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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 19:49:03 GMT -6
Custer Wore his unit out by force marching from June 21 to 24 Split his command into smaller and smaller units. Pack Train 1 company Benteen's Battalion 3 companies Reno's Battalion 3 companies Custer rode off with 5 companies that he spread all over the battlefield ensuring they would be defeated in detail. He sent Benteen 2 messages and a oddly worded vague message that directed Benteen to take 2 opposite actions. Either be quick or bring the packs. Benteen/Reno fought the battle by combining 7 companies and Custer lost by separating his companies. Benteen's performance exceeded Custer's but to protect Custer's reputation and his poor use of tactics many blame Benteen Regards Dave Dave,
Focus on 24 June 1876 and also on what GAC did/did not do to define what QC would call his "battle space"....
Remember that, in the end on 25 June, 25% of GAC's combat companies actually assaulted that village. 67% conducted recon and 8% guarded a supply train.
WO Startling numbers, especially when you consider then that the vast numbers of fatalities would have come from doing recon. Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 19:52:29 GMT -6
So we seem to be of a consensus that he attacked too soon and without the proper reconnaissance followed by dividing his forces. Do you think that assigning too many to guard the pack train was a factor? How far ahead could a main body of troops travel from their pack mules? Beth Beth,
GAC unnecessarily placed himself in a position on the morning of the 25 June 1876 where he felt obliged to attack to deal with the perceived scattering risk before he had conducted most of the very basic pre-battle recon/intel. Planning on the hoof thereafter. No sweep of the terrain. No verification of hostile numbers and location. No knowledge of river crossing points. Just a blind advance. And with dispositions that proved hopelessly unequal to the combat resilience required to withstand what stood and fought against them. Drip feeding understrength companies/battalions to the hostiles.
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jul 8, 2015 19:54:12 GMT -6
Custer Wore his unit out by force marching from June 21 to 24 Split his command into smaller and smaller units. Pack Train 1 company Benteen's Battalion 3 companies Reno's Battalion 3 companies Custer rode off with 5 companies that he spread all over the battlefield ensuring they would be defeated in detail. He sent Benteen 2 messages and a oddly worded vague message that directed Benteen to take 2 opposite actions. Either be quick or bring the packs. Benteen/Reno fought the battle by combining 7 companies and Custer lost by separating his companies. Benteen's performance exceeded Custer's but to protect Custer's reputation and his poor use of tactics many blame Benteen Regards Dave Dave,
Focus on 24 June 1876 and also on what GAC did/did not do to define what QC would call his "battle space"....
Remember that, in the end on 25 June, 25% of GAC's combat companies actually assaulted that village. 67% conducted recon and 8% guarded a supply train.
WO 25% were ordered to assault but never assaulted. They stopped short, hid for a few minutes and then high tailed it out. 25% were ordered forward promptly but ignored the order. 8% were with the pack train. You have an issue with this too?? Should the ammo have been left unguarded? The balance were abandoned while the 7 companies sat it out on a hill.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 19:56:17 GMT -6
Dave,
Focus on 24 June 1876 and also on what GAC did/did not do to define what QC would call his "battle space"....
Remember that, in the end on 25 June, 25% of GAC's combat companies actually assaulted that village. 67% conducted recon and 8% guarded a supply train.
WO Startling numbers, especially when you consider then that the vast numbers of fatalities would have come from doing recon. Beth Beth,
42% of combat companies went on the eastern bluffs recon. No assault, no survivors.
WO
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Post by Deleted on Jul 8, 2015 20:02:44 GMT -6
Startling numbers, especially when you consider then that the vast numbers of fatalities would have come from doing recon. Beth Beth,
42% of combat companies went on the eastern bluffs recon. No assault, no survivors.
WO
While the balance of the 58% sat on a hill and disobeyed a direct order. They abandoned fellow soldiers in battle to die. One officer drunk and the other blinded by personal hatred.
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 20:09:09 GMT -6
Startling numbers, especially when you consider then that the vast numbers of fatalities would have come from doing recon Beth Beth,
People forget that, of the 67% combat companies that attacked, only the 25% under Reno actually assaulted the village.
The hostiles assaulted the other 42% of attacking combat companies on the eastern bluffs and wiped them out.
Do you think, if GAC knew the position in the upper LBH and intervening valleys and the position in relation to the size of the concentrated hostile village, that he would not have added Benteen's 25% to the valley assault instead of a recon/sweep of that deserted real estate as battle was joined?
Which is why people should always rewind back to the 24th to understand why GAC was defeated on the 25th.
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 8, 2015 20:12:39 GMT -6
WO, You have brought much in the way of numbers. The fact you don't mention is all of those people were doing exactly what they were ordered to do. Ineptitude right from the very top of the 7th. You know GAC fought very well in 1873 when Stanley had a leash on him. Maybe that was the problem, he slipped the leash.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 20:18:57 GMT -6
Beth,
Would you want to assault an enemy (after a night march) of undetermined strength (vague suggestions of two to three times your own strength) with undetermined deployment over undetermined ground? That's what happened, by being forced onto the offensive on the morning of the 25th. And the mistakes that triggered a premature and unwanted assault on the 25th were made on the 24th. Fighting blind is not recommended for sound tactical reasons. Sadly the Little Bighorn is but one of many examples of what tends to happen when you do it.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 20:20:50 GMT -6
WO, You have brought much in the way of numbers. The fact you don't mention is all of those people were doing exactly what they were ordered to do. Ineptitude right from the very top of the 7th. You know GAC fought very well in 1873 when Stanley had a leash on him. Maybe that was the problem, he slipped the leash. Regards, Tom Tom,
I have said elsewhere. And I will say it again! Sheridan should have been leading that column with GAC under a tight leash.
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 8, 2015 20:22:24 GMT -6
WO, I know you have.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 20:24:54 GMT -6
Tom,
Sheridan should have been thinking and planning that battle.
GAC was ideal to lead a valley assault on the 26th, with what force allocated to him by Sheridan and what orders given to him by Sheridan.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Jul 8, 2015 20:29:24 GMT -6
Not only did the numbers associated with the pack train diminish his available combat power Beth, the train itself was like dragging your ten year old sister along on a date. You and your date would probably like to get down to the business of dating at some point but the question of what to do with that pesky kid sister always remains. The best answer is for you to spring for the money to hire a baby sitter.
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Post by Beth on Jul 8, 2015 20:33:14 GMT -6
Startling numbers, especially when you consider then that the vast numbers of fatalities would have come from doing recon Beth Beth,
People forget that, of the 67% combat companies that attacked, only the 25% under Reno actually assaulted the village.
The hostiles assaulted the other 42% of attacking combat companies on the eastern bluffs and wiped them out.
Do you think, if GAC knew the position in the upper LBH and intervening valleys and the position in relation to the size of the concentrated hostile village, that he would not have added Benteen's 25% to the valley assault instead of a recon/sweep of that deserted real estate as battle was joined?
Which is why people should always rewind back to the 24th to understand why GAC was defeated on the 25th.
WO
I think if Custer knew the terrain he would have used it totally differently. I'm not sure how though, I know that QC once suggested a much better approach. I am poor at remembering details but remember I thought it was a very interesting idea and made a whole lot of sense. As the battle went on the 25th I have always felt that the battlefield itself was one of the biggest factors against Custer. It chewed him up and spit him out because he didn't understand it nor did he seem to be able to read it. Even worse, he gave orders to Reno and Benteen without even knowing what he was facing, either enemy or terrain. It seems to me as a total non military person that it makes no sense in 1876 to conduct a battle where you can't see your the majority of your enemy or communicate with your own troops. Custer put a huge screen between himself and the rest of events that day and every time he left behind a company he made another move that added to the screen. In the end Custer set his regiment up for failure. Who knows--if he had had another company with him when he went to Ford D he might have left them behind there and rode even further north
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Post by welshofficer on Jul 8, 2015 20:34:46 GMT -6
Not only did the numbers associated with the pack train diminish his available combat power Beth, the train itself was like dragging your ten year old sister along on a date. You and your date would probably like to get down to the business of dating at some point but the question of what to do with that pesky kid sister always remains. The best answer is for you to spring for the money to hire a baby sitter. QC,
Again, too far forward. Way too far forward. Hole up in the Rosebud.
GAC didn't need it. It wrecked Benteen's freedom of action once Martini showed up. Take enough ammo for the intended fight. You don't replenish in the middle of a battle. GAC did need McDougall's company.
And what exactly was McDougall supposed to do if a large hostile force hit them, other than die?
WO
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 8, 2015 20:39:22 GMT -6
So we seem to be of a consensus that he attacked too soon and without the proper reconnaissance followed by dividing his forces. Do you think that assigning too many to guard the pack train was a factor? How far ahead could a main body of troops travel from their pack mules? Beth Beth if the proper recon was done than they would have discovered newer activity on the Rosebud. That the 7th was unaware of the activity is fact and none claimed to have known of the activity. Without going into a debate on Terry's comments regarding Custer he pointed that Custer turned and did not scout at all further up the Rosebud. My position for a long time was to find a secure place for the pack train and move out with the ammunition mules. I don't get moving to contact and leaving the ammunition behind. I have a bailout bag in my truck and if I decide to take my carbine for a walk the ammunition comes with me. Steve
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