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Post by mac on Jan 7, 2015 5:49:55 GMT -6
It seems that when Custer ascends Cemmetry ridge there was a window where he could perhaps have led a retreat (charge?!) away from the village. My question is this. Given the efforts he had made to push his command to that spot, would the horses have still had the "legs" to make such a retreat realistic or would they have been slowly ridden down by the mounted warriors on fresher mounts? Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 7, 2015 6:30:54 GMT -6
Hi Mac, it depends on how much a head start they had, if they reacted as soon as they saw warriors moving up deep ravine and galloped north-east then who knows, as the accounts say that one trooper almost got away only to shoot himself, one would presume that GAC was not for running and was corralled onto LSH with only his RHQ and one company plus a few survivors.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 7, 2015 7:46:52 GMT -6
Mac, best window for retreat was immediately after leaving MTC, by returning south to rest of command. Once he split command and headed to find Ford D he was pretty much toast. Maybe with intact command, a chance. You really need to visit, maps do not give proper perspective to terrain.
Regards. Tom
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Post by Colt45 on Jan 7, 2015 8:41:36 GMT -6
I don't think the possibility really existed to retreat after Custer reached Cemetery Ridge. There were two, maybe three, distinct fights going on: Keogh behind battle ridge and at Calhoun hill, Custer at Cemetery ridge, and possibly E company in the area of SSL. A retreat would have been executed as two or three distinct actions. Keogh would have had to retreat to the North and East before he got surrounded. Custer would have had to retreat North from the area before that avenue filled with hostiles. I don't think E company could have retreated as they were effectively surrounded and only north was a possibility, though remote. Neither Keogh nor Custer would have known of the other's retreat as the terrain prevented either from seeing what was happening at the other's location. All during Custer's move to Cemetery Ridge and ford D area, the hostiles were moving up Deep Ravine, up Deep Coulee and around behind Keogh, and northward up the river to cut off a ford D crossing, and ultimately to cross and converge on LSH. A decision to retreat by Custer would have needed to be made about the time he got to ford D but before he retired to Cemetery Ridge. Keogh would have had to make the decision before C company charged. His orders were probably to stay where he was and wait for Benteen, so it isn't likely he would have bugged out even if he saw that his window of retreat opportunity was closing fast. As Tom said, best opportunity to abort disaster was at MTC, heading back south instead of proceeding north away from Reno and Benteen.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 7, 2015 10:09:25 GMT -6
Agreed: If there was going to be a retreat, coming back from Ford B was the time to do it, heading initially east, then southward. Any such retreat though would cause even more problems for Reno. Contact would have been maintained with him on the bluffs. Benteen coming up might have helped, but I am both not sure of that, and how much help he could be. It would all depend upon the elapsed time between Reno reaching the bluff position and Benteen's arrival. Custer first going east and then south would have heard the sound of that fire and been attracted to it, and I would expect him at the bluff position within half an hour. A half an hour is a long time.
The problem with a retreat after Ford B, is that Custer had no earthly idea he needed to retreat at that point. His reconnaissance had been repulsed, but so what, that happens. Had he been aware what was going on with Reno, he would have pulled back, but he didn't. In his mind Benteen would soon be up, so not to worry. His fatal mistake was to move further northward, but he had not a clue as to the repercussions such a move would have.
So for two paragraphs that it took to say it - He lacked situational awareness due to 1) the distance that separated the various elements of HIS command, 2) reducing himself to battalion commander and not commanding the whole. Nothing at all wrong with the overall commander going in with what is supposed to be the main attack, EXCEPT when that going in leaves you in a position where you cannot control the remainder. Such was the case here.
When Custer went north from B and split, what subsequently transpired were two battles under two commanders, neither having a direct impact on the other. There was a small (but different in time) window where both could have escaped by retreat. They would have been cut up, but I think most would have gotten away. For Keogh it would have to be upon detecting the mass building to his front and before Henryville. For Custer leaving Ford D would be the time.
When you can't communicate you can't support, you are unaware of all but what you can personally see, you cannot coordinate movements, you cannot make timely decisions, YOU CANNOT COMMAND.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 7, 2015 13:38:48 GMT -6
I suppose that when GAC and Yates got to the cemetery area, they had no idea that the Keogh sector had fallen, they could have heard firing but that would have been expected, Custer’s view of the area on the west side of the river would have been impeded by the bluffs and trees thus giving him a false sense of security and when Keogh’s survivors came tumbling over the ridgeline both E and F may have been engaged blocking intrusions in the area around deep ravine, so if you have two companies in two different locations maybe over a hundred yards apart in action then your rear crumbles at it did with Keogh, then in that brief time frame a lot can happen which you cannot control, then things can break down rather quickly thus we have two companies found dead in two different positions, and both units would have had no chance to receive orders to augment any breakout.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 7, 2015 16:58:15 GMT -6
I don't think the Keogh sector had fallen at that time Ian. Not yet.
Custer was a deer caught in the headlights. Narrow focus will get you killed every time. Target fixation is what it is called. You become blind to reality.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 8, 2015 6:47:41 GMT -6
If he was on cemetery and facing west, then would two large terrain features be impeding him? Could he see anything of Keogh’s company positions? And with the ridgeline at his back he would have no view to the east, he would however have a good view to his front and right flank, maybe not much of the village with all the dust caused by the rumpus going on, but I think that before his two companies deployed he would have good vision to his front and right stretching down to the bluffs and trees.
But once firing commenced they all vision would be impaired with visibility down to feet rather than yards.
Ian.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 8, 2015 7:05:42 GMT -6
I don't think the Keogh sector had fallen at that time Ian. Not yet. Custer was a deer caught in the headlights. Narrow focus will get you killed every time. Target fixation is what it is called. You become blind to reality. We work hard at overcoming this. Even a simple task as operating a watercraft when speed is increased can lead to tunnel vision and focus on the immediate front. We teach scanning to break the focus. First we are to be safe and second we are to look for violations. On the range after engaging a target we ask the officers to scan before putting the weapon away. If the world is a safe place they should decock their handgun and holster. The problem is that scanning takes time and the officers begin to move their heads back and forth fast to indicate to the instructor they are scanning. This develops a habit of not seeing what is there and defeats the purpose of scanning. Effective training is a never ending job. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2015 7:15:08 GMT -6
It is similar to the skills you must develop when driving a car. If you are constantly looking forward intent on the road ahead, you are not seeing what may be coming at you from the side, right, left, or immediate rear. You are not scanning your blind spots for any activity from that quarter. That's why you have rear and side mirrors, and it is idiotic not to use them - and deadly.
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Jan 8, 2015 14:54:45 GMT -6
When did Custer ever retreat? Let's say Reno had led the attack along the east side of the Little Big Horn and Custer's five companies had attacked the southern end of the village and let's say they had been stopped. Not like Reno (stopping and forming a skirmish line) but let's say they had charged into the village and had been driven back by an overwhelming concentration NA's. Can you see Custer leading his men in a retreat back across the river to the bluff's? He and his five companies would have been killed to the last man just as they were in the actual battle, but in a different location.
This is all hypothetical of course.
The question is a good one and if it had been Reno or Benteen then retreat was a considered option.
With Custer it was not an option. He simply never thought of it.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2015 15:20:27 GMT -6
"When did Custer ever retreat" Buckland Mills where he and that other jackass Kilpatrick ran all the way back to Haymarket from Stuart. Scared out of their wits they were.
That's what happens when you go blindly into what amounts to a huge L shaped ambush with your neck stuck out like a chicken ready for plucking. Would not be the first time Georgie wondered into such, and it would not be the last.
Believe me if George Custer could have gotten out of there he would have.
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Jan 8, 2015 18:46:28 GMT -6
Here's a brief account of the Buckland Races. Custer's men never broke. At 3:30PM, Stuart's cavalry surprised Fitzpatrick, who fearing enemy to the rear, broke and was chased by Stuart for five miles in what became known as the "Buckland Races." Custer's brigade stemmed the retreat and covered the Union cavalry as it crossed the Broad Run ford.
"When did Custer ever retreat" Buckland Mills where he and that other jackass Kilpatrick ran all the way back to Haymarket from Stuart. Scared out of their wits they were. That's what happens when you go blindly into what amounts to a huge L shaped ambush with your neck stuck out like a chicken ready for plucking. Would not be the first time Georgie wondered into such, and it would not be the last. Believe me if George Custer could have gotten out of there he would have.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 8, 2015 19:06:23 GMT -6
And the next sentence should be both of them got the hell out of there, and were lucky to do so. Read what Thomason says in his biography of Stuart. Stuart was in front with Hampton and Lee were watching them from the flank and hit them.
Please cite your source. Mine is "Jeb Stuart by John W. Thomason Lt Col USMC pages 468-471 inclusive published by Scribner's in 1930 and reprinted several times since and still quite readily available.
When you lose your combat and field trains you have had a bad day. Custer had a bad day, although he did better than Kilpatrick
Shaw please do not fall into the Custer is wonderful trap. Every commander makes mistakes, every one. Every commander does something that he had wished he did not. They are all human. Much of the opinion forming done about Custer is by the hands and from the pen of his adoring Madam Fluffy. There is more to the man than what Fluffy wants you to know. Had it been only for Fluffy we would have never known for instance of the man's very serious character flaws. I can't stand her either. You probably guessed that didn't you?
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 8, 2015 20:04:23 GMT -6
It seems that when Custer ascends Cemmetry ridge there was a window where he could perhaps have led a retreat (charge?!) away from the village. My question is this. Given the efforts he had made to push his command to that spot, would the horses have still had the "legs" to make such a retreat realistic or would they have been slowly ridden down by the mounted warriors on fresher mounts? Cheers Mac,
The problem is that, after Ford B, there gradually ceases to be a concentrated command with which to retreat.
You have five weak companies spread out from L to E under two separate battalion commands.
It's probable that GAC/Yates had little (if any) warning of the collapse of the Keogh battalion mainly to the east of the ridge line.
The battle space back to Reno has been occupied by the hostiles, and Brisbin's cavalry battalion is still 30-40 miles to the north.
How much rest have the troopers and mounts had since daybreak on the 24th...?
WO
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