Post by tubman13 on Mar 21, 2019 16:53:23 GMT -6
The most effective use of firearms in battle is to shoot what you aim at. One would need to train for that, and congress would have had to loosen the purse strings for that training to have occurred.
But fire can also have useful effects, even if zero probability of hit. Get hidden enemies to reveal their position, suppress enemy fire, distract. I am reluctant to use the term fix, since that term on these boards does not mean fix, has been strained into cloud cuckoo land. The only places where fixing was done was at LSH and Reno Hill.
The Henryville fire caused little to no casualties. It did focus the attention of L Company, and caused them to waste fire on targets out of range. The infiltration that destroyed L and C company occurred on the exact OPPOSITE side of Calhoun Hill. SO ineffective Indian fire set the conditions for a massive tactical victory. Indian casualties in this sector were tiny, a handful. Lame White Man may have fallen to friendly fire. LWM fell much closer to LSH after C and L collapsed.
I think the limited basic load of combatants in just not understood at LBH. The cartridge box for US soldiers carried 20 rounds. Twenty. I get that more rounds were in the saddle bags. How does this help when primary US tactic was dismounted skirmish lines. The only true skirmish line that existed in this portion of the battle was at Calhoun.
The excessive firing of US soldiers at targets out of range was a significant cause of their defeat. This is not an individual soldier failure. It is a failure of noncommissioned and commissioned officers. You are absolutely right, the officers and NCO's were responsible for the lack of controlled fire. The lack of prior training helped as well, these guys(the majority) had no idea how to break a trigger, they were jerking. I am certain they could not use the sights properly or walk hits up to a target.
My argument is that Indian forces had little to no hits at even ideal ranges for their weapon systems. Their ineffective fire caused a disproportionate US response, where the USG had ammunition problems long before the enemy entered into effective range. The Indians took very few casualties at LBH, just mind boggling given US weapons. Poor US leadership at NCO and officer level meant the Indians closed the gap from 300 to zero meters against folks out of ammunition. They had something better than their shooting, the weight of numbers. "The village consisted of eighteen hundred lodges, and at least four hundred wickayups, a lodge made of small poles and willows for a temporary shelter. Each of the wikayups contained four young bucks, and the estimate made by Crazy Horse is that each lodge had from three to four warriors. The estimate of the three made A FIGHTING FORCE of seven thousand Indians(?). This is the lowest estimate that can be made, for there were a good many Indians without shelter, hangers-on, who fought when called upon, and the usual number was much above seven thousand(?). The attack was a surprise and totally unlooked for. When Custer made the charge the women, papooses, children, and in fact all that were not fighters, made a stampede in a northerly direction. Custer seeing so numerous a body, mistook them for the main body of Indians retreating and abandoning their villages, and, immediately gave pursuit. The warriors in the village, seeing this, divided their forces into two parts, one intercepting Custer between their non-combat and him, and the other getting his rear. Outnumbering as they did, they had him at their mercy, and THE DREADFUL MASSACRE ENSUED."
Regards,Tom