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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 4:43:10 GMT -6
Post by wild on Jan 5, 2017 4:43:10 GMT -6
Hi AZ If you care to reread my posts it is clear I'm discussing an unopposed crossing. Benteen says he could cross almost anywhere. Of course some places will be more difficult than others in regard to entry and exit and depth. One witness at the RCOI describes the entry side of the river as a ford while the exit was anything but. But this is a cavalry regiment on active operations not a touring party. The point is that Custer without a recce could place his command across that river to confront and attack Indians exiting the village Northwards. If I'm not doing Tom an injustice he says that the river is so easy to cross [North] that actually finding Ford D would be very difficult. A second point is that renders a recce pointless is that the situation North of the village is fluid . Custer can only dicide where to cross when he actually sees the situation he faces. If he decides to wait for Benteen say a minimum of 30 minutes the sitution in and around the North end of the village will had changed rendering his recce redundent. And it is the price he has to pay for this suggested recce and the fact that the recce [if he must have one] could have been undertaken by himself and his scouts. Cheers Richard
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Post by Beth on Jan 5, 2017 7:33:36 GMT -6
Why would Custer take 30 minutes in the middle of a battle to wait for Benteen? Once Reno has engaged the enemy, the battle was begun and the clock is ticking. Why would Custer give away speed and movement for the chance that Benteen will be in a range and have the means to reach him in a timely manner.
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Post by wild on Jan 5, 2017 7:43:56 GMT -6
Exactly Beth. And if he is not going to wait why leave Keogh ? Cheers Richard
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 8:57:25 GMT -6
Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 5, 2017 8:57:25 GMT -6
Hi AZ If you care to reread my posts it is clear I'm discussing an unopposed crossing. Benteen says he could cross almost anywhere. Of course some places will be more difficult than others in regard to entry and exit and depth. One witness at the RCOI describes the entry side of the river as a ford while the exit was anything but. But this is a cavalry regiment on active operations not a touring party. The point is that Custer without a recce could place his command across that river to confront and attack Indians exiting the village Northwards. If I'm not doing Tom an injustice he says that the river is so easy to cross [North] that actually finding Ford D would be very difficult. A second point is that renders a recce pointless is that the situation North of the village is fluid . Custer can only dicide where to cross when he actually sees the situation he faces. If he decides to wait for Benteen say a minimum of 30 minutes the sitution in and around the North end of the village will had changed rendering his recce redundent. And it is the price he has to pay for this suggested recce and the fact that the recce [if he must have one] could have been undertaken by himself and his scouts. Cheers Richard Richard Fords are easy to find in areas where there are thousands of people and they were using the fords. Thompson describes the ford he observed. Fred described terrain features that would lead to discovering a ford. As far as an unopposed crossing once Custer sent the battle into action by sending Reno then there was no assurance that here were unopposed fording areas. I look at my Marine Corps manual and it talks about selecting fording places. I don't think this would be to hard to figure out but you could cross a lot of places that would not be deemed a ford suitable for crossing under fire. So I agree Richard that Benteen after the battle, persons working livestock in the area, or persons riding in general would view crossing availability based upon their skill and what they needed to do. Where we differ is that when attacking a large force the fording place for moving of troops to the enemy side of a river takes on different minimum requirements. I think one consideration would be not climbing up a bank in the middle of a lot of Indians willing to fight with trees they could use for cover and concealment. Regards Steve
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 9:12:18 GMT -6
Post by wild on Jan 5, 2017 9:12:18 GMT -6
Let us retrace our steps to Weir Point and it's environs. Hereabouts Custer sees the tactical situation and what he is up against. He must get into the action quickly to take advantage of the confusion in the village caused by Reno. Also local leadership has not as yet kicked in and taken control and possibly he himself has not yet been picked up on the radar and he also has a committment to support Reno. Time is of the essence He cannot attack across Ford B for obvious reason. His only option is to bypass the village to the North , cross the LBH [unopposed] and attack South. We have made the case that the crossing of the LBH is not an issue . Benteen will be the extra ingredient . We now go to LSH where we find Custer and his entire command dead. The location of the markers suggest that the column was hit while enroute North. This is the logical and simplist conclusion to be drawn . And any other scenario must first disprove this conclusion, otherwise it will always call into doubt the more complex scenarios.
One other point; the suggestion that Custer was not under pressure is a misreading of the situation. He may not have first responders on his case but the fact that the vanguard of 2000+ warriors was no more than 5 minutes distant from him was prima facia tactical pressure.The significance of which is that Custer had zero time for recce and putting a mimimun of 3 miles between himself and Keogh was tactically absurd.
Cheers all Richard
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 9:12:48 GMT -6
Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 5, 2017 9:12:48 GMT -6
Richard
I think if Custer was being driven that he would have moved in the direction of the rest of the regiment where he could regain command of all 12 companies. I think his movement followed the only travel route reasonable toward ford Ds for an offensive movement.
I agree with Dan that the skillsets of these particular soldiers where a limiting factor. Custer could still have ordered them to do something that they could not do. When he finally realized it was soon after he was fixed and shortly before being destroyed in my opinion. I think if he had not been on offense and moving toward Ford Ds that he could have put up a better defensive battle.
For years I had pondered why would Custer have moved past MTC and I comfortable with him maintaining an offense movement which lead him to move further north. I don't think he was driven from Ford B with the Indians having a blocking force to prevent him from moving back toward Weir.
I believe it was the underestimation of the Indians do to a lack of recon that facilitated his defeat. Gordie gave a good treatment in his second analysis regarding how the Indians got the big village. Custer was never following all of the Indians. If he had followed Terry's order and moved up the Rosebud he would discover there were more Indians than just those that made the trail he followed.
Regards Steve
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 9:21:39 GMT -6
Post by wild on Jan 5, 2017 9:21:39 GMT -6
Hi AZ I'm in general agreement with you . My point is that a recce was not needed. That the choice of the best available crossing point can be achieved by fieldcraft and experience and assist from scouts , it did not require suspension of the offensive envolving the division of the command. Hurrah Richard
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 12:10:31 GMT -6
Post by montrose on Jan 5, 2017 12:10:31 GMT -6
fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ranger.pdfLook at the handbook. This is what every NCO and officer in the Army is expected to do. The orders at LBH were bad, showing gross incompetence. The command and control was also bad, and the reason for the loss. When things start going south, competent commanders react.
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Post by Bruce Robert on Jan 5, 2017 12:18:20 GMT -6
Greetings all,
I find this part of the battle most puzzling. One explanation is to assume very little enemy pressure (either real or perceived) and then a sudden wave of overwhelming force. While it may seem to have played out that way, I don't see how Custer couldn't/wouldn't recognize the growing threat. Fox and Philbin (based heavily on Fox) suggest an almost idyllic setting around ford D. Even if true, that can't have been the understanding from Keogh's position.
I have always hated the "attack Reno-Benteen-et al" mindset, and didn't want to treat Custer in the same disrespectful way, but I am having an ever harder time to not see Custer as being in denial of the situation around him. That is the only way I can make sense out of the actions that took place.
Certainty in the face of (overwhelming) opposing evidence might be the summation of Custer's loss. How do you look out from Calhoun Hill and not see the growing enemy forces moving towards you? Then split your command yet again to further recce? And to then place everything on the arrival of Benteen (in the nick of time). Surely Custer must have considered the possibility that Benteen might not arrive, or arrive in time. Then what?
Regardless of the various ways this has been explained, I find my "something doesn't feel right" rise to the forefront. What that something is I don't know. I suppose that is partly why we still discuss/hypothesize/argue this battle. Other than saying Custer utterly failed in his command duties on this day, something I am not ready to say, I have yet to see a narrative that quite comes together for me.
And so I remain a student.
Bruce
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 12:49:37 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Jan 5, 2017 12:49:37 GMT -6
Exactly Beth. And if he is not going to wait why leave Keogh ? Cheers Richard So then, maybe he did not leave Keogh and C,I,&L were cut off and killed during the retreat from the northern environs, as was HQ, E, & F. The move north was not a recon, it was an attempted attack.
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 12:56:37 GMT -6
Post by wild on Jan 5, 2017 12:56:37 GMT -6
Just had a quick look at the handbook and found this reccomandation....Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
As regards command and control, cavalry regiments of the period were led not controlled. Custer could committ units he had no means of control.
Best Wishes Col Richard
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 13:05:57 GMT -6
Post by wild on Jan 5, 2017 13:05:57 GMT -6
Hi Tom
So then, maybe he did not leave Keogh and C,I,&L were cut off and killed during the retreat from the northern environs, as was HQ, E, & F. The move north was not a recon, it was an attempted attack. Yes Custer was moving to attack. However to base a suggested retreat from the North on the formation of the markers would require even more colorful reasoning than that required by the Ford D scenario. Best Wishes Richard
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 13:27:21 GMT -6
Post by Bruce Robert on Jan 5, 2017 13:27:21 GMT -6
Richard,
If Custer was moving to attack, why leave 3 companies behind? If the threat level is low, why not 1 company and a trusted officer to make the link with Benteen?
And what was his plan of attack if he is still in the recce phase?
Do you think he saw an actual opportunity or was he still working out what exactly to do?
If the threat is relatively low at ford D, why not send for Keogh and attack with the force he had?
If the force was great, would an additional Benteen and 3 companies have made a difference?
Thanks, Bruce
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 13:40:21 GMT -6
Post by tubman13 on Jan 5, 2017 13:40:21 GMT -6
Richard,
I am not an ardent GAC fan. I do, however, believe when he viewed the village from 3411 he made up his mind to attack the north end, he wasted no time. He moved his command as quickly as possible east of the ridges as quickly as possible toward the northern fords. He sent a portion of the grey horse troop down MTC to get the pulse of the village. The entire command was shadowed by the Wolf Tooth band as it approached BRE. Then the area behind him was backfilled by Lame White Man, Gall, and others. When he was stopped at the Ford D area he had warriors nipping at his heels from that area Crazy Horse cut the retreat in half at the gap. Lame White Man et. el. dispatched those that passed the gap. GAC was engulfed and terminated. There is no importance to the markers, no indication of which way the men were facing or going.
I await the evisceration by you and Fred.
Regards, Tom
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Ford D
Jan 5, 2017 13:45:08 GMT -6
Post by Colt45 on Jan 5, 2017 13:45:08 GMT -6
Richard, A retreat from the ford D area is not based on marker locations, but rather on sound TPP for a withdrawal. L company probably led the way back the way they came, followed closely by C, and then I. L stops in the face of opposition at Calhoun hill and sets up a skirmish line down the slope, expecting the rest of the regiment very shortly behind. C company arrives, sees the danger to L's right flank, and occupies FFR to provide support, also expecting help from I, E, and F. Sadly, I gets caught where they were found, and E and F never get the chance to withdraw any further than LSH.
Markers only tell us where they wound up approximately. They say nothing about how they got there or what direction they were moving when they fell. There is plenty of archeological and account information that backs up action at CR and in the ford D area. A standard, by-the-book withdrawal from those areas under pressure would have been what was called for, and most likely was in the process of occurring when the Indian pressure became more than they could handle. There simply wasn't enough time to effect the withdrawal successfully due to the delay on CR, for whatever reason they delayed.
I agree Custer was not doing a recce to ford D, he was in attack mode. I also don't believe he parked 3/5ths of his combat power on BR and Calhoun Hill while he took 2 companies to the river. That is crap. That is why Bruce senses that the traditional story smells fishy. Even a poor field grade commander like Custer would not make those kinds of mistakes. A new 2LT from West Point would not make those kinds of mistakes. No, Custer took all 5 companies to ford D to attack. The Indians voted to not let him cross the river and to not let him retreat back south. He delayed at CR just long enough to allow hostiles crossing at ford B, and probably C, and ford D, to block the escape route back south and to provide heavy pressure on the flanks of E and F companies, and from the north to force I company off BRE and into the swale. L and C were the only 2 companies to have made the withdrawal away from ford D, only to get stopped short of crossing Deep Coulee and returning the way they came.
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