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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Dec 23, 2010 17:14:52 GMT -6
Hunk, I do not believe we are applying modern standards to a tactical evaluation of LBH. Issues on CUster's tactics were raised by his contemporaries, starting within days of the battle. The major arguments are the same we are discussing here: 1. GAC was too eager. 2. Major decisions were made before effective reconnaissance had been conducted (AKA Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). 3. The 7th was scattered into too many small parts, outside of mutually supporting distance of each other. The led to defeat in detail. By the way, my wife is English and the kids are dual citizens. So I have to deal with fruitcake and Boxing Day. Merry Christmas. William William, of course some of his contemporaries denigrated Custer's tactics, but if you look at who they were they had an agenda for doing so, mostly to either distance themselves from the LBH disaster or to close ranks and protect the army. In both cases the easy answer was to point the finger of blame at Custer. The three points you raise are all founded on a hindsight viewpoint. Those who made such accusations in the immediate aftermath of the battle found it convenient to use the actions that Custer took to condemn him because he could not defend himself. If we simply follow their lead we are in danger of following red herrings. If we examine your three points we can see how this can be:- 1) Believing the regiment had been see he had no choice but to move on the offensive. Given the whole army command believed Indians would scatter if approached how could Custer take his time? 2) By the same token, how was he to go about more effective reconnaissance? Any careful, slow approach to the target could only result in giving that target more time to scatter. Do you think he would have been praised if that had happened? 3) He was approaching the target using a three pronged movement, the SOP for that time period, again with concern about the flight of the enemy, not a standing fight. There would have been no worry about the enemy numbers in those circumstances and the numbers only started coming into play once Reno retreated. Custer was unfortunate in that the factors for his defeat evolved slowly at first and by the time they accelerated the sequence of events was out of his control. I'm glad to hear that your wife is English. At least you have one redeeming feature! Fruitcake? I love it, send me a piece please. I'll return to the boards post-holidays, so I hope that you and your family have a great Christmas, William. Sincerely, Hunk
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 24, 2010 8:39:11 GMT -6
It would not cost time to move the whole regiment down Reno Creek. The intel of scattered or big village along with north or south of Reno Creek would be sufficient detail. This could have been determined time wise long after Benteen was sent.
Benteen was not part of any three prong attack on the big village. I am sure if the location was known then the choices would be different. Two prongs in the valley or from the bluffs and all at approximately the same time is what I would expect of an attack on a known large village in a particular location. Instead we have not more than 3 companies engaged at one time in support of each other. All recon was done on the move and the intel was big village and lots of warriors willing to fight.
Merry Christmas
Steve Andrews
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jan 28, 2011 15:34:33 GMT -6
It would not cost time to move the whole regiment down Reno Creek. The intel of scattered or big village along with north or south of Reno Creek would be sufficient detail. This could have been determined time wise long after Benteen was sent. Benteen was not part of any three prong attack on the big village. I am sure if the location was known then the choices would be different. Two prongs in the valley or from the bluffs and all at approximately the same time is what I would expect of an attack on a known large village in a particular location. Instead we have not more than 3 companies engaged at one time in support of each other. All recon was done on the move and the intel was big village and lots of warriors willing to fight. Merry Christmas Steve Andrews Steve, I trust that 2011 has started well for you and will continue that way. I look forward to some more stimulating debates with you. Referring to the above quote, I agree that it would not have cost any time if the whole regiment had been deployed down Reno Creek, but that would suppose that Custer (or any other commander in his position that day) knew for sure that the village was going to stand and fight. In fact, it is more a question of what Custer did not know. He did not know that after the Reynolds attack at Powder River the Indians were fully aware that the whites wanted to put an end to their culture once and for all and were totally prepared to resist that ambition with their lives. He did not know that having seen Crook retreat after the Rosebud fight the Indians were supremely confident in their ability to defeat any force sent against them. He did not know that after undergoing the Sun Dance, Sitting Bull had received a vision of a great victory over the soldiers, a vision that imbued his people with the belief that their 'medicine' was too powerful for the soldiers to overcome. In my opinion then, Custer could only plan on the basis of what he knew, or believed he knew, namely that the village would break up as soon as the Indians were apprised of his presence. This Caucasian assumption that native peoples could not provide any serious challenge to well armed white men was rife in Victorian times and not confined to North America. This attitude was endorsed in South Africa by two battles. In October 1836 at Vegkop, a party of 33 boer men plus two boys, defeated 5,000 battle hardened Matabele warriors for the loss of two Boers against 1,700 Matabele dead. In December 1838 at Blood River, 464 Boers plus 200 servants defeated between 10,000 and 20,000 Zulus, suffering 3 men wounded to the Zulus 3,000 dead. These actions did not, of course, parallel that of Custer, but did reinforce the idea that white forces were innately superior to those of native warriors. In America, apart from the Fetterman fight, the U.S. Cavalry had not suffered any major defeat by Indians and Fetterman was ambushed, not attacking a village, so neither Custer nor any other military leader of the time would have taken any lessons from that incident. Let us assume for argument's sake that Custer takes the Indian numbers into account, approaches the village slowly and realises that it will stand and fight, what does he do? As I see it he has three options. He can attack with his whole force, he can organise his force into a defensive formation or he can retreat. I don't think a retreat was viable as that would only have encouraged an enemy attack. A defensive action was only viable if under attack by superior numbers, so attack would seem the logical choice. What is your view? You maintain that Custer did not know the approximate location of the village and that he would have to consider the possibility that it could have stretched further or north or south than it actually did. Yet in his journal, Bradley states on June 18th that Mitch Bouyer, returning from the Reno scout, had told him that the Indian camps forming the village site that had been found, were set up in supporting distance of each other with their horses secured inside the camps at night, ready for any attack. Custer would have learned of this from Bouyer and expected a similar scenario at the LBH, which in fact was the case, except for the horses who by that time were too numerous to be kept in the camps, but were close by. At the Crow's Nest, Bouyer and the Crows would also have told Custer that the village could only be sited on the west bank of the LBH river. You have further opined that in Benteen's testimony, he is stating that Custer did not believe the the village was where it was found. Strangely enough, in his 1894 narrative Benteen says, "Now in 1875, I had a very similar experience with Indians in Dakota, and as the statements of the Indians then were absolutely confirmed by what was afterward proved, I was strong in the belief that the Crow Indians only reported what was shown them by their superior keeness of vision, and that the hostile village was where they located it..." So the Crows did know the village location according to Benteen, in which case so did Bouyer and presumably Reyolds, but though Benteen believed them, he testified that Custer did not! Now whatever else Custer may have been, he was not a fool, so if Benteen was convinced by the scouts then so was Custer and Godfrey confirmed as much. Sincerely, "Hunk" Papa
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jan 28, 2011 17:14:51 GMT -6
What is happening with the strange messages that posts have taken too long, but they then appear anyway but don't record either in adding to a poster's total posts or in the latest post column of that thread?
Baffled of Chipping Sodbury.
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Post by fred on Jan 28, 2011 19:46:19 GMT -6
What is happening with the strange messages that posts have taken too long, but they then appear anyway but don't record either in adding to a poster's total posts or in the latest post column of that thread? I am having the same problem, even to the point of almost losing a long-winded post. I am now having to save the posts before I try hitting the "post reply" button. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Diane Merkel on Jan 30, 2011 16:45:56 GMT -6
Sorry, guys!
I just checked the ProBoards Support Board, and others are reporting similar problems although ProBoards is insisting it's not on their end. I have a feeling they will discover a problem soon as more users chime in.
EVERYONE: If you are going to write a long post, write it in your word processor first and then copy and paste it into the message box. It will save you many frustrations!
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Post by fred on Jan 30, 2011 22:11:44 GMT -6
I just checked the ProBoards Support Board, and others are reporting similar problems although ProBoards is insisting it's not on their end. I have a feeling they will discover a problem soon as more users chime in. Diane, Naturally they deny the problem is theirs. That's the American way... No my fault, mon!Once you get that flag and go back to re-post, it dupes it. Look at my last post on "Weapons and Tactics." You will see it duped. As soon as you acknowledge this post I will delete one of those others. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Jan 31, 2011 12:48:06 GMT -6
Sorry, guys! I just checked the ProBoards Support Board, and others are reporting similar problems although ProBoards is insisting it's not on their end. I have a feeling they will discover a problem soon as more users chime in. EVERYONE: If you are going to write a long post, write it in your word processor first and then copy and paste it into the message box. It will save you many frustrations! I knew all along it couldn't be your fault Goddess! Another way is to write a few lines, then click 'Post Reply' then 'modify'. To be on the safe side with a long reply, 'modify' a few times if necessary. As for you Fred, what do you mean 'long-winded posts'? If you mean your extended monologues of instruction then we who are about to learn salute you! "Hunk" (MOFFC)
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Post by Diane Merkel on Feb 9, 2011 9:56:17 GMT -6
Fred, consider your post read. I'm sorry to be away so much but, once again, someone noticed the word SUCKER tattooed on my forehead so I've become the president of our local historical society. I'm once again juggling too many things to do any one thing well.
Hunk: MOFFC? Happy Birthday + 2 days!
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tel
New Member
Posts: 19
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Post by tel on Feb 9, 2011 16:40:41 GMT -6
Hunk Papa states this well.
Custer based his strategy and approach on the supposition that the Indians would flee. Had he known that the Indians would effectively counterattack and not run, his tactics may well have been different.
Maybe a mass charge into the southern part of the village by his main force with a small force sent to cap off the north or maybe he would have waited for Terry (even though I for one doubt it).
It's all hindsight.
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Post by montrose on Feb 9, 2011 22:03:16 GMT -6
1. Jose cited the original quote,"An officer informs your correspondent: when Custer came in sight of the 1.800 lodges –a village of 7.000 Indians– he swung his hat and said: “Hurrah! Custer’s luck! The biggest Indian village on the American continent!” Halting here only for coffee, he pushed forward at a rapid gait; took five companies for his personal command, gave Reno three, and left four in reserve under Benteen, and sailed in."
Author took a fragment of this quote out of context. The footnote (that wasn't written) should have explained the numerous errors in the full quote and the article as a whole. The quote is completely unreliable.
I have faulted Custer's decisions. I base my views on what he knew, when he knew, and what he did. I do not believe I have used false statements to form my views.
2. Tel wrote, "Custer based his strategy and approach on the supposition that the Indians would flee. Had he known that the Indians would effectively counterattack and not run, his tactics may well have been different...
It's all hindsight.
a. Had he known. At what point did Custer have indications that the Indians were fighting, and not fleeing? Reno sent him two messengers. Cooke and Keough also relayed this data. Custer saw the valley fight from the bluffs.
So I don't agree with "had he known". He knew. The issue is why did he fail to react to Indian counterattacks. I believe complacency and arrogance played a more dominant role than knowledge.
b. Hindsight. I understand the Monday morning quarterback issue. But if you chase Custer's decision tree he made questionable judgments at the time he made them. This has been discussed at length in numerous posts.
Look for a book in the fall written by Fred Wagner that will explain these decision points. I don't know if it has a title yet.
3. Billy. Don't worry. The man love will stay under control. We still hate you, for example.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 10, 2011 6:30:03 GMT -6
So even if we are looking with hindsight are we not able to discern decision making by what occurred. It is quite common in my business to debrief and use that to do it better next time.
My question is do we think the state of the art for warfighting at that time only had a single plan approaches?
AZ Ranger
William I am reading Blink - quite interesting.
Thanks
Steve
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Feb 10, 2011 15:53:12 GMT -6
Fred, consider your post read. I'm sorry to be away so much but, once again, someone noticed the word SUCKER tattooed on my forehead so I've become the president of our local historical society. I'm once again juggling too many things to do any one thing well. Hunk: MOFFC? Happy Birthday + 2 days! Goddess, I'd be very careful about what words you allow to be tattooed on your forehead!! MOFFC = Member of Fred's Fan Club, of course. Hunk + 3
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Post by markland on Feb 10, 2011 16:30:14 GMT -6
Montrose wrote:
William, that was a classic!
Best of wishes,
Billy (who damned near snorted beer out of his nose when he read that!)
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Feb 13, 2011 14:02:56 GMT -6
1. Jose cited the original quote,"An officer informs your correspondent: when Custer came in sight of the 1.800 lodges –a village of 7.000 Indians– he swung his hat and said: “Hurrah! Custer’s luck! The biggest Indian village on the American continent!” Halting here only for coffee, he pushed forward at a rapid gait; took five companies for his personal command, gave Reno three, and left four in reserve under Benteen, and sailed in." Author took a fragment of this quote out of context. The footnote (that wasn't written) should have explained the numerous errors in the full quote and the article as a whole. The quote is completely unreliable. I have faulted Custer's decisions. I base my views on what he knew, when he knew, and what he did. I do not believe I have used false statements to form my views. 2. Tel wrote, "Custer based his strategy and approach on the supposition that the Indians would flee. Had he known that the Indians would effectively counterattack and not run, his tactics may well have been different... It's all hindsight. a. Had he known. At what point did Custer have indications that the Indians were fighting, and not fleeing? Reno sent him two messengers. Cooke and Keough also relayed this data. Custer saw the valley fight from the bluffs. So I don't agree with "had he known". He knew. The issue is why did he fail to react to Indian counterattacks. I believe complacency and arrogance played a more dominant role than knowledge. b. Hindsight. I understand the Monday morning quarterback issue. But if you chase Custer's decision tree he made questionable judgments at the time he made them. This has been discussed at length in numerous posts. Look for a book in the fall written by Fred Wagner that will explain these decision points. I don't know if it has a title yet. 3. Billy. Don't worry. The man love will stay under control. We still hate you, for example. Respectfully, William It would appear that even if you are not a Custerphobe, you have a problem with Custer's character. I can't say that I am particularly attracted to him either as there is no doubt that he was a vain man with a large ego who engendered extreme emotions. Regrettably his negative publicity tends to overshadow his positive traits. Yet he was a very successful cavalry commander and an intuitive soldier who did not become a Brevet Major General by being cautious. Granted that Custer did say something about a large Indian camp in the LBH valley and according to Dr. Porter followed by "and we are going to have a great killing" it is no more than one would expect from any of the cavalry commanders of his era in a similar situation. Indian warriors, whatever their numbers, were not considered any match for well armed soldiers and the possibility of defeat simply did not enter into the thinking of the officers. The fact that there were a lot more warriors than usual merely meant more prestige to follow the anticipated victory. Certainly none of the 7th officers, Benteen excepted, voiced any concerns about attacking, even post-battle. I also believe that it is necessary to differentiate between a counterattack by some of the village warriors and their standard practice of making a show of defiance against attacking soldiers by coming out to kick up dust and make noise in order to give their families time to reach safety. This is well described by Godfrey in his "Custer's Last Battle." All Custer saw in the valley therefore, was just such a demonstration when Reno approached and threw out his skirmish line. By the time the counterattack proper started, once the Indians Reno was not going to press home his charge, Custer was out of sight of the valley action. Whilst there had been villages as large or larger before in the 1865 Powder River War, they had not been discovered. The question of what they would have done if attacked had consequently not been put to the test. Thus the major concern all through the summer campaign was not bringing the Indians to battle but preventing their escape. John Gray in Centennial Campaign page 215 sums it up succintly, "Every officer on the frontier knew only too well that Indians shunned pitched battles and were so mobile and elusive as to be frustratingly difficult to corral. Thus the overriding fear was that the village would break up and scatter."Both Godfrey, "...by flight put themselves beyond danger, and then scattering, made successful pursuit next to impossible" and Edgerly in his Narrative, "At this time it was expected that the Indians would break away as soon as they caught sight of the troop, the only fear being that they would scatter and disappear...", demonstrate the concerns felt by Custer's command at the time. Even Terry in his Confidential Telegram of July 2nd to Sheridan alludes to this concern, "He [Custer] thought, I am confident, that the Indians were running. For fear that they might get away he attacked."What then was Custer to do, disciplined as he was by the worry that permeated all the field commanders? I have seen numerous references to what he should have done rather than move up to Davis Creek, but only what he should not have done once there and believing his regiment discovered. Most of the criticism levelled at him appears to be based on the premise that any commander, seeing the size of the task ahead, would instinctively accept that this was that single unqiue occasion when the Indians would go against all previous experience, and stand to fight. Added to that is the inference that only Custer would have attacked in those circumstances. Yet neither he nor anyone else could have construed that from the numbers of warriors alone or from the fact that the warriors had sallied out to defend against Reno. In the first case there was no precedent to indicate that a village of 8,000 people would not flee as quickly as one of 800, and Custer had spent most of 1867 chasing Indians all over the southern plains without once bringing them to battle. In the second case the warriors were only exhibiting the SOP when a village was attacked so that would have been what Custer expected, notwithstanding Gerard's "Indians running like devils" as any small group would seek safety in numbers. We would also do well to remember that our research and theories are based on having the time to sift through all the information that was not available to Custer, plus we know what happened. He had to make snap decisions based on the Army's previous experience with Indians. Having made those decisions he might have pulled off a victory with a little luck, for the Indians themselves admitted that if Reno had continued his charge they were ready to flee. If he had achieved a victory of course, we would not be exchanging these views! Sincerely, Hunk
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