lens
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Post by lens on Apr 5, 2017 20:33:17 GMT -6
I just read through Should Crook Have Been Court Martialed. How far to a telegraph station? How dependable were runners? Was there any way for the Three columns of that campaign to effectively work together? Was there even an effective way, given the circumstances, for Custer to communicate with Reno and Benteen? How could he even know his message got through to Benteen or Reno, or us for that matter, know if Reno's message got to Custer. Does anyone have an answer? Is there one?
Len
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Post by fred on Apr 6, 2017 9:26:59 GMT -6
Whoever said Crook should be court-martialed... should himself be court-martialed for being such a clown.
Communications between the Terry-Dakota column and the Crook-Wyoming column were virtually impossible. For Crook to communicate with Terry he would have had to send a dispatch from wherever he was located to Fort Fetterman. A telegram would then be sent to department HQ in Omaha. That message would be relayed to division HQ in Chicago and in turn to Terry’s department HQ in St. Paul, MN. From that point the telegram would go to Bismarck, the western terminus for the telegraph in 1876. Then the telegram would have to go aboard one of the steamboats to either Glendive or the Powder River Depot, a little later in the campaign. Then it would be sent by courier to Terry, wherever he was in the field. This entire process would have taken at least two weeks.
Best wishes, Fred.
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lens
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Posts: 24
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Post by lens on Apr 6, 2017 10:44:25 GMT -6
Communications are always the most important and the most likely to compromised in any endeavor, my experience deals with communication in EMS and Fire Ground operations. Even with modern communication equipment there is inevitability communication breakdown. The larger and more complex the situation, the more likely there will be a communication glitch. I read and saw Lone Survivor, the story of Marcus Lutrell and there were communication issues. How then do we expect good communication at The Little Bighorn. I keep reading Custer should have communicated this at this time, Reno should have let Custer know he was no longer attacking but had retreated and taken a defensive position on Reno Hill. Is it safe to assume, yes I know the dangers of that word, that the officers of that time knew the limitations of their communications and were expected to act independently when cut off or out of direct command? Another question/possibility, the more I read the less I know, given the limitations of communication at the time, is it possible that an officer can look at a situation, do a size up as we used to say on a fire ground, and realize no communication was possible, any runner/messenger was going to be killed or captured with no possibility of success, then do the best he can for his particular situation at that time? When modern soldiers are cut off because of communication failures what do they do now? Is there a field guide of the time that discusses the process in use for field communication at the time?
Len
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Post by dave on Apr 6, 2017 10:48:14 GMT -6
He's backkkkkkkkkkk! Good to hear from you Fred and again a concise to the point post. Thank You Regards Dave
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Post by crzhrs on Apr 6, 2017 11:17:31 GMT -6
I'll be the last to question anything Fred says . . . his research, study and objective views on the LBH are second to none.
However, we know that Native Americans, for whatever reason, were far better at transmitting info than the military. They knew about what happened at the LBH before the military did. The "Indian Telegraph" apparently was far superior than anything the military/government could provide info on.
Indian Allies were disgusted with Crook's performance at the Rosebud and left rather than being subjected to absurd orders.
One would have to think if Indians were given instructions on scouting (at the LBH) rather than sending Benteen off into No-Man's Land they would have quickly and efficently found there was nothing there it may have saved Custer from his ignominious defeat and provided the 7th the extra manpower lost on Benteen's Scout.
For reasons we can only attribute to racism, bigotry and the White-Man-Knows-Better-Than-Savages way of thinking Crook and Custer ended up on the short end of the stick rather than using dedicated Native American Guides/Scouts who had a lot of reasons to side with the White Man against their hereditary enemies . . . the Sioux.
The White Man Knows Best philosophy didn't just occur at the LBH but in many places around the world where Whites were trying to overthrow/control centuries-old traditions and felt any local assistance and/or information was not reliable and it was the White-Way-or-No-Way to go. We have seen many instances where that way of thinking resulted in disasters & humiliating defeats. Due to the White Man's superior technology and unlimited manpower they eventually won out, but not without turning the World upside down . . . ending up where we are now.
Sorry for the moralizing and sermon but it is what it is!
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Post by montrose on Apr 7, 2017 10:31:12 GMT -6
1. Discuss communications in 1876. In the pre radio era, communications was by face to face meetings and messenger. This means that when and where you use messengers is part of tactics and plans.
2. Messengers. There was much analysis of messengers in this era, that was being included in tactical manuals by 1890. There is an art to selecting and using messengers. I still remember from officer basic training the mantra of have the messenger repeat the message to you, before you sent him on his way. I believe Martini failed this test, leading to the Cooke note.
a. The 1876 organization design authorized 2 trumpeters per company. The trumpeters were expected to be messengers. (Sidebar: as a legacy of this tradition, to join the Army as a musician requires a bachelors degree, most Army musician MOS came out of college marching bands). As a matter of routine, higher HQ would grab 2nd trumpeters to serve as their own messengers. This is how Martini was assigned for the day on a detail to regiment HQ. This was a daily detail rotated through the companies.
b. The organization design of 1876 did not have an intermediate HQ between company and regiment. Tis meant that any task organization of two or more companies lacked messengers, had to be taken out of hide. This is why Reno had two EM assigned to him for the campaign, to serve as his messengers. (we will come back to M&M, for know note where they died). It is also why Cooke had a striker (If I forget, remind me to come back to who and what happened). Having same EM assigned to same officer for a campaign let's them increase their efficiency and effectiveness through day to day execution of their duties.
c. This army also did not have a proper regimental headquarters and headquarters company(HHC). A proper HHC has 100 plus folks. hey has what we call a Headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD). This is a very small HQ detachment. Without an HHC, the regiment was forced to strip dozens of combat soldiers away from the companies to fill essential support tasks. And the folks detailed were untrained for the jobs they actually did, vice were trained to do. Fred's participants book shows how this process took away 15-20% of 7th combat power.
3. Use of messengers. You have limited number of messengers. Based on the operations order, there are times when use of messengers mandatory. So when you reach phase line Silver send messenger with SITREP. Or the send Herendeen order at Tullock's that LTC Custer disobeyed.
a. Time. It takes time for a messenger to reach designated element and return. So you must think in time and space. When do I have relevant data, how long to inform other element, how long for messenger to return with feedback. So sending and receiving data is not at speed of sound, it is at speed or Martini, am I clear?
b. Messengers are not messages. Messengers are soldiers, capable of acting within their training and experience. SO pay attention when a quality soldier is sent on a message mission, and some Goldin the clown (misspelled Bozo). A messenger sent to another element delivers the message,then gathers battlefield awareness of what is going on at that element, before returning.
b1. LTC Custer sent adjustments to CPT Benteen's scout, flank attack mission through the two best qualified messengers in the regiment. This means he did not want to just micromanage Benteen's flank attack on the estimated village at junction RC and SFRC. He wanted to know what data Benteen was gathering. The messengers were regimental sergeant major and regimental chief of trumpeters. Their mission of delivering a message was far less important than telling him if he had another outlier village to attack. We can understand LTC Custer's intent because of who he sent, not what the message contained.
b2. Maj Reno had two messengers. He sent both of them to LTC Custer saying that he had met a massive enemy force in the valley. A single message automatically triggers the main body deploying to support the advance guard. Not doing this would occur very rarely in this era, maybe one time in a thousand. (By this era, I mean 1600-1900). LTC Custer did not allow these messengers to return. They both died on LSH. SO not only did LTC Custer fail to tell MAJ Reno that he had decided to abandon the Reno element by his own messengers, which was his duty; he failed to even allow Reno's own deliver message and return with main body action messengers to do their job. There is a distinction between negligence and gross negligence, Custer was grossly negligent here.
Hmm. Are people understanding me so far? I am by no means done. I have not even addressed operational C4I.
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Post by dave on Apr 7, 2017 15:01:37 GMT -6
montrose I understand completely and thank you for the information. Regards Dave
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lens
New Member
Posts: 24
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Post by lens on Apr 7, 2017 20:27:24 GMT -6
Thank You sir, I understand what you are saying. Excellent instruction, one would think you have some experience as an Instructor. Yes I remembered that also, I was hoping you would find my post and educate me. Dave, if you can find a boar bristle shaving brush they make great tailing material. Tied up 12 WD40'sand 5 size 18 parachute BWO's thats all my eyes could take.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 9, 2017 15:57:13 GMT -6
1. Discuss communications in 1876. In the pre radio era, communications was by face to face meetings and messenger. This means that when and where you use messengers is part of tactics and plans. 2. Messengers. There was much analysis of messengers in this era, that was being included in tactical manuals by 1890. There is an art to selecting and using messengers. I still remember from officer basic training the mantra of have the messenger repeat the message to you, before you sent him on his way. I believe Martini failed this test, leading to the Cooke note. a. The 1876 organization design authorized 2 trumpeters per company. The trumpeters were expected to be messengers. (Sidebar: as a legacy of this tradition, to join the Army as a musician requires a bachelors degree, most Army musician MOS came out of college marching bands). As a matter of routine, higher HQ would grab 2nd trumpeters to serve as their own messengers. This is how Martini was assigned for the day on a detail to regiment HQ. This was a daily detail rotated through the companies. b. The organization design of 1876 did not have an intermediate HQ between company and regiment. Tis meant that any task organization of two or more companies lacked messengers, had to be taken out of hide. This is why Reno had two EM assigned to him for the campaign, to serve as his messengers. (we will come back to M&M, for know note where they died). It is also why Cooke had a striker (If I forget, remind me to come back to who and what happened). Having same EM assigned to same officer for a campaign let's them increase their efficiency and effectiveness through day to day execution of their duties. c. This army also did not have a proper regimental headquarters and headquarters company(HHC). A proper HHC has 100 plus folks. hey has what we call a Headquarters and headquarters detachment (HHD). This is a very small HQ detachment. Without an HHC, the regiment was forced to strip dozens of combat soldiers away from the companies to fill essential support tasks. And the folks detailed were untrained for the jobs they actually did, vice were trained to do. Fred's participants book shows how this process took away 15-20% of 7th combat power. 3. Use of messengers. You have limited number of messengers. Based on the operations order, there are times when use of messengers mandatory. So when you reach phase line Silver send messenger with SITREP. Or the send Herendeen order at Tullock's that LTC Custer disobeyed. a. Time. It takes time for a messenger to reach designated element and return. So you must think in time and space. When do I have relevant data, how long to inform other element, how long for messenger to return with feedback. So sending and receiving data is not at speed of sound, it is at speed or Martini, am I clear? b. Messengers are not messages. Messengers are soldiers, capable of acting within their training and experience. SO pay attention when a quality soldier is sent on a message mission, and some Goldin the clown (misspelled Bozo). A messenger sent to another element delivers the message,then gathers battlefield awareness of what is going on at that element, before returning. b1. LTC Custer sent adjustments to CPT Benteen's scout, flank attack mission through the two best qualified messengers in the regiment. This means he did not want to just micromanage Benteen's flank attack on the estimated village at junction RC and SFRC. He wanted to know what data Benteen was gathering. The messengers were regimental sergeant major and regimental chief of trumpeters. Their mission of delivering a message was far less important than telling him if he had another outlier village to attack. We can understand LTC Custer's intent because of who he sent, not what the message contained. b2. Maj Reno had two messengers. He sent both of them to LTC Custer saying that he had met a massive enemy force in the valley. A single message automatically triggers the main body deploying to support the advance guard. Not doing this would occur very rarely in this era, maybe one time in a thousand. (By this era, I mean 1600-1900). LTC Custer did not allow these messengers to return. They both died on LSH. SO not only did LTC Custer fail to tell MAJ Reno that he had decided to abandon the Reno element by his own messengers, which was his duty; he failed to even allow Reno's own deliver message and return with main body action messengers to do their job. There is a distinction between negligence and gross negligence, Custer was grossly negligent here. Hmm. Are people understanding me so far? I am by no means done. I have not even addressed operational C4I. Nicely stated, to the point.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 10, 2017 4:54:26 GMT -6
I am waiting to find out who was Cook's striker/orderly as I have no one in my data for this post, but I am also missing orderlies for a number of officers including TWC and Benteen plus between 13-14 other officers.
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Post by montrose on Apr 10, 2017 5:54:24 GMT -6
PVT Goldin joined the army at 17, when minimum age was 21. He was unsuitable soldier materiel, but he was literate. He was assigned in garrison to LT Cooke, to help prepare reports, etc. This detachment continued for the 1876 campaign.
Here is my hypothesis on Goldin's wild ride. MAJ Reno had sent 2 messengers back to HHD. These messages should have automatically triggered main body support. In addition, Cooke had talked to Gerard when he fled to the rear and ordered him to return to his duty with the scouts (He disobeyed this order and hid in the rear of the Reno battalion).
The problem is that LTC Custer had left HHB and the main body. Custer was on his way to 3411. No one had authority to make decisions in his absence. Cooke could not use LTC Custer's messengers without GACs approval. Same for letting Reno's messengers return. The micromanagement that was the core of Custer's command climate paralyzed the 7th decision tree.
Cooke knew the main body was in contact against a large force. I believe he sent Goldin on his own initiative. The problem is that Goldin was young and of poor quality. He never delivered this message, and later claimed he forgot what it was. I don't believe him. Goldin was a man of zero ethics, a life long liar and con man. Goldin was found hiding in the bushes on Reno Hill when Reno went back to the retreat ford. Goldin received a dishonorable discharge the following year.
The use of Goldin vice an authorized messenger is an indicator that GAC wasn't there. Fred's time study work confirms this, at least beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Post by fred on Apr 10, 2017 8:49:42 GMT -6
➢ The following men were assigned Special Duty for all or part of the campaign: Brainard, PVT George—Orderly for General Terry. Murphy, SGT Robert L. — Orderly for General Terry. O’Toole, PVT Francis—Orderly for General Terry. Lynch, PVT Patrick—Orderly for General Terry. Hughes, SGT Robert H. — Orderly-trumpeter for George Custer. Dose, TMP Henry C. — Orderly-trumpeter for George Custer. Martini, TMP PVT Giovanni—Orderly-trumpeter for George Custer. Burkman, PVT John W. — George Custer’s orderly/striker. Goldin, PVT Theodore W. — LT Cooke’s HQ orderly/messenger. Callahan, CPL John J. — Hospital orderly and Dr. Lord’s assistant. Abbotts, PVT Harry—Dr. DeWolf’s attendant. Ryder, PVT Hobart—Hospital orderly for Dr. Porter. Davern, PVT Edward—MAJ Reno’s orderly. McIlhargey, PVT Archibald—MAJ Reno’s striker. Korn, PVT Gustave—CPT Keogh’s orderly. Kelly, PVT Patrick—CPT Keogh’s striker. Pickard, PVT Edwin H. — CPT Yates’ orderly, then assigned to packs. Deihle, PVT Jacob—CPT Moylan’s orderly. Lorentz, PVT George—CPT French’s orderly. Klotzbucher, PVT Henry—CPT French’s striker. Sanders, PVT Charles—CPT Weir’s orderly. Dorn, PVT Richard B. — CPT McDougall’s orderly. Penwell, TMP George B. — LT Godfrey’s orderly, then Reno’s trumpeter. Rapp, PVT John—LT McIntosh’s orderly/striker. Hackett, PVT John—LT Wallace’s orderly. Harrison, SGT Thomas Wilford—LT Edgerly’s orderly. McVeigh, TMP David—LT De Rudio’s orderly. Strode, PVT Elijah T. — LT Varnum’s orderly. Trumble, PVT William—LT Hodgson’s orderly. Kramer, TMP William—Possibly LT Harrington’s orderly. Clear, PVT Elihu F. — LT Hare’s orderly. Klawitter, PVT Ferdinand—Libbie Custer’s orderly at Fort Lincoln.
The Goldin assignment is questionable, but no one disputed his claim.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on Apr 10, 2017 9:34:35 GMT -6
montrose I honestly believe if that you had ordered a boxcar full of liars and they sent you Theodore Goldin you would be over shipped!
Goldin's story and legend started out very simple and believable but he just could not stop "cooking the books" in his pursuit of glory. Just as the fakers are outed by themselves today by adding honors upon honors to the point where individuals are prompted to check up on these unbelievable characters and their "created careers", so was Goldin. But Goldin was skillfully lead to self confession by Colonel W A Graham. As Graham wrote in his 1953 edition of The Custer Myth "I did not discredit Mr. Goldin; he performed that gentle office for himself:..."
Goldin's credibility, as far as I see it, waned after his 1893 Army Magazine articles and one must be very careful and selective in accepting any information or testimony he offers regarding the battle and the participants. He clearly mislead Benteen in their correspondence and only sought the information he could garner from the old Captain of H company for his own purposes. And then in a final display of shamelessness he sold the collection of Benteen's letters. The man had no sense of personal honor and was a miscreant plain and simple.
Of all the participants I know of or have read about, Goldin is the one I have the least respect for. He did serve and participated in the battle, though I believe he received the Medal of Honor in questionable circumstances, and for that I give him credit for doing what I never did. But only that and no more.
That is why I support the efforts to expose and end the charades of these liars, cheats and thieves. If anyone else is as passionate about this matter as I am, I would recommend Stolen Valor by Mr. B.G. Burkett as this is an excellent read about these cowards and fake heroes. The web site stolenvalor.com is a very informative source of information about the liars and thieves out there playing "dress up." Regards Dave
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 10, 2017 9:52:31 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, was Trumpeter W Kramer (C Company) Capt. Tom Custer’s orderly? I fear Capt. Benteen’s orderly remains elusive.
Yan.
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Post by fred on Apr 10, 2017 17:45:48 GMT -6
Thanks Fred, was Trumpeter W Kramer (C Company) Capt. Tom Custer’s orderly? I fear Capt. Benteen’s orderly remains elusive. Yan, What makes you say that? Best wishes, Fred.
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