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Post by Colt45 on Jan 9, 2017 20:08:36 GMT -6
Hi dgfred, You are on the right track. The only way Custer had to "win" the battle was to attack with all companies south of the village. Sending Reno ahead first was perfectly fine. He was the advance guard that is supposed to engage the enemy, allowing the follow-on, main body, to further develop the situation. The advance guard should cause the enemy to deploy his forces to meet the threat. This allows the following units to maneuver or exploit any opportunities arise. This is what Custer should have done.
He should have crossed at ford A and followed Reno. He also should have held everything up until he had Benteen with him or at least in sight. Once Reno attacks and the hostiles respond, Custer, following, could have exploited the Indian right flank, by attacking from the area of the pony herd. Benteen could have followed the others, and reinforced Reno, allowing Reno plus Benteen to continue the forward assault while Custer was on their left flank. In this way, he could have driven the Indians north toward Terry. This is what he should have done on the 26th.
Since the Indians had a very large warrior force, in the event Custer didn't have enough firepower to keep the assault going, he would have been able to withdraw to the benchlands just west of Ford A, which would have been a defensible position. Even in this way he could have kept them busy while Terry approaches from the north. Again, the whole assault should have waited until the 26th at the earliest. Going on the 25th left Custer totally alone with no way for help from Terry to assist him. Even though he didn't know Crook had been derailed, going on the 25th also prevented any help from Crook, if he hadn't turned back after the Rosebud battle.
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Post by wild on Jan 10, 2017 4:33:00 GMT -6
Colt You are on the right track. The only way Custer had to "win" the battle was to attack with all companies south of the village. Sending Reno ahead first was perfectly fine. He was the advance guard that is supposed to engage the enemy, allowing the follow-on, main body, to further develop the situation. The advance guard should cause the enemy to deploy his forces to meet the threat. This allows the following units to maneuver or exploit any opportunities arise. This is what Custer should have done One could go along with this if it was an all arms assult on the village. But it wasn't . This was a cavalry attack, very limited in its repatoire of aggressive actions. If cavalry dismount they are useless [soldiers dragging horses around]. The use of an advance guard in such a situation under such circumstances is suicide as it was. The main effort goes in first with the supports immediately to hand and reserves tactically positioned. Cavalry might develope or shape the battlefield but for other forces to take advantage of. Custer's command was too small without support or reserves to conduct a "by the book" attack. He needed the odds in his favour such as he had at the Washita .......a force of 6000. Cheers Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 10, 2017 7:48:04 GMT -6
Richard
I think you are underestimating what well trained and experienced troopers could do. I think feeding the 7th a few companies at a time to the Indians was a recipe for disaster.
If you follow what was in the paper on the center of gravity which suggested the horse herd as the COG then an attack in the valley to disrupt the COG would be a better choice. Some say the horses would be moved to the village. Good -- since there are no corrals to hold them then they run wild in the village knocking over tipis and other infrastructure. How hard would it be to shoot at 10,000 horses and make hits.
I think having all 12 companies in the valley along with the pack train would have been a superior plan. The advantage of having the horse was not utilized by Custer when he allowed the Indians to prepare for battle.
Regards
Steve
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 10, 2017 8:01:03 GMT -6
Up until the time Girard stated (paraphrase): "General, there go your Indians, running like the Devil!" Custer felt he hadn't been seen.
Once he felt the command was spotted Custer's greatest fear was realized: Indians would run and he would never catch them.
Reno was ordered to attack. The actual worded command is still in doubt and controversial. Various testimoney from the RCOI are all over the place, Indians are running, village is running, Indians are on the move and so on.
There was no plan in place and as Fred said it was "action-re-action", go with the flow, throw the dice.
The greatest impact on Custer's "decisions" was based on Indians running away. He had to act quickly even if he didn't know where the camp was, who was in it, or what size it was.
I guess he forget the old adage: "Know Your Enemy"
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 10, 2017 13:43:26 GMT -6
Richard I think you are underestimating what well trained and experienced troopers could do. I think feeding the 7th a few companies at a time to the Indians was a recipe for disaster. If you follow what was in the paper on the center of gravity which suggested the horse herd as the COG then an attack in the valley to disrupt the COG would be a better choice. Some say the horses would be moved to the village. Good -- since there are no corrals to hold them then they run wild in the village knocking over tipis and other infrastructure. How hard would it be to shoot at 10,000 horses and make hits. I think having all 12 companies in the valley along with the pack train would have been a superior plan. The advantage of having the horse was not utilized by Custer when he allowed the Indians to prepare for battle. Regards Steve I think Custer must have used his plan from the Washita for the LBH. Except it wasn't a winter campaign, it wasn't a dawn attack, and it wasn't the hapless Black Kettle. Attacking from various points sounds good but the village at the LBH was huge, much larger than Washita, even though both villages were large and strung out along rivers, the fact that Custer was able to hit Black Kettles at dawn, during winter and having a hapless leader like BK was a big difference. At the LBH it was Crazy Horse, Sitting Bull, Lame White Man, Gall, Crow KIng, Low Dog et al., all hard core, never-give-in-to-the-White-Man demands and I'll-Die-Before-Giving-Up Free Roamers.. Why Custer would think he could roll over these "hostiles" (Free Indians) rather than limp-wristed, wishy-washy Indians is beyond me. Apparently he didn't learn anything from Gratton, Fetterman, Kidder, et al. If you think you can roll over determined, resolute and the last of the Free Roaming Indians with less-than-trained soldiers with commanding officers who weren't all-in with Custer led to the disaster at the LBH.
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Post by wild on Jan 10, 2017 15:03:07 GMT -6
Reno's attack is all important yet Custer does not see fit to speak with him . He allows Cooke to pass on the order in an airy fairy manner. There is no officers conference...... nobody knows nuttin.Benteen does not know where Reno is going and Reno does not know wher Custer is going. It is an awful pity that man did not survive. Hurrah Richard
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Post by fred on Jan 10, 2017 18:01:31 GMT -6
Re-hashing what Custer should have done is the ultimate in Monday morning quarterbacking, but it is still fun.
In my opinion, even a "balls-on" run down the valley would have had only limited success, if even that. The village was simply too large and too deep; it would have been like hitting a brick wall or it would have simply run out of steam because of the distances involved.
If it had been possible, the best way of tackling numbers and distances of that magnitude would have been to turn the Indian advantages against them and to have attacked out of the west, early in the morning. How that could have been achieved, I have no idea, but if one could have sequestered the regiment west of the pony herds, then driven the herds against the village with the river to its back, I think victory could have been achieved. Or at least some semblance of victory. One, it would have been an utter surprise; two, it would have deprived the warriors of their mobility; three, panicked horses would have created havoc, especially being driven against a village; four, it would have thrown the Indians completely on the defensive; and five, they would have had no place to run when confronted by the river and the bluffs to their rear. At attack out of the west had a chance of success... and certainly more success than anything else.
Best wishes, Fred.
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dgfred
Junior Member
Posts: 69
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Post by dgfred on Jan 10, 2017 20:42:40 GMT -6
Plus... likely what they wanted the most is to just move on without a confrontation (as Custer probably feared the most). Without their horses they would have doomed most of the women and children for sure... even if it took a few days. They didn't know Custer would serve up his men while still leaving an avenue of retreat and their attack mobility in force.
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Post by wild on Jan 11, 2017 4:22:25 GMT -6
Hi Fred Agreed but he would have had to hold some units back so that all his assets did not become part of the shambles. Cheerrs Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 11, 2017 6:46:01 GMT -6
Why would Custer think he could move within striking distance unobserved? If a plan counted on that then it was doomed to failure. Custer would never know if some Indian had not crossed the shod tracks and the horse manure and observe they were following one of the trails used to the LBH. It would be a plus if they unaware but to believe for certain that Custer was not observed seems far fetched.
Custer was on a main travel corridor there should be a probability of discovery.
Not only do we engage in this discussion on what could be done differently there are many military schools and papers written about this battle. I engaging in how to do something better is a good thing.
I know that the Army in some form of debriefings came up with immediate modifications to the carbine to include a cleaning rod, changes in ammunition, a focus on marksmanship, and horsemanship.
I recently took a Gunsite Carbine class in which we went through 1,500 rounds of carbine ammunition per student in 5 days. I believe that the 7th used 60 rounds per soldier in preparation shortly before leaving. Apparently is was not enough to cause malfunctions. For sure it was not enough to make shooters out the troopers.
Of all the things that they did not do the horsemanship bothers me the most. They had horses and could train with them without additional funding. How does a private go into battle never having ridden his horse at a true gallop and never fired his revolver from his horse?
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 11, 2017 13:37:15 GMT -6
Again, Custer feeling the command had been seen and Indians would run before engaged changed whatever plan there was in place and became a "action-re-action". Reno was sent to "bring them to battle" which Custer must have felt once the warriors were engaged they had no other option but to make a fight for it without time for taking down the camp with the only option left for non-coms was to run and leave everything behind.
At least that way Custer could say he captured the village and chastised the Indians into giving up.
But as Fred stated "The village was simply too large and too deep . . ."
Due to the fear of Indians running Custer could not fully determine the size of the village and his only option was to bring the Indians to battle. At least that worked!
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dgfred
Junior Member
Posts: 69
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Post by dgfred on Jan 11, 2017 20:03:09 GMT -6
From a re-read of some of the Reno Inquiry some of the men with Reno definately thought Custer had left them in the lurch... and were still thinking he might show up after nightfall.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 12, 2017 9:06:37 GMT -6
I think what is interesting in regards to opinions of Indians running and in particular in this area that 2 years prior the Indians first ran out to fight and if the met resistance by fire it was a bad medicine day and they would come back and try again. There is no indication that were going to run away. Then closer to the battle we have the Rosebud battle. Crook with a superior force to Custer did not cause the Indians to pack up an leave. Instead just as they had done against the 1874 Expedition they came out and took the fight to Crook.
Herendeen was on the 1874 Expedition and knew that those same Indians did not run. It was judged a bad medicine day because the expedition had shooters that made the Indians believers that another day might be better. It never got better and the expedition after several engagements with only three casualties and one of those a fatality. I believed they faced up 1,000 Indians.
At one event a young expedition member wandered to far away and soon was being chased. One Indian closed within arms reach of the young man. A shooter from the expedition shot the Indian off his horse from a distance of one quarter mile (440 yards) . Private Taylor states he missed an Indian whom he thought was closing on him at point blank range.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 12, 2017 15:12:32 GMT -6
The expedition that AZ alludes to had 3 major skirmishes. The last two years we visited one of the sites, the layout is still there and obvious. I hope to visit the other two this Summer. There is a wagon from that expedition not far from the lone tepee location, rumor has it, little left, hope to visit that area as well.
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Post by battledetective on May 1, 2018 14:36:54 GMT -6
Hello! I'm new here, and I'm not sure if this is the right thread to post this. I have the PDF of Matthew Burns thesis 'Revisiting the Battle of the Little Big Horn' (Naval Postgradual Schhol, Dec 2000), which analyzes the three most popular theories (at least at that time): Ambrose, Fox and Gray. If you think it's relevant and has not been posted before I can post it here as an attachment.
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