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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2013 18:07:40 GMT -6
Will: It won't open but I can hardly wait. I do hope that Mel Brooks was the chief instructor at Hussar U.
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Post by mac on May 21, 2013 18:41:24 GMT -6
I am surprised and heartened to find that there are people other than yours truly who are less than impressed by MacArthur! Personalities certainly count in achieving power and then obviously in using it. I think part of why Custer goes towards ford D is that he cannot simply sit and wait. He cannot be in over his depth, and he certainly can't retreat and be by implication "wrong". For me I still think he went towards ford D. Cheers
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 21, 2013 18:53:16 GMT -6
Why does anyone think Custer went to Ford D whatever, wherever, it is? What actual evidence that isn't totally explained by the Sioux and Cheyenne dressed in the uniforms of the dead, riding their mounts, shedding unwanted items as they rode, and who rode into the Cheyenne camp in formation and scared the hell out of the folks there.
They previously had fooled Weir himself, and the next day fooled some of Terry's guys. Not for long, but they were there, and any evidence they would leave on field or in memory has to be negated before postulating another scenario using the same evidence.
The 'cross dressers' happened, plenty of accounts say so. We can't pretend it did not. It's entirely possible in the confusion that villagers saw them and never got the complete story of who they were. It was a while before they knew they'd fought Custer, and not all the tribes could communicate well by language.
The Navy always hated MacArthur, and Marshall was not a huge fan himself. By the end of his stint in Korea, MacArthur had lived decades outside the US as a near Emperor in Manila and Tokyo and was a near foreigner.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2013 18:54:43 GMT -6
Mac: For me the perfect general officer has the drive, determination, and commonplace demeanor of Sam Grant, and the gentlemanly qualities of Robert E. Lee. That is how I measure them.
Neither of them were perfect. They were both human after all. Each made grievous mistakes, Cold Harbor and Gettysburg respectively come to mind. But both brought a human quality to war and leadership in war that set an example for their own time and that of centuries to come.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2013 18:57:58 GMT -6
DC: One is not mutually exclusive of the other.
That is putting it mildly about MacArthur. Roosevelt and Marshall detested the man, but would not relieve him in December 41 with Kimmel and Short as they should for fear of political repercussions with the Philippine government, and in house by the Republicans in Congress.. Truman can be faulted for a lot of things, but he was the only one with enough guts to throw him to the wolves despite popular opinion and the firestorm generated by the Republican Party. Marshall orchestrated MacArthur's relief, but Truman did it. Maybe that's why the Navy named a carrier after Harry. ;D
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Post by fred on May 21, 2013 19:27:27 GMT -6
Why does anyone think Custer went to Ford D whatever, wherever, it is? I do... because there is enough to tell me it happened... and based on what I believe occurred, Custer's dispositions, and all the rest, it makes sense to me. Your idea of Indians dressed as soldiers is wrong and has nothing to do with Ford D: they picked up the uniforms after the Custer fighting. There is absolutely no evidence those uniforms were used prior to Reno's internment on the hilltop. DeRudio's report of seeing Tom Custer-- so he originally thought-- wasn't until the 26th. It was the same with Terry's command. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2013 19:38:38 GMT -6
Fred: I respect DC's views. I am sure he has good reason for them. That said I completely disagree with them
DC's views are not unlike a three legged stool. Leg one is Custer is wounded early on. Leg two is that an unofficial chain of command takes over, and in their haste to attend to the fallen leader, move onto ground that he feels to be foolhardy for any officer to chose as a course of action. Leg three is the cross dressers at Ford D. Custer going to Ford D becomes an impossibility based upon Leg one and two, so there must be a reason for assorted artifacts to be found down there other than a cavalry incursion to that location. Pull out any of those legs and the stool falls over. Nothing can stand if any one is removed.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 21, 2013 19:50:24 GMT -6
I don't agree, Fred.
But regardless, Weir was pointing out soldiers, as he thought, till Edgerly with glasses corrected him, and said they were warriors in army garb, on army mounts. They were on Weir Point at the time or near. That is well prior to Reno's internment. Further, they were reported in the camp by Kate Bighead during the battle. Some fainted, some ran, big hubbub.
This isn't a one time event unique to the battle, Indians made fun of their enemies a lot although they rarely had so much to work with as here. It's not unique or unusual and it surely happened.
You recoil from this, Fred, and you have for years, but there's enough to show it happened in one form or another. It explains all artifacts in the cemetery, it explains the odd story that soldiers DID cross the river, and there's no reason to think that Indians had a bulletin board to keep up on events. I'd bet some Indians went to their graves in the next century not knowing that soldiers they saw were not, and weren't given to correct their thoughts late in the game. Like all of us old, olde men. Well. You. I'm in Late Youth.
QC, no, the stool theory is great but absolutely not applicable to my theory which, in any case, is not mine but much older. The CD's are well attested, and cannot be wished away. Any one of the legs can be taken away and it doesn't zonk either of the others. But they go together well.
Custer's nepotism is well attested, and for evidence I bring up the move on the divide, which could only have been done by TWC. It made sense, it was logical, it violates nothing of importance except manual procedure, always first on the mind in the 7th. These were small intimate units, and TWC was a good officer. Even Benteen and Reno found TWC a good egg and competent and having insight into the General was probably viewed as a good thing, and there were no complaints. But, any officer would do the same.
The actual vs. official Chain of Command is plausible but not sure, and as I also suspect that if Kanipe was sent at all, it was by TWC saying it was from the General, although the General may have not known immediately Kanipe was sent (an error of a few minutes as things were getting tense) and Martin left in roughly the same ten minute period, although Martin did not know about Kanipe, I don't think.
If I'm totally wrong - not a violation of the time-matter continuum - it doesn't affect at all the theory that Custer, confronted with Reno engaged against a greater number than envisioned, would know he had to support his officer and move, being cavalry and that shock and awe thing. Benteen would know what to do, and he'd find a wasp nest on the bottom land and act correctly.
I think Custer was wounded on his way to MTCF while in MTC well back from the ford. He was famously in front a lot, and probably would not be far from it. It requires no huge Indian defense to wound him and others, and because nobody would risk him falling into their hands, he had to be brought to some safety.
It seems to me the momentum of the move west by the five would not stop and start again but had to keep going. The over precise imaginings of how they worked their way to LSH strikes me as unimportant, only that they did. But they got there too late, the officers were shot from their mounts upon cresting, and it was god awful. The delaying tactics failed sequentially, such as they were.
It's very simple, can absorb various time issues. I still think what HAS to be addressed is how the corpses got to where they were found, and then walk it back. Unsurprisingly, the theory I prefer makes the walk easy, introduces nothing new, nothing implausible, no Custer unknown to history, no debuts of maneuver unusual or idiotic given the situation.
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Post by wild on May 21, 2013 20:46:00 GMT -6
Ford D requires not only Custer to take leave of his senses but also Keogh.It also requires timing of cartoon like proportions and the cooperation of the Indians. Ford D is a play in two acts but we never hear of the second act in which Custer who like a woman realizing she has a cake in the oven races back to Keogh but is halted so tantalizing close. And over all of this comedy of errors there lurks the Cooke message.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2013 20:54:03 GMT -6
DC: The theory goes back at least as far as the mid 1950's. First saw it in one of those men's magazines I was not supposed to read at that tender age. Terry Johnson also used it in his LBH book of the three novels on Custer.
It is always possible that Custer was wounded, unhorsed, knocked senseless etc. It is most likely true that Tom Custer was his designated deputy, in some form or manner. It is also true that battle ridge while not ideal is traversable, much more so that straight ahead out of MTC. I am as nearly positive as I can be that Yates and Keogh were split by some distance when Custer was in MTC. I find absolutely nothing odd about the position of the officer's bodies atop LSH except Smith, all were exactly where I would expect them to be found. Your scenario does not account for the members of other elements of the command that were found on LSH. Soldiers in extreme circumstances rarely run toward danger, and if you are correct Custer was in as much or more danger than the place they left. Then you have to find sufficient reason for that line of bodies that runs from LSH toward the river and all those outliers found a good distance away from battle ridge. Then there are the cross dressers, which you say and I believe happened, but I do not believe it happened to the exclusivity of a movement to Ford D or some other yet to be discovered activity on/in Cemetery Ridge/Ravine.
For yours to be viable each and every one of these things must be explained. The alternative depends upon the practices of normal (albeit ill advised) tactics and finding what one would expect to find in this or a similar situation.
A commander always in front, and by that I mean literally always in front is one of two things, an idiot, or soon to be dead. Riding point is not leading from the front. Leading from the front means placing yourself near the front, but in such a way as you can deploy your forces once contact is made. Making that contact is what points are for. The commander's job is to command. To much hurrah and not enough common sense.
Lastly it makes no damned sense to ride a mile or more with a wounded or incapacitated Custer. The logical course would be to head for the nearest high ground Calhoun or L-N-C and stop, and consolidate both elements as quickly as possible. Those are the two best pieces of ground immediately available.
You put a hell of a lot of thought in it though.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 21, 2013 21:42:47 GMT -6
I think it goes further back than the 1950's. It's not a unique supposition.
We assume there were two groups under Keogh and Yates, but some still consider there were two groups under Custer and Yates, and some consider there to be three groups under Custer, Yates, and Keogh.
It's not that the braid was on LSH, but that the officers were so clumped about Custer. You really would expect to find those officers on the perimeter of a hypothesized organized defense, QC? Where the monument is and where Custer's group was found is exposed to 360 degrees of fire, and was a poor position, the worst of all of them. It's not hard to visualize that upon cresting, they were met by a whole lot of fire.
My account accepts the presence of anyone on LSH, and nowhere claims that other units couldn't have ended up with them. That people got up and ran towards the river - this is well accounted - would explain some if not all of that line of dead, although 28 belong in Deep Ravine anyway, where several accounts said they were found and buried. Others could have died on the way up from failed firing lines on the way from MTC. Others could have been dragged there, or chased.
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Post by mac on May 21, 2013 22:05:47 GMT -6
If Custer is out of action well back in MTC why would you not move out back towards Reno, Benteen and support?
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2013 22:27:05 GMT -6
DC: The body markers and main artifact field form the shape of a C with the open end toward the river. That C starts in the lower end of Calhoun Coulee/Greasy Grass Ridge area moves up and over FF Ridge then to Calhoun Hill. From there it moves north over battle ridge to LSH and then west again to the far reaches of Cemetery Ravine. This configuration completely supports the conventional and accepted theory of the flow of this battle to include the excursion to Ford D. Anyone disputing the generally accepted course of events, must account for all of this.
As an example your scenario has Custer being jumped some distance from the Ford B in the MT Coulee itself. The most direct route from that place to Battle Ridge goes nowhere near Calhoun Coulee. Now I believe you also say that Keogh in trail was confused as to the turn of events in front of him and tried his best to restore order and catch up. Don't want to put words in your mouth, so correct me on this point if I am wrong. Keogh had as his last in line Company C. Were he moving out rapidly to catch up he may very well have put out a rear guard, but it has not been established that a rear guard was necessary, for you yourself said above the thing that tripped off the entire affair was most likely not a great many Indians. In any event FF Ridge and Calhoun Coulee is not the place to put a rear guard in the picture you paint. It goes beyond not advisable in this particular circumstance because it faces away from the threat you paint. In your circumstance there would be only one place for a rear guard that being Calhoun Hill. The only way that CC & FF Ridge could have been a rear guard position in extreme circumstance is a rear guard after a close incursion to Ford B, but you say that did not happen So what is Company C doing down there?
Now I am going to make one more point before going to bed. I am well aware what you think of bullets and cartridges. I believe you know the method I use, bullets and cartridges in pattern in relatively the same location indicating not firing, but an exchange of fire. There is one such find down in lower Cemetery Ravine. They were all determined to be the proper period. That indicates to me that a prolonged exchange of fire took place and that position was occupied by Indians. It fits in very well with the generally excepted scenario, but is an unexplained outlier in yours. Now again I know how you feel about these things. I accept that. So knowing how you feel, and considering there were Army bullets, and Indian cartridges found in pattern in that location, can mean one of two things. Either that was an Indian position, or there was a two sided live fire exercise conducted there. Now I tend toward the former, because while the Army does try to be as realistic in training as possible we do stop short of using live targets with live ammunition, especially live targets that fire back. It tends to have an effect on morale.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2013 22:33:57 GMT -6
Mac: There is no reason. The only people that could have been in the rear of the column were strays out for a stroll. If Custer gets it, the most logical thing would be move back not forward, and I know it pains some folk to think it but there is a by the book maneuver for turning around.
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Post by wild on May 22, 2013 3:14:36 GMT -6
Ford D has Custer parading along the LBH for 1 and 3/4 hours. Was Custer blind that during that prolonged period he did not see the Indians massing? Ford D requires Custer to disport himself in full view of an admiring audience for the sole purpose of counting women and children? Ford D requires Custer to be counter attacked by surprise in the vicinity of Ford D.How is this possible? Ford D requires the Indians to attack across the river.Did Custer not see this coming? And how could he have failed to have gotten through to Keogh.? And how did the Indians time a simultanious attack both on Custer and Keogh.? Ford D gives Keogh all the time necessary to form a defence but he fails to do so? It stretches credulity that both Custer and Keogh had taken leave of their senses. Just think;horses[ lots]were found on LSH.Why no horse holders?
The disaster does not require Custer to blunder,nor Keogh to fail.All the disaster requires is a zillion Indians 3 minutes away from a defenceless column.
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