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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 25, 2016 6:04:23 GMT -6
I want to throw in an added wrinkle here. Holding all else equal, I believe the Springfield carbine may be enough superior to a Civil War rifle, if not in accuracy but in time interval to reload, to expect more efficient results. I believe good target opportunities were fleeting and randomly distributed at LBH. If Trooper Snuffy used a CW rifle his reloading interval increases by a factor of 3 to 4, say from 6 seconds to 24 seconds. A good opportunity occurring during the extended reload interval may not reoccur, leading Snuffy at times to fire at a less choice target. The significance of this is hard to evaluate, again the good opportunities are randomly distributed, and I don't know how great the tendency would be, or what the force of circumstances would demand, for Snuffy to take a shot at a poor opportunity rather than holding his fire for a better. Big deal, medium deal, little deal? My feeling is more toward little deal but not zero. I think it was the rifling in the barrel that brought about change and led to making the horse useless in cavalry. At one time volley fire in volume at 50 yards was the tactic against a cavalry charge. A cavalry charge began by closing up to 50 yards from the enemy and then charging at full speed. That was to keep the horses together. It was also the same distance used to get the shots together from the smoothbores. The rifled barrel allowed aimed shots to 100 yards and beyond. That gave the infantry soldier the time to reload and make another shot. So the reloading enhances the number of shots before a charging by horses made contact. The rifleman evolved in the military and how he was used also changed. You have to develop the skill of a rifleman and it can only be done by shooting. It also is a perishable skill so it requires practice. So for example the Marine Corps develops riflemen. It does it by training to first introduce the basic skill sets needed. Before going into combat there is a staging where you shoot a lot to refresh your skill set on marksmanship. The shooters with the 1874 Expedition made full use of the accuracy of a rifled barrel and made hits at far greater distances than what was done with smoothbores. One shooter made a hit either 7/8 to 1 mile. I believe they were using a .50-70. I agree that the reloading was benefit but the lever action reloading time advantage goes to the Indians. What I find interesting is the number of identified Henry's alone on the Custer battlefield was close to the number of cavalry carbines. I think it was around 69 carbines and 61 Henrys. If the 69 represented around 200 carbines what would the 61 Henrys represent. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 25, 2016 6:36:48 GMT -6
It would not surprise me than someone that had never shot before can be taught to shoot accurately in a short period of time. We see that quite often at our NAU PRTP where students who graduate can hold seasonal law enforcement jobs with the National Park Service. In that respect it is similar to an academy.
As shooters over time in law enforcement we have been taught many methods and also formed bad habits which are hard to correct in a short period of time.
The difference between a grip using isosceles and Weaver is substantial both in coverage without taking a step and control of the firearms recoil. The current isosceles method taught at the Federal standards at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) is a great shooting platform. In this last class we have a retired police officer that told me with all do respect I shoot quite well. I ask if he was only looking for a seasonal job and he stated yes. Therefore he would not have to FLETC to become full time. He is a great shot but FLETC if attended would not let him shoot in any other manner than what he taught.
We also have a retired infantry Marine Corps Colonel and a Marine Corps enlisted man sniper. You have to proud of the training, experience, demonstration of shooting skills that some shooters have developed. We just went through MILO on Saturday which is a interactive video with laser equipped weapons. The sniper ended a traffic stop gone bad with one shot between the eyes of the suspect in less than one second. At the other end of observations we saw the suspect get off several shots and the student recorded shots everywhere.
Semper Fi
AZ Ranger
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Post by jodak on Oct 25, 2016 8:26:22 GMT -6
As Dave mentioned above, it is a common concept that the Southerners and Westerners were better shots and made better soldiers by virtue of being more familiar with firearms as civilians. However, I wonder about that to some extent. While it is true that some may have had some familiarity with larger caliber weapons for deer hunting and the like, I would imagine that most were primarily familiar with smaller caliber rifles/muskets or shotguns for hunting things like rabbits, turkeys, and other small game. As a result, I wonder how well that experience with smaller caliber weapons translated into proficiency in the very large calibers used in the civil War and later and if it may not have actually been a detriment, with soldiers having to re-learn to shoot properly.
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Post by tubman13 on Oct 25, 2016 13:34:42 GMT -6
jodak,
Shooting is an acquired skill. Some folks have better eyes, some have better eye hand coordination. Riding a bike is an acquired skill. Some folks are better than others. A Harley is as different from a peddle bike as a .30-06 is from a .22 or a pellet gun. The basics are the same. The difference between those proficient and not is practice. Steve is dead on, I would no longer attempt a 300yd kill shot, without working with the tool that I intend to use. I no longer shoot for competition, but still can get lucky now and again. Practice, practice, practice, with the weapon you intend to use.
Mike, your topic is part and parcel of the loss in this battle, so is fire control, and command and control.
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Post by Mike Powell on Oct 25, 2016 17:09:06 GMT -6
Steve,
your memory is holding up well. I found the comment on 69 carbines and 61 Henry rifles very interesting. I'd not heard it before and it prompted me to dig out Scott/Fox and sure enough, their "Chart 1" lists 69 and 60, respectively. It got me sort of excited which is dangerous at any age. My first knee jerk was it must tell us something about the relationship between the total Henry rifles present to the total carbines present. But after chewing on some cashews for a while, I think it may first tell something about the number of rounds fired from each type. But that may get complicated by policing up the "brass", as practiced by the winners and their wives and kids. I think I've read that there may be some evidence Native Americans did find a way to reload .44 rimfire but if I did read that I'll bet I also read it was pretty darn hard to do and not a common practice. Now, I don't know how much value NA's placed in empty centerfire cases, with an eye toward reloading them but there may have been more tendency to pick up the one than the rimfire other. If there's any truth to that then I don't know where you end up for sure. It is especially interesting that Chart 1 also shows that while 57% of the Henry rifles identified involved two or more matching cartridges, only 17% of the carbines did so. This means something but I'm not at all sure what? All this must have been plowed through and maybe someone will come forward with the real story? Maybe I need to actually read Scott/Fox instead of just looking at the pictures? At any rate, thanks Steve. Too bad DC isn't here to give us an archeology reality check.
Jodak,
Not sure your question about the Southerners and the Westerners really got put to bed. I've heard such rumors somewhere, that they were better with their weapons, and vaguely aware about Southern cavalry prowess in the early war years, etc. Have no idea how much of this is conjecture, etc. versus hard information. I'm tempted to delve more into Griffin's , "Battle Tactics of the Civil War". I admired his style of stringing period commentary into things, the little I read of him, and it is available free on Google Books.
Tubman,
Not sure I get your meaning. Can you help me out?
Regards to all
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Post by dave on Oct 25, 2016 19:51:07 GMT -6
Speaking of perishable skills, I joined several friends this afternoon to do some serious plinking. We assembled quite an arsenal of shotguns, pistols, revolvers and rifles. My S&W 38 I carried as a reserve police officer has not been shot since 2012 and my aim proved that skills fail as time goes by without practice. The same qualification test I used to score 98 out 100 I shot a 82! That sucked to say the least.
Shooting skeet proved that my last duck hunt in January 1999 was a good decision. Those little orange orbs are hard to hit. Needless to say I was greatly embarrassed by my performance with my old Browning BPS 12 gauge. At least I could still shoot fairly well with the 30-06 at 200 yards with a scope.
Believe I will stick with playing golf. Regards Dave
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Post by Mike Powell on Oct 25, 2016 20:57:18 GMT -6
Wonder how much batting practice it would take to get to where I could hit a major league fast ball?
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Post by montrose on Oct 26, 2016 2:25:30 GMT -6
I think we are not understanding the relationship of firearms and combat.
1. Weapon. We know the 1873 Springfield carbine had a max effective range of 300 meters, and the pistol of 25. The long guns of this era had heavier and slower bullets than modern long guns. This means point of aim and windage mattered a lot more than today. Beyond 100 meters training matters to a significant degree.
2. Basic Load. The more ammo you carry, the less important accuracy. So what was UBL? (Unit Basic Load, not Usama Bin Laden). The cartridge box held 20 rounds, the pistol 5 (they had an AD issue, so carried weapon on empty space). The order to carry 100 long and 50 short, meant they were carrying one basic load, and 4 resupply.
So soldier has 20 long rounds on his person, then has to go to horse to refill 4 more times. This means spray and pray is suicide. You better hit what you aim at.
3. Individual training. The 7th was badly trained at individual level, worse than most units of that year. We know they shot most of their UBL far beyond effective range: 500-1200 meters. This set the condition for the tactical overrun. They were out of ammo when Indians reached effective range. The claim that the US fired little and had lots of ammo left is true. They fired off what was on their body, and left 80% of their ammo on the horses.
M Company is only one I know of that showed proper management, to send folks to resupply during the firefight phase.
Bottom line: If soldiers have 20 rounds, and are badly trained, no one should fire at a target beyond 150 meters.
Fire when you can see the whites of their eyes ring a bell? You can see white of eye at 50 meters, which was effective range of Brown Bess musket.
4. Collective training. Military fights in units, as opposed to hunters or law enforcement. So a group of weak shooters can still outperform an individual skilled shooter. On a shooting range, the paper doesn't shoot back. Battle raises group dynamics, and interactive relationships between combatants.
Military uses term Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to cover this area. Not sure if this relates to civilian and LEO. I can explain this if required.
5. Leaders. Small unit leaders control fires. This is most distinct difference between military and civilian and LEO. The excessive firing at 800-1200 meters is an astounding failure of NCO and officer leaders. The center of gravity of the LBH disaster is on poor NCO and officers, not soldiers.
The extensive waste of ammo shows not a failure to control fires by leaders, but that leaders were ordering fire with zero probability of hit. The soldiers obeyed orders that led to the loss of the battle and their own deaths.
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Post by tubman13 on Oct 26, 2016 6:06:32 GMT -6
Mike,
My comment, is that your thread started in August, "Rounds fired per Kill" is an important ingredient in the loss at the LBH. Also what you and others have brought up since is also germane. I was speaking above, my last post, to what Montrose points out above, fire control, also overall command and control. Proper fire control could have overcome some of the poor shooting issues. Overall command and control could have also alleviated other contributing issues.
It would be interesting to assign a weighting system to the issues that contributed to this disaster.
I am sure you are aware that many, if not most, of the troops breaking out/retreating with Reno were holding on to the reins with one hand and the saddle with the other. Obviously, little or no defensive shooting at those pursuing. This is another training issue(lack of horsemanship) to go along with the lack of firearms training.
I defer to the Col. above, just my 2 cents.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 26, 2016 6:50:05 GMT -6
Steve, your memory is holding up well. I found the comment on 69 carbines and 61 Henry rifles very interesting. I'd not heard it before and it prompted me to dig out Scott/Fox and sure enough, their "Chart 1" lists 69 and 60, respectively. It got me sort of excited which is dangerous at any age. My first knee jerk was it must tell us something about the relationship between the total Henry rifles present to the total carbines present. But after chewing on some cashews for a while, I think it may first tell something about the number of rounds fired from each type. But that may get complicated by policing up the "brass", as practiced by the winners and their wives and kids. I think I've read that there may be some evidence Native Americans did find a way to reload .44 rimfire but if I did read that I'll bet I also read it was pretty darn hard to do and not a common practice. Now, I don't know how much value NA's placed in empty centerfire cases, with an eye toward reloading them but there may have been more tendency to pick up the one than the rimfire other. If there's any truth to that then I don't know where you end up for sure. It is especially interesting that Chart 1 also shows that while 57% of the Henry rifles identified involved two or more matching cartridges, only 17% of the carbines did so. This means something but I'm not at all sure what? All this must have been plowed through and maybe someone will come forward with the real story? Maybe I need to actually read Scott/Fox instead of just looking at the pictures? At any rate, thanks Steve. Too bad DC isn't here to give us an archeology reality check. Jodak, Not sure your question about the Southerners and the Westerners really got put to bed. I've heard such rumors somewhere, that they were better with their weapons, and vaguely aware about Southern cavalry prowess in the early war years, etc. Have no idea how much of this is conjecture, etc. versus hard information. I'm tempted to delve more into Griffin's , "Battle Tactics of the Civil War". I admired his style of stringing period commentary into things, the little I read of him, and it is available free on Google Books. Tubman, Not sure I get your meaning. Can you help me out? Regards to all Hi Mike I would think total number fired would be indicated by more cases found from a particular weapon. I think there are also tracking of weapons at different locations and quite possible different shooters. So I am still sticking with the total numbers of identified weapons of .45-70 carbine and .44 Henry as an indication of a subset of the total carbines and Henry's present. I am not sure about reloading a .44 rim fire. It only takes one case to identify a single weapon if the tool markings are sufficient to make that determination. I still think that the known identified weapons by found cases is significant and that is only for the carbine - henry ratios. Next you have to add all other Indian weapons including .50-70 and .44-40. Regards Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 26, 2016 7:18:44 GMT -6
I think we are not understanding the relationship of firearms and combat. 1. Weapon. We know the 1873 Springfield carbine had a max effective range of 300 meters, and the pistol of 25. The long guns of this era had heavier and slower bullets than modern long guns. This means point of aim and windage mattered a lot more than today. Beyond 100 meters training matters to a significant degree. 2. Basic Load. The more ammo you carry, the less important accuracy. So what was UBL? (Unit Basic Load, not Usama Bin Laden). The cartridge box held 20 rounds, the pistol 5 (they had an AD issue, so carried weapon on empty space). The order to carry 100 long and 50 short, meant they were carrying one basic load, and 4 resupply. So soldier has 20 long rounds on his person, then has to go to horse to refill 4 more times. This means spray and pray is suicide. You better hit what you aim at. 3. Individual training. The 7th was badly trained at individual level, worse than most units of that year. We know they shot most of their UBL far beyond effective range: 500-1200 meters. This set the condition for the tactical overrun. They were out of ammo when Indians reached effective range. The claim that the US fired little and had lots of ammo left is true. They fired off what was on their body, and left 80% of their ammo on the horses. M Company is only one I know of that showed proper management, to send folks to resupply during the firefight phase. Bottom line: If soldiers have 20 rounds, and are badly trained, no one should fire at a target beyond 150 meters. Fire when you can see the whites of their eyes ring a bell? You can see white of eye at 50 meters, which was effective range of Brown Bess musket. 4. Collective training. Military fights in units, as opposed to hunters or law enforcement. So a group of weak shooters can still outperform an individual skilled shooter. On a shooting range, the paper doesn't shoot back. Battle raises group dynamics, and interactive relationships between combatants. Military uses term Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures to cover this area. Not sure if this relates to civilian and LEO. I can explain this if required. 5. Leaders. Small unit leaders control fires. This is most distinct difference between military and civilian and LEO. The excessive firing at 800-1200 meters is an astounding failure of NCO and officer leaders. The center of gravity of the LBH disaster is on poor NCO and officers, not soldiers. The extensive waste of ammo shows not a failure to control fires by leaders, but that leaders were ordering fire with zero probability of hit. The soldiers obeyed orders that led to the loss of the battle and their own deaths. I think in law enforcement training we have bridged a gap in training from individuals to "multiagency teams" efforts. I think we saw teams beginning with single agency SWAT teams and in recent years we have realized that people die before SWAT can respond to a call. The formation of multiagency teams only works if they train and practice together. That training is now available and I got to participate with some training about seven years ago. I thought I was there as an armorer but found it that I was in the class. At over 60 it is not as much fun running flat out and hitting the ground. It wasn't even easy to jump from the back of a 4X4 pick up. I could still do a good low crawl without sticking my butt in air. Another drill was up 3 strides down and roll and the down part was easy since I never got my balance. What I did notice is that some training from 40 years ago was still there. I was told I was wounded and another officer was putting a tourniquet on my right arm. At the same location a remote target was activated and the old Marine shot while on my back and the officer working on me. Unfortunately for the instructor I am left handed and still had my carbine pistol grip in hand. The training was taught by 3 Marines and one Special Forces Air Force personal for the class I took. They now have developed more instructors from law enforcement and expanded the outreach for training. Here is the website for the class that took. It is now called ERASE. alerrt.org/I agree with the fighting in units comment and now at least small units are formed by multi-agency officers that work together in the same area. Regards Steve
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Post by Mike Powell on Oct 26, 2016 9:02:10 GMT -6
Tubman,
Thanks for elaborating. I agree that weapons skill has a part in the outcome at LBH, but in my mind not a very great one. I say this because from the limited information available, which is presented in the chart "Rounds Per Kill", the numbers say that those at LBH were about as efficient as those at Gettyburg. This is not to say they were "good" shots, having their fire controlled in a "good" manner, it only says they achieved about the same results as had been achieved fourteen years earlier. Now had it been the case that their results were far poorer than at Gettysburg, say 10% as good or half as good, then I would think the quality of the shooting counted as something important at LBH.
Here's another way to look at it. They, the 7th, killed about 63 warriors or about 2.5% of the 2,500 engaged, had their fire been more appropriately directed by their non-coms and officers as montrose points out above, we would expect improvement in results. What could we realistically expect in those terms? Say they did twice as well, were 100% more effective than troops at Gettysburg, they would have killed 126 warriors. Do we think 126 dead out of 2,500 instead of 63 would have led to a different outcome? That would be a death rate of 5% and when Lee turned away from Gettysburg that's about what he had suffered. But as well as knowing his losses, Lee knew he still faced a numerically superior enemy on good ground. If the Native Americans faced a 5% loss to their own people, what would they seen left of their opponents at that point? Not very damn much in my opinion, a far different picture than Lee saw. And, again, driving the Native American losses to 5% requires doubling the 7th's output, to twice what was achieved at Gettysburg based on kills per round expended. Is it realistic to expect that? I'm doubtful.
regards
Mike
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Post by Mike Powell on Oct 26, 2016 9:16:25 GMT -6
Steve,
It's going to take me quite a while to plow through the meaning of those cartridge samples but I will get back to you eventually. I don't know if I'll really come to understand it but I sure don't now. It did shock me how great was the number of identified Henry's and I do appreciate you bringing it forward.
For some time I've wondered if the variety of Indian weapons didn't convey some advantage? A mix of repeaters, long guns and bows could cover a wide range of firing opportunities. But it's all probably poppycock due to the problem of getting the fellow with the right weapon to just the right place. Of course when there are 2,500 or so of you the opportunities look a little better than when there are only 200 odd of you.
Regards,
Mike
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 26, 2016 9:17:59 GMT -6
I think we only need to look at the 1874 expedition fighting against some of these same Indians. I don't think either the north or south decided what they would do next based upon whether their medicine was good on a particular day. Well maybe Bull Run. Every time the Indians attacked the 1874 expedition the shooters with the expedition convinced them it was a bad medicine day. They even conducted activities specifically designed to reinforce that it was a bad medicine day for them and a good medicine day for the expedition.
When an Indian holds up a feather at distance and some shooter cuts it in half that is going to be a bad medicine day.
How about if the 7th were shooting at Crazy Horse and killed him while riding in front of the troops. During the expedition one shooter shot an Indians at 1/4 miles attempting to pull a expedition member off his horse by hand. Immediately the other Indians discontinued the chase.
I think to consider the Indians methods of fighting and their choice of when to fight is an error that Custer made. The Indians didn't always run and sometimes they attacked soldiers in large numbers.
The persons with the expedition understood this unconventional warfare with Indians and Custer thought they would always run.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 26, 2016 9:27:26 GMT -6
Steve, It's going to take me quite a while to plow through the meaning of those cartridge samples but I will get back to you eventually. I don't know if I'll really come to understand it but I sure don't now. It did shock me how great was the number of identified Henry's and I do appreciate you bringing it forward. For some time I've wondered if the variety of Indian weapons didn't convey some advantage? A mix of repeaters, long guns and bows could cover a wide range of firing opportunities. But it's all probably poppycock due to the problem of getting the fellow with the right weapon to just the right place. Of course when there are 2,500 or so of you the opportunities look a little better than when there are only 200 odd of you. Regards, Mike I think the subset of expert shooters with the cavalry was a lot closer to the same number with Indians. When Reno's three scouts all shot at one Indian and missed that should be a clue that the Indians were out of range. Sometime after Washita and before LBH Custer lost his shooter platoon. At distances those should have been the only soldiers shooting. Instead we have Indians wearing what they thought were ballistic vests that prevented hits and the results were consistent with their beliefs. I think we will find that Indians had as many firearms as did the 7th and as the distances closed the Indians were superior in CQB both mounted and on foot. French is one of the few that claims to be killing Indians from his running horse. I believe him. He covered the rear if I recall correctly. Regards Steve
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