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Post by tubman13 on May 1, 2018 14:41:56 GMT -6
Welcome BD, there are better places but you could post it here.
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Post by tubman13 on May 1, 2018 14:46:27 GMT -6
Try independent Research.
Regards, Tom
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Post by battledetective on May 1, 2018 14:49:49 GMT -6
Thanks! I will post it in Independent Research then.
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Post by Bruce Robert on May 5, 2018 11:10:57 GMT -6
My take is this: Custer would have to be an idiot, and he was no idiot, to think or assume his command wasn't observed. The dust cloud alone, plus some scout reports suggesting they had been spotted would be enough to, at the least, make it a possibility (a possibility he would have considered even if he didn't make it known to his officers). This idea that everything that follows is built on Custer's response to being "discovered" and the "divils running" sounds far more like a justification to various theories than practical realities might suggest. Though it would have been another point to consider in his "making it up as he went."
To say that cavalry without horses were useless, I think Buford at Gettysburg might disagree. I think Benteen "commanding" on Reno's Hill might disagree.
Could Custer have won? I think this interminable question misses an important point. How about, could the NA's lose? Or, how did the NA's win? All the focus on Custer's role misses the role the winners played in this battle. Or at least places it in the secondary position. It deserves to be placed in the first position, as they won. On that day, Custer was outmaneuvered, outcommanded, and outfought. It was the NA's battle far more than it was Custer's, though clearly it was Custer, via the US government, that initiated it. And this does not condemn Custer, nor does it glorify him. It makes him what he always was, human. Like Lee at Gettysburg.
Speaking of human beings, another missing component, or at least underused, is the issue of battlefield psychology. No matter what training, leadership, technology, a human being is not a machine, and acts in certain ways when placed in a "hell on earth" situation. Perhaps a chess-like analysis will always fall short insofar as it doesn't take into account the human spirit.
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Post by tubman13 on May 6, 2018 5:06:29 GMT -6
Thoughtful and well expressed. There were certainly flaws in GAC's planning and communicating any plan. Your point about the other team having a say in the outcome of the game is often overlooked. In this game we see an example of the best defense is a strong offense, Nice post.
Regards, Tom
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Post by noggy on May 7, 2018 1:05:21 GMT -6
Could Custer have won? I think this interminable question misses an important point. How about, could the NA's lose? Or, how did the NA's win? All the focus on Custer's role misses the role the winners played in this battle. Or at least places it in the secondary position. It deserves to be placed in the first position, as they won. On that day, Custer was outmaneuvered, outcommanded, and outfought. It was the NA's battle far more than it was Custer's, though clearly it was Custer, via the US government, that initiated it. And this does not condemn Custer, nor does it glorify him. It makes him what he always was, human. Like Lee at Gettysburg. Agreed. In Norway, when we started being involved in Afghanistan, the first reports of casualties (mainly IEDs) created somewhat of an outcry as to finding out "what had went wrong". The answer of course being that the other guys also have a tendency to shoot. The same goes for LBH. Very often, at least. And many other battles. And in sports! But Custer played his cards poorly, and I believe it was the former member of this board DarkCloud who a number of times said "The least incompetent side lost that day". I find that true. Custer could have won with a concentrated his forces. But he split them up. That made it easier for the NAs to s outmaneuvere, outcommand, and outfoight the US troops one by one rather than as a whole, which they imo would not have been able to. Hope this made sense, too early here...
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Post by battledetective on May 9, 2018 14:57:39 GMT -6
I agree, Noggy. While probably nobody can give a simple answer to the reasons of GAC defeat (or of the NA victory) splitting the forces was probably the most important factor. At least one could say that splitting the force ensured that the defeat was catastrophic. Notice that the splitting didn't stop with the subdivision in three battalions and the pack train. Whatever theory one follows for the GAC battalion engagement, the positions of the dead clearly indicate that the already under-strength companies in the battalion were dispersed all over the battlefield, ensuring their defeat in detail. However the reasons behind this decision of Custer to split his forces may not entirely depend on his bad judgement. Custer was acting on the basis of the intelligence in his possess, according to which not many more than 800 warriors were present at LBH. Dividing a force to attack an Indian village from multiple directions was standard procedure in the Indian wars. Undoubtedly Custer acted quite rashly, but the extent to which he can be blamed for his decisions is still an open question IMHO. Also, if the theory of Custer battalion divided in two wings is correct, the disposition of the companies of the right wing probably was not directly decided by Custer.
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Post by noggy on May 10, 2018 4:45:43 GMT -6
Custer was acting on the basis of the intelligence in his possess, according to which not many more than 800 warriors were present at LBH. Dividing a force to attack an Indian village from multiple directions was standard procedure in the Indian wars. Undoubtedly Custer acted quite rashly, but the extent to which he can be blamed for his decisions is still an open question IMHO. Also, if the theory of Custer battalion divided in two wings is correct, the disposition of the companies of the right wing probably was not directly decided by Custer. Before the battle, numerous members of the 7th noted that Custer had changed his mind about the number of "hostiles". I imagine the trails found and the assessments of his scouts played a part here. Godfrey mentions this number as given by Custer too, if I remember correctly. Somewhere, I also recall reading that Kellogg mentioned 1 500 warriors as a to be expected in one of his last letters, but I`ll have to look that up. Still, the US army was supposed to be able to manage 2 or 3 to 1 odds (at least as long as they did not fight the enemy at Rosebud...). But that was due to fire power and organization. Splitting up reduced those two advantages. I believe in the two wings theory. If Custer himself before leaving or Keogh deployed the three companies along BR, I have no idea. All the best, Noggy
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 10, 2018 6:03:36 GMT -6
Gordon Harper has an analysis section at the end of his book Fights on the Little Horn. Analysis 2 tells how the Indians arrived at the Big Village. Custer was not following all the Indians. Gordie who was a member here tells of 4,500 coming from a different direction. So any estimate based upon the trail followed is low. It is our hindsight that makes some of Custer's decision making appear worse. I believe he missed those Indians because he did not scout further up the Rosebud but he may have thought he had more than enough just in the group he was following. I think the Cheyennes were missed until Custer moved north of LSH and when the crossed the river to go after him they fixed and destroyed him in place.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on May 15, 2018 17:56:49 GMT -6
I am trying to understand the discussion here.
I understand that LTC Custer followed the main Indian trail that led to LBH. I also understand this means he did not see converging Indian trails from other directions. I also understand part of this is he disobeyed orders to check these other infiltration routes.
It was known to US commanders that the Indians were planning a major defiance, a last stand this season. decisive action.The total number of Indians was properly estimated in the planning phase. LTC Custer skipped checking areas to confirm Indian numbers, in order to bring them to battle.
I believe LTC Custer's operational analysis was sound. He lost because his regiment was badly trained, far worse than any other regiment in this Army between 1865-1898. Add this to LTC Custer was incompetent at leading anything smaller than a division.
The LBH defeat could only happen with the 7th Cavalry regiment. Any other regiment would have had a better outcome. It also required Custer. Any other officer in the 1876 Army would have had a better performance. In fact, so would inanimate objects, like rocks, plankton, Fred, Old Barnum.
GAC failing to obey orders to identify size of enemy is not a mortal sin. The estimate of enemy was in the ball park. There is a point where sneaking and peeking interfears with
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 16, 2018 6:28:15 GMT -6
Hello William
I think total numbers of Indians located in the Big Village area is only part of the intel that Custer could have acquired by moving up just a little further on the Rosebud. The more important finding would be the Indians willingness to fight as evidenced at the battle of the Rosebud. Combining their willingness to fight with a confirmation of total numbers should be valuable information when making the best available decision.
So my belief is that Custer might have decided to follow Reno into the valley if he knew the Indians were willing to fight and he could have known that from Herendeen's past experience and confirmation at the Rosebud battle site. I think fighting a large force of soldier and Indians to standstill after coming out to fight them is significant information that was not available to Custer but could have been discovered in a short period of time.
Regards
Steve
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Post by herosrest on May 16, 2018 13:25:48 GMT -6
The 1,500 hostiles number came from Lt. Bradley after he debriefed the Yellowstone Wagon Road & Prospecting Expedition on its return to Bozeman. That number included Cheyennes who participated in the final fight at Lodgegrass. Hunkpapa and Minnieconjou were amongst Sioux who opposed the expedition. This wa Herendeen's experience and this is where one might assume That Custer arrived at his number. Stuff. IntelAnecdoteMAY 14, 1874Arkansas City Traveler, June 14, 1876. Front Page. Omaha, June 5. Three herders were killed by Indians 25 miles south of Sidney, in this State, on Saturday last. A dispatch received at headquarters today, dated the 4th, states that a courier arrived from Red Cloud this morning, says Yellow Robe arrived at the agency six days ago from a hostile camp of 1,806 lodges, on the Rose, but they were about to leave for Powder River, below the point of Crazy Horse's fight. The Indians say they will fight, and have three thousand warriors. Cowley old newsGordon Harper's Companion Fights on the Little Horn, provides evidence that a significant contingent of the gathered buffalo hunters left Little Bighorn valley camp which stretched south along the east bank from Ford A to the site of Benteen today and moved via Lodgegrass on the 23/24th June towards Powder River. The camp moved at the same time to the location where 7th Cavalry struck it. The significant contingent which left the camp may have been as large or larger than that which remained. Companion
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Post by AZ Ranger on May 17, 2018 6:41:00 GMT -6
HR
What are you calling Benteen today? There is train marker called Benteen but there is no town or city there.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on May 17, 2018 12:50:43 GMT -6
Steve,
OK, so LTC Custer faces an uncertain situation. USA has been fighting GWOT since 2001, 17 years where that is our everyday environment.
When unsure, you maintain positive command and control. If Plan A goes wrong, you maintain the ability to go to alternative plans.
We see a brilliant command and control environment at Rosebud, fought by the same army, in the same environment. The only difference between the outcome at r\Rosebud and outcome at LBH is officer leadership.
LTC Custer failed on 2 levels.
1. Organization. The 7th Cavalry regiment was badly organized and trained, compared to every other regiment of this Army. He created a regiment band to provide his personal entertainment, in a regiment at 70% strength. So combat power was exchanged for tuba power. In contrast, Crook also took folks out of hide, to create his mule train, that had a direct impact on combat power.
2. Officer tactical ability. The 7th had mindboggling horrible leadership of officers. No other unit 1865-1898 showed such sustained incompetence of officers. We see that the NCOs and soldiers were sound, the 7th died in company clusters. The problem is these company clusters were all out of supporting distance on any other cluster.
In the northern sector, 5 companies died five separate deaths, all out of supporting distance of one another. I know many folks here have received some type of leadership training, even PLDC. This level of incompetence is hard to fathom. It is not just unusual for the 1876 Army, it is unusual for any Army, of any era, over 4000 years of history.
The 7th cavalry had a serious problem whenever any company had to cooperate with another. The only officer who had the ability to manage two or more companies at LBH was CPT Benteen.
3. The noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldiers had the ability to win at LBH. These same folks won not just this campaign, but the Indian Wars overall. This fight failed because of an incompetent set of officers, who had no ability at training, tactics, management or any other military skill.
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Post by montrose on May 17, 2018 13:02:13 GMT -6
Steve;
The main infiltration route to LBH area was from the Northwest. Let's say that is best route for 50% of Indians (I would say based on historical data should be 70). And lets say the other end of valley 10%. So this means LTC Custer was chasing no better than 40% or less of Indian routes. Whatever his estimate of trail he was following, he knew it was a fraction of total force.
He ignored orders to check main route to see numbers coming in. This isn't wrong, he assumed responsibility for these numbers, he knew they were there. The Indian accounts clearly show he knew what was there. LBH was not an intelligence failure. Intelligence Estimate was sound. Strategy was sound. Operations (campaign plan) was sound. Battle failed at tactics, regiment and company officer incompetence.
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