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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2013 10:06:07 GMT -6
JAG: Not being specific to any one battle, a feint does not necessarily involve engagement. Sometimes mere presence is enough to impart the idea of threat. It should never involve decisive engagement.
Any look at what anyone did at LBH must include the tactics employed being a product of changing times for cavalry units, where the introduction of accurate at distance weapons, along with relative rapidity of fire made the mounted charge nearly obsolete, as a viable tactical option.
The prime weapons system was the carbine, and the tactics selected must make maximum use of the prime weapon.
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jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
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Post by jag on May 20, 2013 11:03:24 GMT -6
JAG: Not being specific to any one battle, a feint does not necessarily involve engagement. Sometimes mere presence is enough to impart the idea of threat. It should never involve decisive engagement. Any look at what anyone did at LBH must include the tactics employed being a product of changing times for cavalry units, where the introduction of accurate at distance weapons, along with relative rapidity of fire made the mounted charge nearly obsolete, as a viable tactical option. The prime weapons system was the carbine, and the tactics selected must make maximum use of the prime weapon. Go ahead. Lets be specific to this battle. What overall named tactical maneuver (past or present) would it have taken to make what I postulated - happen. Reno command fixing that one end of the enemy flank. Perhaps even the main attack force. This if Benteen had gone to the sound of his guns and reinforced him (in time) there. And if this had happened, then Custer's would have by happenstance became the command fixing the other flank. Lets put Benteen in this equation and see what happens. He was within minutes of reinforcing Reno. Pull it back just this little time. Place him on those bluffs 5 minutes, even 10 minutes earlier than he arrived there... see what happens. What would have Custer expected him to do? What would Benteen have done? And. How would that have applied to all of his orders? You really do need to read all of what I stated. Because you just said what I did. In another way.
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Post by benteen on May 20, 2013 11:22:04 GMT -6
Lets put Benteen in this equation and see what happens. He was within minutes of reinforcing Reno. Pull it back just this little time. Place him on those bluffs 5 minutes, even 10 minutes earlier than he arrived there... see what happens. What would have Custer expected him to do? What would Benteen have done? And. How would that have applied to all of his orders? Jag, Hope its ok if I jump in. I believe Benteen got there about 15 minutes after Reno, If he had been there 5 or 10 minutes earlier he would have been faced with the same issue, that is a badly beaten outfit with dead, and wounded troopers. Some without mounts. I believe he would have done exactly what he did do. Which I believe was the right thing Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2013 11:46:30 GMT -6
JAG: As far as I can see there was no feint anywhere in this battle.
Attacking forces are divided into two main parts, the main attack, and the supporting attack, if you include a reserve force that becomes the third. Throughout this battle Reno was always the supporting attack. Regardless of what you think of Custer's original intentions, Reno was sent in to draw the enemy out and onto him. Had Custer stayed in the valley, he would have maneuvered against this drawn out force, while Reno occupied their attention.
Custer did not stay in the valley and was attempting to envelop the right flank and attack what he thought would be the rear. The rear was not the rear. Instead it was the middle, and attacking the middle was of no value whatsoever.
I should mention here that it is not unknown for the main and supporting attacks to exchange roles during the course of battle depending upon the circumstance. One of the methods of doing this is to insert the reserve to weight a supporting attack should it become the main effort.
All this is pretty standard stuff. There is nothing that Custer did tactically that I would find fault with, given sufficient forces available. For whatever reason he chose to do what he did without sufficient combat power. Therefore it was not his choice of scheme of maneuver that was his undoing, but insufficiency of resources.
Montrose often points to placing two major terrain features (the bluff and river) between the maneuvering forces. Montrose is correct, but only correct in this specific situation. Had Custer sufficient forces available, and had he organized his whole force into three self sustaining elements, his choice of maneuver would have yielded decisive results. It did not, because he did not, and should have known better.
If you are leading me down the road of Benteen going into the valley. I think there is a fair chance he would have had be arrived on scene 10 or 15 minutes earlier, and given the totality of circumstance. I believe he had every reason to believe Custer would have been involved in the valley fight, and that belief would have sent him on the most direct pathway to that fight, not up and over the bluffs to some presumed ford, just so he could be cheek by jowl with Custer himself.
When you go into battle thinking that the enemy will not fight but rather run, you have already lost, because everything you do it tainted with misconception. It does not matter what has happened before or even yesterday. What matters is what they will do today, and you take NOTHING for granted.
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Post by fred on May 20, 2013 14:05:42 GMT -6
As far as I can see there was no feint anywhere in this battle. I agree with this statement. This thing was a very straightforward battle, no feints, no diversions, no nothing, but attack. Reno was sent down the valley to bring the Indians to battle. He wasn't chasing after anyone, even though it appears that was the case. The 50 or so Indians to his front-- first seen in the Reno Creek valley by Hare, Davern, Herendeen, and Gerard-- were incidental and irrelevant. Reno was forced to halt and dismount: he could go no farther, not with all the dust obscuring things and the ravine to his front, disgorging Indians. As Reno moved forward, Indians pulled back. What more does anyone want? From the heights, Custer saw the problem... and the solution was to get behind the fleeing Indians. Thus, Ford D. Simple as that. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by wild on May 20, 2013 14:18:23 GMT -6
On a point of information;what is being described as a feint is in fact a demonstration. The maneuver executated by Custer at the Washita was a feint.
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Post by wild on May 20, 2013 16:51:54 GMT -6
As per QC Montrose often points to placing two major terrain features (the bluff and river) between the maneuvering forces. There is another "feature"between the maneuvering forces which Fred fails to recogonise when he says From the heights, Custer saw the problem... and the solution was to get behind the fleeing Indians. Thus, Ford D. Simple as thatThat Feature was time.It will take Custer over 1 and 1/2 hours to reach Ford D. That it would take the Indians 1 and 1/2 hours to react and attack this puny force stretches credulity to breaking.
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2013 19:58:31 GMT -6
DEMONSTRATION: A show of force on a front where a decision is not sought and one not involving contact with the enemy. ---- A demonstration may be as simple as making a lot of noise to simulate activity. It may be as complicated as displaying a lot of rubber tanks and trucks and sending false radio traffic to fool German reconnaissance and SIGINT before the invasion of France, making them think the intended target was the Pas de Calais, not Normandy
FEINT: Offensive action by feigned (meaning no contact intended or contact is incidental) attack to draw defensive focus/action away from the intended target.----- A feint in boxing terms is jabbing with your left and hitting with your right. The objective is to distract, not to fight.
Neither of these techniques were used at Little Big Horn. As Fred already said this was a straight, no frills, cavalry action. No back flips. No swan dives. Lots of mistakes.
SUPPORTING ATTACK: An offensive action that compliments the main effort by drawing enemy forces away, or fixing enemy forces in place. Decisive combat outcomes are sought just as much in the supporting attack as in the main effort.
Desert Storm saw all these techniques in play.
Demonstration: "Leaked" Marine amphibious exercises in the days leading up to battle
Feint: Naval gunfire attacks simulating preparation for an amphibious landing
Supporting Attacks: Straight in by Marines and others out of Saudi Arabia, and an attack providing flank protection by XVIII Corps.
Main Effort: The deep attack by VII Corps against Iraqi mobile reserves.
Regarding demonstrations: I am sure all of you remember the TV and news outlets reporting on those Marine exercises leading up to Desert Storm, and more recently, just before the start of OIF, the flap, again widely covered by news outlets of the 4th Infantry Division sitting off Turkey waiting to be landed and march overland into Iraq, permission for which was never granted. Does anyone think all of that was by accident or ineptness?
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Post by mac on May 20, 2013 21:06:57 GMT -6
I am sure I don't "know" Custer as well as many here but the suggestion that he did anything at any ford to take pressure off Reno doesn't sit that well with me. Is my view of Custer unreasonable? Cheers
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2013 21:13:05 GMT -6
Mac:
1) You're correct.
2) No.
Why should he want to take pressure off of Reno? He wanted pressure on Reno. In this regard Custer acted properly. What was improper is not giving Reno enough combat power to where he could sustain that pressure. He could not give what he did not have which calls the entirety of his actions into question. You may chose the greatest tactical menu since Cannae, but if you do not have sufficient combat power to execute the tactics all is for naught.
Given that Custer chose the exact same tactics, but had as a force his 3000 plus or minus civil war cavalry division, there would not be a single Indian alive in Montana on the evening of 25 June 76 had Custer wished it that way. You see the results of trying to do the same thing on the cheap.
Tactics are the practical application of common sense. Implementation of those tactics require that you chose only those tactics that are within the capabilities and limitations of the force you have in hand. The more combat power you possess, the greater are your tactical options. The smaller your force the number of your options decrease.
You would not try to paint your entire house with only one gallon of paint, but you may be able to paint the front of the house quite well.
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Post by mac on May 20, 2013 23:15:43 GMT -6
In view of quincannon's suggestion of having more pressure on Reno: Custer may have been just as happy to have Benteen "Come on" to Reno and support him in the valley allowing Custer to pick up Keogh and move back to ford D (which he had checked out while waiting) and take control of the women and children thus ending the affair. Of course this means he should have waited for Benteen to catch up with the packs before kicking off. He probably doesn't because they always run! So just hit them now and Benteen can come on later after they are on the run. Sounds to me like he probably went towards ford D.
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Post by wild on May 21, 2013 1:13:10 GMT -6
Hi mac Custer may have been just as happy to have Benteen "Come on" to Reno and support him in the valley allowing Custer to pick up Keogh and move back to ford D (which he had checked out while waiting) and take control of the women and children thus ending the affair. This would be the application of tactics by chance. Bearing in mind that the Indians have gained the initiative,Custer's forces are scattered and he is outnumbered 10 to 1,chance would be the icing on the cake. There is a tendency to fight this battle as per sand table.Unlike the sand table view Custer cannot see his units and his view of the enemy and terrain is greatly restricted. He can but issue one order to his scattered battalions after that, command and control for all practical purposes is nonexistant. In the Ford D scenario Reno fails,Benteen Fails,Keogh fails and Custer himself fails. As bold Oscar said to fail once may be regarded as misfortunate but to fail 4 times is carelessness. Best Wishes
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Post by wild on May 21, 2013 2:53:52 GMT -6
Just heard the terrible news from the States;all those poor kiddies,very sorry,have some idea of the suffering.Hope all you guys are safe.
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Post by mac on May 21, 2013 2:57:43 GMT -6
wild To manage to work in a quote from your namesake bold Oscar in such a forum is a triumph! Well played! Tactics by chance. At the time he sends the note, as I understand it, he is still short of any engagement and I think just wants Benteen to come on and be useful because the enemy will run. Tactics in this case are being formed under a false assumption. This assumption means you can do things that would not be done against another adversary. He feels able to show himself to the enemy at MTC then move away, wait, because soon they will run (they have started already) and when Benteen gets involved all will be well. Meanwhile he will take a trip along the river to find access to the rear of the village. There is some fire from the NA but soon they will retire and run. Seems crazy from our perspective because we know what is happening but they don't; Indians always fire a few shots and run. I reckon he goes towards ford D. Cheers
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Post by mac on May 21, 2013 2:59:27 GMT -6
Ditto to wild's sentiment! Best to you all!
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