LBH: Was It Really That Simple?

[Tricia]

All--

I finally went out and purchased a copy of February, 2006's, "Wild West." I found one of the letters to the editor rather interesting and after reading it, I just shook my head and wondered, "what if LBH really was that simple to figure out?" I'll include a portion of the letter here, penned by Steve Munzel (if you're a member of this board, thanks, great letter!). I believe this is in response to an earlier article penned by Robert Nightengale:

" ... What continues to stand up, therefore, is that Custer divided his force in the absence of reliable intelligence regarding his enemy's position or strength, that he attempted to attack a superior enemy before his forces had reassembled, and that he was surprised by those he had hoped to surprise. It is likely when Custer saw the village from Weir Point he realized that he had miscalculated but also saw a long-shot opportunity to pull off a spectacular coup with another of his patented charges. From there on, his plan of battle was revised from moment to moment as he was compelled to respond to spontaneously clever movements by those uncooperative Indians ... No doubt at some point Custer must have thought, 'This is just not my day.' But of course, he was wrong about that, too, wasn't he?"

So, was it that easy to discern? Happy holidays from America's south ... !

Leyton McLean

[alfuso]

It doesn't get simpler than this:

Callwell: "It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in a small war the only possibley attitude to assume is, speaking strategically, the offensive.The regular army must force its way into the enemy's country and seek him out. It must be ready to fight him wherever he may be found. It must play to win and not for safety."

And Godfrey underscores it with

Lt Edward Godfrey wrote: "An attack against indians must be made with celerity, and generally without other knowledge of the numbers of the opposing force than that discovered or the attack may be said to be made in the dark and successful surprise to depend on luck."

[crzhrs]

It seems that the only ones in the know that day were the Indians.

Custer planned an attack based on a small number of Indians running from the Lone Tepee site. He was unsure of the terrain, had to cross a river somewhere, but not sure where. Once he had gone downriver he was without immediate support or communication with the rest of the command, had to send for help and extra ammunition and hope messengers get through and help arrives.

Meanwhile the Indians were routing Reno, Benteen is on his way only to find Reno rather than Custer; the pack train is wallowing in the morass and ends up arriving even later than Benteen.

The Indians had done everything the military was suppose to do: meet the enemy rather than run, proper communication, fearless fighting, rush to another part of the battlefield, and show no mercy.

Lack of proper intelligence was the main factor when the 7th faced the largest Indian village even known on the Great Plains and it should not have been attacked with only "Custer's Luck"

[Treasuredude]

Or this from General Hugh L. Scott....

"He had a right to feel that he had been discovered by those Indians. If he did not attack before they gave the alarm the Indians would escape, for which he would have to answer to a court-martial.”

[crzhrs]

No one said attacking the Indians was wrong. However, Custer's plan was based on fleeing Indians from the Lone Tepee Site, not a village somewhere in the LBH Valley. He may have been right to send Reno with a 150 plus/minus men to bring to battle the small group fleeing from LT and Custer would support him, but to base an attack on 1,500-2,000 warriors with a divided command widely separated was wrong.

I can only assume Custer's plan was based on the fleeing Indians from the LT site.

Callwell's philosophy may work on paper but apparently had holes in it for real time fights.

PS: Does anyone know if Callwell had any combat experience or was he a "paper soldier"?

[alfuso]

Yes, Callwell had combat experience. Boar War.

Read Darling's SAD AND TERRIBLE BLUNDER. He makes a strong case that Custer knew just where the village was and how big it was. He wasn't after a bunch of satellite lodges.

His scouts told him exactly where the village was and that it was BIG. And he believed them.

[olehoss]

There were some questions concerning Custers vision on another board. Does anyone have any ideas concerning this?

Ole'

[stevewilk]

alfuso, that would be the "Boer", not "Boar" (as in male swine)....but maybe the Brits did attack a few wild hogs too....to supplement dreary army rations.

[El Crab]

olehoss said:

There were some questions concerning Custers vision on another board. Does anyone have any ideas concerning this?

Ole'

I believe the crux of that idea was Custer was tired. Of course, he was considered tireless and often went on a few hours of sleep, staying up late to stuff a bird or write letters. Everyone seemed to be in awe of his stamina and immunity to fatigue.

But suddenly, on June 25th, 1876, his immunity to fatigue fails him. And while he probably couldn't see as well at 36 as at 26, I'd doubt that was the reason he couldn't see what the scouts did. No need explaining it beyond haze and less acute senses than his scouts had.

[elisabeth]

Agree, no need to think his vision was failing him ... but the "immunity to fatigue" question could be quite another thing. There's plenty of evidence that his usual manner was "brusque". However, on this trip, and especially on the 25th, he seems to be more than usually ratty. Varnum remarks on it; he flies off the handle to Tom about moving the troops up; and we get all those "are we there yet, are we there yet?" repeat messengers to Hare and to Benteen, driving them both nuts.

Always, before, he's been in the ascendant; his immunity to fatigue has been inextricably linked with his supreme self-confidence. (Even in the summer of '67, I don't think he realised what a hash he'd made of his part in the Hancock campaign until the court-martial -- and even then, there are no signs of contrition or self-doubt. The way he writes about it later makes it clear that he still thinks his talks with Pawnee Killer were a great idea, for instance ...) Now, for the first time, he's in serious career trouble; even Sheridan, his protector, is fed up with him. Could all this unaccustomed anxiety have sapped his stamina? He mightn't recognise that it had, and would drive himself as hard as ever; but is it possible that it skewed his judgement? ---- I know we've discussed this on the "exhaustion" thread, but mostly with regard to the troopers. If Custer himself was running on empty, it could explain quite a bit ...

[alfuso]

stevewilk

typos are inevitable.

You don't look good in "cute"

[crzhrs]

It's one thing to be physically tired, but a completely different is emotionally/mentally tired. Usually adrenaline will power you up in physically stressful conditions, but mental fatigue doesn't work that way.

All the pressure from the Belknap Scandal, Grant's feud, not going on the campaign (Until Terry interceced), going back and forth between Washington and other places must have taken it's toll.

Then the pressure of a successful campaign to redeem himself could have led to rash and hasty decisions on June 25 & 26.

How much of a factor emotional fatigue played can be added to the reasons for defeat at the LBH.

[olehoss]

Thanks, folks. Much obliged for your answers.

ole'

[George Mabry]

Yes, it is simple. Custer was defeated because he fought a larger, more belligerent force who used the terrain more effectively that he did. And that is it in a nutshell.

Custer's orders doomed him. In attempting to follow his orders to capture or at least contain the indians, Custer was forced into dividing his command and fighting on terrain not of his own choosing.

[Dark Cloud]

That's ridiculous. His orders/instructions in no way doomed him.

Terry's expressed wishes are not responsible for his decision to cross the Wolf Mt.'s, his choice of terrain, his decision to partially attack a then unknown number, his inability to fulfill his support in anything approaching a timely manner. If he'd brought the entire regiment up from the south in the LBH valley that day, he'd be on about as perfect cavalry land as there is. The numbers involved are another issue, as are his divisions of force, but the orders to him are not responsible for either his defeat or his blunders.

These things happen. If he'd broken through at MTC with everyone and a certain combination of Sioux panicked in sequence, Benteen and Reno coincidently united and were able to join in, we might still be studying his genius today. He took a flying leap into the unknown and it bit him on the ass for once. I do not understand why someone has to be to blame, but if anyone it's certainly the knucklehead in chief that day. I don't know why grand conspiracies, and grand slanders and wild accusations and stuff have to be proposed.