Rounds Fired Per Kill

[Mike Powell]

This is far from anything to bet the farm on but maybe with a little help sanding the rough edges it might go somewhere.

Browsing back through Hammer's The Springfield Carbine On The Western Frontier (about the most valuable 24 pages on the subject money can buy) I find Major Reno's letter of July 11, 1876 to General S V Benet, Chief of Ordnance, United States Army. The Major complains about problems with the carbine breech block failing to fully close, the block then flying open upon discharge and the extractor ripping off the head of the cartridge leaving the weapon unserviceable. He cites two causes; weakness of design and dirt in the mechanism, six of his carbines being thusly disabled. He further states an Indian Scout saw men of the Custer battalion under fire "working at their guns" and evidence of knives with broken blades found on the field. Nothing that hasn't already been discussed at some length over the years.

What I found interesting was at the close of the letter Major Reno annotated the following:

Amt. Ammunition exp'd - Carbine: 38,030
Amt. Ammunition exp'd - Pistol: 2,954

OK, so a total of just under 41,000 rounds. Now, I'm going to posit that he was speaking for the regiment; he signed the letter properly, "Comd'g Regt" and I'll bet he got the number by "On Hand - Beginning", minus "On Hand - Today" equals "exp'd". If I'm right and there were (to keep the math simple) 41 warriors killed then that means a measly 1,000 rounds to produce a kill. But say I'm wrong and he was referring only to "exp'd" by the survivors, I guess we'd have to figure in "exp'd" by Custer's battalion. Again to keep things simple, lets say in that case the massacred shot double what the survivors did, you're still at 3,000 rounds per kill. Heck, call it 4,000 if you feel the need. Now go nose around on the internet for such statistics and you'll find things like: World War II 20,000 rounds per casualty, Vietnam 50,000 - 200,000 rounds per.

Now I'll grant finding anything definitive is harder than calculus but the Little Big Horn seems to be in a lot smaller ballpark than some other notable affairs.

What I take from all this is that the 7th wasn't as big a bunch of lousy shots teamed up with a poor excuse of a carbine as we often conceive and that they did a respectable amount of killing during the limited time and opportunity they had to work with. That and the "gravel bellies" were right about what repeaters, semi-automatics and full automatics meant as far as ammunition expenditure goes.

[wild]

Mike
The Indians got most of Custer's 5 companies ammo and fired it back at Reno.
I'v always thought their [Indians]hit rate at Reno Hill fairly impressive so not much wrong with the carbine.
Cheers

[Colt45]

The artifact evidence found in the '84-'85 expedition also comes to the conclusion that the jamming problem was not as significant a problem as some made it out to be. There was evidence of that, broken knife blades, cartridges with messed up rims, etc., but statistically it was not the determining factor in the battle. The biggest factor, other than the sheer numbers of Indians, was the main advantage of the carbine (range) being neutralized by the close quarters the battle was fought in, which gave repeaters the advantage.

The reason the number of rounds expended per kill is so low compared to later wars is the fact later wars had fully automatic weapons which throw a lot of lead in a short time, and as anyone who has fired full automatic weapons can attest, they scatter bullets everywhere, reducing the number that actually find their mark.

The 7th was not that well trained, as there just wasn't enough ammo allocated to training to permit the troops to become proficient with their firearms, plus they weren't trained to shoot from horseback. The high number of misses is easily accounted for given the conditions, stress, and fear the men felt.

[AZ Ranger]

Aug 10, 2016 20:01:49 GMT -6 Colt45 said:

The artifact evidence found in the '84-'85 expedition also comes to the conclusion that the jamming problem was not as significant a problem as some made it out to be. There was evidence of that, broken knife blades, cartridges with messed up rims, etc., but statistically it was not the determining factor in the battle. The biggest factor, other than the sheer numbers of Indians, was the main advantage of the carbine (range) being neutralized by the close quarters the battle was fought in, which gave repeaters the advantage.

The reason the number of rounds expended per kill is so low compared to later wars is the fact later wars had fully automatic weapons which throw a lot of lead in a short time, and as anyone who has fired full automatic weapons can attest, they scatter bullets everywhere, reducing the number that actually find their mark.

The 7th was not that well trained, as there just wasn't enough ammo allocated to training to permit the troops to become proficient with their firearms, plus they weren't trained to shoot from horseback. The high number of misses is easily accounted for given the conditions, stress, and fear the men felt.

Right on target. I am sure the hit ratio increases in the CQB just before the troopers are destroyed to the last man. At that point muzzle indexing is sufficient to make hits.

The total rounds fired per causality means very little in regards to accuracy. When you have automatic weapons and fire for suppression there is no intent to make every round a hit. If you can move upon your enemy using the suppression fire that is not a waste of ammunition. If you can prevent your enemy from moving against you that is also valuable. Any comparison with single shot individually aimed weapon systems and weapon systems designed for suppression fire does not seemed a valid comparison to me.

Regards

AZ Ranger

[benteen]

Aug 12, 2016 5:52:27 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

Aug 10, 2016 20:01:49 GMT -6 Colt45 said:

The artifact evidence found in the '84-'85 expedition also comes to the conclusion that the jamming problem was not as significant a problem as some made it out to be. There was evidence of that, broken knife blades, cartridges with messed up rims, etc., but statistically it was not the determining factor in the battle. The biggest factor, other than the sheer numbers of Indians, was the main advantage of the carbine (range) being neutralized by the close quarters the battle was fought in, which gave repeaters the advantage.

The reason the number of rounds expended per kill is so low compared to later wars is the fact later wars had fully automatic weapons which throw a lot of lead in a short time, and as anyone who has fired full automatic weapons can attest, they scatter bullets everywhere, reducing the number that actually find their mark.

The 7th was not that well trained, as there just wasn't enough ammo allocated to training to permit the troops to become proficient with their firearms, plus they weren't trained to shoot from horseback. The high number of misses is easily accounted for given the conditions, stress, and fear the men felt.

Right on target. I am sure the hit ratio increases in the CQB just before the troopers are destroyed to the last man. At that point muzzle indexing is sufficient to make hits.

The total rounds fired per causality means very little in regards to accuracy. When you have automatic weapons and fire for suppression there is no intent to make every round a hit. If you can move upon your enemy using the suppression fire that is not a waste of ammunition. If you can prevent your enemy from moving against you that is also valuable. Any comparison with single shot individually aimed weapon systems and weapon systems designed for suppression fire does not seemed a valid comparison to me.

Regards

AZ Ranger

Steve,

Right on target as usual. There is also that tactic (if thats what it is called) of recon by fire, which also can burn up some ammo.

Be Well
Semper Fi
Dan

[Mike Powell]

First of all, I regret and apologize for allowing this thread to lie dormant so long after the responses. I'll simply say, other things got in the way. But now I want to recast my point, which is that while we commonly tend to think of small arms fire by the men of the 7th Cavalry as ineffective or substandard (and I certainly have held that view for a very long time), in comparison to other engagements they may not have fared so badly. My initial offering on this was poorly aimed by my apples to oranges comparison of the LBH rifled, black powder era to modern conflicts which are marked by promiscuous, relatively speaking, expenditures of ammunition. That was simply a waster of time and here I'll offer a second apology, for having done so.

But enough of the apologies, already. Here's my recast:

The small arms fire of the 7th Cavalry at LBH was approximately as efficient, in terms of rounds fired per kill achieved, as the results obtained by Union and Confederate troops at Gettysburg.

These are two premises; (1) The muzzle-loading rifle of the American Civil War was equivalent in accuracy to the Springfield carbine of 1873 at close and medium ranges, both grouping around 15 inches at 200 yards. (2) The tendency toward "promiscuous" firing, despite the Springfield carbine's simpler loading, would not have been much more pronounced in 1876 than in 1863. Taken together, these premises argue that differences in rounds per kill between the two fights is not greatly influenced by the differences in the weapons involved. This leaves differences in efficiency to combat marksmanship and circumstances of the fighting, principally tactics and terrain. The circumstances were obviously different, but I cannot see a clear argument that the circumstances at LBH argue for more efficient killing results than at Gettysburg, there certainly were no massed, in order assaults at LBH . I am left with the belief that if we simply on a large scale exchanged Trooper Snuffy of the 7th Cavalry for Private Beauregard of the 4th Alabama, we would not get markedly different results in Montana or Pennsylvania when they pulled their triggers.

Now, here are the numbers:




Caveats re the numbers:

(1) I had previously used 41 as the number of Indian dead. Then I got to poking around some in Fred's work.

(2) Reno's report of ammunition expended is critical. I believe he could only have arrived at his numbers by BI-EI=E, beginning inventory minus ending inventory equals what was "expended". To me this means his figures have to be for the Regiment, not just the surviving companies. He was reporting for the Regiment and I don't believe he would have simply ignored the ammunition carried by the lost companies and failed to mention that fact.

(3) The ammunition expended at Gettysburg is also important and are of course estimates for both sides. Taken on a rounds expended per soldier engaged they do not seem wildly implausible; Confederates may of necessity have been more conservative in firing or their greater offensive employment may have impacted their consumption. The higher individual consumption at LBH I suspect reflects a higher ratio of dog to tail than prevailed at Gettysburg.

[dave]

Mike
A wonderful post full of great facts. I would propose that those soldiers of both sides who lived in rural areas would have been far better shots than those from urban environments. The men fighting at Gettysburg would have been much more familiar with their rifles than the troopers of the 7th were with their Springfield carbines simply because they had been fighting for 3 years. The Federal troops from Wisconsin, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota and Michigan were every bit as good of shots as the Confederates from the back woods.

The part of all this that simply amazes me is these men stood there shoulder to shoulder, without seeking cover and fired over and over again. Their courage deserves to be honored regardless of their cause.
Regards
Dave 

[AZ Ranger]

I look at it as a collection of data rather than facts. I think Mike pointed out that the number of dead Indians is subject to change. Data may change but facts should not. This would make a great spread sheet calculator where you can change numbers.

When we look at the total of rounds of 7th Cavalry ammunition we don't have the facts on who fired all of rounds. As Wild pointed out the Indians did well with the recovered carbines firing some of that 41,000 total.

As far as the cartridge case sticking when hot in the chamber I am not convinced that finding X percentage of cases with tool marks indicating soldier assisted extraction would be evidence of the firearms that remained stuck and recovered by the Indians. In other words how do we know how many soldiers died with a case stuck in the chamber. Then latter when the firearm cooled down the Indians owner had no problem extracting and ejecting the case.

Unless the Indians firing at Reno with their new carbines had a high rate of fire the malfunction of the case expanding greater than the chamber may not have occurred. It apparently did not manifest itself when the testing of the carbine was done. It could be a combination of dirty case and rapid fire that enabled the malfunction.

You don't bend an M-60 barrel by firing one round every 5 seconds.

Regards

AZ Ranger

[AZ Ranger]

If the data is correct and 100% of Indians killed were by small arms then the 7th sucked in CQB. I find it hard to believe that no Indians were killed at the retreat crossing other than by small arms fire. So the CQB on LSH was one sided when using hand held weapons other than small arms?

No knives no bashing Indians with their rifle or carbine?

What the hell were they doing there?

I think this points out Sgt Ryan's concern over these particular troops. First he states that even Custer would not fight these troops mounted and then we add they had zero CQB kills other than with firearms.

Regards

AZ Ranger

[Mike Powell]

Dave,

Thank you for the kind words.

The point you raise of the relative time in service of those at LBH is interesting. My instinct would be that such would not be greatly different from Gettysburg, when considering the averages. I suspect that those at GB were also a mix of new men and veterans. But I do not know enough of how units, either state or Federal, were or were not replenished with new men or whether they were more likely just bled down and new regiments raised. If the latter is the case, then you still end up with a mix of old and new but now intra rather than inter-unit. I bet a dollar to a doughnut (and it's interesting what inflation has done to that old saying) that this has been studied and the answer is out there. Still the question and the premise behind it, that term of service equals weapon familiarity, are very interesting. Maybe someone on this board can give something to chew on here. And I'm sure the average service term at LBH has been well studied for some time. Overall on weapon familiarity, my longtime wish has been for the publication of "Small Arms Training In North America - Its Theory, Practice and Practical Application 1650 - Present, Illustrated", but I doubt I'll ever see it. We seem to know a little bit about what the Frontier Army practiced prior to 1877, such knowledge generally limited to rounds allotted. But I know nothing of what the range of practices was during the Civil War, except a few dribs and drabs about Berdan's methods. I suspect there were men at GB and the LBH who had never fired their weapons previously.

As to those backwoods boys, regardless of uniform color, I tend to agree with you. But I have to mention that the kid who shot high expert in my recruit platoon on qualification was a big, hulking Jewish fellow from New York City who had never touched a firearm until he came to Perris Island. To some extent, you either got it or you don't.

AZ,

You raise several good points. What I have presented is simply a model that uses numbers to represent what I would call reality or truth. Notice I say "represent"; the question is how well does it make the representation? Is it perfect or absurd? How would we know? Well, like any reasonable model it is capable of alteration and you've seen to the heart of it, it's a spreadsheet. We can focus in on any number within the spreadsheet and change it to whatever you like better. Then we can see the result; have we moved things more toward the perfect or more toward the absurd? I'll tell you this, it's easy to discern absurd but knowing what's a perfect representation gets a lot more difficult. All I'd hope to achieve on the way toward perfection is: just a little better than "close enough for government work". Don't like 100% for "killed by small arms" at LBH? Let's change it. Say it's 10%; that means the rounds per kill goes to 6,833. So now we've "proved" those poor bastards couldn't shoot worth a darn - but it's absurd. Take another tack, let's change it to 90%, one in ten of the Indian dead came from knives, clubbed carbines and large, handy rocks. I don't think that's at all an absurd modification and now the RPK is 719 at LBH. They're still, in this iteration, shooting 27% more efficiently than what the model says the Union shot at GB. But if one in ten doesn't fit your commonsense, tell me what you think it should be and we can kick it around. Sixtythree dead Indians not feel right? We can change that also. We can probably agree on any change, after some discussion among reasonable men, and when we make the change we can look at what the model spits out. The key is, in the end does the model (which is really nothing more than rounds fired divided by resulting killed) represent that the fellows at LBH did worse, better or about the same as those at GB. Right now I'm in the "about the same" camp. Where are you?

regards to both you fellows,

Mike

[Mike Powell]

I want to throw in an added wrinkle here. Holding all else equal, I believe the Springfield carbine may be enough superior to a Civil War rifle, if not in accuracy but in time interval to reload, to expect more efficient results. I believe good target opportunities were fleeting and randomly distributed at LBH. If Trooper Snuffy used a CW rifle his reloading interval increases by a factor of 3 to 4, say from 6 seconds to 24 seconds. A good opportunity occurring during the extended reload interval may not reoccur, leading Snuffy at times to fire at a less choice target. The significance of this is hard to evaluate, again the good opportunities are randomly distributed, and I don't know how great the tendency would be, or what the force of circumstances would demand, for Snuffy to take a shot at a poor opportunity rather than holding his fire for a better. Big deal, medium deal, little deal? My feeling is more toward little deal but not zero.

[dave]

Mike
Excellent points in your last post regarding the policy of replacement troops being feed into the armies prior to Gettysburg. Allow me to preface my remarks as being from an amatuer historian and not an educated one who has had a lifelong interest in the War of 1861-1865. That being said: The South used the policy of replacing troops into existing units using boys from the same local if possible while the Union policy was to create new regiments as replacement troops were brought into the system. The dreaded "Bounty Soldiers" replaced the three year volunteers who were leaving the army in the spring and summer of 1864.

I failed to make myself clear in my earlier post regrading the qualifications and familiarity of the soldiers with their Springfield and Enfield rifles. These same men had just had a major battle at Chancellorsville during the first week of May 1863 and surely were very familiar if not comfortable with their weapons. Your example of the Marine marksman is an anomaly and not the norm I would imagine but very enlightning. The soldiers who had lived their lives eating what they hunted surely were from rural settings and I would suspect more Federal troops came from urban societies than rural which would be just the opposite for Johnny Reb.

I am certainly enjoying and learning from this thread and appreciate your efforts. Please continue with more posts so that I can take notes and steal your ideas and claim them as my own. I learned that action from another board in a galaxy far far away.
Regards
Dave

[benteen]

Oct 24, 2016 10:19:37 GMT -6 Mike Powell said:

. But I have to mention that the kid who shot high expert in my recruit platoon on qualification was a big, hulking Jewish fellow from New York City who had never touched a firearm until he came to Perris Island. To some extent, you either got it or you don't.


Mike

Mike,

Fine posts. If I may just tweak it a little. If you dont get it, you dont get off the Island

Semper Fi
Be Well
Dan

[Mike Powell]

Dave,

Feel free to appropriate any thing you see, I've never had an original thought in my life.

Your point on Chancellorsville does ring well, the school of practical experience. Thanks for that additional thought, I'll now call it my own.

Mike

[Mike Powell]

Dan,

Fits with my recollection. The beatings will continue until marksmanship improves.

Mike