 2006 0:18:44 GMT -6
Here's a bit more, to answer your questions. Custer left the right wing to skirmish with the Indians while he himself went north to slow the exodus in that direction, and to check available fords and the overall terrain. I think he was checking out the terrain around him, since he was looking to fight a battle with these warriors. So he drops off the right wing, has a look around, threatens the women and children and perhaps splits the Indian forces even moreso. They have soldiers to the south, soldiers fighting just a mile from the MTC ford, and soldiers moving north towards the ford across from the refugees.
Keogh wasn't waiting for Benteen, per se. He was engaging the Indians, holding ground. He was in a holding action, with a company in reserve. And let's say Benteen comes marching along, and shows up to the south of all of those Indians fighting Calhoun. What do you think they'd do? They'd be faced with soldiers on both sides, and the village wide open. I don't think Keogh's wing/battalion was waiting for Benteen, as in holding ground to facilitate his arrival. I think Custer was probably expecting Benteen to show up to the south, squeezing some of the Indians between two commands and presenting a threat.
But really, overall, I think Custer found a willing foe, and knew if he could keep them occupied and defeat them, he'd have the village and chase them towards Terry/Gibbon. So he drew them north, reducing his immediate fronts from three sides to one for the moment, and opening the possibility of Benteen showing up.
If Custer stayed at Nye-Cartwright, and Benteen showed up, the MTC ford would still be blocked, he wouldn't know where another ford to the north lay, and Benteen wouldn't make much of a difference to his battle. But if he moved north, MTC is now open, Custer could find other fords, he would know what terrain he has around him, his battalion would threaten the non-combatants, and he could potentially squeeze his opponent between himself and Benteen.
I think he was expecting to have to contain them, and was thrilled to be able to fight them, instead of facing just a rearguard defending the fleeing occupants of the village. Custer probably could have taken the village, but then he'd have to defend it against an unbeaten foe, and have little hope of getting any hostages. If he fought the warriors and won, which I'm sure success was his only thought (and should have been his only thought), he'd get the village anyway. It wasn't going anywhere. And he couldn't go after non-combatants with an angry, unbeaten mob of Sioux and Cheyenne hanging around. Defeat them, and the rest falls into place.
And imagine what he'd say to Terry, as they either showed up on the scene of the burning/destroyed village, or ran into Custer's troopers and the Indians they were chasing. The Seventh caught a large village, defeated the warriors in a pitched battle, captured some hostages and most of their pony herd, and burned their lodges and property. Custer's ambition might have finally gotten the best of him. But not because he saw a village and attacked, but because he saw an opportunity for total victory, rather than partial. He might have been thinking of the Woodstock Races, AKA Tom's Brook in 1864. After retreating from their raid, Custer and Merritt were finally allowed to counterattack their Confederate pursuers, and routed them. They chased them for 20 miles. But in this case, Custer would have soldiers to the north, soldiers to the south and the intact village to the west.
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Post by elisabeth on May 1, 2006 1:36:40 GMT -6
Yes, I see your logic ... And the Indians themselves said (as per the General Miles theory) that if another force had appeared to the south, they'd have been caught between two fires and would have had to give up.
However -- it really would be a case of "Custer's ambition having finally gotten the better of him", wouldn't it, if he was proposing to fight this pitched battle in units as small as (in his own case) two companies plus some hangers-on? Almost a recipe for being defeated in detail. (As of course he was.)
How realistically could he expect to defeat that many warriors with his five, or eight, companies? (Assuming he fully realised the Indian numbers.) In an open battle out on the Plains, maybe -- where "defeat" would consist in routing them a la Woodstock Races. But on their own doorstep, when they're not going anywhere? Hmmm ... Are you thinking that he was perhaps banking on their reluctance to take too many casualties? And that if he simply killed enough to reach critical mass, the Indians would fold and surrender? That's the only way I can see. It's conceivable. He inflicts more casualties than they want to take; they call a halt and negotiate; he takes hostages (non-coms? or, on past form, some key chiefs?) to ensure their good behaviour; he then sacks the village and destroys the bulk of the pony herd; and either has this nice gift-wrapped package to present to Terry when he finally arrives, or starts the Indians back to their reservations right away ... Possible. But certainly very, very ambitious!
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Post by George Mabry on May 25, 2006 13:53:46 GMT -6
What do you think? A waiting fight? It's not like him, I know, but is it conceivable?[/quote]
I believe that was exactly what happened. The 7th Cavalry kept the indians tied up in one spot for two days. When Terry got within striking range, the indians simply road away. Terry's column might have had some value in the field as far as flushing out the indians but it was worthless as a blocking force. Terry knew this. That is why he offered Custer his small cavalry contingent. Terry never expected to be a factor in the fighting.
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Post by mcaryf on May 26, 2006 11:58:14 GMT -6
This question of what Custer was doing/intending is the key mystery of LBH. If he was thinking defensively then at the very least he should consolidate Left and Right Wings so they can support each other even if he does not want to go back for Benteen/Reno.
If he is still thinking offensively how do we explain him allowing time to slip away. There are only 4 or so hours until dark, this is hardly enough to defeat such a large body of alerted Indians. Waiting for Benteen or indeed anything is just not a viable strategy.
Thus the conundrum his actions cannot really be explained by either strategy. We are left with the possibility that he had lost control of events as a result of accumulating casualties. Perhaps Keogh and one or two other key officers were wounded early on and Custer finds that he has to establish a base position near Calhoun Hill. He intends to return to consolidate after a further recce but events overtake his forces before he can do it.
It is the idea of a significant pause by Custer on his way back from Ford D but out of touch with Keogh that I find hard to explain either defensively or offensively.
Mike
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 26, 2006 13:13:27 GMT -6
I suggest the puzzle is earlier if he did NOT make a serious attack at MTC, and in fact from Weir Point on, his actions make no sense whatsoever.
If you believe he was going for the civvies, than you go by the shortest distance, and if the warriors are with Reno and the civvies heading north, this virtually empty village is a straight line to your goal. If you believe that was his goal.
Pulling back to wait for anything, in full view of the enemy, is contrary to the known Custer and cavalry purpose of surprise and shock. I dismiss that as desperate Custerphile dementia trying to pat possible battle artifacts and wishful thinking into plausibility, at which they fail. No officer would split his command, already insufficient, into two monumentally insufficient groups in the face of a large village, holding the larger back "for later" as if it were a picnic Twinkie, and catastrophically blow all surprise - or indeed, the remotest chance of future offense - by an action that demands a defensive battle on their part on what can only laughingly be called defensive ground.
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Post by crzhrs on May 26, 2006 13:21:48 GMT -6
The question then is what was Custer doing? I also do not believe he was waiting around for something to happen, or sending a couple companies to fake an attack then pull back to see what happens.
If there were non-coms to be had, then he should have immediately gone for them while most of the warriors were elsewhere (Martini stated he could only see children & dogs, but who in their right mind would leave the kids alone when the village is being attacked?)
We know Custer was aggressive and given the opportunity to attack he would have done so. What was stopping him . . . 10-12 warriors at the ford? Wolf Tooth's band producing enough fire power to cause Custer to hesitate? Wait for Benteen to supplement his command?
Someone apparently did not hear about the famous saying: "He who hesitates is lost!"
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Post by crzhrs on May 26, 2006 13:36:43 GMT -6
According to Darling's short booklet (released prior to A SAD AND TERRIBLE BLUNDER) he state's Custer was doomed as soon as he left Weir Point . . . and all the other movements by him would be moot.
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Post by d o harris on May 26, 2006 16:01:50 GMT -6
To paraphrase DC, I hope correctly, from Weir Point on, Custer's actions make no sense whatever if he did not make a serious, all or nothing attack at MTF. To delay, to manuever hither and yon, and back again, surrendered the only useful tactic he had in the bag---an unexpected attack on the village while the bulk of the warriors were temporarily distracted. Anything else seems suicidal. Dementia (I'd choose a different word, such as enchantment) isn't attributable to Custerphiles alone, but to any who approach with an agenda, or theory, and force or select evidence to support that agenda or theory. More and more I believe the archaeologists, or those who blindly accept what these people say, are, in fact, enchanted. I'd think any true Custerphile would forthwith reject the notion he tarried about for 30-40 minutes in MTC, and then, after sauntering down to ford D, hung around in idleness for an additional 20 minutes.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 26, 2006 19:57:29 GMT -6
Enchantment? Yes, that works. But I'll stick with dementia. More satisfying.
I agree with Darling on that point about Weir Pt. and what followed. Not only moot, all else - if true, mind you - are just dance routines lovingly related by those enthralled with purported military procedure to explain artifactual finds which may or may not have appeared during the short period of battle. Wings deployed, organized movement, then bunching and tactical disintegration. So exciting. Those seven cases prove it.
If more start agreeing with you, Mr. Harris, my work here is done, and precise interpretation based on archaeology will be viewed with the decidedly cancerous eye it deserves.
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Post by maaloxmya19 on Jun 1, 2006 3:14:27 GMT -6
What is this "Terry was due the next day" stuff:
Custer's Orders say where Terry Planned to be:
1. Terry would HOLD at the LBH/Big Horn river ( NOT advance FROM it towards the Camp. Custer would have waited forever).
(But Terry CHANGED his plans BASED ON BETTER INTELLIGENCE ).
2. The Date Terry mentioned was NOT June 25 +1 day. Custer should report there "no later than when your provisions expire" (3 weeks, plus 2 weeks of salt to eat his mules = MORE THAN A MONTH AFTER the battle)
3. A couple days into his liesurely jaunt, Terry did some idle chit-chat (especially with the Mounted Infantry Officer) & found Gibbon had already SEEN the village -- & backed off. So :
4. Terry RACED to the July 27 rendezvous, then up the Valley: essentially 2 sides of a triangle, to tell Custer NOT to attack. 'Too Many Indians'. He culls a quarter of his force & advances with it himself
5. Since everyone assumed the Sioux would continue South to the Hunting Grounds where Crook was, he was doing this to CATCH UP to Custer FROM BEHIND.
6. Terry's Strike force is a THIRD the size of Custer's unit & had the played-out Horses: it would have been eaten alive ... . 7, Terry REFUSED his Staff Officers' request to FRAUD an Order, for a Combined Attack. Though he did moan to Sherman that, if Custer had only waited 1 day ....
8. THAT AFTERNOON, the Indians planned to come down the valley & camp at the LBH/Big Horn.
Terry's force was in 4 separated pieces.
The Steamboat was lost upriver & would have put over a Million cartridges in S. Bull's guns. when it returned the next Morn.
The Gatling guns were lost up a side valley.
The Infantry was lagging.
Terry's Personal force was 220 men.
It just keeps coming up "Terry's Last Stand".
9. It gets worse. If everyone BLINDLY followed the Plan:
9a: the Indians would have gone PAST the blocking location, on their way to the Crows, before a much slower Terry reached it. 9b. while Custer went South towards Mexico ... 9c. Terry would have dug in facing East, _ against an enemy ALREADY WEST of his position. 9d. The Crows, the U.S.'s largest Allies, would lose their homes, herds, & families (most of their men were heping Crook to the South).
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