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Post by El Crab on Aug 19, 2005 9:24:56 GMT -6
I don't buy it. Many accounts speak of being surprised by Reno and then by Custer. If they knew where Custer was, why'd they go after Reno in full force? Why weren't there more warriors between Custer and the village at MTC? Or, more importantly, why were there women and children and old men in the village? Why didn't the warriors go out and meet Custer's 7th, as they did with Crook? I just can't believe they'd wait to see what Custer would do, and not at least be ready for him. The horses were not in the camp, the battalions surprised them. They didn't know about Reno's battalion, they didn't know about Benteen or the pack train. They weren't ready for Custer's battalion. And they had their families and their lodges in harm's way. it makes sense , we must always remember that one indian account refers only to himself , there were indians east that saw custer many minutes before he was engaged and these indians wait to see what Custer would do ( wholf thoot account ecplain this ) so indians east of river knew nothing of reno , indians west of river knew nothing of custer you have different accounts on the base of whose indian said that , many knew there were soldiers around but custer speed surprised the village Yes, but that's not the entire village. Its akin to saying the persons in the village saw Custer coming down MTC and waited to see what he would do. They were surprised, and were not ready for Custer. Essentially, they knew of Custer when he appeared across the river or, for a select few others, before that. But the spirit of the post I was replying to concerned the Indians knowing Custer was there all along and were waiting for him. They didn't, and they weren't. Some undoubtedly knew there was an army column in the vicinity, but they clearly underestimated its ability to close on the village so quickly.
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Post by crzhrs on Aug 19, 2005 13:39:21 GMT -6
Crow King said scouts told them an army of white soldiers was coming and the command had divided, that one party was going round to attack on the opposite side.
Spotted Horn Bull said warriors were prepared for Custer's approach. The Indians quickly crossed the river, and by hundreds galloped to his rear, out of range at first, but taking advantage of coolies and mounds, soon hemming him in. I knew the fighting men of the Sioux were hidden in the ravine behind the hill upon which Long Hair was marching, and he would be attacked from both sides.
Gall (whose testimony may be questioned) stated We saw the soldiers early in the morning crossing the divide. When Reno and Custer separated, we watched them until they came down into the valley. Reno swept down so rapidly the Indians were forced to fight. The Sioux attacked Reno and the Cheyenne Custer. After Reno was pushed back the Sioux joined the Cheyenne in fighting Custer.
From THE FIGHTING CHEYENNE: It was known in the camp that the troops had separated on Reno Creek, and an old man harangued that the soldiers were about to charge from the upper end and also from the lower end. Reno's men was seen approaching the upper Indian camp.
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Post by John Brundage on Aug 19, 2005 13:47:08 GMT -6
Both sides made assumptions about their enemy based on past experience. Kuhlman points out that on the 24th of June the Indians knew that troops were moving in their direction from the Rosebud. However, they realized that the troops could not reach the Indian camp in the early morning of the 25th. In previous engagements, troopers had always attacked villages in the early morning, never after noon. Naturally on the morning of the 25th the Indians believed they had another 24 hours to prepare. By changing tactics, Custer surprised them. Luckily for the Indians, Custer too was a victim of his own assumptions. His scouts told him of a big village, but his past experience led him to believe that such a village would hold no more than several hundred warriors. The northern plains had not seen a village of the size of the LBH village (several thousand warriors) prior to this event. In addition, Custer assumed, as did Terry and the other experienced officers, that the Indians would be running with their women and children either up or down the valley upon approach of the soldiers. This assumption caused him to send Benteen on his scout to the left - to cut off the Indians' escape. Custer set his attack plan in motion prior to or during his intelligence gathering phase. Once in motion, it was difficult to disengage Reno when he (GAC) realized (at Weir Point) that retreat and consolidation was necessary. If you buy Kuhlman's story, and I see no reason to discount it, you realize that Custer's tactics (after he saw Reno dismount) were solid. He knew he must relieve the pressure on Reno, so he made an obvious move in the downstream direction of the camp, which drew off most of the Indians in Reno's front before he (Reno) was irretrievably flanked. Custer's northerly movement, which he expected to be quickly supported by Benteen, also drew the Indian's attention away from the vulnerable pack train.
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