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Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 25, 2012 13:35:19 GMT -6
You have covered a lot of the bases Chuck well done Sir. My take on the battle (if I was in command) is this; my scouts have given me some but not a lot of data, that leaves me four points to consider.
A; my force is too small to separate again now that Benteen has gone on his scout. B; I don’t know how big the village is, or how many warriors it may contain. C; I still don’t know how far away I am from my objective or how the terrain pans out. D; I don’t know if the village has been alerted and I am taking my whole command into a killing ground.
So taking these four points into account, I would be if I am honest very cautious (call me Monty if you wish), I would rule out any move to the East, I would send for Benteen to come forward with the ammo packs, also send word to the pack train that Benteen needs the ammo, but both B Company and the rest of the train must follow as fast as possible (follow my trail), Moving my Regiment forward, I would form into three Battalions,
Keogh; C and I Companies Yates; E, F and L Companies Reno; A, G and M Companies + HQ
I would then proceed towards the village with Yates in the lead (with one platoon from L coy on the on the right flank, the Scouts with both Varnum and Hare on the other flank).
I place my HQ with Reno just behind Yates. Keogh close up behind me, and hoping Benteen and the ammo would not be too far from catching them up.
When the village comes in sight, I would order Yates forward to hit the village full on, me and Reno would carry the momentum forward if Yates slows, finally Keogh and Benteen (if he gets there) could now move up the western side of the village and enter the attack.
Now I have based this on being in command and having no fore sight into what I am facing, my goal would be to smash through the village hoping that momentum would carry me through.
One last thing, thanks for the kind words guys, good comments from my peers makes Ian a humble man.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2012 13:53:00 GMT -6
Ian: You and I are not far apart. I would choose two instead of three battalions with a regiment still minus Benteen. If I stay in the valley Benteen will join me soon enough to meet my needs. I would avoid the village, at least initially, not wanting to be bogged down in restricted and compartmented areas that would dissapate and fragment my combat power. I am making the assumption I am outnumbered. I don't know how outnumbered but in a "in village" fight those numbers work greatly against me. I want the warriors out to meet me. They will come in dribs and drabs, and that suits me just fine. I want as much panic and confusion as possible inside that village. That works for me. I want to thump the warriors. I want to give them a good bloody nose. I don't want to kill them all. I just want to kill enough. The rest I will worry about tomorrow, or the day after, or the day after that.
I want them to think I am in great strength or shortly will be, hence the two battalions of two squadrons each. I also want them to see Benteen coming from my rear. That I want very much, for they will have no earthly idea what is behind him. If I can put the scare in them so much the better for me. In addition they have to fight. As long as I keep my forces well in hand I can withdraw if necessary and come at them again.
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Post by benteen on Aug 25, 2012 14:15:32 GMT -6
First let me thank Colonel Montrose for taking the time to set this up, it seems like it is going to be an interesting excercise. As an NCO I have never taken part in one of these at least not as someone making tactical decisions. With that being said allow me to ask what may be a foolish question.
When giving my opinion as to the blue commander, am I stuck with a decision Custer already made, or can I start from scratch. What I mean is Colonel Q said he would recall Benteen, I wouldnt. Simply because I wouldnt have to. Not knowing exactly where the enemy was, not knowing their strenght or disposition, or in fact the terrain, I would never have sent 1/3 of my effective force miles away from where I thought my point of contact with the enemy would be. I would have kept my regiment together until I had more info as to the situation.
Would appreciate any instructions or rules of this excercise. Thank You Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2012 14:22:25 GMT -6
Dan: Montrose stipulated in the initial scenario lay out that Benteen was off to the west, at least that's how I read it (See Reply 58 Line 3 He either meant 2 battalions with Custer or is counting the trains and B as a third battalion. In my response I term them Trains Group to avoid confusion with the combat battalions)
You of course, using Will's scenario, have the option to undo what Custer already did, an opt for recalling Benteen and having him closed up before you proceed further. That is your decision to make.
In the immortal words of LTC Owen Thursday (Fonda) to CPT Kirby Yorke (Wayne) - CPT Yorke when you command this regiment, and you will, COMMAND. I will trouble you for your sabre sir.
You are the commander Dan. If it makes you feel any better about it, assume everyone present above the rank of Corporal of Marines has a dose of the clap and are on sick call, lining up to get their shots. Therefore you are senior. Take command Corporal.
The rules are simple. Check out Montrose's post and proceed as you would from that point on. We will get further limitation I expect as the Red Force, and/or the unpire checks in.
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Post by lew on Aug 25, 2012 15:15:24 GMT -6
I agree with Benteen--keep everyone together. No details,no scouts,just the pack train bringing up the rear. Everyone sticks to me like a flea on a hound pup. We wait til we meet the enemy before thinking any further ahead.
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Post by benteen on Aug 25, 2012 15:17:39 GMT -6
OK Colonel thank you.
My first move would be to immediately recall not only Benteen, but the 80 man detail with the pack trains. My reasoning is that Benteen has found no warriors to the SouthWest. The pack train will be under no threat since the warrior force will have to go through my whole regiment to get to them. Capt Mcdougalls company B plus the mule hearders will have ample fire-power to deal with any stray hunting parties. With the pack detail I will have my companies at full strenght and my entire regiment together
I would send out a recon patrol to my front, but where I differ with you Colonel is that I would not send scouts. I would send a patrol with a good NCO. Indians dont know what you want they can see something and add their own comments, a good NCO is going to know exactly what info you need and report it accuratley
I would figure my recon patrol and Benteen would be arriving back to me about the same time I would then decide what to do based on what info my recon tells me
Now how do I procede from here. Does my recon tell me what we know, that the village is 4 miles away, it is together not seperate, it is all on the west side of the LBH, that judging by the pony heard and tepees etc there are probably far more warriors than we thought. Or do I wait for another part of the equation where Colonel Montrose tells me this is what your recon found, this is your additional info, procede from here.
Or am I in fact screwing this up and completly misunderstanding the whole concept (The likely scenerio)
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2012 15:20:12 GMT -6
Larry: Will set the scenariio with Benteen off to the west. That is the exercise starting point. What is done is done. You have the option by game rules to recall Benteen before you go further, if that is what you wish to do, but what was done is set in stone by the umpire.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2012 15:34:35 GMT -6
Dan:
The scouts have at least one officer with them already. I believe this situation calls for armed reconnaissance and not a sneak and peak. The Blue Force commander has ordered an advance (in my solution) based upon assumptions. The Blue Force still has the element of surprise. I want to beat this iron while it's hot. Any delay in my view lessens the chances of me getting the drop on these people. Scouts out stirring them up and screening me helps me layer this thing, along with the formation I have chosen. Remember I said that I wanted to appear to be in great strength. The scouting line, followed fairly close behind, say a mile, by four squadrons in echelon seperated by a hundred meters or so, in column, then into line. They are going to raise one hell of a lot of dust, a smoke screan if you will, through which glimpses of advancing soldiers can be seen. I want them out to protect the families. I want them to see Benteen coming up giving the illusion that there are many more where he came from.
I want them to think they are outnumbered. I want them to die as they prance around. I want them to die as they try to prove to their fellows that they really have a pair. I want their comrades to see more than a few skulls split open by carbine rounds, or see them on the ground doing the dance of death with thier spines cracked open like a walnut. That's what I want, because the more I scare them the better chance I have of my smaller force beating their larger one.
I also think you forget what Will said about there being people between Ford A and the south end of the village, Deeds and the turnip pickers. Do you think they are not going to see that recon patrol? Do you want to take that chance? I would not. Now as the Blue commander 1 and a half miles south of Ford A I would have no way of knowing for sure they were there, but I believe it is prudent to assume there will be some folk roaming around, and I would govern my decisions based upon that prudent assumption. There is absolutely nothing wrong with fighting for information.
Never give up the initative unless you are forced to by enemy action. Waiting potentially allows that initative to pass to the other side. That is a very bad thing.
You recall those eighty men and it does give you more combat power. But again you have to wait, and who is going to get those pack mules forward. They are not a secuity detachment. Company B provides that. They are mule handlers, probably there because the Quartermaster was to damned cheap to hire enough, or packing was not in the initial plan. Custer could be a dumb SOB, but I don't think he would have had those men there if there is not where they were required. Nobody cuts down combat power unless there is a perceived urgency about a matter that requires you to do so.
Larry: You don't play Chess do you?
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Post by benteen on Aug 25, 2012 16:02:23 GMT -6
Colonel...to my untrained eyes your action certainly seems to be a reasonable and knowledgeable action. It makes total sense to me except for the fact that it is based on the element of surprise. Isnt the reason Custer attacked in the afternoon of the 25th rather than wait till dawn on 26th because he thought the Regiment had been discovered. So unless Im missing something, to the Blue Commander (Custer) there is no element of surprise.
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2012 16:14:55 GMT -6
What has he seen since that discovery was reported to him, and after he crossed the Divide? Don't think there is anything that would cause him to think he did not have surprise on his side. He sees smoke and the dust from the pony herd. He sees no one coming out to meet him along Ash Creek. Can't get into his mind of course but he might have reflected and thought maybe I still do. Sending Benteen to the west is also an indicator of not really thinking he had lost surprise and was walking into an ambush. You often have said splitting off one third of the force was foolish. Were you Custer would you do this thing if you did not feel you still had the advantage?
Also remember there was no centralized command and control. No one could stop any warrior band with a wild hair from coming out to mix it up with him, had the news of discovery spread through the village. Chances are some would.
Imformation in battle is imprecise. It always is, not just here. Sometimes you have more, sometimes less, but when you go into battle there is always some element of dice roll.
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Post by montrose on Aug 25, 2012 16:16:46 GMT -6
I started this scenario at the point and place and time where GAC ordered the regiment to attack. Actions taken prior to this are a fact, and can not be changed. One thing you learn in a planning rock drill is that earlier decisions can have unintended consequences.
Remember that the command is still 1.5 miles from Ford A. So options of how to get command to A, and in what strength apply.
Ford A is key terrain at this stage, since if you block it, Indian main strength will be across the river. Information still to be gathered helps decide what to do next. Remember, this is mobile warfare, you want flexibility to respond to intelligence as you go.
So you are still making decisions and moving elements to gather information, while trying to position your combat elements to execute your plans as you receive data.
So let us consider a small patrol of 6 men sent across Ford A and downstream to gather data. You know as a fact there are at least 30 Indians in the area, since you have been chasing them. How far do you let your patrol go? Say they go a mile and bump into the fleeing band, or new reinforcements, or Sitting Bull conducting a new Sun Dance, or Elizabeth Warren explaining to the village how she reaaly is an Indian. Now they have to getthatinfo back to you. Call it a mile up and back.
Now you want to do something about it, and you face your own return trip of a mile. The whole reason you see the regiment sending small scout elements up the sides of the ridges, is to get a glimpse of what is ahead; while being close enough to the commander so he can make timely decisions.
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Post by lew on Aug 25, 2012 16:32:11 GMT -6
I'm planning on an action that may very well last til the next day. As soon as I cross Ford A, I post E Company at the Ford. They will dig in the best they can and wait for Benteen and the pack train. They will also act as a rally point in case things go wrong. My Indian scouts will be instructed to attempt to blend in with the hostiles and play havoc. I plan on making a charge with the remaining force. It will be a hit and run--with a retreat back to Ford A, to regroup.
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Post by benteen on Aug 25, 2012 16:36:46 GMT -6
What has he seen since that discovery was reported to him, and after he crossed the Divide? Don't think there is anything that would cause him to think he did not have surprise on his side. He sees smoke and the dust from the pony herd. He sees no one coming out to meet him along Ash Creek. Can't get into his mind of course but he might have reflected and thought maybe I still do.. Were you Custer would you do this thing if you did not feel you still had the advantage? . Colonel....You are absolutely correct. I had not thought of that. Custer thought his command had been discovered but everything he had seen since then showed that he may not have been discovered and may very well thought he still had the element of surprise, I stand corrected. As to dividing my force, that I can say without a doubt, no sir, I would not have divided my command under any circumstances especially 1/3 of it, unless I knew within reason what I was up against. Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Aug 25, 2012 16:42:02 GMT -6
Colonel Montrose....Thanks for the additional info, it will take me time to digest it and try and come up with a logical thought. Bare with me, no excuses, but I am new to this.
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Aug 25, 2012 16:48:57 GMT -6
Ford A is key terrain. That is why I stop the Trains Group there as they come up. Holding that ford for the time being is essential as it is your only back door. Until they come up however the main body covers it with the advance to the north. In other words you would have to go through or around them for the hostiles to get to Ford A. In light of Will's comments my formation to Ford A is still regiment (-) column of battalions, scouts out.
Larry: By detaching E as a gate guard you just lowered your available combat power by 1/8.. Do you really feel it is that necessary to physically occupy key terrain at this stage of the game? Won't covering it do just as well?
Dan: What is within reason? I don't know, for within reason varies from commander to commander. If you know everything there is to know, you are not taking any risk at all. When has that ever occured? There is nothing I know of in the human experience without some element of risk, including breathing. Risk is OK, as long as it is calculated, and not reckless endangerment bordering on deliberate manslaughter.
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