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Post by stevewilk on Jan 13, 2006 9:51:26 GMT -6
Fred, according to Bruce Liddic, in his latest book, _Vanishing Victory_, Custer's march to LBH included plenty of halts for rest the day prior to the attack. Yes it was a hot day and the troops lost a night's sleep. You've experienced combat; how much did you sleep the night prior if you knew you would be in battle the next day? Custer's fight lasted only an hour or so. Adrenaline surely must have overcome any fatigue, at least for the that amount of time. Reno's men (and their mounts) did not let fatigue get in the way of their "retreat", did they? I doubt any troopers were falling asleep atop Last Stand Hill.
As for the condition of the horses; consider these were not pets, but transportation. Army commands routinely lost mounts on campaign. The amount of animals lost during the winter campaign of 1868-69 was over one thousand. The Seventh alone lost around 600 horses; the Nineteenth Kansas lost almost all their mounts, and in one ten day march Maj. Evans lost 172 horses and 64 mules. Custer in fact had to burn virtually all his supply wagons due to his mules dropping dead.
Compared to these losses, any problems with mount fatigue during the LBH campaign seems miniscule. Sure, some horses played out and came up lame, but they did not die like they did in '68. The horses got Custer where he needed to go. He did not pursue nor try to escape from the Indians so the condition of the horses was adequate for the mission.
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Post by shatonska on Jan 13, 2006 9:57:30 GMT -6
fred , my words were a simple word on reality , custer actions saved reno , reno and benteen actions condamned Custer , i didn't want to show who acted right or wrong , that was the outcome of the actions that day , maybe if they acted differently they could be all wiped out , who knows !
if Crook faced 800 warriors this means that another 800 were left at the village , they could not leave a village with no defence in crow's country , plus other hundreds of warriors who came from the reservation the folowing week , 2500 warriors at the lbh i think can be a good guess but no more than half of it was engaged in the fight at the same time , even against Custer i think , just a guess anyway
for the tired horses , martini could ride back with a wounded horse at a fast pace , this shows that horses were not so exhausted
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 13, 2006 10:31:59 GMT -6
Fred:
<I thought, however, Crook did write a report right away & send it on.>
I'm not sure if or when a message was sent. If so it should have been sent with the Crows or Shoshoni who would have delivered it quicker. Now how fast would it have gotten to HQ then relayed to Custer/Terry/Gibbons is another question.
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Post by shatonska on Jan 13, 2006 10:39:35 GMT -6
As Benteen approached the Reno fight he estimated the number of warriors at around 900. Apparently they were still interested in Reno and had not moved on to Custer. The reason may have been that there were still enough warriors in the northern part of the village, which included Crazy Horse's Oglalas and the Northern Cheyenne, both groups were hard-core fighters. I doubt Benteen's approach frightened the Reno warriors, they had routed Reno and forced his retreat and now were not a threat. However once word came that more soldiers were advancing further north they left and joined CH & the Cheyenne. Technically Custer's advanced may have saved Reno. crazy horse and the oglalas fought in the valley against reno , plenty of accounts , he dog said Ch arrival was the fulcrum of the fight with reno , just arrived they sent a volley in the wood , reno escaped soon after this volley
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2006 15:34:43 GMT -6
Hey, Steve--
I don't disagree w/ you, not a bit. The tired command is no excuse for anything & I do believe, despite everything, the horses performed up to their capabilities. Custer's command was galloping down Reno Creek! You are right on! And Shatonska, I agree w/ you more than I disagree. My only point about Benteen is that I don't blame Custer's demise on Benteen & I don't blame his demise on Reno. Custer is the only one to blame for his own death. There are reasons why Benteen performed the way he did & tired men & horses added to it, but both could be & were overcome by other factors.
In a nutshell: (1) Benteen did not dog it & was not responsible for Custer's death; (2) Benteen had a choice to make & under the circumstances as they were, it is my opinion he cannot be justifiably criticized for choosing the option he chose; (3) Custer died because there were too many Indians.
And I do not believe those are simplistic answer. You're correct, Steve. In combat, you make do. In the after-action report, you seek answers & you begin at the very basics. Those 3 "nutshells" are the very basics. Things escalate & are filled in from there.
From my own personal point of view, I like all your answers, Steve, Shatonska, Crzhrs. It's a pleasure reading smart, knowledgable, intelligent commentary. Thanks.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2006 15:44:57 GMT -6
Oh, and Steve--
I'm not terribly big on Bruce Liddic. I read & liked his book, but most of it is old stuff & to be very honest w/ you, sounds a lot like some of the stuff I'm reading now. I liked Liddic's-- can I say "unique"?-- take on Custer using Sharpshooters' Ridge rather than Weir & I also liked Liddic's spunk w/ the Godfrey Gorge, as opposed to Cedar Coulee route. I also thought his Reno Hill defense section on 26Jun76, was the best I've read, but there are too many inconsistencies (I've said that before) & he makes too many off the wall assumptions. His "securing" Ford B scenario is typical mess hall tactics used to justify a pet theory, his battalion breakdown scenario & his justifications for it, are strictly fourth-rate, & he's got the order of march down the valley for Reno all fouled up. Either he didn't pay a lot of attention to his notes or his editor needs a little educating.
If that seems harsh, I don't mean it to be so. It's just that I don't think the book is quite as good as everyone says it is. In my very humble opinion, I'd give it a B+. (I just don't like inconsistencies; they drive me crazy!) It's not in the same league w/ Fox, Michno, or Gray. My opinion.
See you, Steve.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Jan 13, 2006 17:34:25 GMT -6
Steve Wilk--
Go to the "Book Boards," "Top Ten Recommended Books." Look at El Crab's photos. Not only are they spectacular, but it just puts the difficulty of campaigning in 1876 in some sort of spacial perspective. They almost make you want to forget the most egregious faults.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 14, 2006 11:14:36 GMT -6
Re: Blaming Benteen and/or Reno:
I cannot blame Reno for stopping his charge in the face of a large standing village with warriors gathering in his front, rather than a small fleeing village.
I cannot blame Benteen for deciding to assist and/or save Reno when Reno's command was in disarray and suffering heavy casualties and shock, rather than assisting Custer who from reports from Kanipe and Martini seemed to on the verge of a victory.
I do fail Reno for his actions in not holding the timber and his panicked "charge".
I do blame Benteen & Reno for not sending a company or two to IMMEDIATELY check on the whereabouts of Custer and the gunfire from downriver.
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Post by fred on Jan 14, 2006 13:01:23 GMT -6
Crzhrs--
I can agree w/ you on all points. While I had never thought about Reno & Benteen sending out a company or 2, that's a good point. And reasonable.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by weir on Jan 18, 2006 10:12:46 GMT -6
Strange comment. You agree with the facts but not the conclusion... Let me help you... It begins with a b...yal...
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 18, 2006 10:37:45 GMT -6
b . . . yal ?? Most every agrees that Reno failed to hold the timber and his "charge" and Benteen and Reno should have sent someone to investigate Custer's whereabouts. We do disagree whether those actions would have done anything to save Custer or whether Reno/Benteen's command would have added to the death toll. Reno was right in stopping his charge in the face of a large standing village rather than a small village running. Benteen was right to assist Reno and help with the wounded. Custer's decision to split the command without full knowledge of what lay ahead and then expecting far flung units to immediately act in coordination was wishful thinking at best and handing the Indians a victory at worse.
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Post by El Crab on Jan 18, 2006 16:01:24 GMT -6
Betrayal.
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Post by shan on Jan 19, 2006 6:23:20 GMT -6
Given that I'm not quite sure where to place this question, I'll place it here in the hope that the person with the answers may stumble across it. I wonder can any of you folks out there help me, I currently writing something on the battle, { aren't we all?} and having got to the part where Martini departs with the final message, search as I might, I cannot find any evidence that he reported the division of the command into two wings, indeed he seems to imply that the whole command was heading down the coulee to attack. If true, then this poses us all with yet another of those conundrums that litter this subject. How are we to explain both Indian testimony, and artifacts on the ground, that place at least part of the command on the high ridges above the ford. Could it simply be that Martini was never asked the question, and as a result failed to mention it? thanks shan
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Post by shatonska on Jan 19, 2006 6:43:13 GMT -6
division came after Martini rode away , Curley talked about it
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Post by fred on Jan 19, 2006 7:32:45 GMT -6
Shan--
I just want to let you know, you've stuck your hand in the hornet's nest here.
There are any number of theories about this division, its composition, where it took place, when, etc., etc., etc. (Those last 3 words are from "The King & I." [That's just a bit of a joke!])
One theory claims the command rode into Cedar Coulee, stopped, & Custer & some others rode to the top of Weir Peak to view the village. After returning, the note was written & Martini rode off. (That would jive w/ shatonska's point.) The command then rode down Cedar, turned into MTC, found a route to the high ground, i.e., the East, Luce, Blummer's/ (Nye)-Cartwright complex, split, & then the 2 or 3 companies (again, depending on who you want to believe), rode down the high ground, back into MTC, & on to the ford.
Michno claims the command barely used MTC & traveled on the high ground for most of the route to the ford. He cites testimony to back his case, & from a purely military point of view, his scenario holds water.
Pennington claims Martini rode all the way w/ the command, using Middle Coulee (as opposed to Cedar), & then returned-- using the same route-- after getting the note some 600 yards from the ford. (Your conundrum grows!)
The command-- or at least part of it-- was clearly on the high ridges; too much archeological evidence bears it out. In my opinion--at this time!-- I believe the command split after it arrived on the high ridges, then Custer took Yates' battalion (E & F) to the ford. That would, in essence, mean that Martini left well before the split. And please[/b], don't hold me to it. It's probably going to change after I've finished all my reading, note-taking, & personal analysis. (In a word or two or 3 or 4, I don't really know!)
Then, of course, there's Bruce Liddic. He chooses a completely different route, & gives solid, supporting evidence for his thesis. In fact, his evidence may be the best of anyones'!
Does this help? If not, I'll try again.
Best wishes, Fred.
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