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Post by noggy on Mar 22, 2018 6:53:19 GMT -6
Since this is a mission essential task list would not CQB be a skill that would needed? I think the real problem is that CQB was not on the list of what would be expected of these particular soldiers. Regards AZ Ranger What would be classified as CQB in the 1870s? I take for granted that the infantry units still trained to use bayonets. Hand-to-hand fighting techniques out of the question, but the firing of revolvers would be within the definition of CQC/CQB? A Colt would only be able to hit targets really close, after all. That seems like a "must" for any cavalry soldier. All the best, Noggy
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Post by montrose on Mar 22, 2018 18:12:23 GMT -6
CQB is 25 meters to hand to hand range; with respect to LBH.
US tactics was to avoid melee. Technology provided no advantage, so it was a numbers thing, and Indians had the numbers. And were better trained and more physically fit.
The US tactics required using firepower to hold off and defeat the enemy. This meant engagement areas 100-300 meters from skirmish lines, to optimize the 1873 Springfield Carbine. The US had an organizational advantage, in that the Indians had no comparable organization to US companies, battalions (task force in modern lingo) and above.
This means US maximizes advantage when having companies work together. It becomes an exponential combat multiplier. So two companies working together is not double the combat power, it is quadruple. (meaning if number of companies is X, additional companies are not just additive (x plus x) but squared (x times x).
So Custer took 5 companies north where all fought out of supporting range of one another. Combat power is 5. He had the option of taking 8 companies into the valley to fight a battle all in support range of one another. Combat power is not 8, it is 64. Whatever happened in the valley; the chances of a positive outcome are 64 times higher than the disaster that took place. The 5 separate deaths in the north meant that the individual companies had a combat power of one, when they died in place.
Again, no other field grade commander in this era (1866-1898) would have made the tactical decisions of LTC Custer. His incompetence is the main factor in the outcome, nothing else.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 22, 2018 20:23:27 GMT -6
I feel that you are overly harsh on George and should consider period cavalry tactics. Certainly, the engagement phase of the action was disastrous once the five companies failed to operate as intended. We don't know why that occured and never will but the obvious intention was to do what you suggest, in te valley. So, why didn't it happen? The tactic employed cannot of itself be faulted and is certainly not flawed but in this fight which we study it failed. That does not undermine the tactic which remains valid and should have been effective but was not implemented.
The stated object of his intention was to get what I refer to as the right wing of the 7th Cavalry, fighting in the valley of the Little Bighorn. We know this from sworn testimony so what went wrong?
I did sit quite a few months, long ago, contemplating Crook's defence on the Rosebud and came away from the study thoroughly confused with his use of his cavalry who were all over the place. Rather like Little Bighorn. I'm not comparing the two which were chalk and cheese and the Long Tom infantry rifle was in use but his units were not supporting one another and were rather pusher and pulled all over the place looking for a village that wasn't there.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 23, 2018 4:47:33 GMT -6
In the Crook fight the infantry location was used much like the NA village at the LBH a little over a week later. It afforded interior lines of movement for the US troops to traverse. The cavalry was used in a number of fire fights(hot spots), they were deployed not just sent, Having said that a portion of the cavalry was nearly cut off and ambushed while attempting to follow the withdrawing NA's. This was foreseen and the cavalry was recalled, had it not been you may have seen a replay of Fetterman.
Regards, Tom
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Post by montrose on Mar 23, 2018 6:04:36 GMT -6
1. Battalion. The normal practice of the 1876 Army was to form the battalions a the start of a campaign, and maintain them for the duration. This allows the battalion commander, the company commanders and the other officers and NCOs to get used to working together. This maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the multi company task force.
GAC's failure to do what all his peers would do; had a major impact of the poor performance of the 7th. Organizing and leading batalions is a standard METL task of this era, and the 7th performed at a lower standard than the rest of this army.
2. Provide Regiment Command and control. This is another standard METL task. Crook maintained command and controlat the Rosebud. When Royal screwed up on the left, Crook recalled Mills Bn from the right and rescued Royal Bn. GAC had no such ability. If he had a plan, he failed to tell the regiment second in command and at least 3 battalion and 7 company commanders. GAC failed to establish a command post capable of providing leadership and fighting the battle. He scattered his forces across the prairie and provided no more command and control than Old Barnum.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Mar 23, 2018 6:17:19 GMT -6
Thanks William
So it appears that CQB was not a high priority for training and would explain why Custer would leave the saber behind. It would also explain why Sgt Ryan stated they sucked in saber use. Based upon what they trained for then what would constitute a charge into a village. Seems the duration would be limited to revolver use. A Big Village would easily empty a revolver so does that affect a commanding officers decision making?
If the Army had given up CQB in a melee type action would that have been a factor considered by Reno?
Regards
Steve
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Post by montrose on Mar 23, 2018 8:43:21 GMT -6
medium.com/@doctrine_Man/the-battle-of-73-easting-25-years-later-d928bade1ecQuote: "Perhaps the greatest lesson I walked away from the 73 Easting was the fact that, in combat, you will only perform as good as you were trained. Adrenaline and fear may help you run or talk faster, but they will not magically teach you skills you have not previously mastered." My first real firefights was this war, several after it was technically over. Green tracers to this day raise my pucker factor.
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 23, 2018 11:12:18 GMT -6
There were numerous accounts of enlisted men firing to fast and not taking proper aim during Reno's "charge". Officers and NCO had to tell the men to slow down and make sure you are hitting what you are aiming it.
There are numerous accounts of not properly trained enlisted men after the Civil War with many of them looking for an escape from poverty, racial discrimination and a way to get out West and then desert and head elsewhere. The Civil War soldiers was better trained, equipped and there was far more incentive to serve your country in an area you were familiar with rather than chasing after Indians in unknown country, harsher weather conditions, poor rations, guns, ammo, and leadership.
As far as using sabers . . . I think there may have been one battle with Cheyennes where soldiers used sabers, other than that they were useless and were only good in close-combat fighting and the last thing the US military wanted was close-quarter combat with Indians who were better in-close fighters and whose style of fighting up close and personal was what they were better at. A wild melee gave the Indians the advantage.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 23, 2018 11:14:40 GMT -6
1. Battalion. The normal practice of the 1876 Army was to form the battalions a the start of a campaign, and maintain them for the duration. This allows the battalion commander, the company commanders and the other officers and NCOs to get used to working together. This maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the multi company task force. GAC's failure to do what all his peers would do; had a major impact of the poor performance of the 7th. Organizing and leading batalions is a standard METL task of this era, and the 7th performed at a lower standard than the rest of this army. 2. Provide Regiment Command and control. This is another standard METL task. Crook maintained command and controlat the Rosebud. When Royal screwed up on the left, Crook recalled Mills Bn from the right and rescued Royal Bn. GAC had no such ability. If he had a plan, he failed to tell the regiment second in command and at least 3 battalion and 7 company commanders. GAC failed to establish a command post capable of providing leadership and fighting the battle. He scattered his forces across the prairie and provided no more command and control than Old Barnum. Battalions were formed at FAL before the march and this was reported by Kellogg. Obviously there was no time for training during the march with lots of duty bridging for wagons and artillery andescort and scouting. It must have been an interesting time at Lincoln, Rice, Abercrombie as the regiment began to assemble its full strength. I believe that they were short of mounts and with five year enlistments then some 20% of the headcount was leaving or new. Godfrey felt that considerable responsibility was vested in the company commanders. Custer did have a plan - we Know this and what is was. He did not carry it out although he did attempt to concentrate his strength in the valley with Benteen arriving as Reno left. Custer of course rode north. That the five companies with Custer were wiped out by massacre does not indicate that they performed poorly or badly. They were simply defeated.
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Post by crzhrs on Mar 23, 2018 13:51:07 GMT -6
<Custer did have a plan . . .>
Really? What was the plan? It was fly by the seat of your pants in the middle of the afternoon, separation of command with no lines of communication and hope the Indians wouldn't have the chance to run.
It didn't quite work out with the "plan".
Benteen was too far away with orders to keep looking for Indians until it was too late for him to do anything to help out other than save Reno. If Benteen didn't decide to give up his valley hunting Reno may have met the same fate as Custer. It was only by chance that Benteen could do anything to save Reno. By then Custer was on his own hoping someone would come to save him. I think Elliott (Washita) probably was hoping for the same thing!
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Post by herosrest on Mar 23, 2018 17:35:02 GMT -6
<Custer did have a plan . . .> Really? What was the plan? It was fly by the seat of your pants in the middle of the afternoon, separation of command with no lines of communication and hope the Indians wouldn't have the chance to run. It didn't quite work out with the "plan". Benteen was too far away with orders to keep looking for Indians until it was too late for him to do anything to help out other than save Reno. If Benteen didn't decide to give up his valley hunting Reno may have met the same fate as Custer. It was only by chance that Benteen could do anything to save Reno. By then Custer was on his own hoping someone would come to save him. I think Elliott (Washita) probably was hoping for the same thing! He did have a plan and it failed. Benteen was sent looking for the valley... Reno was sent into it. Custer intended to cross into it below. So there was a plan to concentrate his strength at the village. Benteen was ordered there. It went wrong with Benteen arriving as Reno left. The five companies were cut off from Reno and Benteen and the regiment cut to pieces in detail. Now, if they had been mounted on a platoon of Bradley's.... well, I feel things might have turned out differently.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 23, 2018 18:19:06 GMT -6
I was just over at Zerohedge which is often interesting and fun filled for weekend and bump this, weapon which could have destroyed the village without harming the inhabitants by burning up the tipis. There's an interesting turn of events in Hong Kong where revenue surplus has been returned to residents. I wonder if it will catch on - Govt making profits and returning them to voters. Ultimate Capitalism in China??? HO hum. That won't go well, will it.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 23, 2018 18:22:39 GMT -6
1. Battalion. The normal practice of the 1876 Army was to form the battalions a the start of a campaign, and maintain them for the duration. This allows the battalion commander, the company commanders and the other officers and NCOs to get used to working together. This maximizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the multi company task force. Montrose, I agree with what you are saying, but would it be standard practice then for a regimental commander to separate his battalion into two smaller units in a combat zone? If Custer decided on his move north to change his formation enroute, would that be thinking out of the box by Custer? If he did separate his battalion into two and give one to Yates and the other to Keogh, would this be keeping with a commander who was thinking on the hoof? I suppose any commander could formulate any number of types of formation to deal with the mission or any threat that he came in contact with as you know well enough, that when in action things can dramatically change in a short period of of time.
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Post by noggy on Mar 23, 2018 19:25:54 GMT -6
He did have a plan and it failed. Benteen was sent looking for the valley... Reno was sent into it. Custer intended to cross into it below. So there was a plan to concentrate his strength at the village. Benteen was ordered there. It went wrong with Benteen arriving as Reno left. The five companies were cut off from Reno and Benteen and the regiment cut to pieces in detail. Now, if they had been mounted on a platoon of Bradley's.... well, I feel things might have turned out differently. A plan where you divide your force, knowing you are meeting a numerically superior force, and sending two of them (including the strongest of the three) into unknown terrain letting the maybe weakest with the perhaps lest competent commanding officer as the only one advance at the enemy is a faulty one. I never did more than lead a squad, stepping in to take over as platoon leader a couple of weeks, but the entire approach of the 7th is something even I`d understand would be flawed/too risky. It gives way to chance and reduces the advantages one has. Tactics in them self can never be wrong, but they can be used wrong or at the wrong scenarios. Custer did just that. At least I think so. All the best, Noggy
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Post by montrose on Mar 24, 2018 3:37:01 GMT -6
noblecotactical.com/1/post/2013/10/establish-five-contingency-plan-using-gotwa.htmlThe "Five Point Contingency Plan" memory aid "GOTWA" (Going, Others, Time, What, Actions) is an easy to remember acronym, designed to remind leaders of key "Contingency Information" that must be provided to stay behind individuals when leadership is absent from the main element. Leaders normally depart the unit throughout all patrol phases; planning, coordination, preparation, and execution of the patrol mission. Each time the leader departs the patrol main body, he must issue a Five Point Contingency plan to the leader left in charge of the unit. The patrol leader will also issue additional specific guidance stating what tasks are to be accomplished by the stay behind element in his absence. The Five Point Contingency plan must always be issued using the elements of GOTWA as described below. This is standard patrol leader stuff. Taught in basic training and a focus in the Primary Leader Development course (PLDC). PLDC is the school to train specialists/corporals; grade E-4. It is not new, Roger's Rangers were doing this in the 1700s. A critical part of this is the linkup plan and then the contingencies. What happens if I get hit? What if you get hit? What if we both get hit? There is normally a go to hell linkup point to reassemble if everyone scatters, normally a rally point on your backtrail; like the Lone Tepee or intersection Reno Creek and SFRC. The contingency plan is discussed with senior leaders before commander moves out. But it doesn't end there. It is then passed down the chain of command to every single soldier/civilian/indigenous in the patrol. This is Tactics 101, to use a Conz term from when he was here. Note that the Indian scouts knew this. They went down the backtrail to the divide, then went to the Powder River depot; which was closest friendly force.
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