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Post by elisabeth on Apr 3, 2006 0:10:09 GMT -6
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Post by El Crab on Apr 3, 2006 2:02:39 GMT -6
The two quick volley was a distress signal. This had been a method used by Sheridan during the Civil War, and documented in his memoirs. Several of the indian scouts said that's what they were. Also several of the 7th's officers made similar remarks... so the practice was known. Whether or not the two quick volleys that were heard that day was a signal or not is unknown. Some soldiers heard more than two volleys, and might not have described them as quick. Basically, regardless of the exact count, volleys were heard and then general firing.
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Post by mcaryf on Apr 3, 2006 3:53:07 GMT -6
Hi Elisabeth Thank you for the Reno Inquiry reference. I searched it for comments on volleys and came to one which described the Indian firing at the hilltop. It said the firing would die away and then restart with a volley. So perhaps the Indians were in fact using some sort of volley fire possibly when they had all reloaded or some such.
Regards
Mike
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Post by elisabeth on Apr 3, 2006 5:03:30 GMT -6
That would be quite a smart tactic, come to think of it, to draw fire from the defenders; they'd then have to reload, while those Indians with repeaters could carry on firing.
I was looking through the Inquiry myself just now, for something else, and noticed there were references to hearing "four or five" volleys, "several" volleys, etc. (As Crab says above.) So if a double volley was an accepted distress signal, what they were hearing from the Custer field doesn't seem to have been that; massed firing from one or both sides, with a view to hitting people, seems more likely.
All the testimony at the RCOI, and in later recollections, suggests that at the time the volleys were interpreted as Custer "having a warm time of it", but nothing worse. It's Godfrey, in his 1892 Century article, who gets up this "signals of distress" theory ... The questioning in the RCOI does return to the volleys again and again -- perhaps with that thought in mind -- but I don't recall it being raised directly. Nor do you get the feeling that witnesses were shying away from it as a danger area (the way they do from the timing and duration-of-fight questions, for instance). So my suspicion is that it's post-rationalisation. I'm frequently wrong, though!
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Post by q on Apr 3, 2006 7:18:00 GMT -6
While it is unknown the purpose of the quick volleys. The evidence more or less leaves the impression that they were distress signals. Cases in point.
1) It was reported that this event occured in what would have been or should have been just after the opening of Custer's fight. As we shall see, this may shed some light upon: When Custer could have realized that he was in "real" trouble!
2) The volleys have been bandied about as to the "exact" time they occured. And is really a moot point. Some claim that they occured when Custer's men retreated from ford B. Other's near the opening volleys at Calhoun Hill. Both of these events would have occured relatively close together. And Both happened at the beginning of Custer's battle.
3) Curleys statements. Ohhhh boy! Yeah, I know. But! Just what "if" he was right. Well, he said that at Calhoun Hill or near there when relating the Wounded Bouyer story that: Tom said that the general was looking for a place to make a stand. Now while this may or may not be of some significance, the conclusion points in the direction that the volleys were distress signals.
If Custer realized early on that he was in deep do-do, and looking for, as Curley reported Tom saying, "some place to make a stand", then the distress signal's could have happened and likely did. The evidence seems or tends to support the distress signal theory. There is more evidence to suggest that they were distress signals than that they weren't.
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Post by mcaryf on Apr 3, 2006 8:38:34 GMT -6
If you read page 44 of the RCOI you will see a description of standard practice for firing by the cavalry at that time.
It starts out as file firing and then pretty well every man fire for himself at targets of opportunity. Thus there might effectively be two initial volleys by file and then general fire. This could be what was reported as volley firing when particular skirmish lines (and there were several occasions when new skirmish lines were formed) fired initially.
Regards
Mike
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Post by markland on Apr 3, 2006 9:03:53 GMT -6
*chuckle* I love it when someone agrees with me!
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 3, 2006 22:31:30 GMT -6
To me it is not whether there was volley fire as a signal or skirmishers firing odd and even. It could have been the Indians also but the importance is that it indicated that Custer was engaged or the Indians were firing into dead bodies. The time of day that it occurred is more important than who, why, or how many fired. If you could hear the sounds of gun fire what did it mean as far as a response to the sound. There were a lot more considerations than just running to the sounds of gun fire.
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Post by mcaryf on Apr 3, 2006 23:52:27 GMT -6
Hi Azranger
So do you think there was something that could or should have been done as a result of Reno/Benteen hearing the sound of the Custer fighting?
Regards
Mike
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Post by custerstillstands on Apr 4, 2006 11:01:20 GMT -6
Going toward Custer.
Military basic rule - going on the sound of the cannon.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 4, 2006 22:01:10 GMT -6
Hello Mike
I think that there was enough information regarding the number of Indians willing to fight to raise the level of concern. It would take the remaining units plus the packtain to suceed if at all possible. Therefore if the volleys were before the rest of the command united then it was not tactically wise to to procede. There was an attempt to procede which I believe was well after the volleys that was met by overwhelming force. In reality only those there knew if they should have attempted to join Custer. Everyone there had there own perception of events and actions and even if they defer it doesn't mean one was correct and the other was not. In order for me to believe that they did something wrong at Reno Benteen there would have to be overwhelming evidence. I don't see it.
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Post by mcaryf on Apr 5, 2006 2:51:09 GMT -6
Hi CSS
Well you know the idea of going to the sound of the guns cuts both ways.
If we are to beleive the sequence outlined by RA Fox then Custer was sitting on his hill waiting for 20 or so minutes for Benteen without doing very much. Surely he will have heard the heavy and sustained firing coming from Reno's force and then an ominous period of relative silence. Surely should he not have moved his men back to form a junction with the rest of his force or at least to Weir Point where he could have seen what was happening.
My only theory as to why he might not have done this is the possibility that he had already got some wounded so movement might have been constrained. However, sending two companies back to observe from Weir Point would still seem to be the sensible option - if they had met Benteen on the way then they could have returned.
regards
Mike
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Post by michigander on Apr 5, 2006 4:04:32 GMT -6
Is my opinion, that when he get the exactly view of the situation, it would have been too late to send two people back. In fact, already when he sent Martini for Benteen he said to him to stay with him and not come back if the situation was not safe. In this optic, maybe the volleys could have been a signal to tell Benteen where he was, as no men could have be back to tell with their mouths. But I still think he was attacked and volleys was just part of this engagement.
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Post by mcaryf on Apr 5, 2006 5:03:44 GMT -6
Hi Michigander
My suggestion was to send at least two companies (probably E and F) not two people.
To be honest I do not really understand what Custer was hoping to achieve by staying where he was near LSH. If he did not want to attack until Benteen came up then he might as well go to meet Benteen and reunite his command and then attack. He could hardly have been expecting Reno or Benteen to appear coming through the middle of the village so they must approach by the route he himself had taken. Thus why stay on what was poor defensive ground when you know the route your reinforcements will necessarily be taking - go and meet them. That way you avoid the worse case scenario that actually happened and for CSS's benefit he would have been marching towards where the sound of the guns had been coming from!
Regards
Mike
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Post by weir on Apr 5, 2006 5:57:10 GMT -6
Custer was the commander. He was not supposed to join Benteen but Benteen was ordered to join his commander.
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