|
Post by El Crab on Apr 3, 2006 1:58:03 GMT -6
It's curious that there were so many from Co. C, isn't it? From Kanipe's story it would seem that C was at the head of the column. Could it be that they saw something in Custer's mood that they didn't like, or overheard some exchange between him and Tom that alarmed them? You've got to feel sorry for Harrington, really. Under strength by the absence of a) his company commander (with HQ), b) all those stragglers, and c) one sergeant. Assuming the Fox theory is correct, it's hardly surprising they were the first company to crack when they'd been leaching people at such a rate ... Re Kanipe: in Benteen's second narrative ( Benteen-Goldin Letters, p. 184-185) Benteen states that Kanipe was carrying written orders. It's not mentioned anywhere else, as far as I can recall -- even by Kanipe -- so his memory may have been playing tricks. But if true, it would scupper the "deserter" story. As for the officers receiving no message: hmmm. I wonder if Mathey and McDougall haven't got off rather lightly all these years! C had it better than L or E. L was commanded by a C company lieutenant (Calhoun) and a detached, one-eyed infantry officer. E was commanded by a half-crippled lieutenant from A (Smith) and the Regimental Colonel's son, fresh from the Point. They already were recently removed from their former captain, McDougall, and Lt. Reily was detached from E to help with F Company. I really don't believe that had much to do with the collapse, though. But C definitely wasn't the company that had the least consistent leaders. And they did lose one sergeant, but they had at least three more (Finckle, Finley and Bobo). I'd be curious to know how many sergeants the other four companies had. Off the top of my head... E: Hohmeyer and Ogden L: Butler
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Apr 3, 2006 3:38:27 GMT -6
Put like that, Crab, it really was a disaster waiting to happen. If Custer had sat down and mapped out on paper the best way to confuse and demoralise his troops, he could hardly have improved on this!!
Maybe you're right, maybe none of this had any effect on the outcome. If the current theories of Fox et al are correct, the one company that did have its familiar and long-standing officers -- Co. I -- was the one that collapsed fastest and most abjectly. (Allegedly.) But it's hard to think it could have helped much ...
|
|
|
Post by mcaryf on Apr 3, 2006 5:39:07 GMT -6
Hi Elisabeth In the Reno Inquiry evidence (thanks again for the reference - as you see I am using it) on page 389, it is reported that Kanipe (actually they do not use his name but plainly it is him) came up to Benteen and gave him a message that Custer wanted him to bring up the packs. Benteen is reported as saying words to the effect that Kanipe has made a mistake and the message is for Capt McDougall and he should go there.
It makes you wonder whether, in light of the second message, the first message was also actually intended for Benteen and Kanipe assumed he had got it wrong. As Kanipe's name does not figure in the Inquiry I presume he did not give evidence.
Looking at Capt McDougall's evidence he says he received no orders but assumed Lt (Capt?) Mathey had received the hurry up order as he was in front of the train. Mathey says he received no orders. Churchill the civilian packer says they had been told by someone that there was fighting ahead but does not indicate who said this. So that might be Kanipe or possibly the scouts.
As with much of this action there are glimpses of the events but a lot that is unclear.
Regards
Mike
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Apr 3, 2006 9:09:35 GMT -6
Mike:
According to Kanipe it was Tom Custer who gave him the order to find the packtrain. The next statement is big: "And IF you see Benteen tell him to . . ." (or something like that) Kanipe was to go to the packtrain NOT Benteen.
|
|
|
Post by mcaryf on Apr 3, 2006 10:26:07 GMT -6
Hi Crzhrs I was trying to get a handle on why neither of the packtrain officers reckoned they received any message. My theory was that perhaps at the time Kanipe did really think the message was for Benteen so did not deliver it to the packtrain and later changed his recollection as to whom it was for so he did not look a fool. The other alternatives are that he did deliver the message and the packtrain officers forgot (unlikely) or he really was a deserter who told a story to Benteen to cover himself but did not follow through with the message. This also seems unlikely as he had a good record and did anyway stay around for the Reno fight. I suppose another possibility is he could have given the message to Boston Custer or some other civilian.
It may just be one of those small mysteries that never gets resolved.
Regards
Mike
|
|
|
Post by d o harris on Apr 7, 2006 13:43:32 GMT -6
The "IF" in Kanipe's instructions that crzhrs emphasized is important. Kanipe was not sent on the backtrail, but straight across country to the packs. He could have easily missed Benteen. When he saw Benteen Kanipe turned sharply to the right and came down from the hills to intercept Benteen. The message he delivered was, in substance, "They want you up there right away." Benteen never acknowledged receiving a message in these terms. That he may have obfuscated has more to do with subsequent controversies and little to do with the manner in which he responded. If you are told to hurry, and you do hurry, but arrive too late to impact rapidly unfolding events, no matter how fast you travel someone will accuse you of being too slow. Mathey and McDougal seemed to play a version of Alphonse and Gaston regarding a messenger. Good evidence a messenger was received is how McD responded to the non-message. Examinig what the two officers did say, and with the aid of John Gray's analysis, at about the place Kanipe would have met the train McD called a halt to close up the packs and to guard against attack. Prior to this halt B Co had ridden as a rear guard. From here on McD had one platoon in front, and one to the rear. The hesitancy in acknowledging a messenger may have been the same problem Benteen had. The orders Kanipe carried was to lead the packs straight across country. So long as Benteen remained on trail toward the LBH McD chose to follow in his van. This was probably the better part of wisdom, for they could hear the sounds of fighting ahead, and it was not necessarily the best course to get out of sight of a battalion whose protection may be needed. Unfortunately, the wise course of action was not in strict compliance with the order to come straight across country, and within days there began a wild hunt for scapegoats.
|
|
|
Post by mcaryf on Apr 7, 2006 17:02:25 GMT -6
Hi D O harris
I think you have some good points as to why the packtrain officers might have been reluctant to acknowledge having received Kanipe's order. Although to be fair to them the closing up was probably sensible anyway if they could hear Reno skirmishing ahead.
When you consider whether the actual events were not a reasonable outcome for the 7th that day, the fact that the packtrain was not intercepted in the open was a big plus.
If Benteen had followed orders and stayed out on his Bluff Climbing expedition and if Reno had fought it out in the timber, then the packtrain would have had an unfortunate encounter with the Indians sealing off Reno's potential escape route by the Ford. Lots more ammo for the Sioux!
Regards
Mike
|
|
|
Post by d o harris on Apr 7, 2006 23:34:59 GMT -6
Mike---One of the problems in assessing Benteen's role on 6/25/76 is separating the lies he told from the duty he performed. What is particularly confounding is that the lies do him no credit and the truth does him no harm. Quite the contrary. If one refers only to the reports and statements he made through August, 1876, and fills it in with the COI testimony of Lt Edgerly and Lt Godfrey and the communication these two and Lt Gibson had with Walter Camp 'Old Gnarly' emerges as a competent and obedient officer who carried out the orders given, and he did it expeditiously. He wasn't ordered to go valley hunting ad infinitum, and regardless of what he said later, he did not engage in that senseless activity on June 25. Custer obviously had a high opinion of Benteen's qualities as a soldier. He gave him a command that protocol suggested belonged to Reno, and at the same time he gave Benteen full authority to use his own discretion to continue or terminate the oblique. I'd much prefer to arrive at a different conclusion. If authorship for the disaster must be assigned I'd rather it go to Benteen than any other participant. Ultimately, I go where the facts take me, even if the facts take me to Philadelphia.
|
|
|
Post by d o harris on Apr 7, 2006 23:43:34 GMT -6
Elisabeth re: #16-a disaster waiting to happen. The entire seventh cavalry was a disaster waiting to happen. It surely must rank as the worst prepared outfit the US Army ever sent into battle But there is the rub. No one expected the Indians to stand. No one expected any serious fighting. From Sheridan down it seemed to be a given that when found the Indians would scatter and Custer could burn the village at his leisure.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Apr 8, 2006 10:31:20 GMT -6
The old adage held up at the LBH . . . never underestimate your enemy
|
|