June 24 to 5 p.m.: The Looming Abyss

[fred]

More things happened during the first 17 hours of this day than during any previous day.

“Everyone noted puzzling changes in the Indian trail.... Instead of a single heavy trail with old campsites a day’s journey apart, there were now multiple trails in various directions and small scattered campsites, some growing fresher and fresher. These were, in fact, converging trails left by summer roamers coming out to join the winter roamers.” [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 215]

He goes on to explain why this was of such concern to Custer and why he spent the next four hours bivouacked, while he sent scouts scurrying hither and yon. “Every officer on the frontier knew only too well that Indians shunned pitched battles and were so mobile and elusive as to be frustratingly difficult to corral. Thus the overriding fear was that the village would break up and scatter.” [Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 215]

[mcaryf]

You may not be surprised to know that I disagree with John Gray's analysis here. It would not have been a surprise in the context of Terry's plan that the Indians had moved across to the LBH valley. However, the fact, not then known to Custer, that they had initially at least turned down rather than up the river was the surprise. Edit Note this objection was to a Gray quote now removed.
I understood Terry's expectation to be that the Indians would turn up river. Custer would move faster than them along the Rosebud valley cut across to the LBH and come down to meet them coming up the LBH. If the Indians had already been in the upper reaches of the LBH then they would probably have moved on again and so escaped Terry's trap. Thus they needed to be where they were for Terry's plan to work, just going in the other direction.

The correct action in light of Terry's plan would have been for Custer to conceal his command somewhere near Busby whilst his scouts examined the headwaters of Tullock and the route of the Indians in the LBH. By choosing to move the whole command up Davis (or whichever) Creek in his night march he vastly increased the likelihood that his command would be spotted and that he would have to mount the precipitate attack that eventually occurred.

Regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

In the morning the troops came to the great circle where earlier in the month the Hunkpapas had held their Sun Dance. All signs pointed to a confident enemy. The Ree scouts were nervous. They understood the power of the people they had come to fight. The column was now far beyond the farthest extent of Reno's scout. The track was growing confused with various branching trails. The troops passed over areas where a large number of camps had recently been close together. Herendeen noted, "The Indians were travelling very slowly and only moving for grass."

[crzhrs]

From Godfrey:

June 24th: we passed a great many camping places, all appearing to be of nearly the same strength. One would naturally suppose these were the successive camping-places of the same village, when, in fact, they were the continuous camps of the several bands. The fact that they appeared to be of nearly the same age, that is, having been made at the same time, did not impress us then. We passed through one much larger than any of the others. The grass for a considerable distance around it had been cropped close, indicating that large herds had been grazed there. The command halted here and the "officers' call" was sounded. Upon assembling we were informed that our Crow scouts, who had been very active and efficient, had discovered fresh signs, the tracks of three or four ponies and one Indian on foot. The valley was heavily marked with lodge-pole trails and pony tracks, showing that immense herds of ponies had been driven over it.
_______

More signs of a large village with huge numbers of horses representing a big population. The noose is getting tighter . . . but around who's neck?

[conz]

Out of Bray:

"With buffalo dispersing south, decisions had to be made about meat. Briefly, the councils favored a move toward the mountains, defying Crook at Goose Creek. Then scouts sighted concentrations of pronghorn antelope northwest, grazing the flats across the Bighorn, and the councils decided to move down the Little Bighorn two short days' travel. The move was risky, nearer any army movements based from the Yellowstone. In the atmosphere of uncertainty, holy men in both the Sans Arc and Cheyenne circles announced predictions of imminent attack, but early on June 24, the village decamped."

It appears that the huge camp of over 1,000 lodges stayed on Reno creek from the 16th to the 24th from where they launched hunting parties against local buffalo herds, and Crook. After the 17th, there were probably large celebrations as well each night.

Clair

[conz]

Also this:

"Late in the afternoon of the twenty-fourth, three scouts rode in, their ponies jaded after a fifty-mile ride. Two days earlier, explained Owns Bobtail Horse in the council tipi, his party had seen a strong party of troops marching up the Rosebud, which the scouts shadowed until 6:30 that morning, when they left the soldier force at the Sun Dance site. The evidence was clear: there was the dust storm of soldiers promised them. The village must be ready, for the soldiers could follow its tracks and be in place for attack by the morning of June 26. If marched through the night, Crazy Horse probably reflected, they could arrive by noon the next day."

Clair

[crzhrs]

By June 24 large numbers of reservation Indians had now joined their "free" relatives, swelling the LBH camp to at least 2,000 warriors and more than 8,000 total Indians.

They had now moved back DOWN the valley of the LBH . . . and after 8-9 miles the Cheyennes halted about 2 miles north from the future railway station at Garyown and the women began to erect the lodges.

Later that day and into the evening Indians would start socializing and celebrating.

[mcaryf]

Hi George

I think Gerard is missing the point with that quote. The purpose of scouting Tullocks was not to tell Custer it was clear so much as to inform Terry. The failure to inform Terry resulted in him taking a much harder route and consequently arriving in the vicinity of the battle that much later. Custer's intention not to inform Terry was made clear by his failure either to send Herendeen with the initial Varnum party or to take Herendeen with him when he went on to the Crow's Nest at 8am.

With respect to the trip by the scouts to the Crows Nest there was no need for Custer himself to plan to be there, he had not accompanied the scouts on other parts of their work. As you approach a position where you anticipate that the enemy might be located you increase your chances of discovery by a factor of 6 times the reduction in the distance. When the routes to the enemy are constrained, as they were by the access routes through the mountains, the risk is enormously much greater. The fact that Custer allowed his command to light breakfast fires and had his trumpeter sound reveille are also significant pointers to his not caring and indeed wanting to be discovered so that he would be justified in attacking. However, as these last two events occurred on the 25th I am getting ahead of the thread.

Regards

Mike

[erkki]

crzhrs said:

In the morning the troops came to the great circle where earlier in the month the Hunkpapas had held their Sun Dance.

Godfrey's diary "We passed a very large camp about 7:30 (i.e. p.m.) and officers' call was sounded. The poles of the lodge for the "Sun Dance" was [sic] standing."

Edgerly's letter to his wife, July 4, 1976 says they got into camp about 5:00 p.m. and officers' call was about 9:00 p.m.

[mcaryf]

I hate to argue with a moderator as it usually results in getting deleted. However, I would point out that the moderator himself chose to post an opinion/theory by John Gray, with which I disagree, so I posted my disagreement. I would also reckon that an observation that something was not done at a particular time (e.g. Herendeen not being sent with Varnum or taken in Custer's party to the Crows Nest) might be as significant as saying that Varnum himself was sent there.

Now I could just post the fact that Herendeen was left in the camp or I could explain why I think that fact is significant. I am happy to take guidance on this.

Regards

Mike

[mcaryf]

Hi Fred

It was the first post in this thread and this quote:

The unexpected news brought by the Crows that the Sioux were probably on the lower, rather than the upper, reaches of the Little Big Horn posed a serious problem that demanded a weighty decision from Custer.” [Gray, Custer’s Last Campaign, p. 219]


My post was really objecting to the use of the word "unexpected" since I do not think it should have been "unexpected".

How about my question about highlighting that something did not happen. I realise that all sorts of things did not happen but there are a few significant occasions when the fact that something was not done does have a significance. I realise that saying a non-event is significant might stimulate debate but perhaps we might be occasionally permitted to record that some thing did not happen which resulted in some noteworthy consequence.

Regards

Mike

["Hunk" Papa]

The Far West

From Willert's LBH Diary page 246 'Time[stress Willert's] was becoming something of a precious consideration this June 24th in the view of General Terry - Custer and the Seventh Cavalry could well be far along[stress Willert's] the trail of the hostiles, while he, with Gibbon's force, was yet along the Yellowstone; so, as soon as daylight permitted visibility, he had Grant Marsh push the Far West upriver to the rendezvous place near the mouth of the Big Horn River. The steamer halted at 'Fort Pease' to take on wood, but then resumed to the campsite.'

Terry remains behind schedule.

["Hunk" Papa]

The Montana Column

In his Journal for June 24th, Lt. Bradley states that the column's infantry broke camp at 6.00 a.m. and joined the cavalry. Willert LBH Diary page 246 says that this was after about an hour which accords with a 2 mile march.
As Terry had come to the June 21st conference with his plan apparently already worked out, we have to question why it took him over 4 hours to get 12 Crow and two white ones ferried to the south bank of the Yellowstone, then a further 6 hours before the rest of the Montana Column crossed the river.

Being already behind schedule when the Far West moored near the cavalry camp at 6.00 a.m., why Terry did not begin the transfer of the men across the Yellowstone much earlier must bear investigation.

[victorsixkilo]

June 24,1876 was the 15th anniversary of Custer's graduation from West Point.

[Gerry]

Breaking camp early 3:30AM, June 24th, Pvt. Peter Thompson says,"It was a hard sight to see men, who have been roused out of their sleep at half past three in the morning; not only once but day after day, sleeping in their saddles; and lucky indeed was the man who had a quiet and steady hourse that allowed the luxury of a sleep while traveling. I often took a nap in this way although my horse was a very restless brute. On June 24th, we reached the Rosebud River again where we moved into camp.....We received orders in a quiet way to be ready to move that night at twelve o'clock, for the purpose of crossing the divide which separated the Rosebud River from the Little Big Horn River. The men began to ask one another if they were going to travel all the time. We made preparations for a short nap. No canvas was stretched; no mules were unpacked except those who were carring the necessary supplies for supper."

Recently I made a trip up the Rosebud Creek. If you wish to follow along you may view this page. These are the same views the 7th viewed as they traveled.