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Post by George Mabry on Jun 4, 2006 23:16:34 GMT -6
Thank you Darkcloud. Your eloquent commentary is always appreciated; however, I think you missed my point and that point is that Custer's chances of winning that fight were remote at best regardless of his troop dispositions.
His orders were basically to defeat or detain the Indians and not to let them get around him and escape. With that in mind, there is no way he could have developed a tactical plan that would have kept his regiment together. He simply didn't have enough men for the job. Throw in an unusually large and belligerent group of Indians and the unfavorable terrain, and you have a formula for disaster.
Custer could have done things differently and if he were here today I'm sure he'd agree. The low casuality figures among the Indians indicate the 7th wasn't well led that day. But would it have changed the outcome? He could have continued on up the Rosebud as Terry suggested instead of crossing the divide. That might has saved some U.S. lives, maybe even Custer's, but it would have certainly guaranteed the failure of the operation.
When I said that his orders doomed him I meant that any attempt to fulfill those orders, given the circumstances, was almost assured to fail. Don't get me wrong. I do believe in miracles. And it would have taken one for the 7th to win that fight. If you feel otherwise, I would enjoy hearing your views.
As you know, I started a thread asking for opinions on what Custer's options were when he went into the valley. What should Custer have done to win that fight and accomplish his mission? I'll wager that there will not be many responses. I've tried this before in other discussions concerning this battle and it is rare that anyone will toss their hat into that debate. I salute you for even making your half hearted attempt to answer the question. Most won't try. I'm not even sure it is answerable.
This battle is a good mystery. And that is what I treat it as. I would like to know what happened. I'm not much interested in hearing about Custer's mistakes because I don't think those mistakes really matter.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 5, 2006 8:33:54 GMT -6
I haven't missed the point. Custer wasn't assigned the job by himself. It was his decision to do the job by himself, and that despite information precluding the wisdom of that choice, and that negates any attempt to blame his superiors for that on the field decision.
The 'mission' may or may not have been doomed, but that need be flensed apart the decisions that formed Custer's 'doom.' There were a wide range of acceptable alternatives between complete mission success and what happened, which in turn could have been far worse.
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Post by PhillyBlair on Jun 5, 2006 9:03:39 GMT -6
This post is interesting to me in that I've lately been re-reading Camp's interviews to examine what the most pertinent eye and "sound" witnesses related in their testimonies. In no way do I mean to disrespect modern scholarship which has shed much light on the battle. But at the core have we made it too difficult? Putting aside the RCOI due to its alleged false testimonies, let's consider Camp's work.
First, the most important witnesses to help us discern what Custer knew and what his plan may have been are: Kanipe, Martin and Curley. To paraphrase and briefly summarize those testimonies:
Curley: Custer attacked at Ford B (moving "rapidly" toward there from the bluffs). There were volleys fired early in the battle. The whole command was "driven like a herd of horses" from the river to LSH. Resistance was made at several points, but the fight did not last long.
Kanipe: Custer saw 60-75 Indians, 3/4 to one mile away (This was before he separated from Reno, according to Kanipe and Camp). Kanipe speaks of no pause before he was sent with his message, and always believed that the 60-75 Indians were what drew Custer to the hills. He saw this as Custer's "plan" in separating from Reno.
Martin: Did not see the Indians that Kanipe claimed to have seen. Custer did pause for about 10 minutes to observe the village, but that was his only hesitation. By the time Martin reached the high ridge and looked back, Custer was retreating from the Ford and swarms of Indians were crossing to confront him (Custer).
In addition to these key witnesses we have the accounts from Reno's men left in the timber who heard loud firing near the river (Custer), which was brief and then began to sound as if it moved further away from the river and further downstream. Some on Reno Hill heard volleys, but no one heard any steady, organized resistance on Custer's part.
Of course I am leaving out much detail in this post, but I go back to the original question posed -- have we complicated a very simple story? There will always be debate as to Custer's motives, where the battle actually ended, etc., but have we tried too hard to make LBH more than what it may have been -- a brief and decisive rout??? What evidence do we have (eyewitness or "ear witness") that there was a prolonged battle with strategy involved? What evidence do we have (from 1876, not the present) that Custer was ever on the offensive? Most of the Indian testimony agrees with the testimony above. Any thoughts as to how we're progressed (or regressed) so far from the original sources?
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Post by historynut1876 on Jun 5, 2006 9:28:02 GMT -6
PhillyBlair...That was a very good post. I suspect that the reason for complicating the battle is this -- in order to keep the study of the battle interesting, there is no choice but to complicate it. If we kept it simple, the discussion of the battle would have been over many years ago. At its core, it is a fairly simple battle. It becomes complicated as we try to incorporate all the witness testimony with the archeology and meld it into a cohesive unit, not to mention the personalities and moods of the main players and what they ate for breakfast that day. Of course, the secret is to do it without having an axe to grind. I know that personally, I sometimes think we're making much to do about nothing, but then I get dragged right back in. Heck, as hobbies go, this ain't a bad one ;D.
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 5, 2006 9:28:38 GMT -6
What an interesting question, Blair.
Perhaps the two things that bother people enough to drive the need for a more complex scenario are:
1) The repulse at MTF. By all accounts, Custer had an open door before him: a feasible crossing, and minimal resistance. The Custer we (think we) know would have grabbed that opportunity with both hands well before the swarms of Indians made their appearance and forced a retreat. So we find ourselves thinking that he must have withdrawn from Ford B for a reason, namely that he thought he had a better plan ...
2) The line of retreat. OK, we've got Curley's statement, and some Indian testimony; but other Indians give us a picture of an orderly withdrawal, and long-range desultory firing for quite some time -- which goes against the notion of a panic rout or being "driven" at that stage. In which case Custer, even if in retreat, had some choice as to where to go. If he wasn't on the offensive, why move away from support? At the time of the withdrawal from Ford B, there were comparatively few Indians between Custer and Weir Point/Reno Hill, the direction from which he must have expected Benteen and the packs to come; why not hotfoot it back the way he came? So again we find ourselves assuming he must have had a reason. And racking our brains trying to think of a sensible one.
Maybe we are wrong. But those seem to me to be the key anomalies that set us puzzling away ...
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Post by PhillyBlair on Jun 5, 2006 9:57:24 GMT -6
Elisabeth and 1876,
I don't want to sound overly simplistic, and I certainly realize there are parts of Custer's engagement that will always remain a mystery. I just find it interesting that we have often defied the only eyewitness testimony we have in developing recent theories of the battle. I am also not intending in any way to discredit Indian testimony, which aligns with Curley and Martin on the whole. We must always remember that the Indians were not familiar with cavalry tactics (if any were utilized that day!) and could not always interpret what they witnessed through "military eyes."
Elisabeth, I'm not trying to discredit your post in any way and I always appreciate reading your knowledgeable input. But consider for a moment this quote from your post in the context of what I had written:
"The repulse at MTF. By all accounts, Custer had an open door before him: a feasible crossing, and minimal resistance."
The only possible military eyewitness accounts we have are from Martin and Curley, both of whom report a high level of resistance at Ford B. Check out Camp's interviews for this. Indian testimony is mixed in this regard, but reports are often here say from those who arrived later. Consistency is difficult to find.
My point is that most of us who read the modern scholarship of the battle may now accept the modern scholarship in the same way that so many accepted the "Custer myth" for 100 years. It's human nature to do so. We add study upon study and sooner or later we have an entire new theory. I happen to agree with much of the modern battle studies and theories, but have we reached those conclusions at the expense of the only eye and ear witnesses that have been passed down to us? That's the question I'm posing.
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 5, 2006 10:40:04 GMT -6
I do take your point, and it's a good one. In fact, the shifting mythology of LBH over the years would make a fascinating study -- if no-one's already done it.
For MTF, I was going on what seems to be the consensus of Indian accounts -- but you're right, the only two military witnesses we have talk of much greater resistance. (Which could lead us to yet another story and/or myth: the one that says the Indians had time to lay a substantial ambush!)
There's another bit of ear-witness testimony -- I forget now from whom; Girard? -- which complicates things further: the description of gunfire coming closer in the valley before going away again. The implication of that being that some part, at least, of Custer's battalion did get into the village. (As Benteen thought at first glance.) If we make the experiment of restricting ourselves to contemporary testimony, it would be arbitrary to discount that while accepting other ear-witnesses, perhaps ... even though it mars the beautiful simplicity of the straightforward "a rout, a panic" version. As you so rightly say, "consistency is difficult to find".
Perhaps that's what draws us all to this so much. It's an almost blank canvas on which each generation, and each individual, can paint the battle they want to see ...!
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Post by PhillyBlair on Jun 5, 2006 11:05:07 GMT -6
Well said, as usual, Elisabeth.
You're correct about Gerard's ear witness testimony, and if we look further at that testimony it only further proves the point we've been discussing. From Camp's notes: [parenthetical statements are mine]
"About 1/2 hour after the troops retreated from the timber firing began down the river [from the Indian camp, or from the pursuit of the 60-75 Indians Kanipe reported Custer to be chasing??].....Before this there had been some general firing and when heard volleys thought Custer must be coming nearer ....These shots seemed to be much nearer than the general firing, insomuch that he thought Custer or a detachment of Custer's battalion was making way through the village. Gerard says he heard the two volleys fired...Says these were certainly fired down at the river....There were 30 or 40 shots, then straggling shots, and in a little while another volley, apparently nearer to them."
Again, we have a few volleys reported (a unified story from all ear witnesses), as well as some scattered fire. No timetable given, but one more ear witness who doesn't describe a heated or long term battle. For the record, I think it's possible that the shots he heard from the village could have been Indians passing through on the way to the battle -- perhaps a way to alarm the remaining warriors to action? Someone (perhaps Edgerly or Godfrey) recalled hearing shots from the direction of the village from Reno Hill at what would have been the same time.
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Post by PhillyBlair on Jun 5, 2006 12:56:24 GMT -6
One other point to add in relation to the sounds of firing heard from the vicinity of Ford B. Some Indian accounts relate that soldiers sat on their horses and fired into the village. Others speak of a charge. I've always thought that both were correct. Perhaps Custer began by firing into the village and then sent one company down to the river while another was held in reserve further back. If this reserve unit continued to fire into the village while the charge was being made, AND if they covered the eventual retreat with volley firing, wouldn't this explain the firing (near the river and then distant) as described by Gerard and others?
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