May 17, 1876: The Campaign Begins

[fred]

After several days of rain and at least one delay, the Dakota Column under the command of Brigadier General Alfred Terry, begins its march west. It consisted of more than 1,000 uniformed personnel, the most prominent unit being the Seventh Cavalry under the command of Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer.

(a) What was the mission of this column and of the overall campaign?
(b) Where were they headed?
(c) What coordination with other commands was planned?
(d) What intelligence did the commanders have to help them make their decisions? What did they know?
(e) Were their resources sufficient to accomplish their mission?
(f) What were other commands doing and where were they?

[fred]

The following is apparently what was known:

February 7, 1876—Authority was received to commence operations against the hostile Indians. It was essentially this time that Terry was informed Sitting Bull had moved to the Dry Fork of the Missouri River, some 200 miles farther to the west.
* Bloody Knife reported no Sioux camps on the Little Missouri.
* Terry received information that the Hunkpapa camp was no more than 30 to 40 lodges and no more than 70 warriors. [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 81]
* Indian agents reported more than 10 times that number of lodges.
* CPT Robert Hughes, Terry’s aide and brother-in-law, declared Terry believed Sitting Bull’s personal following consisted of some 500 lodges. [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 81, fn 21]
* The Indian Office estimated there would be no more than 3,000 men, women, and children off the reservations. [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 82]
* Military authorities were told there would not be more than a “few hundred” warriors, not united.
* Estimates ranged from 500 to 800 warriors, with 500 being the most commonly assumed.
* Again, agents put the figures much higher.
* The military was told Sitting Bull only had 75 warriors in the Dry Fork camp and Crazy Horse’s village contained no more than 120 lodges with 150 warriors as the extreme. [all, Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 82]
* Despite the fact that both Terry and Crook realized and calculated that Indians would slip off the reservations during the spring, “military leaders… assumed that any one of the three columns could defeat any force of the enemy that it might encounter. The main difficulty… would be to catch the Indians and force them to fight or surrender.” [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 83]

March 17, 1876—COL J. J. Reynolds of BG George Crook’s command attacks Cheyenne village of Old Bear located on the Powder River. The village consisted of about 110 lodges and 500-700 Indians, 250 of whom were warriors. The attack was successful, but Reynolds eventually withdrew, leaving several dead and 1 wounded soldier behind and destroying huge amounts of supplies the military could have used.

March 24, 1876—BG Terry sends telegram to GEN Sheridan: “The most trustworthy scout on the Missouri recently in hostile camp reports not less than 2,000 lodges and that the Indians are loaded down with ammunition.” [Connell, Son of the Morning Star, p. 264 and Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 84]

April 1, 1876—Custer sends a telegram—probably to Terry—informing him that scout Charley Reynolds reports, “ ‘from 300 to 600 lodges under Sitting Bull are now en route to (Fort) Berthold.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 219]

May 7, 1876—LT Egan of Crook’s command met a war party of 100 lodges and some 700-800 warriors on the Powder River trail, all heading north. Each party ignored the other. [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 190] The Red Cloud Agency was reported to be virtually deserted.

May 14, 1876—Terry telegrams Sheridan: “It is represented that they have 1,500 lodges, are confident and intend making a stand.” [Connell, Son of the Morning Star, p. 264] “From this message it is obvious that Terry appreciated the strength of the enemy and should, from an estimate based on the number of lodges, have expected to encounter a force of between 4,500 and 6,000 warriors.” [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 139] Terry received information from a number of independent sources and concluded the Indians were concentrated either on the Little Missouri or between that river and the Yellowstone. MAJ Marcus Reno, commanding FAL in Custer’s absence, had reported large numbers of Indians leaving the agencies.

May 15, 1876—Reports indicated Sitting Bull had assembled the Sioux and Cheyenne on the Little Missouri, ready for a fight.

The correspondent for the NY Herald, Reuben B. Davenport, wrote, “3,000 bucks have left the Cheyenne Agency on the Missouri to join Crazy Horse. Louis [Richaud] reports that of 42 lodges that went on the warpath from Red Cloud Agency, 17 returned… [May 17]…” [Willert, p. 44]

That should kick off the campaign.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[blaque]

17 May:

Herder R. A. Roberts’ report, published by the New York Sun on May 27th, seems to bear out Maguire’s time records: the expedition started out from FAL “at five o’clock a.m. […] and by 2 p.m we were encamped for the night”, after having travelled 14,5 miles (later corrected to 13,8 miles). Cattle herd was made up “of one hundred ten fine Texas steers”.

[elisabeth]

May 17: two other small events. (1) The troopers were paid in camp (rather than at FAL). (2) A prairie fire threatened the camp that night. According to Willert, LBH Diary, p. 8, Custer annoyed the men by rushing around giving superfluous instructions.

[mwkeogh]

harpskiddie said:

17 May: The march from Fort Abraham Lincoln begins.

The march commenced at the encampment outside the fort [some distance south], went through the fort [Creighton says the entire train marched around the parade ground] and then up the hill northward. At the top of the hill, the band played "The Girl I Left Behind Me."

Gordie

This is probably not very important, but I would question whether the entire wagon supply train marched around the parade ground on May 17 as Creighton seems to indicate. If anything, Creighton must mean that the entire supply train, instead of marching into the parade ground, marched around it outside the boundaries of the fort, just west of the Parade Ground.

If you go to Ft Lincoln today, you can still see the rows of ruts from these same wagons lined up about 4 abreast on the west side of the Fort (on the hill above the officer's quarters). This would indicate to me that the wagon train was diverted around west of the Fort and joined in on the back end of the trail as the Cavalry and Infantry left heading NW out of the Fort.

[fred]

Here's another interesting thing. There is a picture of a military wagon train all lined up (I don't have it at my fingertips, but I think it may be from Custer's Black Hills Expedition). These guys are lined up like four abreast rather than one behind each other. Is this the way they traveled out of Lincoln and through the countryside?

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Gordie--

I understand the flank formations, but what surprised me when I first saw it or read about it was that the wagons themselves would travel-- and obviously, the terrain would have to be conducive to this mode-- at least 4 abreast. That surprised me.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[mwkeogh]

fred said:

Gordie--

I understand the flank formations, but what surprised me when I first saw it or read about it was that the wagons themselves would travel-- and obviously, the terrain would have to be conducive to this mode-- at least 4 abreast. That surprised me.

Best wishes,
Fred.

This would make the most sense. Traveling 4 abreast, when terrain permitted, would lessen the dust raised and be easier on the troops or wagons following behind.

It is interesting to note that, unless prevented by terrain, each Cavalry Company moved in the same formation....a column of 4's. This would be reduced to a column of two's or even single file if needed to cross an obstruction, like a river, stream or a narrow canyon, but column of 4's was the routine formation.

["Hunk" Papa]

When the Dakota Column set out on this day the mind-sets of the officers, almost to a man, were encumbered with intangible impedimenta that would colour their thinking throughout the whole of the campaign - a belief in the innate superiority of the white race and its military technology, coupled with disdain for the Indians as a fighting force and contempt for them as a race.
There was no doubt in their minds that they would defeat any Indian force that engaged them in battle or that the campaign would end in anything other than great success. It was an arrogance that would have repurcussions, because the main concern of the commanders became not how they could bring the Indians to battle, but how they could be prevented from scattering and escaping, thus making it impossible to force them on to the reservations.

Already there was one example of this flawed thinking being demonstrated by Gibbon's command, less than half the strength of the Dakota Column, 50% of the troops being infantry, camped on the north side of the Yellowstone, a river well over 120 miles in length, with the express purpose of stopping the highly mobile Indians escaping north!

Prior to this day, the Indians too had been imbued by a mind-set that made them a different proposition from the one that was arrogantly assumed to be their traditional one by the Dakota Column. That mind-set had been forged on March 17th by Reynolds' attack on the Northern Cheyenne/Oglala/Miniconjou village on Powder River and manifested itself in the understanding that their way of life was marked for extinction by the white man and that they must band together to fight for survival if necessary.

[conz]

In Reno's autobiography, as printed in Ottie Reno's book, Reno quotes Terry's plans like this:

"On February 21 Terry gave Sheridan an outline of his plans for Custer's column. 'I think my only plan will be to give Custer a secure base well up on the Yellowstone form which he can operate, at which he can find supplies, and to which he can retire at any time the Indians gather in too great numbers for the small force he will have."

Is this an accurate report of Terry's letter to Sheridan? Did Terry visualize that Custer could run into too great numbers to handle, and that the Yellowstone camp could be a refuge in such an event?

Clair

[elisabeth]

According to the chronology Fred's give above for the various reports, Terry's still claiming as many as 1,500 lodges on May 14th, i.e. just before the expedition sets off. He must already have got the southern companies by then, so it looks as if the figures he gives are based on genuine belief rather than any attempt at trickery.

Incidentally, that April 1st telegram listed as sent by Custer: the New York Times reports Custer's Belknap testimony on March 30th, so Custer must surely still have been in Washington on April 1st. Is Willert in error as to who sent the telegram?

[fred]

Terry also felt they were still on the Little Missouri.

[harpskiddie]

Gray says [Cent. Camp. pp89]: "Charley Reynolds had been sent to Fort Berthold to tap this fountain of intelligence. Before April 1st, he had reported to Custer in Washington that these trading parties [of northern Sioux] amounted to 3-400 lodges, enough to represent most of the winter roamers. Shortly after this the local newspapers picked up the rumors that Sitting Bull would fight Custer in the badlands of the Little Missouri. Major Reno reported this on April 16th, but sent Reynolds again to check it out."

No source is given for this information, and no mention is made of a Custer telegram; but he does mention that Custer had the info from Reynolds before April 1st.

Gordie

[elisabeth]

Right. So this implies Custer was keeping informed even while stuck in Washington. Useful stuff.

["Hunk" Papa]

elisabeth said:

According to the chronology Fred's give above for the various reports, Terry's still claiming as many as 1,500 lodges on May 14th, i.e. just before the expedition sets off. He must already have got the southern companies by then, so it looks as if the figures he gives are based on genuine belief rather than any attempt at trickery.

Gray 'Centennial Campaign' also says on p89 "Every dispatch from Fort A. Lincoln at this time carried this story of Sitting Bull having gathered 1500 lodges and 3000 warriors on the Little Missouri due west of the Fort, near present Medora. Unfortunately, it was a myth, whose origin reveals how poorly Terry's staff was processing the generous flow of Indian intelligence from its own and other sources.'

It is notable that in Terry's letter of May 14th to Sheridan he states '...1500 lodges, are confident, and intend to make a stand. Should they do so, and should the three columns be able to act simultaneously, I should expect great success..'

But Crook is making his own plans and the Wyoming Column will not be able to join Terry's commands. Nevertheless, Terry sends a dispatch to Gibbon to coordinate in a combined movement against the supposed Little Missouri Indian camp. Gibbon's command is 150 miles from that location, yet the distances between his two columns making coordination a hope rather than a reality and the Indian numbers do not seem to deter him from the distinct possibility that the Dakota Column may have to attack alone.