|
Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 11, 2017 5:36:06 GMT -6
Hi Fred, I was interested in what Montrose wrote concerning Trumpeters used as couriers and going through some old word documents I saw Trumpeter W Kramer’s name with in brackets [possibly orderly to TWC], now this document was a few years old so I cannot remember where I actually got the info from but underneath it also says that Private Charles Bischoff was Tom’s orderly before they left, but he was left behind at PRD, so he would I guess replace him with another man in his company, a trumpeter perhaps?
But I must have got that info from somewhere, so maybe someone put two and two together and came up with Kramer and I stumbled across it, as he was a trumpeter with C Company, but that’s why I was asking you and the other board members in an effort to find if this is true.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Apr 11, 2017 10:58:45 GMT -6
Do we need further discussion on tactical communications on LBH?
Example. LTC GAC not sending a messenger to MAJ Reno is significant. MAJ Reno was deployed as the advance guard for a regimental attack. LTC Custer decided to abandon this attack, and move both the main body and the Benteen and McDougal battalions (Bns) away from the Reno Bn, and deliberately not support Reno. I am not condemning this decision. I am condemning not telling the Reno Bn on this drastic change of plan. Many men died because no message was sent.
Else I will flip to operational communications. This means between columns, Departments, Divisions (This term in 1876 is an area thing, not the organizational division most of you are thinking of) etc. I have seem some posts showing folks have no idea of the art of the possible on communications. Remember communications is inherently linked to organization design and decision trees. Data has to get to decision makers, decions are made, then data sent to outliers. OODA loop.
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Apr 11, 2017 11:27:53 GMT -6
Montrose: Benteen was sent off on his "scout" before Reno was given his orders to charge fleeing Indians and or village. Therefore Reno would have known Benteen was out of the loop once Custer gave Reno his attack orders.
Reno sent two messengers to Custer telling him of Indians not running, but rather standing there ground. In addition Girard was said to have told Cooke and/or Keough that Indians were making a stand. Custer must have been told that info from Cooke/Keough and altered his plans. Unfortunately, as far as we know Custer didn't send any message to Reno regarding Custer not "supporting" Reno.
Meanwhile Benteen is off wandering around trying to find fleeing Indians or a village. No scouts were with him, no medical personal either. One would have to wonder why that was.
Once Custer ordered an attack on Indians and/or the village he failed to notify Benteen. Hard to believe that an important decision regarding immediate contact with Hostile Indians would not have been relayed to Benteen to let him know what was going on.
All I can think of is the line from Cool Hand Luke (with Paul Newman) and Strother Martin saying: "What we have here is a failure to communicate"!
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Apr 11, 2017 19:06:01 GMT -6
What we have here is a failure to command.
|
|
lens
New Member
Posts: 24
|
Post by lens on Apr 11, 2017 20:16:05 GMT -6
I thought the night march after Crows nest was to attack the village and Benteen was supposed to make sure they didn't miss any. So I need more study time. So Benteen had no idea that Reno was going "Up the Middle" so to speak? I have A lot to learn. Feel like a new medic on his first call.
|
|
|
Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 12, 2017 6:47:33 GMT -6
If Custer formed a plan in his head to move to the bluffs it was after he sent Benteen and shortly after sending Reno. I think a missing element is what the scouts and guides told Custer that influenced his decision making. What we see is a lack of communication from the top down. I believe there was more to the Benteen scout to the left mission then what appears in the accounts and testimony. What I don't know is was it a Custer failure to share his knowledge.
I think you have to take Benteen's comments and testimony as coming from hindsight. Crossing drainages at right angles insures lots of elevation changes. It's not till he rides it that valley hunting ad infinitum comes to mind in his testimony. Having ridden that area I can see how he formed that opinion.
It does not take a rocket scientist to look from the divide and know the rate of travel is going to be easier following a drainage and larger trail to the LBH. I think the angle taken was to insure Benteen's position would be around 5 miles up SFRC and would be sufficient to stop fleeing Indians. If contacted he them he was to send Custer a message. That would indicate to me the distance of contact was anticipated to be potentially beyond hearing distance for gun fire.
Regards
AZ Ranger
|
|
|
Post by fred on Apr 12, 2017 7:26:07 GMT -6
I thought the night march after Crows nest was to attack the village and Benteen was supposed to make sure they didn't miss any. So I need more study time. So Benteen had no idea that Reno was going "Up the Middle" so to speak? Your impressions, above, are completely incorrect. LT Charles Varnum and an entourage of scouts left for the Crow's Nest at 9:20 PM. The distance they were to travel was about 11 miles. The night march of the rest of the regiment began at 11 PM. Varnum and crew reached the Crow's Nest just about at 2:15 AM. The regiment traveled about 6.2 to 6.7 miles and went into a temporary camp at about the same time. Custer halted only because his scouts told him he could never reach the divide before light. At that point in time, Custer had decided to hunker down and attack in the early morning of the 26th. After Custer had decided to attack that day-- the 25th-- a series of circumstances forcing him to change his mind, he crossed the divide, traveled about 1/4 mile, halted, and divided the regiment. That is when he sent off Benteen and three companies on their scout to the left. Custer did that to ensure no Indians were in the intervening valleys-- the whole area was chopped up with small, narrow valleys, and a series of small creeks-- and no Indians were in the upper LBH valley. Benton had no idea about Reno or where Custer went after Benteen departed or what was going on in the valley after he returned to Reno Creek and started down that creek for the LBH River. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Apr 12, 2017 7:27:43 GMT -6
But I must have got that info from somewhere... Gotcha, Ian... and thanks. It is something to keep in mind in case some evidence pops up; but it is a good call and quite reasonable. Thanks. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Apr 12, 2017 11:02:54 GMT -6
Ian,
Great call!!
I checked further and my notes show TMP William Kramer as possibly the orderly for Henry Harrington. It would fit perfectly.
Good job, my boy!!
Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 13, 2017 5:12:28 GMT -6
I probably get most of my info from you Fred, I know I source you books whenever I am hunting for something.
I guess that both C Company Trumpeters died with the bulk of their Company, I have not come across anyone identifying either Trumpeters Bucknell or Kramer, and I think that you could count the number of C Company men found on LSH on one hand [possibly two].
I would guess that if Tom Custer had an orderly and it was one of these Trumpeters, I would guess that he would have died with the HQ section on LSH, but neither Bucknell or Kramer were found.
Ian.
|
|
lens
New Member
Posts: 24
|
Post by lens on Apr 13, 2017 18:51:39 GMT -6
Thank you all it is going to take a long time to put what is out there together. This is like a graduate level history class.
|
|
|
Post by Bill_S on Apr 22, 2017 23:38:16 GMT -6
For reasons we can only attribute to racism, bigotry and the White-Man-Knows-Better-Than-Savages way of thinking Crook and Custer ended up on the short end of the stick rather than using dedicated Native American Guides/Scouts who had a lot of reasons to side with the White Man against their hereditary enemies . . . the Sioux. Major General Crook was considered by his contemporaries and by historians as an innovator in using Native Americans not only as guides and scouts but also as warriors. In the text that follows, I will try to demonstrate this. I am sorry that I am currently away from my library of primary sources, so I have been forced to use sources I could find on the internet. I would be pleased, in late May, to provide primary sources for all of the facts and quotations I will cite. I will now quote from a thesis written by Major Wesley Pirkle US Army in 1993. This document can be found at this link. An introductory statement: "Crook stands out as an anomaly during the post Civil War period and there are divergent popular and historical analyses of Crook. General William T. Sherman “named him the greatest Indian fighter and manager the United States Army ever had.”11 He was lionized by his many of his generation such as Captain John G. Bourke and Charles F. Lummis and has been noted for his “rare insight” by historians like Robert Utley. Crook has been also been criticized as by the modern historian Charles Robinson for being only an “adequate general officer.” Regardless of their analysis, most historians agree that Major General George Crook approached the Indian War with a uniqueness of thought and application shared by none of his military contemporaries."Since this forum seems to be focused on a part of the Centennial Campaign, I will not detail Major General Crook's activities against the Apaches after the Civil War and after the Centennial Campaign; if the reader wants to understand his use of Indians against Indians a study of this period is critical. During this time, the strategy and tactics he developed would be used in the Centennial Campaign. It is also critical to understand the political and funding issues during the Centennial Campaign. There were factors outside the strategic and tactical which controlled decisions. A quote from Major Wesley Pirkle: " On July 31st 1876, a joint resolution passed both Houses of Congress authorizing an increased authorized strength of one thousand Indian Scouts. This was a significantly higher number than the three hundred authorized by a bill earlier that year and the growing the size of cavalry companies to one hundred men[ 92] permitted Crook to fully implement a counterinsurgency compound warfare campaign plan.
From Major Wesley Pirkle's thesis allow me to quote pieces regarding the Centennial Campaign which relate to this issue. " On the 14th of May 1876, Crook left his headquarters and traveled to the Red Cloud Agency to meet with Chief Red Cloud and Interior Department Agent James S. Hastings but both were not available on the first day. Crook traveled with Bourke, Grouard, Richard, and a security contingent and attempted to recruit 300 Sioux (Oglala) allies. But when Chief Red Cloud and Agent Hastings returned they both opposed his request. Red Cloud bluntly stated that his people were fighting no more and they would not help the Army fight their kinsmen. Agent Hastings openly stated that he would permit the Oglala Sioux to volunteer but would also encouraged them not to fight.
"As he assembled his force at Fort Fetterman in late May, the prospect of beginning another expedition without Indian allies caused Crook to seek allies that were neither Sioux nor Cheyenne."
"At Fort Reno, Crook made a drastic decision to attempt to secure native allies. He charged Grouard, Pourier and Richard to undertake a risky mission to the Crow Agency in order to induce the Crows to fight for the Army. The mission would take a week or more and Crook was hesitant to proceed further in the expedition without native scouts to lead the way."
"On the 14th of June, Grouard and Richard returned to camp with 175 Crow volunteers. Shortly thereafter, the Shoshones arrived with 86 warriors under the command of the renowned Chief Washakie."
"The scouts remained to the north of the makeshift encampment and it was from here that the main body in the valley heard the first shots. Initially, it was assumed that the scouts had found another herd of buffalo but some of the scouts rushed back to warn that the Sioux were closing in from the north. The Crow and Shoshone scouts formed a loose picket or skirmish line on the northern edge of the encampment and fought the battle alone until the command could form up. It was in these opening moments that the Crow warriors might have saved the soldiers from an impending disaster. Frank Grouard recounted that: “The troops were not ready to meet the attack, so the Crows met the first charge of the Indians, and I believe if it had not been for the Crows, the Sioux would have killed half of our command before the soldiers were in a position to meet the attack.”
"On the 20th of June, the Crows left en masse to return to their families and all but a few of the Shoshones departed to their reservation. The desire to celebrate the battle and return to protect their families both played into their decisions. With the battle over, the Indians saw no need to stay and desired return to their lives on the agency and protect their families from possible reprisals."
"While this may seem odd, there are numerous reasons why the Crow and Shoshone scouts left the command. The first is that, from a Native American perspective, the battle was over and therefore the warriors should return to their tribes. The other reason was that this action made their tribes vulnerable to reprisals from roving bands of Sioux warriors. Lastly, Crook’s command was in no condition to continue the fight and, from the Indians perception on the 19th of June, the scout’s role in this campaign was over."
"Crook was also adroit in his handling of his Indian allies during the campaign. Upon their arrival at Crook’s Camp, the Crow and Shoshone scouts were keen to negotiate the specifics of their tactical roles. Specifically, “they asked however, the privilege of scouting in their own way, a privilege General Crook very willingly conceded, confident that nothing would be lost by doing so.”
The following quotes relate to the Dull Knife fight, which is generally accepted as separating the Northern Cheyenne from the Sioux and removing them as a factor in the campaign. These quotes are from the Wyoming Historical society and can be viewed at this link. "Crook used Indian spies and scouts to gather intelligence on the locations and plans of their kinsmen.”
"Crook’s scouts captured a young Cheyenne, who under questioning revealed that the main camp of the Northern Cheyenne was secluded on the Red Fork of the Powder River, called by the tribes Willow Creek, about a two-day ride to the southwest.”
“Another Cheyenne, a spy who had arrived from the Lakota camps in the north, told Crook that Crazy Horse had no doubt heard soldiers were in the area and would certainly move his camp farther north, away from the encroaching danger.”
"Seizing this opportunity, Crook changed his objective and sent more than half his troops, under the command of Col. Ranald S. Mackenzie, into the Bighorn Mountains in search of the Cheyenne village. Mackenzie’s force consisted of 700 men in 11 companies of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th cavalry regiments. Augmenting these troops were more than 400 Indian scouts, including about 150 Lakota and Arapaho, more than 100 Pawnee and roughly the same number of Shoshone."
Please note, that Mackenzie's force consisted of approximately 36% Indian warriors. I believe this fact alone, disputes the statement from a previous post which I quoted above. The comment I quoted above said that Major General Crook held a "white man knows better" mentality. I do not believe a reading of his autobiography or other writer's biographies will support that statement. Please consider Major General Crooks involvement in the significant legal decision in the Standing Bear v Crook case in 1879. Major General Crook initiated the public campaign which brought attention and free legal counsel in this case, which for the first time decided that a native American was a legal person and had the rights of habeas corpus. I found it amusing that was implied that Major General Crook did not listen to Native Americans. Actually, the primary sources strongly contradict this. His subordinates often complained that he ignored their advice and only listened to the advice given by Native Americans. I quote again from Major Wesley Pirkle: "Colonel Richard Irving Dodge laments that “The Cav[ alry] & Inf[ antry] are nobodies. The Indians and pack mules have all the good places [in camp]. He scarcely treats Mckenzie and I decently, but he will spend hours chatting pleasantly with an Indian, or a dirty scout.”
If a person holds a feeling of "cultural superiority", a typical trait of this belief is the feeling that dishonesty to the perceived lower culture is acceptable. If you agree with this assessment, you might find the Sioux Chief Red Cloud's famous comment about Major General Crook to be insightful: "He, at least, never lied to us."Cheers, and thank you for reading.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on Apr 24, 2017 7:23:20 GMT -6
Crook is the greatest officer who served in the Army from post ACW to WW1. He understood that using Indians as fighters added combat power. GAC did not.
The Special Forces branch insignia is crossed arrows. This is a direct homage to Crook, who developed that symbol for his Indian scout units.
For the 1876 campaign, Crook wanted to hire Sioux. The local corrupt and incompetent federal Indian agents blocked this. The Shoshone were Plan B and Crow Plan C. (Shoshone fought well, Crow,..ehhh).
After LBH Crook aggressively pursued Sioux and Plains Indian fighters, and hundreds flipped sides. I do not think that most folks on this board realize that many Indians who fought at LBH changed sides,
|
|
|
Post by crzhrs on Apr 24, 2017 12:31:46 GMT -6
Crook was one of the most competent and able commanders during the late 19th century battles with Native Americans. He was very successful in dealing with the Apache and chased down Geronimo when no one else could.
He used Native Americans as trackers to find fellow Indians when the US military floundered around. He used mules as pack animals because they were more sturdy and dependable than horses.
He was one of the few officers who actually knew ABOUT Native American Culture rather than just from fighting them.
He also was a reliable adviser to Indians once they were on reservations.
However, his performance against the Sioux at the Rosebud left a bad taste in his mouth and was very controversial among many local newspapers who criticized him.
All in all he was not only a figher of Native Americans but a friend. I have no issues with him as far as trying to help the Indians once on Reservations.
However, his failture to communicate with other commands after the Rosebud is suspect. He had Crow/Shoshoni Scouts who knew the country and could have relayed info to other commands notifying them of the strong and unconventional attack of a large standing army in the field by Hostile Indians. Whether that would have made any difference for Custer is debatable. Still he should have tried to contact higher-ups and the best way was via the "Indian Telegraph" which was far more efficient in relaying info than the military.
Let's get back to Custer's decision to send Benteen on his "Scout to the Left." There were no Scouts, Indian or White with Benteen, let alone any medical personal which is a scenario that no one has answered correctly for.
Custer could have sent a small force of soldiers led by Scouts to check out the territory. The Scouts were far more familiar with it and could have relayed any info quickly as regards to whether there were any Indians there . . . either camped or fleeing.
Instead he sent Benteen with several companies, no scouts, no medical personal and with very poor communciation once Custer decided to send Reno to attack the village while Custer sauntered off leaving not only Reno out on a limb but Benteen with no knowledge of what was going on.
Whether this was about bigotry, racism by whites towards Indians or just incompetence is something worthy of a debate. I think incompetence by Custer is at the top of the list with Crook "maybe" refusing to admit he failed misterably at the Rosebud.
|
|