Nelson Miles' memoirs

[elisabeth]

Another from Wisconsin:

digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/History/History-idx?type=header&id=History.Miles&isize=M

Good stuff, well written. His take on LBH is interesting. Predictably pro-Custer, anti-Reno/Benteen; but prejudice aside, some useful soldierly insights. (Much more to his memoirs than just LBH, of course.)

[shatonska]

thanks

[shatonska]

page 289 very interesting

[elisabeth]

It is, isn't it. Both his point about 'the timber' -- which makes sense of the Deep Ravine foray -- and the 'between two fires' one. He's got an agenda, of course, but this IS an expert talking ...

[shatonska]

he was there with 28 wariors who fought custer , michno's e company theory is confirmed in that page , in the last of the fight about 40 soldiers left lsh , went toward cemetery ravine but were forced by indians to cross cemetery ridge and tried to reach deep ravine but almost none reached deep ravine , warriors told this in various accounts and to Miles right there on that place , the 28 bodies were in cemetery ravine not deep ravine and were carried out by 7th infantry and buried on the ridge among the other soliers who died on the ridge trying to reach deep ravine

[Saugus Zouave]

Nelson Miles actually published two autobiographies, of which the one you cite is the first. The other one, "Serving the Republic" was published in 1911. It has less detail but more opinion than "Personal Recollections" does.

For example on p. 189 "Benteen, moving slowly in the direction of Custer, stopped to rally Reno's troops, and the two commands remained there, out of action, although for hours they heard the firing, and at one time volley-firing, a signal for help."

p. 191: "The Indians said that they would have fled if Reno's troops had not retreated, for the troops could not have been dislodged." [italics in original]

"They also said that, when they left to attack Custer, had the seven companies under Reno and Benteen followed them down and fired into their backs they would have been between two fires and would have had to retreat."

"Moving at a smart trot or gallop, as cavalry go into action, it could have attacked the Indians in the rear easily in fifteen or twenty minutes."

"How his strong heart must have felt when he saw from the ridge a part of his own regiment running from the field and when the major part of his command failed to come into action!"

"His brothers and strongest friends died with him, while his enemies lived to criticize and cast odium upon his name and fame; but it is easy to kick a dead lion."

Guess we know where he stands.

Paul K

[redwhiteman]

Keep in mind, Miles was very biased. He slammed Reno and Benteen with a comment that no commander can win with 7/12ths of his troops not in the battle (p. 290, Personal Recollections). But as I point out in another thread (i.e. Custer and his plan to attack), it was Custer who sent Reno on the attack without first reuniting with Benteen and without knowing from just where or when his promised support of Reno would come. As a matter of fact, how did Custer know the Indians he sent Reno after weren't decoys, a well-known tactic of the Lakota and Cheyenne. Anyway, attacking at a later time from another direction does not conform to prior known battle tactics and therefore is of questionable "support." It looks like Custer got himself in a fix of his own making. Perhaps he could have been extricated by his subordinates, perhaps not. Keep in mind my brave Internet compadres...we weren't there and it's easy to be brave in front of the computer saying Reno should have bla bla bla and Benteen should have bla bla bla.

Anyway, it has occurred to me that we're all trying to make sense out of this battle, when perhaps the answers we are looking for just don't exist. It could very well be that things went down that day in a very unusual and nonsensical manner and therein lies the answer. We're to busy trying to piece all the (allegedly) known details together in such a way that makes everything meet our expectations and sensibilities. But haven't you ever done anything that was completely out of character and just didn't make any sense? Perhaps that is what happened on this day. One mistake after another, and all out of character, creating an historical jigsaw puzzle that cannot be solved, at least in any conventional manner.

[elisabeth]

Maybe you've hit it. Maybe the reason the battle doesn't make sense is quite simply that it DOESN'T make sense!

As discussed on another thread, the 'Did the Custer brothers disagree on battle's eve?' one, there are some signs of Custer behaving out of character earlier -- certainly from the 22nd June on. Possibly from the Reno scout, as he's almost irrationally hostile about that. Roger Darling, in 'A Sad and Terrible Blunder', argues that Terry intended the Reno scout as a wake-up call for Custer: a reminder that he could even now be replaced as field commander if he didn't behave. So he's fighting for his professional life now. He's no longer even got Sheridan in his corner. He's out on his own. A recipe for misjudgements, perhaps ... He dithers about the Gatlings, which is unlike him. Officers' call on the 22nd: everyone remarks on how uncharacteristically he's acting. And so it goes on, example after example of a man who's off his game even before the day of the battle.

Interesting to look at what happens with Reno and Benteen, too. Reno was perfectly capable on the scout; yet on the 25th he falls to pieces. Benteen has never put a foot wrong before; he may be a pain at times, but always the dependable soldier. Yet when he reaches Reno, he's virtually inactive for a couple of hours. It's McDougall who has to do the intelligent thing and set up a defensive perimeter on Reno Hill. Only on the return from Weir Point does Benteen snap out of it and start behaving like himself again. If those two can act out of character, why not GAC?

The conditions are the worst they could possibly be for calm, rational decision-making, after all. They've had the night march; little or no breakfast; the water's alkaline and undrinkable, so they (and the horses) are set fair for dehydration as the day goes on; it's broilingly hot; and -- perhaps crucially? -- they'd all psyched themselves for attack the following day, after a chance to rest. Suddenly they've got to change that mindset. What effect that has on the morale of the enlisted men, one can only guess; but even some officers could have been unsettled by it. So yes, RWM, this could be a very good explanation. "One mistake after another, and all out of character" just about sums it up, IMHO!

[crzhrs]

Elisabeth:

After the shocking and stunning rout of Reno's command I would assume most of his men would be in shock, regardless of their experiences in battle. And fighting against Indians, who many considered "savages" who would kill you, then even in worse, chop you up, it isn't any wonder why there was so much confusion when Benteen showed up.

[Scout]

A very good point whiteredman...I agree completely. When things started to pop at the LBH they happened fast and major mistakes were made, decisions were made in split seconds. I think we try to pick apart these events as if they were some sort of football game. When you have so many bad decisions it is hard to make any logical sense of the whole thing, thus the confusion and the attempted reconciling of the events.

[crzhrs]

<"They also said that, when they left to attack Custer, had the seven companies under Reno and Benteen followed them down and fired into their backs they would have been between two fires and would have had to retreat.">

There were more than enough warriors to handle all the 7th's command. Don't forget the Weir Advance did go in search of Custer, albeit after most of the Custer's command was dead. Yet the warriors turned on them in full force ready to take on hundreds of more blue coats.

I don't think anything would have stopped the warriors that day.

[Saugus Zouave]

"But as I point out in another thread (i.e. Custer and his plan to attack), it was Custer who sent Reno on the attack without first reuniting with Benteen and without knowing from just where or when his promised support of Reno would come."

The assertion that Custer did not know when or where Benteen would join the attack is Benteen's. The assertion that Custer had no plan is Benteen's and Reno's. Custer was in contact by messenger with both Benteen and Reno until well into the valley fight. Unfortunately for us, and maybe fortunately for both Reno and Benteen, most of the communication was verbal and/or carried by messengers who did not survive the action. For example, what message was so important that Custer used the regimental sergeant major to carry it to Reno? We'll probably never know.

Nelson Mile's specific goal in riding the battlefield in 1878 was to ascertain how far apart the different battalions got and whether or not they were in supporting distance of each other. He rode the routes and timed them with his watch. He determined to his satisfaction that:

1. Custer was never more than a 15 minute trot from Reno's valley fight or from the northernmost point of Benteen's advance to Weir Point.

2. That Custer was in clear sight of the valley fight location when he took up positions north of Medicine Tail Coulee.

3. That he had overlapping fields of fire with the valley fight location and Weir Point.

Proving something to Gen. Mile's satisfaction carries a fair amount of weight because:

1. He was an experienced regimental commander with 15 years of combat experience.

2. He fought the same hostiles that Custer fought less than 6 months after the LBH.

3. He campaigned in more difficult terrain and harsher weather than Custer did.

4. He traveled the battlefield two years after the battle in the company of eye witnesses.

Mile's bias was that he was an aggressive commander and was naturally suspicious of officers, like Benteen and Reno, who weren't. With good reason; the army of the time was full of "coffee coolers" and other questionable types. (See for example, Benjamin Greirson's problems with the 10th Cavalry at Ft. Sill.) Part of that is reflected in how many officers were absent from the regiment during the campaign.

The biggest problem with Mile's analysis is the credence he gives to the testimony of the Lakota and Cheyenne he was with. It is probable that they would have avoided contradicting him and would have been willing to overstate their respect for the troops they faced. Therefore we don't know how much weight to give to their statements that Reno could have held out in the valley indefinitely or that an attack northward from Weir Point would have driven off the warriors. We know that what happened didn't work, but Miles doesn't present any evidence except the testimony of subjugated warriors that what he proposed instead would have worked.

"As a matter of fact, how did Custer know the Indians he sent Reno after weren't decoys, a well-known tactic of the Lakota and Cheyenne."

Because he sent Benteen to the left and he went to the right looking for flanking Indians. He also sent Ree scouts out ahead of Reno into the valley to drive off the pony herds. They would have sprung any trap.

"Anyway, attacking at a later time from another direction does not conform to prior known battle tactics and therefore is of questionable "support." "

As Gen. Miles rightly points out, that is exactly what Gebhard von Blucher and the Prussians did at Waterloo to defeat Napoleon. It is a very old tactic to fix an enemy with fire and then use a maneuver element to enfilade him. Phil Sheridan's cavalry at Five Forks in April of 1865 was the fixing force while GK Warren's 5th Corps was the maneuver element. (Despite the success of that attack, Sheridan still relieved Warren of his command for not being aggressive enough.)

Nelson Miles proposes a perfectly reasonable way for Custer to fight the battle based on his own extensive experience. He then proposed a way for Benteen and Reno to recover when the plan went wrong. What we will never know is whether that was the way Custer intended to fight it, and whether it would have really been possible to rescue Custer's battalion once the plan went wrong.

[redwhiteman]

Saugus Zouave -
I think you make some good points, and hope we can have some good discussions here. I don't agree with all of what you said, but you said it well Later, when I have time I will try and respond in more detail.

[redwhiteman]

Saugus Zouave -

"The assertion that Custer did not know when or where Benteen would join the attack is Benteen's. The assertion that Custer had no plan is Benteen's and Reno's."

I agree with you on this. But unless Benteen (and others) was successful at a magnifient cover-up, he was sent off on a scout before any Indians were spotted, and when they were observed, Custer was prompted to order Reno to charge. My assertion is that it was a premature order, based on what we know. Custer should have waited for Benteen to physically make his appearance. For all he knew, Benteen had already engaged the Indians, even if only lightly.

Because he sent Benteen to the left and he went to the right looking for flanking Indians. He also sent Ree scouts out ahead of Reno into the valley to drive off the pony herds. They would have sprung any trap.

I'm not saying it was a decoy maneuver, I was just throwing it out there as a consideration. But I'm saying it could have been in the eyes of the soldiers sent in pursuit, and the Rees didn't have to necessarily detect this or cause it to occur prematurely.

As Gen. Miles rightly points out, that is exactly what Gebhard von Blucher and the Prussians did at Waterloo to defeat Napoleon. It is a very old tactic to fix an enemy with fire and then use a maneuver element to enfilade him. Phil Sheridan's cavalry at Five Forks in April of 1865 was the fixing force while GK Warren's 5th Corps was the maneuver element. (Despite the success of that attack, Sheridan still relieved Warren of his command for not being aggressive enough.)

This is a very good point. However, I am talking about Indian Wars tactics, not Napolean/European style tactics against a much different kind of enemy. Admittedly, I don't know everything about the Indian Wars, so please tell me where tactics like this were used. Until then, I'm sticking with my original statement:
Attacking at a later time from another direction does not conform to prior known battle tactics and therefore is of questionable "support.

We're seeing two sides of the same coin. But I enjoy the discussion.