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Post by welshofficer on Jan 15, 2015 14:06:31 GMT -6
Ladies and gentlemen,
Time to rewind....
Without the proper implementation of what QC/Montrose would call the ISR elements of C2, GAC was not properly risk managing and developing a flexible and resilient tactical plan to subdue the hostile village.
He was there to defeat an enemy. That might involve winning a full on pitched battle. It might involve a corralling operation. It might involve chasing down a scattering enemy.
It certainly did not involve a wide force dispersal outside of mutual support, with the hostiles obtaining localised tactical supremacy leading to a stunning defeat in detail of 3 battalions.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 15, 2015 14:17:48 GMT -6
I agree Justin, maybe his reason for being there was to defeat and capture the Indian village, but he did divide his regiment, and none of this was forced on him by Indian pressure as all of the separations were conducted without a shot being fired.
Ian.
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Post by Beth on Jan 15, 2015 14:34:30 GMT -6
Excuse me if this doesn't belong in this thread. Please feel free to move it where it belongs.
Sometimes when I read about the journey from FAL to Little Bighorn it makes me think that Custer viewed the whole campaign as an extended romp in the country with his relatives with a whole lot of killing Indians as the climax. From the point Custer recieves word that the Indians are confronting Reno instead of running, he seems to be just reacting to events, instead of thinking ahead to how to gain control of the situation. Am I wrong with that impression? Also in a battle situation can an action where you are always reacting just reacting to events ever turn out successful?
Beth
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 15, 2015 15:13:00 GMT -6
Beth,
Yes, it can turn out successful. Especially if you are prepared to flexibly and opportunistically counter-attack and go on the offensive if/when opportunities present themselves. But it is not ideal, because it doesn't give you much overall control of events, initiative or momentum. You have to be very good to successfully wage warfare like this. Take a look at the 1943-45 battles of "the Fuhrer's fireman" (Walter Model)...?
Today, we would call GAC's youngest brother and nephew "combat tourists". What impression of a campaign does that give you...? There are various testimonies that, if that was GAC's mindset, it was changing in the final days. The 22 June 1876 officer's call...?
WO
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 15, 2015 15:15:40 GMT -6
Beth, It may appear that way, and maybe his younger brother and nephew viewed it that way. Custer may have even mentioned to these family members that this might be his last campaign. We must remember he was on very thin ice at this point, Grant wanted him benched for keeps. He had not endeared himself to the powers that be. He, even before his stunt before congress, was not the favorite of either Sherman or Grant. If not for Sheridan and to a lesser degree Terry, Custer would probably would never have commanded a regiment again and would have been slowly forced from the service while performing jobs not fit for a light COL.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Jan 15, 2015 16:18:40 GMT -6
I believe that I have read somewhere that Custer came out of that briefing serious and white faced. (I don't know if that is true or an antecdote) I wonder if Terry sort of told him George if you F this up you won't be able to get a posting evenly cleaning the stables. I do believe that when Custer worked he worked and when he played, he played--and he did both with gusto. I wonder though if at any time on the 25th he found Boston and Autie a distraction or if he was able to focus so much on the battle he didn't think at all about the civilians traveling with him.
Beth
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 15, 2015 16:25:19 GMT -6
The bullet to the head was probably not self inflicted, but I am sure he regretted the killing of his nephew and baby brother, if he even had time to think about it. Had he not died, he would have had to carry that the rest of his life. Not easy.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Jan 15, 2015 17:20:43 GMT -6
The bullet to the head was probably not self inflicted, but I am sure he regretted the killing of his nephew and baby brother, if he even had time to think about it. Had he not died, he would have had to carry that the rest of his life. Not easy. Regards, Tom I've always wondered if the 'left temple' actually means anywhere about the jaw on the left side of his head. It is much better to leave the impression for the legend that the Tom brother put his last bullet in brother George's brain pain rather than have him suffer the horrors of the savage Indians--than he had his brains blown out by those heathen savages. The same for the though that George chose to end things on his own terms. What the truth is we will never know of course. Maybe his horse shot him in revenge for his brothern left on a sun soaked praire after a 'buffalo hunt.' Beth
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 16, 2015 6:26:57 GMT -6
The key is something we will never know for sure and that is what was going on in Custer's mind. We can only try to put together the end results and form opinions how they got to the end point.
There are long discussions on the timber area but the only thing that counts is what did Reno think at the time. He stated he believed it was not defensible. It doesn't matter what others thought in hind sight.
Custer knew the Indians didn't always run from his own experience but that would not matter if on this battle day it is what he believed. He also knew that when the number advantage favored the Indians they would stick around and see what happens.
I think if you look how wildlife hunts in packs you can see a lot of similarities. I don't think the alpha male goes around giving orders neither do the subordinates decide I am not going to participate in the pursuit.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by welshofficer on Jan 16, 2015 7:04:07 GMT -6
The key is something we will never know for sure and that is what was going on in Custer's mind. We can only try to put together the end results and form opinions how they got to the end point. There are long discussions on the timber area but the only thing that counts is what did Reno think at the time. He stated he believed it was not defensible. It doesn't matter what others thought in hind sight.
Custer knew the Indians didn't always run from his own experience but that would not matter if on this battle day it is what he believed. He also knew that when the number advantage favored the Indians they would stick around and see what happens. I think if you look how wildlife hunts in packs you can see a lot of similarities. I don't think the alpha male goes around giving orders neither do the subordinates decide I am not going to participate in the pursuit. Regards AZ Ranger AZ,
I would simply add one very slight caveat in relation to Reno that hindsight enables us to try and verify whether Reno truly believed what he stated about the timber.
That was not a defendable position, including because of the "swamping" risk that Benteen made reference to in his RCOI testimony.
There is therefore nothing to suggest that Reno was doing other than telling the truth, as he perceived it, about the timber on the afternoon of 25 June 1876.
WO
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Post by montrose on Jan 16, 2015 7:06:29 GMT -6
Steve,
Consider the intercourse between the US and NA command and control systems. GAC was moving faster than the NA system could respond. At each of his decision points, he took an action and then moved north; so quickly that he never saw the Indian reactions to his decisions. The trailing elements of the regiment ended up getting clobbered by these delayed Indian responses.
For example, the Ford B event was GAC and the Yates Bn. By the time the Indians arrived at Ford B in response, GAC and Yates were long gone. Unfortunately, Keough is sitting there in plain view on the south end of Battle Ridge.
A critical failure of US at LBH was the failure of command and control. Where was the regimental brain to monitor what was going on with the rest of the regiment? A command post should have been established to provide control. When GAC left Calhoun Hill, he was out of sight and out of communication with 10 of 12 companies.
Now consider the lost opportunity. When GAC took his 2 Bns right, he had the Reno Bn in contact. The trailing 2 Bns had no idea that the regiment was dividing, so they would need to know where to go. CPT Benteen is the 3rd in the chain of command. So the order Bring packs makes sense, if it meant: Take command of the two trailing Bns.
Here is the exercise of the day. How would you write the Martini note?
Reno attacking village in the valley. I am moving to the right. Bring your BN, McD Bn and trains and follow me.
Remember the 5 Ps. Prior Planning Prevents Poor Performance.
WIlliam
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 16, 2015 7:35:18 GMT -6
Great question. I could and will rewrite the note if required, to include a link up with Keogh then proceed to me. My question to all is would you have left Reno's severely damaged and broken command to their own devices. Would you have told Reno you had orders to got to Custer and that he should get his remaining combat troops to come along, as he had orders from the boss. Leave the wounded here and detach a few to protect them. He then would then place himself under Reno's command for the intended link up. I think, no matter how the note was written, Benteen could not/would not bypass Reno, even if he did not have to wait for the packs. The last P, not included, but I will here for Benteen, Prioritize.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 16, 2015 7:55:45 GMT -6
Benteen
Reno attacking big village in valley. I am moving right from creek bottom along bluffs. Bring your BN, McD. BN and trains. Follow me.
GAC
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 16, 2015 8:21:52 GMT -6
I will go the full hog, so be gentle with me;
Benteen, bring the train and latch on to my trail, big village sited, leave train in coulee (cedar) shown to you by the NCO (no Martini), bring forward your battalion and B company and we will wait for you.
P.S. leave train in coulee
W W Cook
My reasons behind this is that cedar coulee would make a good place to hide the train and still have it available.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 16, 2015 9:32:59 GMT -6
Will's composition is brief, clear, and concise. It contains all of the essentials Benteen requires.
There is no reason to do anything but give Benteen the tactical picture. and tell him what you want.
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