LBH: Similarities to Modern Combat?

[Mulligan]

RE: LBH: Similarities to Modern Combat?

There are, I have learned, former military officers on this board who have achieved relatively senior levels of command. I hope that is the correct way to phrase it.

Let me take a moment to give a nod of sincere appreciation to these gentlemen. All who have served in the United States military deserve a profound measure of gratitude and respect from every American citizen.

I was wondering if any of these officers would share -- from their direct personal combat experience as opposed to their academic knowledge of the principles -- wartime recollections (WWII, Korea, Vietnam, Middle East) that might correlate to situations likely faced by LTC Custer and his officer corps during the LBH battle.

I am interested, in particular, if any of these officers on the LBHA board has ever been involved in the decision to deploy a group of soldiers in a rear-guard defensive action while other members of their force pressed forward to a separate area in an offensive attack posture.


Thanks!

Mulligan

[quincannon]

What you are attempting to describe is not a rear guard. A rear guard guards the rear as the name implies. More on that in a moment.

You are describing a supporting attack, one designed to hold the attention and resources of your adversary so they will not interfere with your main effort, going in at some other location. Often times these supporting attacks become bogged down in a firefight that may look an awful lot like a defensive situation. At other times a fixed friendly position may be used as a pivot point by a friendly force, for the same reason, to hold attention from the main effort. That is most often the case in a counterattack designed to gain back ground lost.

A rear guard is used in two instances.

On the march the rear guard is part of four such guard forces - advance - flank (2) - rear. As the name implies it guards the rear of a column on the move. It orients its own movements on the direction and speed of the column it guards.

Rear guards are also used in during a withdrawal, but that has no connection with an offensive operation anywhere. Their purpose is to keep the enemy off of the backsides of your main body until contact can be broken. If the enemy is very aggressive, you can lose them real easy,

There is a tactical variation of this type of rear guard known as a detachment left in contact (DLIC). It is used during a deliberate withdrawal. The idea is the DLIC, approximately one third of your force drawn from each of the companies in contact, spread out clandestinely across your front, simulating your entire unit being there, while the bulk of your force withdraws. If the enemy is deceived, and does not attack,you are golden. If they detect what you 're doing, you are toast.

Now to the heart of the matter. If you are trying to glean insight into the Reno in the valley affair, that is probably best described as an advanced guard that evolved by circumstance into a supporting attack. If you reference is to the Keogh battalion, that defies book description to some extent. We do not know what Custer's orders were to Keogh, or even Custer's intent. There is no one to tell us. It appears to be a temporary holding force bent on short term area denial. About the only thing that can be said for sure is that Custer had no intent for them to DIP, and DIP they did.

To be perfectly clear, and in keeping with the tittle of this thread, all combat ancient to modern is similar. The tactics are unchangeable. The technique of employing those tactics adaptable to the situation and to some extent the intensity of conflict. The same tactics used at Waterloo and LBH were evident at the Bulge and Chipyong Ni, and down the very street where our current enemies lives. You modify those tactics, by technique of employment based upon the opposition you face, be it panzer division or a small band of roving Comanche in the Llano Estacado.

[Mulligan]

Thanks, Q.

As a civilian, I'm really trying to get a handle on the thinking that went into Custer leaving a DLIC contingent (Keogh?) in the rear of what, apparently, was going to be a further advance by the remaining companies toward the village. It would seem by the time Custer had crested the ridge (Calhoun Hill?) and was able to look down into the valley that it would be obvious to all concerned that a successful assault on the target was going to require every available resource.

I know as I get deeper into this problem the experienced and knowledgeable members here will discuss the reasons they are convinced that such a deployment occurred. It just seems incredibly foolhardy, does it not, to stop and deploy a DLIC when these men might be more useful as part of a mobile assault force moving rapidly forward?

If the plan was for everyone in Custer's command to charge down to the river and cross it, and then enter the main village and/or begin rounding up NC's to the northwest, wouldn't any DLIC make more sense deployed on the western bank of LBH firing eastward into the approaching NA's rather than left on an exposed hilltop a mile away where the detachment could be surrounded or otherwise overwhelmed?


Mulligan

[quincannon]

Calling Keogh a DLIC is a bit of a stretch. Let me try and give you an example of a DLIC and then we can discuss but Keogh's probable or possible mission, and speculate about what Custer had in mind.

Let's say you have a platoon on line in a defensive posture, and the order comes down that your company is going to withdraw tonight along with all the other forward elements of your battalion and parent brigade. Here is what you would do. You select one squad (out of your three, alone with one each of both types of your crew served weapons. Normally that would be a machine gun and an anti-armor weapon. During the last hours of day light you spread out that squad over your entire platoon front, slowly, carefully, seemingly routine. Keep in mind that you can assume all this is being watched. What you are doing is placing these soldiers away from where they once were and commingling them with the other two squads, The crew serves normally remain in place as there is rarely a requirement to move the. While all this is going on, your squad leaders and platoon sergeant are busy, again appearing to be conducting routine business, in selecting paths to the rear to first squad then platoon rally points, ones that can easily be identified after dark.

Dark comes, and still you do nothing. Nothing appears out of order, then gradually one r two at a time the men you are going to withdraw move to the rear until finally only that one squad and the two crew serves cover an area that was once covered by your entire platoon. Once you as the platoon leader/DLIC commander get the word all those that have withdrawn on safely in the rear, you start pulling your DLIC out and move to the rear. If it is done right it is a work of art. If it is done wrong or someone gets careless your dead. Very simple, but in tactics the simple is hard.

Now Keogh was no DLIC. I like to use the expression "fending". It is not in any book. It something like a mobile defense, one where you are not tied to a single piece of terrain but rather a larger area in which to operate. It's one of those things you cannot adequately describe but you know it when you see it. Was he waiting for Benteen? I doubt it. Was he stopping up some hole? I doubt that too. Was he providing a deep cover rally point for whatever Custer was doing? Probably. Was he engaged in a hold this position deliberate, don't let them pass defense. Not on your life. Without being privy to Custer's instructions to him, the best I can come up with as a description is fending for area denial.

What was Custer doing. Who the hell knows. He should have been tending to business, the business he stirred up at Ford B. I once was hooked on the Ford D theory. I then backed off a bit, saying to myself he need not physically go there to see what needs seeing. He was not looking for any defensive ground as others suggest, because at that time he had no idea he would need it. The proof of that is had he been considering a defense, he would not have split from CPT Keogh. Defense is one are where all the numbers you have count. The Calhoun Hill area sucks as chosen defensive ground but it is better than any in the immediate vicinity.

Had Custer been smart, well no sense wishing for something that could not happen.

Others say Custer was no fool. My friend Fred first among them ---- When you act like a fool, and do foolish things you are a fool ---- It is then up to the observer to determine if that condition is temporary or permanent.

[Mulligan]

Q:

This is deeply, deeply, rich material.


Briefly, what is the basis for believing that Keogh was engaged in "fending" atop the ridge whilst LTC Custer was sallying forth elsewhere?   What argues against a different scenario, say perhaps that all the cavalry, including the Keogh Battalion, were forced back to Battle Ridge together following a failed assault on the village?



Mulligan

[quincannon]

The only assault conducted that day was Reno's assault on the southern end of the village in the valley. Custer attacked nothing the whole livelong day

Custer went to Ford B, and had absolutely no intention of crossing. He goes with two companies, leaving three behind on N-C Ridge. That is no assault formation. He was either trying a recon to get a better appreciation of what confronted him (remember the talk today about, dust, smoke, inversions and such) or he was playing paddyfingers with those people to test their resolve. Both fall under the recon category. Keogh's three then an N-C were his deep cover rally point, in case someone took their finger out of the dam. It was a place to run to. One company goes to the ford (E), one company is in close cover (F), and one battalion in deep cover (Keogh)

Custer feels then he must move north (a brainfart) Keogh takes up the same role deep cover while the other two go looking. Keogh has the additional mission of area denial concentrating on those folks starting across Ford B, in what was first a careful, deliberate pursuit.

The Indians only made one mistake here. They thought all of Custer (5 companies) were centered around Calhoun Hill and converged upon that place from both B and C. Custer could have ridden half way to Helena, and the Indians would probably have not detected him. The damned fool exposed himself up north. You know he rest.

What, the DLIC rich? Washington did the same thing to the Brits on Long Island in 1776. The guy who said there is nothing new under the sun was right. There are just different ways to get sunburned. It's all pretty standard stuff that you learn a BSFB.

[Yan Taylor]

Chuck, we have read posts that refer to Keogh skirmishing with groups of Indians, some say that this was done on the ridges, so that would mean that both wings could be under fire and the area was becoming dangerous, so why would they leave a gap of a mile between the two wings? Keogh may have attempted to close this distance by moving L Company onto Calhoun hill to cover Custer/Yates and move the rest of his Battalion onto Battle Ridge.

Ian.