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Post by fred on Oct 16, 2007 5:06:39 GMT -6
This was a day of preparation. Despite Reno's tender posterior, the brain-power of the Dakota and Montana columns discussed the events ahead. What plans were made and how did they differ from anything before?
To me, one of the most fascinating exercises of the pre-Rosebud move, is the thought process that went into figuring out the location of the Indians. If the Rosebud-Little Big Horn area was known to be such a favorable one for a Sioux pow-wow, why all the posturing over the previous weeks? Where was the strategic value in such discussions?
Another thing of interest: what were the results of Eugene Carr's Fifth Cavalry forays? What did he accomplish and who got what intelligence? Did Terry and Custer even know of this column?
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Post by fred on Oct 16, 2007 9:03:01 GMT -6
June 21: The Seventh marches some 16 miles toward the Rosebud and goes into camp around noon. R&R richly deserved.
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Post by elisabeth on Oct 16, 2007 10:19:27 GMT -6
June 21: Custer writes rude report to the New York Herald condemning Reno.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 16, 2007 13:32:30 GMT -6
Prior to Reno's scout all planned movements against the Indians had been based on out of date reports and no clear indication of which direction they were moving in. Reno's discovery of the relatively recent trail heading up the Rosebud brought Bouyer into play. He was with Terry and Custer at their June 20th conference and with his intimate knowledge of the terrain and the favourite hunting haunts of the 'hostiles', would have best guessed the headwaters of either the Rosebud or the Little Big Horn.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 16, 2007 16:59:32 GMT -6
Prior to the the Dakota Column's departure from FAL, there were various reports of the possible whereabouts of the Indians until Terry wrote a letter dated May 15th 1876, to Sheridan:- "Information from several independent sources seems to establish the fact that the Sioux are collected in camps on the Little Missouri and between that and the Powder River. I have already ordered Colonel Gibbon to move eastward and suggest that it would be very desirable for General Crook's column to move up as soon as possible. It is represented that they have 1500 lodges, are confident, and intend to make a stand. Should they do so, and should the three columns be able to act simultaneously, I should expect great success. We start tomorrow morning."
Terry must have believed the information he had received or he would hardly have advocated that the three columns converge on that location. In the event that did not happen, but Terry neverthless in late May, deployed Custer and Gibbon in a two pronged attack aimed at the Little Missouri location. On May 29th the Dakota Column reached their objective but found no Indians and no Gibbon.
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Post by elisabeth on Oct 18, 2007 7:28:15 GMT -6
June 21: as Hunk notes above, the initial expectation had been 1500 lodges. Bradley's observation in mid-May had been of a village of about 400 lodges. Now, the latest figure the planners are working with is from Reno's scout: again, around 400 lodges. The implication is that the quarry is (a) stable in numbers, and (b) little more than a third of the strength that the column was geared up to deal with.
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Post by crzhrs on Oct 18, 2007 16:29:53 GMT -6
From THE LBH CAMPAIGN (Sarf):
Thus Terry suggested that if as he believed likely the trail seemed to turn westward across the Chetish or Wolf Mountains into the valley of the LBH, Custer should take the unusual step of NOT FOLLOWING it. Moving instead farther south, he might go even as far as the headwaters of the Tongue River before turning to the west and south. Presumably this would give Gibbons's foot soldiers (who needed at least an extra day) time to get into position on the LBH. In performing these maneuvers, Custer would supposedly be able to block any Indian attempt to escape around his left.
However, there seemed to be a consensus that Custer would be the one to strike first:
Lt. Bradley's diary of June 21: ". . . it was understood that if Custer arrives first he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent. We have little hope of being in on the death, as Custer will undoubtedly exert himself to the utmost to get there first and win all the laurels for himself and his regiment.
In a July 8 New York Herald article (possibly Major Brisbin):
It was announced by Gen. Terry that Gen. Custer's column would strike the blow and Gen. Gibbon and his men received the decision without a murmur . . . Gen. Terry's reasons for affording the honor to Gen. Custer were good ones . . . Gen. Cuser's men, were AS USUAL (my emphasis) to have the post of honor . . ."
One disturbing occurrence, however, may have spelled what was to come:
"Charley Reynolds, suffering from an infected hand and feeling sure that he was riding to his death, tried to have Gen. Terry release him honorably from his post. But Terry convinced him to carry on."
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Post by fred on Oct 19, 2007 14:55:56 GMT -6
6am—Gibbon, anticipating the change in Terry’s plans, sends 3 companies (H, E, and K, 7th Infantry) under CPT Freeman, up the north bank of the Yellowstone to do some roadwork and build bridges. The Big Horn confluence was some 60 miles away.
* Gibbon now had at his command: • A, B, and I/7th Infantry, and, • F, G, H, and L/2nd Cavalry. • The “Diamond R” supply train contingent.
6am—Custer marches the 7th Cavalry west towards the Rosebud. 8:35am—Terry, on the “Far West,” arrives at Gibbon’s camp, immediately ordering him to send the remainder of his command up to the mouth of the Big Horn, picking up his “road-workers” along the way.
* Terry takes 6 of Bradley’s Crow scouts and assigns them to Custer (picked by Boyer). • Hires Herendeen to scout for Custer, primarily down Tullock’s Fork and then to meet Terry at the mouth of the Bighorn. • Assigns Boyer to Custer
9:30am—Terry, Gibbon, Brisbin, Boyer, and the 6 Crows, steam up Yellowstone for mouth of Rosebud.
* LT Bradley, with his mounted infantry and Crow scouts, leaves to scout the van for Gibbon’s column. • Bradley was very upset at losing Boyer and 6 of his best Crows.
9:30am-10am—Gibbon’s column starts up north bank of Yellowstone for the Big Horn River. Prior to 10am—Terry writes his 21Jun report to Sheridan. In it, he mentions plan to send Gibbon (and himself) to the mouth of the LBH and Custer up the Rosebud and across to the headwaters of the LBH, and down the LBH. This is similar in concept to his Rosebud plan, a quasi-pincer movement:
No Indians have been met with as yet, but traces of a large and recent village have been discovered 20 or 30 miles up the Rosebud. Gibbon’s column will move this morning on the north side of the Yellowstone for the mouth of the Big Horn, where it will be ferried across by the supply steamer, and whence it will proceed to the mouth of the Little Horn, and so on. Custer will go up the Rosebud tomorrow with his whole regiment and thence to the Little Horn, thence down the Little Horn. I only hope that one of the two columns will find the Indians. I go personally with Gibbon.
* It is also interesting to note, Terry never said anything about a “pincer” attack, any plan of having the two columns meet. This was probably “in accordance with Sheridan’s idea that it was an absurdity to expect cooperation in such an open and broken country, especially since each column was believed able to take care of itself if it met the Indians.” [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 239]
11:45am—“Far West” arrives at mouth of Rosebud to await Custer’s arrival. Noon—Custer finds a good place to camp, 2 miles below mouth of Rosebud and about 16 miles from previous camp, Yellowstone/Rosebud Camp, #24. 12:30pm—Tents pitched. Terry and Gibbon steam back down the 2 miles to Custer. • Crows report to Custer (in his “big” tent near the river’s edge), who in turn, has them report to LT Varnum.
* Not long after the camp was established, a mackinaw boat pulled into the south bank of the river. It was probably this boat that had the merchants from Bozeman on it. They sold fresh eggs and many other things, including straw hats, and they sold them much more cheaply than the traders and sutlers that had latched onto the column in its westward march. • This is where Reno bought his straw hat for 25¢.
Please Note: Much of the information from the "strategy conference," below, is taken from post-battle reports and does not fit with our goal of using only "daily evidence." It is, however, germane to the campaign and allows us a small look into the minds of the planners and the things they were grappling with when they made their decisions.
2pm to 4pm—Strategy conference held on board steamer: Terry, Gibbon, Custer, and Brisbin.
* Gibbon’s scouts had recently reported seeing smoke from the vicinity of the LBH, so it was assumed the Sioux were somewhere in that area.
* Because of the melting snow fields of the Big Horn Mountains, it was thought that if the Indians were in the LBH valley, they could only be approached from 2 ways: north and east.
* Because of the disparity in troops (Gibbon’s column, with its infantry, would be slower; Custer said he could move 30 miles a day) and distances (Gibbon was 60 miles from the Big Horn), it was decided that if Custer reached the LBH valley by 25Jun, he would have to lay low and mark time for a day until Gibbon’s command could reach the area.
* Terry wrote Sheridan telling of his desire that Custer bypass the Indian trail if it led west into the LBH valley, and continue south (Custer should send scouts along the Indian trail). This way, Custer could ensure that if the hostiles had moved south, up the LBH valley, or south and then back east, Custer would intersect them. If they had moved west and Custer were to follow their trail and the Sioux had turned south, Custer would find himself between Gibbon and the Sioux, merely forcing another chase and negating Terry’s “trap.” • Terry wanted to bring the infantry into the fight. When Custer said his 7th Cavalry could win the fight without any support, Terry said, “I will not have the infantry out of the fight!” [Willert, LBH Diary, FN quoting CPT Hughes, p. 199] • If the Sioux did move south, it was figured they would run into Crook. • LT Bradley wrote: “… it is understood that if Custer arrives first he is at liberty to attack at once if he deems prudent. We have little hope of being in on the death, as Custer will undoubtedly exert himself to the utmost to get there first and win all the laurels for himself and his regiment.” [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 247; citing Bradley in FN 42]
* Both Terry and Gibbon emphasized to Custer the importance of adhering to this plan. Apparently, Custer was rather disconsolate about it.
* Obviously, everything was rather a “guess” and Custer had to be granted some leeway based on the situation as he saw it on the ground.
* If the Sioux had not turned west and gone into the LBH valley, but had continued south, then Custer was to pursue them and send messengers back to inform Terry.
* There was some thought that the Sioux may have been camped on Tullock’s Creek, “a broad valley, running oblique to the Yellowstone, whose western terminus touched the lower Big Horn River, and whose eastern opening emerged somewhere near the valley of the Rosebud…. [T]he plat was accurate on Terry’s official map.” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 200] • Gibbon would explore the lower reaches, Custer the higher.
* Because of his knowledge of that area, George Herendeen was transferred to Custer.
* “If the trail veered west to the LBH as expected, Custer was to ignore it and continue south up the Rosebud before turning west and descending the LBH—unless he saw sufficient reasons to change the orders. The rationale for not directly following the Indian trail across to the LBH was to minimize the possibility of detection, and reduce the chances of ‘scattering’ the enemy. Terry expressed to Custer the necessity of preventing the Indians’ escape by advancing far enough south before turning west.” [Mangum, “The LBH Campaign,” Research Review, pp. 19-20]
* Custer refuses LT Low’s Gatling battery as too slow and cumbersome; battery ordered out to join Gibbon’s column, report to CPT Ball, and take 13 mules, injured with Reno’s march, with him.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 20, 2007 16:28:01 GMT -6
The Montana Column's initial destination is not the Big Horn confluence as in his Journal for June 21st Lt. Bradley states 'We were ordered to march at once for Fort Pease and got off at 9.30 a.m.'
Terry's dispatch to Sheridan is written prior to the conference on the Far West. Mark Kellogg's last dispatch to the New York Herald is also written on this day and again before that conference. The information it contains can only therefore stem from the discussions on June 20th between Terry, Custer and Reno, with Boyer in attendance. His dispatch includes the following wording "...tomorrow, June 22nd, General Custer with twelve cavalry companies will scout from its mouth up the valley of the Rosebud until he reaches the fresh trail discovered by Major Reno, and move on that trail with all the rapidity possible in order to overhaul the Indians whom it has been ascertained are hunting buffalo and making daily and leisurely short marches. Gibbon's part of the command will march up the Big Horn valley in order to intercept the Indians if they should attempt to escape from General Custer down that avenue."
Kellogg's words are echoed in Terry's message to Sheridan but make it clear that the words "Gibbon's column will move......for the mouth of the Big Horn, where it will be ferried...and whence it will proceed to the mouth of the Little Horn..." mean that the Montana Column are meant to march up the Big Horn valley. There is no reference to Tullock's Creek here.
The Montana Column march 18 miles and camp "a short distance below the mouth of Great Porcupine" [Bradley:Journal page 144]
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Post by AZ Ranger on Oct 20, 2007 17:20:58 GMT -6
Shavetails and Bell Sharps The History of the U.S Army Mule By Emmett M. Essin
Godfrey wrote " Cargo began falling off before we got out of camp."
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Oct 22, 2007 16:41:16 GMT -6
Terry's dispatch to Sheridan is reflecting the belief that the Indians are most likely to be found as Gibbon describes in his June 18th note to Terry, "I presume the only remaining chance of finding Indians now is in the direction of the headwaters of Rosebud or Little Big Horn." [Gray Centennial Campaign, page 135]. This makes sense of the indication that Custer is not to get into the LBH valley north of the Indians.
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Post by fred on Oct 30, 2007 14:57:49 GMT -6
This makes sense of the indication that Custer is not to get into the LBH valley north of the Indians. This makes eminent sense, especially in light of the fact the Little Big Horn valley operation was Terry's 3rd attempt to employ the strategy of catching the Indians between two forces. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by clw on Oct 31, 2007 12:57:50 GMT -6
from Command and General Staff College...
"On 21 June, Custer departed with his regiment of 12 companies (652 men). Shortly thereafter, Terry and Gibbon led the remaining forces, 4 cavalry companies and 5 infantry companies (723 men), westward along the Yellowstone on their route to the mouth of the Little Bighorn. Each of these two columns followed Terry's plan to the letter until the evening of 24 June."
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