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Post by Diane Merkel on Sept 12, 2004 17:32:49 GMT -6
A high school student wrote to me and asked, "Who was held accountable for the battle of little big horn???" I gave my answer, but I would be interested to read how others answer that question.
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Post by tomthebomb on Sept 14, 2004 17:13:23 GMT -6
Accountability starts at the top . . . we can say Custer because he was in charge of the Seventh on June 25, 1876; we could say Terry because he gave Custer his "orders"; we could say Sheridan and Sherman because they were not truthful in their knowledge of the number of Indians that the military could expect to deal with.
But in the end . . . on June 25, 1876, Custer made the decisions . . . and his decisions resulted in his death along with his immediate command and the deaths of many others of the Seventh.
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Post by David on Sept 16, 2004 11:23:39 GMT -6
and what about terry and Benteen ? 66% of the regiment was out of the fight because of these two bastards !! D www.custer.tk
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Post by David on Sept 16, 2004 11:33:22 GMT -6
and what about Reno ?
If you quote Lt De Rudio, Reno could have stayed almost 120 minutes in the woods, he retreated after 25 minutes, without organising any rear-guard !
Frederick Chiaventone (teacher in Army Central Command) in Leavernworth, said in A Road We Do Not Know that he gave to his students (colonels and generals of Vietnam and 1st Gulf War) the same informations as Custer when he made his decision on the ill-fated day. All, without exception, took the same decisions as Custer ! But Benteen and Reno refuse to do their jobs. They didn't answer the call. Lt Godfrey said that Benteen even refused to inspect his company before going to battle on June 25th 1876, only to make Custer angry.
They are the responsible of the result of the battle ! Custer had a lot of chance to win the battle with a flank attack, because the number of Indians doesn't matter in Old West fights (remember Beecher's Island, Wagon Box). But he had only 34% of his regiment in the battle !!!! The other 66% were with Benteen and Reno and didn't support him at all time ! And what about Benteen who gave water to the horses two times (!), after receiving TWO orders to be quick !!!
They are the responsible of the massacre. Custer was the commander of the Seventh, but he asked for normal support of his own troops and subordinates. He hasn't them for the battle.
He could only loose the battle with only the third of his regiment.
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Post by bigpond on Jan 15, 2005 15:44:51 GMT -6
The buck has to stop with Custer. He has seen for himself the size of the trail,his Ree & Crow scouts have given him umpteen warnings of the numbers of hostiles. At the Crows nest,his Crow scouts tell him exactly where the village is,so why then does he send Benteen away on a wild goose chase to the south[supposedly to stop the hostiles escaping that way]he then sends Reno to charge at the south end of the village,and gives the impression that backup will be immediate if or when needed. He then takes his command northward behind the bluffs aiming i pressume to attack at the Northern end of the village,going further away from the rest of his command. He knows that there are a couple of fords further on,because he has the right scouts with him[Boyer and the Crows]and once he actually see's the size of the village,sends back for Benteen and the pack train who have the ammo.At this moment in time,his command is all over the place ! A word at this point concerning the pack train. There are 150 men guarding the mules,who are miles behind,how can he fight against these odds,without the ammo and men ?unlike Crook who's pack train was kept up with the main command and guarded by the command ! Ironically the pack train arrived at Reno Hill,fully 15 minutes after the last shots were heard from the battlefield. Reno is repulsed after the initial attack,and gambles on a retreat back over the river and try and make a stand up on a bluff,consequencies High ! Luckily for Reno and his men ,Custer is spotted,roughly at medicine Tail coulee,and the vast majority of hostiles make for him. Reno Hill is still under attack from sharpshooters,when Benteen arrives,and the onset of heavy firing comes from Custer direction. IMO no soldier of GAC troop get anywhere near the river,the 2 company's that go down medicine tail coulee retreat and join main command. As hostiles pile over the fords,B &C and join the others who are already engaging the cavalry,the first main volleys and fighting start at Calhoun Hill. Roughly 40-50 minutes later,Custer's command is routed.
Not one general of the so called 3 prong attack,can hold there heads up,they all failed !
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mike
New Member
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Post by mike on Jan 15, 2005 19:58:28 GMT -6
Custer did win the indian war he killed so many warriors the indians never could make another major battle with the cav.
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Post by bigpond on Jan 15, 2005 20:23:43 GMT -6
Custer did win the indian war he killed so many warriors the indians never could make another major battle with the cav. absolute nonesense ! what comic book did you read that in.
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Post by steve wilk on Jan 16, 2005 9:22:31 GMT -6
Perhaps this is not so nonsensical. Estimates of Indian losses range from a low of thirty to a ridiculous high of 300. Even a loss of 30 warriors was devastating; this large village (which the size thereof has been greatly exaggerated to imply Custer was foolhardy for attacking it and that once this was done, defeat was unavoidable) was not the norm. A loss of even one warrior to a small band was viewed as one too many, and for weeks thereafter the battle the Sioux losses continued to mount as the more seriously wounded died. So even though Custer may not have "won" that day, the 7th Cavalry did do some damage, and Mike is correct that the Lakota and Cheyenne were never able to fight a battle of this magnitude again. Dwindling resources (vanishing buffalo), the ever increasing settlement of the frontier, and political factionalism among the Sioux indicated that their days were numbered.
As far as accountability: one can point fingers in many directions. True, Custer made the decisions that day but a commander can do only so much with what he has. A stingy Congress made sure these soldiers were poor marksmen that seldom got to fire their carbines. Army brass never came up with Indian fighting doctrine or tactics. Many of Custer's troopers, even though in the army several years had no combat experience, having spent the greater part of their enlistments chasing the KKK while on reconstruction duty.
One can blame Terry as well as this was his "plan"; Sheridan, for this occured under his leadership, Congress, for skeletonizing the army, and President Grant, who ordered this campaign to begin with (this occured "on his watch").
As for Custer dividing his forces; he must have done this to create the illusion of superior numbers. As if there were soldiers coming from everywhere, executing multiple attacks. Envelopment was a common tactic employed against aboriginals by the British in Africa, allowing a smaller force of regulars with disciplined firepower to defeat a larger body of natives. Benteen and Reno get blamed for the defeat. In fairness to Reno, his orders to charge pertained to the small satellite village of some sixty lodges which was fleeing. Custer's orders prior to attack were based on the belief that the village was fleeing.
Finally, as to Custer supposedly ignoring his scouts.....they were fairly notorious for overestimating the enemy. Hence Custer's comment: "I think we'll get through with them in one day" after the scouts told him the Sioux would keep him busy for days. As for attacking on the 25th, it was at imploring of the Crow scouts that Custer did so. So he did NOT ignore his scouts in that regard. As far as warrior numbers, this was not the Rosebud or Beecher Island or Wagon Box. The troops were attacking a village, the Indian's families were directly threatened which necessitated a ferocious defense and counter attack unequalled at these other engagements where this was not the case.
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Post by shatonska on Jan 16, 2005 15:05:40 GMT -6
i think that grey's book is the one to follow until the beginning of the last stand fight , benteen was correctly send west to controll the esistence of other villages in the south part of the valley , grey has demonstrated that benteen could easily reach custer well in time for the fight , but hate between custer reno and benteen was the problem that day ! supply arrived in time for reno , if benteen was in battle instead that on a tourist trip he could help custer , but the result could easily have been the same , probably !
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Post by bigpond on Jan 21, 2005 16:25:59 GMT -6
Perhaps this is not so nonsensical. Estimates of Indian losses range from a low of thirty to a ridiculous high of 300. Even a loss of 30 warriors was devastating; this large village (which the size thereof has been greatly exaggerated to imply Custer was foolhardy for attacking it and that once this was done, defeat was unavoidable) was not the norm.
There are several accounts of large villages,especially around the Sun Dance,notably Bear Butte in the black Hills,Powder River,and Northern Nebraska.
So even though Custer may not have "won" that day, the 7th Cavalry did do some damage, and Mike is correct that the Lakota and Cheyenne were never able to fight a battle of this magnitude again. Dwindling resources (vanishing buffalo), the ever increasing settlement of the frontier, and political factionalism among the Sioux indicated that their days were numbered --------------------------------------------------------------- The damage done by Custer was minimal so say the least,the Military's eventual defeat of the Sioux & Cheyenne was inevatible. Another fact was that it was impossible tribes to remain concentrated due to scarcity of game,which meant they could only survive by breaking into smaller groups,especially with winter coming on. You write like they where a military army,far from it ! -----------------------------------------------------------------
As far as accountability: one can point fingers in many directions. True, Custer made the decisions that day but a commander can do only so much with what he has. A stingy Congress made sure these soldiers were poor marksmen that seldom got to fire their carbines. Army brass never came up with Indian fighting doctrine or tactics. Many of Custer's troopers, even though in the army several years had no combat experience, having spent the greater part of their enlistments chasing the KKK while on reconstruction duty.
One can blame Terry as well as this was his "plan"; Sheridan, for this occured under his leadership, Congress, for skeletonizing the army, and President Grant, who ordered this campaign to begin with (this occured "on his watch"). ------------------------------------------------------------------- Custer's words "we[the 7th] can handle anything the hostiles throw at us" The" fighting 7th" was a myth,but for Custer being the regimental commander you would probarbly never heard of them. There is truth in what you say about Congress & capability. ------------------------------------------------------------------- As for Custer dividing his forces; he must have done this to create the illusion of superior numbers. As if there were soldiers coming from everywhere, executing multiple attacks. Envelopment was a common tactic employed against aboriginals by the British in Africa, allowing a smaller force of regulars with disciplined firepower to defeat a larger body of natives. Benteen and Reno get blamed for the defeat. In fairness to Reno, his orders to charge pertained to the small satellite village of some sixty lodges which was fleeing. Custer's orders prior to attack were based on the belief that the village was fleeing. ------------------------------------------------------------------ How does anybody split there command up,when they dont even know what is in front of them ? He got away with it at the Wa**ita ! but the circumstances at the LBH are comletely different. Wa**ita:winter,dawn attack on sleeping small village. LBH.Summer,mid day attack,very large village. He attacked the village with just over half of his command[350 between himself & Reno] while the remainder of the command under Benteen and McDougall with 260 men are 8 Miles back. Of these more than 140 are guarding 175 mules !which took 3 Hours to catch up with the rest of the regiment. Hardly a advert for a dashing Cavarly Officer. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Finally, as to Custer supposedly ignoring his scouts.....they were fairly notorious for overestimating the enemy. Hence Custer's comment: "I think we'll get through with them in one day" after the scouts told him the Sioux would keep him busy for days. As for attacking on the 25th, it was at imploring of the Crow scouts that Custer did so. So he did NOT ignore his scouts in that regard. As far as warrior numbers, this was not the Rosebud or Beecher Island or Wagon Box. The troops were attacking a village, the Indian's families were directly threatened which necessitated a ferocious defense and counter attack unequalled at these other engagements where this was not the case ----------------------------------------------------------------- Who said they were fairly notorious for overestimating ? on this occasion they were very accurate ! Imploring of the Crow scouts to attack ? show me the proof of that statement. Even if it were true,do you honestly think Custer would act on there hear say,Never ! he was on a mission,his own mission !and it didn't matter how it was achieved,as long as he got a result. As it turned out his fate was decided on the 24th !when he took a right turn.
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Post by steve wilk on Jan 24, 2005 20:59:33 GMT -6
Regarding village size: _Lakota Noon_ by Greg Michno dispells the myth of the gigantic village. It simply was not that large; read it if you haven't. The scouts did not see the village from the Crow's nest, only the pony herd. Warriors often owned more than one horse. As for them overestimating the enemy's forces, I cannot quote you my source, just remember reading it somewhere. This appears in many accounts. Perhaps Michno again. Same with the Crow scouts urging he attack at once after the lost pack incident. Custer's original intent was to wait till dawn the 26th. Once under the assumption that the regiment was discovered (as if you could hide 600 horses traversing a plain) and the village was packing up to flee, Custer did not have the luxury of further reconaissance. If He waits, they get away or attack HIM. Chiaventone mentions in his novel _A Road We Do Not Know_ that the scenario was presented to officers at Army Command and Staff College and all these officers, combat veterans, agreed Custer executed the right tactical decisions. A rather strong endorsement, in my opinion.
Minimal damage and losses inflicted? A relative term. You don't think the loss of thirty warriors was felt? The loss of even one was too many. I am NOT writing as if they were an army....and no, the Indians couldn't fight a battle like that again, for the reasons you mentioned, dwindling game, unable to stay together--I mentioned the vanishing buffalo.
Lastly, the "myth" of the Fighting 7th: Again from Michno; _Encyclopedia of Indian Wars_ p. 365-66. Table shows that this is in one sense correct. The 7th was last in number of engagements at 40 (even comparing to only the other three regiments formed in 1866) but in terms of Indian casualties inflicted, they ranked first at 16.1 per engagement. Since the 7th served on the plains they tended to fight bigger battles when they did engage. And if you factor in the years when it was on Reconstruction duty; and the years after the Sioux War when the regiment did virtually no fighting, the 7th was quite active and saw some hot action while on duty in Kansas (a hotbed for Indian fighting) and Dakota.
Did Custer do everything right? No, but I wasn't there, neither were you. Easy to condemn after the fact. As for his "agenda" it was to strike the Sioux and acheive a victory. If he could've done this without firing a shot I believe he would have. You think he rashly attacked so he, his brothers, nephew, and brother in law could all die together? His regiment was given the assignment of the strike force; he had confidence enough in his men to refuse Brisbin's battalion of 2d Cav. (had he taken it with, this would've diminished Gibbon's force to render it virtually useless if needed. Gibbon would be without cavalry).
Benteen dawdled, Reno dropped the ball, they fought on unfavorable terrain, and the Sioux fought with a determination to win (they were defending their families). If Custer inflicted "minimal" damage, why didn't they overrun Reno?? Because that would result in many more casualties than it was worth!
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mike
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Post by mike on Jan 30, 2005 20:42:37 GMT -6
I didnot get it from a comic book anyone can see the indians had no replacements. I think Benteen wanted Custer to fall on his face.
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Post by bigpond on Feb 5, 2005 16:55:02 GMT -6
The reason Reno and then Benteen where not slaughtered,was simply the Sioux and Cheyenne had won there battle.The troops where dug in on Reno hill,which rightly they didn't wont to know anything about,and for the rest of the evening and early morning fired from Sharpshooters hill.Plains Indians only fought when circumstances where in there favour.Reno's command would have been slaughtered to a man if it hadn't been for Custer's approach.
Custer and everyone associated with him thought this was going to be a buffalo hunt,that they would run,scatter,do anything but fight.He took along Kellogg[the reporter]against orders,to report on his glorious defeat of the hostiles.
Although the 7th is represented as one of the Indian fighting regiments,the statistics do not support this view.Up to 1876,elements of the regiment had fought in only 32 actions,of these 5 had involved battalions exceeding 5 companies[which Custer had commanded]the 7th hadn't attacked a single village in summer.4 companies[C,D,H and I]had no combat experience for 7[seven] years prior to 1876,during this period 8 companies had fought in 5 actions,none of these were more than skirmishes.finally a considerable proportion of the troops had never been in action before.
Everybody's perception of the size of the village is different,Michno is no different,wether its 1.5 or 2.5 miles long it dosn't really matter,it was larger than most villages anyone had come across. The warriors lost during the fight would certainly be missed by each Band,and thats why I believe the numbers were low,and not up to 100's as a few people think.The Sioux and Cheyene named there dead and would have no reason to lie. The simple truth is the army were outfought,outnumbered and outmanouvered,and Custer couldn't or didn't know how to handle the circumstances as they unveiled.
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Post by bigpond on Feb 6, 2005 6:38:21 GMT -6
absolute nonesense ! what comic book did you read that in. Mike,I take that back,and apoligise. Everyone is entitled to there opinion
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Post by Steve Wilk on Feb 20, 2005 9:12:26 GMT -6
To Big Pond; in a prior post I mentioned the Crow scouts urging Custer to attack immediately...you wanted proof of this. I just began reading _Vanishing Victory_ by Bruce Liddic. Page 27 cites _The Custer Myth_ by Graham (p 33):
....Red Star agreed with the Crow. They told Custer if he waited the warriors would come out to fight him to give the women and children time to escape, then all would scatter. (Note even other Indians were under the impression that the Sioux would flee rather than fight a pitched battle. If the village was indeed so enormous, as the scouts supposedly claimed, why would they advise attacking it, and why would they assume it would flee???)
Continuing from Liddic: p 27:
...The other scouts said to attack the Sioux camp right away before they could react to their presence; capture their horses so they couldn't move; they would not expect a midday battle. It was reported Custer listened to this advice and finally said through the interpreter they were right and he would march on the village......
Prior to this Custer was not convinced the regiment had been seen, telling Half Yellow Face "This camp has not seen our army, none of their scouts have seen us...I want to wait until it is dark and then we will march, we will place our army around the Sioux camp" (Graham, p.33)
These are not the words or sentiments of a man who was reckless and concerned only with glory hunting or some supposed agenda. He wanted to wait; this implies caution and preparation; to march in the darkness to avoid detection. Hardly a rash decision.
Any field commander worth his shoulder straps would have attacked as Custer did. That was his duty; any commander who didn't would have faced censure or even court martial. Liddic points out that Custer did something no other commander on the western frontier was able to do: He brought an entire regiment of cavalry, virtually undetected, right to the doorstep of a Sioux village and attacked it. Not something an incompetent commander could have done.
There was no reason to believe that some 600 soldiers armed with modern weapons could not face three to five times as many aboriginals and prevail. The flee fallacy was not a fallacy at all, but a scenario that was played out on the frontier over and over. Troops trail Indians; maybe find village; troops attack, Indians give brief battle and scatter. This cat and mouse game was the norm. The Fettermans and Custers were the rare exceptions.
Godfrey agreed years later that Indian fighting was an inexact science:
"At all events his attack must be made with celerity, and without other knowledge of the numbers of the opposing forces....The dispositions for the attack may be said to be 'made in the dark' and a successful surprise to depend upon luck...In Indian warfare the rule is 'touch and go'"(Graham p.136-137)
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