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Post by herosrest on Mar 2, 2018 19:16:25 GMT -6
I agree that..... it had proved to be wise to sneak up in't middle of the night and gain victory that way. The Sioux and Cheyenne simply were not capable of lining up in ranks to exchange volleys at point blank. Weapons were evolving of course and rendering the old way of battle, difficult and eventually impossible. The machine gun had debuted and with the improved accuracy and lethality of rifled rounds the old ways were the olden days - particularly so with cavalry horseflesh. There were difficulties with the Springfield weapon system which was improved and you can look no further than Miles' memoir to learn that 5th Infantry spent all their time polishing copper 45.70 rounds. It's hindsight from us but the days of the brightly coloured peacock uniform was ending and criticism leveled at Custer by his scouts about lining up to be sh0t down like pigs, proved to be apt and as equally ignored as their concerns about enemy numbers. Whilst the ensuing campaign in the field was pursued against the scattered groups, the reservation populations were disarmed and dismounted to prevent them reinforcing Sitting Bull as happened in June. The Summer roamers, roamed no more. It was a robust and less concerned policy based on the lesson that feeding and arming the Sioux was counter productive, incredibly expensive, and daft. 7th cavalry's attack on Camp Buffalo was a surprise and one which was thrown away. Why and how tends into acrimony so I'll avoid that. The surprise was as great as that of any dawn attack and where sleepy heads at 4am panic in confusion - so do they at 12pm. I believe that it was understood that the dawn attack was best undertaken during winter and the attempt in 1876 went wrong at Powder River. Little Bighorn and Rosebud were the consequence. There was a job to be done and it was was done eventually. Summer of '76, the Sioux were not ready to rollover and their recent history indicated to them that a victory in the field would earn political concessions from Washington in the way that occured from Red Cloud's war. The Sioux made their stand and were heard. It did them no good and today they are Borg (so to speak). Their way of life had to end and the US desperately needed to move on from the CW. There are all sorts of moral issues related to conflict and its politics but, I believe, very few if any commanders would find a better tactic in the field. How to achieve surprise? Regards.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 3, 2018 4:12:22 GMT -6
So back to METL. I would like to discuss what the 7th was capable of doing and how that should have impacted decision making.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Mar 3, 2018 11:30:39 GMT -6
So back to METL. I would like to discuss what the 7th was capable of doing and how that should have impacted decision making. Regards AZ Ranger Great. Since that is my entire approach to military analysis. During the pre deployment phase units organize for the expected fight. This means the tittle 10 United States Code function of man, train, and equip. This means if your TOE does not match your missions, you create new abilities. This is one of my main theories of this battle. Many units adapted to their specific tasks, conditions and standards. The 7th did not, The issue is why did the 7th fail, when no one else failed.
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Post by benteen on Mar 3, 2018 15:30:08 GMT -6
So back to METL. I would like to discuss what the 7th was capable of doing and how that should have impacted decision making. Regards AZ Ranger Great. Since that is my entire approach to military analysis. During the pre deployment phase units organize for the expected fight. This means the tittle 10 United States Code function of man, train, and equip. This means if your TOE does not match your missions, you create new abilities. This is one of my main theories of this battle. Many units adapted to their specific tasks, conditions and standards. The 7th did not, The issue is why did the 7th fail, when no one else failed. Col Montrose, In one of my previous posts I explained how poorly I think the Army was, in their lack of training, non exam of recruits, attitude towards the Indians, etc. But that does not explain why some units were able to overcome and the 7th wasn't. The only reason I can come up with is leadership. Be Well Dan
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 4, 2018 7:57:33 GMT -6
So what was the lead time that the 7th had to prepare for this mission?
What basic skills were worked on regardless of any particular mission?
So to get me on the same page if I am off let me know. I think that METL is developed first and then you train. If something changes the mission then the METL is changed and the corresponding training. Am I on the right page?
Steve
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Post by montrose on Mar 6, 2018 0:06:00 GMT -6
So what was the lead time that the 7th had to prepare for this mission? What basic skills were worked on regardless of any particular mission? So to get me on the same page if I am off let me know. I think that METL is developed first and then you train. If something changes the mission then the METL is changed and the corresponding training. Am I on the right page? Steve METL means doing a same battle drill as you commonly use, and unique ones based on this specific mission, this specific campaign. Movement to contact, operate in Battalions, hasty attack, operate a wagon train are common. Operate a mule train is new, first time 7th did this. www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FM%207-8%20W%20CH%201.pdfLook at the battle drills in Army Regulation 7-8. These are common METL tasks. Note that every non commissioned officer in the Army is expected to be fully proficient in every single word in 7-8, it is the basic warfighting bible for any small unit leader. I would say Army NCos are about one third proficient, USMC 60%. For all our folks who served, can you execute everything here? Please note, this version has significant changes to close quarter battle. I don't agree, and SF doesn't use, but it is better than what they taught at Benning 30 years ago. Bottom line. Their are METL tasks that were known in Sep 1875 and not trained on until day of battle Jun 76 This did not happen in other units of the Army of this era. The 7th showed lack of BFA/METL analysis and individual and collective training, that no other unit of this era. The hypothesis that any unit of the Army would have had the same result is false. Only the 7th could be so bad, and was so bad. So we need to look at why them, and no one else.
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Post by mac on Mar 7, 2018 1:35:02 GMT -6
Quite a document. Huge amount of content. When we look at the time fractions involved armies actually devote only a small fraction of their time to the main function of battle. In purely time terms their main activity is training. A consequence of this is they are only as good as the quality of that training. That depends on a few things. The teaching ability of those doing the training. Officers and NCOs must be very good teachers as well as other leadership qualities. The time devoted to meaningful training. The resources devoted to training. The accessibility to training on the scale required. The accessibility to training in suitable task relevant environments. Interesting discussion about the 7th to be had here. Cheers
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 7, 2018 4:23:02 GMT -6
So were are back to what Dan stated in that the troopers had little training in just about everything. The specific training for this mission should have had METL requirements with the mules added. Who would have been in charge of having the detached companies knowing what is to be expected of an individual soldier. Seems to me that horsemanship and marksmanship could be trained for anywhere. I agree with William in that it seems to many things were ignored for preparation for battle and it was learned on the job. That cost lives and created mission failure.
I would not want to learn to stay on my horse and attempt to shoot an Indian at close range with my revolver during a battle. Those are trained for skills and used if needed. In this battle they were needed. If known and it should have been known it has an effect on decision making. Sgt. Ryan wrote that even Custer wouldn't fight these soldiers mounted. So it appears Ryan had the METL in mind when he wrote that statement.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Mar 7, 2018 6:14:54 GMT -6
The 7th Cav did extensive training prior to the Washita campaign. Some of this was new unit training, since the 7th was established in 1866. Accounts cover marksmanship horse riding, practice marches, forming skirmish lines, simulated attacks, etc.
This proves that this Army new how to train, and even this unit. But you can't train a unit every 10 years. With a 30% plus annual turnover ate, training must be a priority, especially in the spring and summer.
Remember the majority of soldier activity was post support details. Wood details, hay details, gardening details, dog details (GAC used soldiers to support his personal life, like his dogs, his taxidermy hobby, his collection of exotic animals, etc). Accounts show long periods in the winter of no training whatsoever.
Remember the plan was for a winter campaign. Crook and Gibbon both managed to launch winter movements, months before the 7th. The 7th had much better lines of communications, and should have been the first out of the gate, not the last. The 7th proved itself to incompetent and inept, compared to the all other units in the two Departments, long before 25 Jun 76.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 7, 2018 6:53:01 GMT -6
I believe that Gordon Harper researched this aspect of 7th Cavalry's poor show at LBH and arrived at definitive numbers for inexperienced and untrained recruits. I'll see if I can dig the numbers out.
The use of Mules was an ad hoc undertaking which one would and should really expect to have been troublesome. The hope was for improved mobility by retaining indepenance without the immense bridging efforts requured to travel with wagons. Terry's Montana column were scattered all over upper reaches of the Tulloch and Bighorn by late afternoon of the 25th. Admittedly this was in part due to poor guidance by scouts.
There should have been worthwhile experience gained with the packs and animals during the Reno scout. The difficultues experienced in hauling a Gatling and damaging the running gear of its wagon obviously influenced thinking about taking them on with 7th Cavalry.
Godfrey's record of the march indicates that Custer devolved broad responsibilities to his Company commanders and with that introduced an element of competition by performance being reported daily. Benteen failed this test and was stung by criticism to improve deployment of the escort. That of course was the point and coming last in competion is its own point. It worked.
Marksmanship was hamstrung by regulation monthly allotment of ten rounds per man. It appears to have been rigid mikitaryness although I guess that the reserve supply could have been used. Judgement call.
Certainly one might hope that a cavalry charge pistols drawn could hit something with their shots but this was only tested during the charge into LBH river where influencing the hostiles had been abandoned. Benteen advanced to Reno's succour in mounted skirmish line but to only light opposition.
Firing of weapons during the march from FAL was quite seriously punished as happend with one of the scouts who spent a day stood on one leg atop a barrel. He was fortunate that the order which he disobeyed - prevented him being shot in punishment.
Had the regiment been aware that they would confront overwhelming force employing innovative (different) tactics - I'm not sure that anything more than was, could have been.
The march from 17th May was an operation in the field requiring the full resources of the column to advance the wagons by bridging and was beset by poor climate. There was little time for anything besides the march, I suspect and readiness was as much a matter for Terry's and Custer's staff as them themselves. I don't feel that Custer's absence from FAL as the companies assembled had any bearing on the considerations here, since it was only on his return n the April that the mission preparation got under way. The thing was rushed, in spite of Gibbon having been under way for a considerable time and suffering considerable.... difficulties on the Yellowstone. Poor marksmanship if it exited at LBH, must surely have extended to the regiments of Crook's expedition.
There were too many Indians.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 7, 2018 8:07:55 GMT -6
Above, Will mentions September of 1875. The tasks and proficiency needs were known way prior to September, in fact those aspects of training should be ongoing. The edict to the NA's went out in November as I recall, the planning for the three expeditions probably began around that time. Training should have been on going for the skills required. The Stanley expedition and the Black Hills expedition were nothing more than junkets and even they could have turned into minor disasters had the NA's truly massed against the soldiers.
Will, I can hit you every time at 25-50yds with a 1911 or my .44 single action if you are walking or standing still. I can get you with my .30-06 easily at 300 yards. However if you zigzag or duck and use cover it becomes more problematic. Now put me on a horse with those same weapons and with you shooting at me, I have issues. I have never trained for that. In reality my shooting skills are not what they were when I used them more. I could not get 23, 24, or 25 trap shooting on a regular basis without practice.
Colt does Cowboy Action Shooting, trust me he practices!
Regards, Tom
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Post by herosrest on Mar 7, 2018 8:38:51 GMT -6
On February 8, 1876, Lieutenant General Phil Sheridan – Civil War hero and commander of the Department of the Missouri – telegraphed Generals George Crook and Alfred Terry ordering them to undertake winter campaigns against the "hostiles."
Crook's objective was to strike the Indians in their winter camps. Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse and their followers were thought to be in the area of the Powder, Tongue, or Rosebud rivers. Crook's force consisted of 883 men, including in addition to cavalry and infantry, civilian packers, scouts, guides, and a newspaper reporter. On March 17, 1876 - Bad weather and poor intelligence conspired to cause the failure of Crook's expedition to .
The result of the battle was the opposite of what the military had hoped to achieve. Crook wrote, “After this affair the Indians became more openly defiant than ever.” He and his men returned to the supply base, Cantonment Reno, located at the Bozeman Trail crossing of the Powder River, few miles away from the site of the original and now defunct Fort Reno. Plans for a summer campaign were soon organized.
The summer campaign of 1876 was the result of the earlier one which attacked...…… the Cheyennes. Sitting Bull went to sleep every night dreaming of ways to drag the Cheyennes into his fight with the White man.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 7, 2018 11:02:03 GMT -6
Back to MTL:"Custer had risen as suddenly as a volcanic eruption, and had no such understanding of himself or others. During the war he had taken his units immediately into battle upon assuming command; he had never needed to cultivate his men, to listen them, to build a relationship upon anything other than shared danger and victory. He had never learned to win consent."(T.J.Stiles)While Custer worshiped McClellan, he never really learned how to plan or train. While he worked for Grant and Sheridan he never learned how to manage only to lead. Early during the ACW he cultivated numerous relationships with General officers and politician simply to leverage those relationships to his on benefit and promotion. They were not symbiotic relationships. He relied on patronage in conjunction with his ability to rise in the ACW command structure. He played one against the other in some areas. He used the patronage of Sheridan on several occasions after the war.
Regards, Tom
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Post by montrose on Mar 7, 2018 12:23:33 GMT -6
Hero wrote "I believe that Gordon Harper researched this aspect of 7th Cavalry's poor show at LBH and arrived at definitive numbers for inexperienced and untrained recruits. I'll see if I can dig the numbers out"
I have a complicated relationship with Hero. He has much research data on LBH. In my opinion, his issue is comprehension. For the record, I like Hero, and he has contributed far more than many other posters.
1. The Nonsense Theory. LBH has a theory that the longer you served, the more combat power you had, even with zero, repeat zero training. SO its great to say many soldiers in LBH had been in Amy 6-12 months, but they had never zerod their weapon, never been trained in known distance training, never been taught how to ride, never been taught how to shoot mounted.
By the way, the animal needs to be taught how to react to the muttonhead on back shooting. Prey species panic when rider fires.
2, Days since you enlisted are meaningless unless you train. Training is not just individual skill, but small unit leader and collective. A major failing of the 7th Cav is he gross incompetence of small unit leaders, from section of 4s, to squad to company.
a. Individual. The 1873 carbine was effective to 300 meters with trained marksmen. With untrained folks, 150 or less.
b. Small unit leaders. Small unit leaders control fire. Mass fire control measures can overcome poorly trained soldiers. S0 a small unit leader can provide guidance to allow poorly trained shooters to hit out to 200 meters.
c. Reality. The archeology evidence of LBH shows the 7th was shooting at ranges of 800 meters and above. Every officer and NCO who allowed this is incompetent, unfit for their rank. Any evidence that shows this means every NCO and officer should be fired. The evidence clearly proves every officer and NCO on the northern sector were hopelessly incompetent. Every, no exceptions.
If you don't understand this I will bet you your life savings that you cant hit a target I choose, even if you are an Olympian shooter. Of course, my targets will be on the moon.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 7, 2018 17:17:09 GMT -6
I think that it is fair to say that a transition was underway with the long established practice of ranks of soldiers lined up directly in opposition stood erect and eye to eye, was passing into history. The 19th Century soldier was perfectly well able to undertake the duties assigned to him, by bugle and order and there was an order and bugle call for everything that he could possibly be required to do. If, as you feel, there was a lack of understanding and or ability, then I disagree. The officers ran the show and directed fire as you say. The cavalry were unable to keep the enemy at bay on Custer's field so maybe we have or are missing something. The Indian tactics changed and no one foresaw that.... well, Reynolds (Charles) did I believe and also the scouts. The evolution of the skirmish line was underway in esponse to rifled rapid fire and the problem which Custer's men encountered was poor terrain, a desperate lack of entrenching tools and seriously vulnerable led mounts when they were led. There were too many Indians. I am aware of the weapons range and ranging issues and offered that in a previous discussion of the bullet artifacts peppering the terrain west and downriver of LSH from LSH. With regards the officers, they may have been overconfident and unprepared for what took place but that happens all the time. Maybe the soldiers were outgunned. That idea does pop up now and again and in regards the mooning...... that's a hell of risk to take. Linked is George L. Gillespie's report and summation of activity in prepartation for the 1876 campaign and summation of what was what, where and when. Crisp. It was dated July 11, 1876 to A.A. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers US Army. (APPENDIX NN) It's a good read.
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