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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 20:43:04 GMT -6
I think if Custer knew the terrain he would have used it totally differently. I'm not sure how though, I know that QC once suggested a much better approach. I am poor at remembering details but remember I thought it was a very interesting idea and made a whole lot of sense. As the battle went on the 25th I have always felt that the battlefield itself was one of the biggest factors against Custer. It chewed him up and spit him out because he didn't understand it nor did he seem to be able to read it. Even worse, he gave orders to Reno and Benteen without even knowing what he was facing, either enemy or terrain. It seems to me as a total non military person that it makes no sense in 1876 to conduct a battle where you can't see your the majority of your enemy or communicate with your own troops. Custer put a huge screen between himself and the rest of events that day and every time he left behind a company he made another move that added to the screen. In the end Custer set his regiment up for failure. Who knows--if he had had another company with him when he went to Ford D he might have left them behind there and rode even further north Beth,
This wasn't an 1876 tactical failure. It was simply a tactical failure.
The basics were not done - verifying hostile strength, hostile location, key terrain features.
And to grasp why this occurred, you look at what happened on the 24th to trigger the hurried blind attack on the 25th.
Remember, GAC was not planning an attack on the 25th. No realistic prospect of Terry/Gibbon being at the mouth of the LBH before the 26th.
WO
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 20:45:01 GMT -6
Not only did the numbers associated with the pack train diminish his available combat power Beth, the train itself was like dragging your ten year old sister along on a date. You and your date would probably like to get down to the business of dating at some point but the question of what to do with that pesky kid sister always remains. The best answer is for you to spring for the money to hire a baby sitter. Should he left them in on the other side of the Divide? Around the morass? Is there a golden distance between and army and its supplies? Was Custer wrong to limit his people whatever it was everyone carried, or should he have divided the ammo up before the attack and left the food, blankets, fodder, mules and mule handlers in the way back? I know that being cut off from supplies is a real worry for an army but even if Custer lost everything he knew Terry was in the area. Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2015 20:50:23 GMT -6
Well see if I am going to ask you out on a date WO.
There are a hundred places to stash those packs, the best being on the Rosebud side of the divide. The further away you leave them, the less that will be required to guard them. Load your soldiers with what they will require. If they get hungry, that is a heck of a lot better than getting dead.
He should have been ten miles back from the divide crossing, perhaps more, on the 24th with scouts out all that remained of that day, and well into the 25, before he moved an inch.
There is nothing in holy writ that say they had to be engaged on the 25-26-27. They should have only been engaged when everything was ready, and battle space shaping and preparation complete. If the Indians move, so what. Start the process over until you can bring them to battle on the terms that favor you.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 20:57:40 GMT -6
Ah but Girard played into Custer's biggest fears with his "There goes your Indians, running like the devils." and Custer took off like a dog chasing a tennis ball and not stopping to think for one minute about whether what he was seeing made sense with the size of village he was tracking.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 20:59:02 GMT -6
Not only did the numbers associated with the pack train diminish his available combat power Beth, the train itself was like dragging your ten year old sister along on a date. You and your date would probably like to get down to the business of dating at some point but the question of what to do with that pesky kid sister always remains. The best answer is for you to spring for the money to hire a baby sitter. Should he left them in on the other side of the Divide? Around the morass? Is there a golden distance between and army and its supplies? Was Custer wrong to limit his people whatever it was everyone carried, or should he have divided the ammo up before the attack and left the food, blankets, fodder, mules and mule handlers in the way back? I know that being cut off from supplies is a real worry for an army but even if Custer lost everything he knew Terry was in the area. Beth Beth,
You are my logistics staff officer. What do you really need badly and quickly enough that it can't be brought up within 24 hours, other than bullets?
Way back in the Rosebud before the divide. The further away, the less chance Mathey gets discovered by any hunters. The pack train may be backtracking when it is time for GAC to quickly close the gap post-recon.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2015 20:59:31 GMT -6
AZ: If you emptied your saddle bags of any personal gear you might have, and loaded it with nothing but ammo, approximately how much of that period ammo could be carried in those saddle bags? You are the horse expert around these parts. If it became a matter of weight, I am sure there were a few other things that could be left behind to compensate.
Actually a basic load of a 100 per carbine was probably adequate had those companies been employed together. It becomes problematic when your force is deployed in small packets that you do not have adequate numbers for meaningful cross leveling.
The idea of having the pack train close up for during battle resupply is moronic.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 21:01:09 GMT -6
Ah but Girard played into Custer's biggest fears with his "There goes your Indians, running like the devils." and Custer took off like a dog chasing a tennis ball and not stopping to think for one minute about whether what he was seeing made sense with the size of village he was tracking. Beth,
Too close on the morning of the 25th. Way too close. Gerard. Curtiss. Camp fires. Collectively triggering what...?
So rewind to the 24th....
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2015 21:09:41 GMT -6
I mentioned some time ago that I had purchased a new book on the Bulge, dealing primarily with the 4th AD attacking into the Bulge from the south. I put is down for a while and picked it up again yesterday, and to partially answer Beth's question about distance from tooth to tail, combat elements to trains, each of the 3 combat commands of 4th AD, each of which is roughly the size of a regiment, left their trains back about 20 miles, and resupplied every few days by bringing them forward. That distance is a little far for a dismounted Infantry brigade, but the idea regardless of type unit is to keep them out of your way.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 21:40:44 GMT -6
AZ: If you emptied your saddle bags of any personal gear you might have, and loaded it with nothing but ammo, approximately how much of that period ammo could be carried in those saddle bags? You are the horse expert around these parts. If it became a matter of weight, I am sure there were a few other things that could be left behind to compensate. Actually a basic load of a 100 per carbine was probably adequate had those companies been employed together. It becomes problematic when your force is deployed in small packets that you do not have adequate numbers for meaningful cross leveling. The idea of having the pack train close up for during battle resupply is moronic. Of course putting all of your ammo in your saddle bags only works if you can keep your horse near you, which didn't work for everyone at LBH. Fanny packs would have been useful. Beth
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 21:59:23 GMT -6
Ah but Girard played into Custer's biggest fears with his "There goes your Indians, running like the devils." and Custer took off like a dog chasing a tennis ball and not stopping to think for one minute about whether what he was seeing made sense with the size of village he was tracking. Beth,
Too close on the morning of the 25th. Way too close. Gerard. Curtiss. Camp fires. Collectively triggering what...?
So rewind to the 24th....
WO
I totally agree--perhaps he should have flipped the agenda for the 23 and the 24th. The 23rd he just road a short distance and spent too much time in camp as I recall (again missing scouting oppurnities) He should have pushed further on the 23 and spent the 24 carefully scouting if they thought the Indians were within battle range. When exactly did Custer realize how close the village was? Depending on the time of day would he have been better even to backtrack a bit to prevent discovery?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2015 22:11:20 GMT -6
It beat the hell out of nothing Beth.
The basic soldiers load with an M-1 was 88 rounds (less than LBH). The basic load with and M14 was 140, but as we normally loading only 18 rounds in a magazine it was actually 126. The basic load with the M16 was the same, but being lighter ammo we would usually manage to carry near two hundred, by stuffing an extra mag or two in our cargo pockets.
The basic need is for only water and ammo. Food can wait.
Typically we would strip down to only load bearing equipment for an assault, leaving everything else behind.
I think carrying about half of the basic load in saddlebags was pretty much standard procedure for the day.
As I said above the fact that they were so dispersed, did not allow a large enough universe to adequately cross level ammo during or immediately after a firefight. What you will always find is that some soldiers use up ammo much faster than others. Every opportunity you have you cross level to even it out as much as possible.
It did not work at LBH simply because of dispersion, no mutual support thereby the transportation was always vulnerable except in the Reno/Benteen hilltop position. That is a tactical error, not caused by the procedure itself, rather by incompetent commanders.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 22:16:33 GMT -6
I mentioned some time ago that I had purchased a new book on the Bulge, dealing primarily with the 4th AD attacking into the Bulge from the south. I put is down for a while and picked it up again yesterday, and to partially answer Beth's question about distance from tooth to tail, combat elements to trains, each of the 3 combat commands of 4th AD, each of which is roughly the size of a regiment, left their trains back about 20 miles, and resupplied every few days by bringing them forward. That distance is a little far for a dismounted Infantry brigade, but the idea regardless of type unit is to keep them out of your way. Thanks that makes sense. I wonder if Custer had been better at handling his mules, if he would had more confidence leaving them further behind and with less manpower. Of course like most of the mysteries of LBH there is no answer. Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2015 22:30:08 GMT -6
Just as every solution to a tactical problem is somewhat different, no two being exactly alike, so too are answers to logistical problems. There are guidelines but each commander must decide what is best logistically to enable him to support his tactical operation. Keeping those packs that close hamstrung the entire tactical operation in this battle.
What was the purpose? Everything those packs contained was for after action resupply. There is nothing in them that would be required in close combat, with the exception of some, but certainly not all, of the ammo, and some limited amount of medical supplies. That could be solved by a few led mules, or better yet by making sure each soldier carried more than a basic load. Had each soldier carried as few as twenty additional rounds that total would have approached the 12,000 mark. Each doctor had a detailed striker who could have carried additional medical supplies, which were little more than the 1876 version of band-aids and gauze anyway. The packs forward as they were contained useless junk.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 23:28:28 GMT -6
I can see where salt, beans, fodder and a slab of bacon are useless in battle so I feel pretty confident that as far as things needed in battle is the ammo.
Funny how that brings us back to that darn note, if Custer felt he was about to go into battle why didn't he tell Benteen to bring up the ammo. If Custer felt they were going to move further afield then you would bring up everything--
Perhaps one of the bigger mistakes Custer made on the day of the battle was very poor communications and/or instructions. Do military orders usually include 'and if' or "once you've done that, then" type instructions-especially when communications might be a problem?
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Post by Deleted on Jul 9, 2015 3:39:00 GMT -6
WO, You have brought much in the way of numbers. The fact you don't mention is all of those people were doing exactly what they were ordered to do. Ineptitude right from the very top of the 7th. You know GAC fought very well in 1873 when Stanley had a leash on him. Maybe that was the problem, he slipped the leash. Regards, Tom Wrong again. Your "fact" is nothing more than spin to fit your agenda. Reno was ordered to attack the village. He didn't. Fact. He was not ordered to retreat. He did. Fact Benteen was ordered to return to trail. He didn't. Fact. Benteen was order to "Come on, be quick". He didn't. Fact.
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