|
Post by shatonska on Aug 18, 2005 15:14:52 GMT -6
it is only me that somethimes has the impression that cheyenne camp was in front of ford d not mtc ? lakota call mtc ford minneconjou ford , but after minniconjou there was the sans arc , the santee and then last the cheyenne circle the confusion in the accounts sometimes make me think that custer went at ford d in front of cheyenne camp and retreated over deep ravine and cemetery flats as cheyenne say , ay mtc there only was a fast movements of companies then gone to cahloun
|
|
|
Post by El Crab on Aug 18, 2005 20:59:41 GMT -6
The village wasn't necessarily arranged in a neighborhood-style layout. That is to say, as you walk down the street you find houses next to each other. Its possible that the different tribes put their lodge "circles" not in a line, but adjacent to others. To where you'd walk north and in the middle, and find the Santees on your right and Minneconjou on your left. The smaller tribes especially, since they'd have less area to take up. And we don't know if its called Minneconjou Ford because of the location of the Minneconjou lodges, or if that was the original name before the fight.
It is interesting that you mention it, as I've thought that its possible some of the Cheyenne lodges may have been near Ford D, as they were originally planning on moving north before Custer showed up. Its also possible, of course, that some lodges were still that far north when Custer showed up.
But the village itself wasn't that long. It terminated around MTC ford. The huge village was a result of a previous encampment, which made it seem as if the village reached all the way to Custer's battlefield. And that Custer's men on the ridge could look down and see it across the river as they perished. But that was where the previous encampment had been, before moving south to where Custer found it.
|
|
|
Post by El Crab on Aug 18, 2005 21:06:30 GMT -6
Curley said he saw Reno retreating and they signaled Custer, and the battalion cheered. And after that, they rode to Custer and Bouyer spoke to him. Curley said he assumed Bouyer told Custer of Reno's actions.
|
|
|
Post by markland on Aug 19, 2005 0:39:50 GMT -6
Don't know I will look through the regimental returns to see if there are any numbers on new horses which were delivered. I seem to recall that at least two officers were off getting horses but I don't recollect if that was before or after the LBH. As far as horses for the cavalry and their training in general goes, an article from the Journal of the United States Cavalry Association, published June, 1892 written by Capt. J. H. Dorst, Fourth Cavalry states that few, if any, of the horses were well trained. Some excerpts from his article: "The standard cavalry horse must fulfill few requirements, as prescribed by the regulations. The contractor, as a rule, begins by putting forward his worst horses first, and determines from the action on them the cheapest and poorest kind of horses that will be accepted. Those received will usually just fill the required conditions, and no more. Better horses are not offered. As a result the grade of the whole is low." p. 303 I think this gets to the gist of your question regarding training. "As far as mere riding is concerned, the portion of our cavalry tactics that refer to it is a rehash of European cavalry tactics. In European armies cavalry horses first receive a careful school training, and afterwards are turned over to the troopers. Their tactics are made for trained horses. We have copied the tactics, which are not applicable to the horses we buy. In fact, our tactics almost ignore the fact that any special training is necessary, and many officers, especially those who have not served in the cavalry, seem to be of the opinion that any man who can stick well to a docile horse that can be guided by the reins in one hand needs only dicipline [sic] and a knowledge of drill movements to be a good cavalry soldier, and that such a horse is a properly trained cavalry steed. From such ideas has probably grown the belief that an ordinary, tractable horse, eight years old, broken to ride and controllable by the reins, but otherwise untrained, is suitable for purchase for cavalry service." p. 304 "Our tactics do give a few pages to the subject of training new horses, but the subject is treated so briefly as to give no idea whatever of its importance, and is placed in the back part of the book, where it is likely to be overlooked. The fact that no inspection is ever made of this matter by an authorized inspector shows at once how it has escaped attention and the little importance attached to it generally." p. 304 "In Europe the training of the horse is considered to be fully as much [of] importance as the training of the rider. The Germans have their cavalry horses in training from a year and a half to two years before given to a trooper." p. 305 Perhaps of relevance to who was where, and when they got there... "Another item of training is to educate the horse to move always at one certain rate of speed at the walk, trot, gallop and charge. This requires much time, and also a considerable extent of level, unobstructed ground. Six troops of the Fourth Cavalry, when not scouting, were drilled daily, except Sunday, from early in the spring of 1878 to February, 1879, about eleven months, before they acquired the faculty of moving always at uniform speed at the walk, trot, and gallop. I have since learned that horses with some school training can be taught as much in less time." p. 305 Since this was published in 1892, it is now out of copyright so I will put it on the list to scan and OCR and then post it at my site. Also, the Cavalry Journal has numerous articles about horses, training, etc. I had grabbed this one as I was copying something else in the same issue. Best of wishes, Billy
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Aug 19, 2005 3:15:59 GMT -6
Great stuff, Markland. I think training did take a great leap forward around then (just in time for cavalry to become obsolete!); somewhere on the web I've seen a photograph of the indoor riding school at Fort Riley (I think) in about 1898 (I think -- reallly helpful, aren't i?!) with horses being trained to lie down on command. So maybe this report had some influence. A couple of items that might be of interest. The first is a rather earlier US Ordnance report, 1883, painting a similarly dire picture: www.militaryhorse.org/resources/ordreport/no297.aspAnd the other -- published 1861, if I've read the Roman numerals correctly -- throws some light on the kind of knowledge that COULD have been available to any officer choosing to pay attention. It's really quite a gem. Captain Louis Nolan, of Charge of the Light Brigade fame, visited the French cavalry training school in the early 1850s. He was so struck by the contrast between their training standards and those of the British cavalry that he wrote a training manual based on his observations. This is it: www.crimeantexts.org.uk/nolantch.htmlAll this is getting us slightly off topic, I realise, but I think we could be onto something here!
|
|
|
Post by One Tin Soldier on Aug 19, 2005 6:09:49 GMT -6
hmmm....
I always wondered how a "mobile" unit could have been so thoroughly destroyed! What isn't making any sense though is the sensing of imminent danger, and just how fool hardy any of them would have been to have stayed there and be overran. Now it makes a little more sense. These "untrained" horses were easily spooked, and this apparently was done early on in each instance by the indians waving blankets and scaring them, thus wrenching them from the horseholders hands. This simple tactic, overlooked for decades, indeed caused the demise of the whole command. Once horseless, they weren't going anywhere! Was this or could this have caused the panic of the soliders, so reported by the indians? I guess if it had been me, the works from my mouth and thoughts in my head would have been something like, Ohhhhhh..... Sheezen, and off for my horse I would run!
Was the old dismounted style of fighting during the civil war the primary cause of their deaths? Or was it because of the poor horse training that they couldn't remain mounted on these steeds, when it came time to battle? Or was it both? In any event. The indians simple and well executed plan, worked, and once it did, those soldiers were doomed.
And could this have been what Bouyer was referring to when he said, "that man is going to get us all killed"? (Or words to that effect) Was the whole command starting to unravel at that time? Their mounts now critically low. And the ever yet brave Custer refusing to call retreat, while there was still time?
|
|
|
Post by shatonska on Aug 19, 2005 6:38:56 GMT -6
The village wasn't necessarily arranged in a neighborhood-style layout. That is to say, as you walk down the street you find houses next to each other. Its possible that the different tribes put their lodge "circles" not in a line, but adjacent to others. To where you'd walk north and in the middle, and find the Santees on your right and Minneconjou on your left. The smaller tribes especially, since they'd have less area to take up. And we don't know if its called Minneconjou Ford because of the location of the Minneconjou lodges, or if that was the original name before the fight. It is interesting that you mention it, as I've thought that its possible some of the Cheyenne lodges may have been near Ford D, as they were originally planning on moving north before Custer showed up. Its also possible, of course, that some lodges were still that far north when Custer showed up. But the village itself wasn't that long. It terminated around MTC ford. The huge village was a result of a previous encampment, which made it seem as if the village reached all the way to Custer's battlefield. And that Custer's men on the ridge could look down and see it across the river as they perished. But that was where the previous encampment had been, before moving south to where Custer found it. anyway we are not sure here too , lakota say mtc ford was in front of minneconjou , if so cheyenne camp was in front of ford D , from what i read i understand that village was very long but thin , circles had water by one side and space for horses on the other only oglala and small brulee circles were not by the river if different as now many authors think custer was at the end of the village at mtc ford, so he had no reason not to cross the river , if there was the end of the village mtc was the perfect place to charge instead if i recall well from weir they could not see the end of the village it was far north , that is why custer went north and didn't cross
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Aug 19, 2005 6:44:41 GMT -6
And not just your transport disappearing, but all the back-up ammunition in those saddle pockets!!
Ironic that Custer tried to run the Indians' horses off, on the same principle (the Rees' task in the Reno charge), and was hoist by his own petard ...
I don't know, though ... The dismounted style of fighting was pretty essential if they were going to make any effective use of their long-range weapons, the carbines. They were mostly rotten shots as well as rotten horsemen, poor things (the training issue again) and couldn't have hit a barn door from a moving horse. It was standard practice for light dragoons, which is essentially what they were. Trouble is, the idea is to have your horse-holders out of harm's way -- and the whole area was 'harm's way'. No decent cover anywhere. Once the Indians could get around and behind the lines, the horse-holders didn't have a chance.
Yes, I agree, there are signs that it was starting to unravel. Significant, perhaps, that Bouyer first starts voicing gloomy thoughts earlier in the day -- when they've just come tottering in from that gruelling night march. Gray does a fine job of trying to prove that the previous days' marches weren't in any way excessive, but even so, men and horses are unrested when the decision to attack is made. Unwatered, too, because the last water they saw was too alkaline to drink. Now they have to hike all the way to the LBH ... a very brief watering halt ... mountaineering up and down bluffs ... in blazing heat ... and then into battle. In one of Sitting Bull's accounts, he sportingly says that they won partly because troopers were 'quivering like aspens' from exhaustion, and horses were so worn out that they just stood there cropping the grass while bullets whizzed around them. This may be one of his more fanciful bits of creativity, but we have dozens of other accounts of horses thinking of nothing but making a dash for water. It's not an outfit at the peak of battle-readiness, that's for sure. Adrenaline got them going on the gallop to MTC, but it's hard to imagine it kept them going for long ...
|
|
|
Post by shatonska on Aug 19, 2005 6:57:38 GMT -6
And not just your transport disappearing, but all the back-up ammunition in those saddle pockets!! Ironic that Custer tried to run the Indians' horses off, on the same principle (the Rees' task in the Reno charge), and was hoist by his own petard ... I don't know, though ... The dismounted style of fighting was pretty essential if they were going to make any effective use of their long-range weapons, the carbines. They were mostly rotten shots as well as rotten horsemen, poor things (the training issue again) and couldn't have hit a barn door from a moving horse. It was standard practice for light dragoons, which is essentially what they were. Trouble is, the idea is to have your horse-holders out of harm's way -- and the whole area was 'harm's way'. No decent cover anywhere. Once the Indians could get around and behind the lines, the horse-holders didn't have a chance. Yes, I agree, there are signs that it was starting to unravel. Significant, perhaps, that Bouyer first starts voicing gloomy thoughts earlier in the day -- when they've just come tottering in from that gruelling night march. Gray does a fine job of trying to prove that the previous days' marches weren't in any way excessive, but even so, men and horses are unrested when the decision to attack is made. Unwatered, too, because the last water they saw was too alkaline to drink. Now they have to hike all the way to the LBH ... a very brief watering halt ... mountaineering up and down bluffs ... in blazing heat ... and then into battle. In one of Sitting Bull's accounts, he sportingly says that they won partly because troopers were 'quivering like aspens' from exhaustion, and horses were so worn out that they just stood there cropping the grass while bullets whizzed around them. This may be one of his more fanciful bits of creativity, but we have dozens of other accounts of horses thinking of nothing but making a dash for water. It's not an outfit at the peak of battle-readiness, that's for sure. Adrenaline got them going on the gallop to MTC, but it's hard to imagine it kept them going for long ... i think there was a problem of ammunitions too , rifle ammunitions , when stopped soldiers were forced soon to let horses go , until they had rifle ammunitions indians stay back but only with colts they were pressed and collapsed , action on keogh is clear , few rifle cases colt cases remained in the colt no time to reload .
|
|
|
Post by One Tin Soldier on Aug 19, 2005 7:03:18 GMT -6
For me anyway it's now easier to understand why: Benteen was late. Why Reno retreated. And now why Custer was so easily defeated. Your right Elisabeth the whole outfit from the shod hooves of their mounts to the crown of their hats, wasn't an outfit at the peak of battle-readiness.
|
|
|
Post by elisabeth on Aug 19, 2005 7:04:11 GMT -6
Good point. Everyone interprets 'few rifle cases' as 'no resistance', which is nonsense; close-range fighting with Colts explains it all.
|
|
|
Post by One Tin Soldier on Aug 19, 2005 7:05:59 GMT -6
I'm sorry shatonska, I guess we were posting at the same time. Yes what you say is also, sadly true! The simple sad fact was this outfit wasn't fit for battle that day.
|
|
|
Post by One Tin Soldier on Aug 19, 2005 7:11:44 GMT -6
Elisabeth, personally I don't see how anyone could have justified attacking when these facts are exposed. Oh, I know Custer was obsessed with not letting the Indians escape, which when one looks at it really shouldn't have been even considered a factor. Because, where were they going? That huge of a village scattering to the winds on a moments notice? That I highly doubt. Maybe that was possible for the warriors, but I don't see them doing it, because to have done so would have meant leaving behind the women, children and the old. All of which weren't used to travelling on top of ponies at break neck speeds.
|
|
|
Post by shatonska on Aug 19, 2005 7:20:47 GMT -6
Good point. Everyone interprets 'few rifle cases' as 'no resistance', which is nonsense; close-range fighting with Colts explains it all. it's logical , i don't loose 20 seconds reloading a rifle when i'm pressed by hundred of indians i use the colt , rifle could be used under low pressure on cahloun but as soon indians charged they had the last rifle shot then colts during the route toward keogh and the route toward custer you run or ride and cannot use rifle only colt when you finish the 6 shots or you are safe on the hill or dead , only an action like on reno hill could save custer , horses inside a circle and iindians kept at distance with rifle fire , during a charge or routing they had zero possibilities with more skilled one to one warriors better armed with shart range weapons and 10 times in number i think many soldiers paniched and shut themselves , to many indian accounts of this fact , but were brave soldiers , could not do better , reno holding the timber and benteen faster instead of being on a seaside trip would have save them !
|
|
|
Post by One Tin Soldier on Aug 19, 2005 7:29:09 GMT -6
shatonska
No shatonska, you still don't get it. These were all tired men, riding upon untrained, unwatered and unfed horses in stifleing heat, ill equipped and totally unprepared for that days battle. Benteen couldn't have gone faster. Reno's retreat is justified if for nothing else than by these factors as well. And as for Custer. When he issued the orders to attack, Bouyer was right, they were all doomed.
|
|