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Post by tubman13 on Jul 30, 2018 3:22:55 GMT -6
Hello Richard,
Are you saying the buck stops/starts at the top?
Regards, Tom
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Post by wild on Jul 30, 2018 6:59:47 GMT -6
A slow afternoon Tom ....had not looked in for long time ....thought I could bait someone just to see who was still alive. Take care Richard
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Post by dave on Jul 30, 2018 9:51:01 GMT -6
Colt I have never fired a .45 but had years of experience shooting a S&W Model 686 with .38 + P 135 grain. When qualifying, both day and night, we shot around 30 rounds and the cases were hot, damn hot! I can only imagine how much hotter a .45 case would be and so much more difficult to reload. The black powder residue would certainly increased the difficulty of reloading as well, I would imagine. Regards David
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Post by Colt45 on Jul 30, 2018 14:58:52 GMT -6
All that is true, Dave. The biggest disadvantage a single action revolver has is the slowness in emptying the cylinder and reloading it. Not what you want to have when surrounded by lots of close-in hostiles.
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Post by tubman13 on Jul 31, 2018 9:37:52 GMT -6
Dave had the advantage of the spider and side eject, what is he crying about. S&W top break had an advantage on your Colt, Colt.
Regards, Tom
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Post by wild on Jul 31, 2018 11:12:00 GMT -6
Cant imagine hot shells being an issue . Just been looking a fellow demonstrating the colt and he drops the "shells into his hand and that only because he is keeping the empties.and he could chamber 5 rounds in as many seconds. And my guess is that because the shell was ejected rather than extracted there was less chance of jaming. Cheers
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Post by wild on Jul 31, 2018 17:50:30 GMT -6
As regards the suggested lack of firearms training . The US had a billion rounds of obsolete civil war ammo and numerious types obsolete arms which could have been used for training purposes. No better way to train a man than a day or two on the range with a limitless supply of ammo regardless of the arms used. Cheers Richard
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Post by noggy on Aug 1, 2018 0:54:41 GMT -6
As regards the suggested lack of firearms training . The US had a billion rounds of obsolete civil war ammo and numerious types obsolete arms which could have been used for training purposes. No better way to train a man than a day or two on the range with a limitless supply of ammo regardless of the arms used. Cheers Richard Yet they had only 10 rounds for practice per month up til September 75, pistol and carbine, which was then increased to 15 (If Donovan has quoted the General order correctly, which I assume he has). That is borderline madness. All the best, Noggy
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Post by wild on Aug 1, 2018 7:24:09 GMT -6
Not borderline Noggy it was madness. The regular army miniscule as it was had to be the best they could produce because it was the nucleus of an expanded army for war. For example every trooper in the 7th should have been trained to NCO standard. Cheers Richard
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Post by montrose on Aug 2, 2018 17:15:32 GMT -6
1. Ammunition storage. Each soldier had one cartridge box that held 20 rounds. The cartridge belt came out years later. Some individuals may have built their own. One soldier in E company was put on charges for defacing government property by cutting up straps to build his own cartridge belt. The spare ammunition was kept in saddle bags.
This means a soldier had one basic load in his box, and 4 more in the saddle bags. Resupply was a huge problem, they hadn't figured out how to resupply a dismounted line. We know in the valley M Company had to send soldiers back in shifts to gain another basic load. The Indians said they found thousands of rounds after the battle. This was from the saddle bags. I believe the majority of soldiers on Battle Ridge had empty or near empty cartridge boxes.
My point is they really had 20 long rounds and 6 short on their person. Use that as your approach, and see how drastically that changes your analysis.
2. Training. AN authorization of 10 rounds a month does not mean the ammunition was present, or that any training took place. We know the 7th main activity Sep 75 to Apr 76 was garrison support. MAJ Reno did conduct marksmanship training in Apr and May, following regulations. This means company in line shooting at a sheet 50 yards long and 4 feet high. There was no process for zeroing a weapon and individual shooting at a bullseye or known distance range. This came in the post LBH reforms. There is no record or account of monthly marksmanship training, not in daily logs, diaries, accounts or supply records.
3. New systems training. The 1873 Carbine was a new weapon system. It was fielded to the 7th in 1874-1875. The logical thing with a new weapon is an intense initial training, followed by sustainment training. Some units do have records saying they did this, like the 4th and 5th Cav. We have some indications that an effort was made when weapons first fielded. Buy the 7th seemed very unaware of the most basic data on the weapon. They routinely fired at targets 800-900 yards away, which is wasting fire. They were unprepared for how rapidly the carbine can fire 20 rounds. The weapon demanded fire control measures, an officer and NCO responsibility, that clearly did not exist in this unit.
Just curious, why are we posting on this old thread I started?
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Post by montrose on Aug 2, 2018 17:29:32 GMT -6
Not borderline Noggy it was madness. The regular army miniscule as it was had to be the best they could produce because it was the nucleus of an expanded army for war. For example every trooper in the 7th should have been trained to NCO standard. Cheers Richard Richard, You are a genius. www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/06/26/will-longer-basic-training-make-stronger-infantrymen-the-army-is-adding-8-weeks-to-osut-to-find-out/US Army is adding 8 weeks to basic infantry training to ensure soldier can do his job as a fire team member, AND fire team leader since he is one bullet away from that job in combat. Sounds simple, but it is not. I stood up the 18X program in 2001. This is where we allow a soldier to enlist directly off the street for Special Forces. We send them to Fort Benning for basic and advanced training as an infantryman (11B). When we looked at their curriculum, we realized the training of 11Bs was setting them up to fail when they got to us. They knew way too little about troop leading procedures, land nav, call for fire, etc. So we designed a course to make up these shortfalls for 6 weeks, then we ran them through our version of the Army's corporal course. I think our prep course was 6 weeks, and the abbreviated PLDC was 2 weeks (big Armys was 4, but we had some already in the prep course). Basically, we figured Army infantry soldiers were lacking 8 weeks of training; 17 years before the Army did. Now to LBH. The 1876 Army had ZERO basic training requirements. You could enlist at a garrison location and go straight to the company the same day. The training at the cavalry depot was for new enlistees from the east, who needed to wait somewhere until they were assigned and shipped to a unit. This training was meant to occupy dead time, and was not mandatory.
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Post by montrose on Aug 4, 2018 6:51:51 GMT -6
This thread was started to dicuss the gross incompetence of CPT Keogh. He was unfit as a company commander and a disaster at leading any combination of 2 or more companies. His true strength was a garrison soldier. He looked great in a uniform and had great skills as a brown nose sycophant to his superiors, masking his tactical incompetence.
His incompetence was a major cause of the LBH defeat. One of the problem at LBH was officers who should have been privates, like Keogh, DeRudia, TC.
Read this thread, tell me I am wrong. Good luck.
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Post by wild on Aug 5, 2018 2:54:43 GMT -6
To make such a claim colonel you would have to be in possesion of Custer's orders to Keogh and know Custer's intentions together with the movements of the Indians and Custer's units. Unlike the situation with Reno and Benteen we have no such information. As to "brownnosing"it was probably the culture of the day . Did not Custer go down on his knees to get command of the Regiment? There was a Custer clann ....being in ment picnics and hunting and extra leave....what's a man to do? As to being better fitted to the rank of private yes sorta maybe .The problem was the privates were not fitted to being officers. Junior officers of the day were only required to be Gentlemen and have enough courage to place themselves at the head of their men and lead them into the volleys and showers of grape shot. One last word in defence of Keogh . Benteen the outstanding hero of the debacle and picky about his company was a good pal of Keogh's. And yes of course less I forget his ability in the saddle was renowned. Best Richard
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 5, 2018 5:25:44 GMT -6
Interestingly, in his new book, Michael Donahue states that Keogh led the movement to Ford B. He says that Custer wanted Keogh to get that opportunity as he had missed the Yellowstone and Black Hills expeditions, due to being on detached duty. The book "Where Rivers Ran Red" is also a bit of a hatchet job on Benteen, Wild you would like that part.
Regards, Tom
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Post by wild on Aug 5, 2018 7:01:12 GMT -6
Hi Tom 2000 Local residents tried and failed to do a hatchet job on our rascal so cant imagine Donhue having better luck still must watch out for book.
Just a further observation on Keogh........the fact that his surviving horse became the mascot of the regiment says something about the esteem in which Keogh was held. Would Reno's horse have gotten the same treatment? We have Keogh's sword here with his commission and other memorabilia.
Officers below the rank of brigadier were nothing more than judus goats.In the British army you could buy these ranks. In the civil war many brigadiers were civilian appointments. It was unthinkable to allow the great unwashed to get their hands on the higher echlons of command. Best Richard
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