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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2022 0:12:59 GMT -6
Thank you all for your thoughtful comments. The one thing I come back to is that there is, in all the sources mentioned, no even reasonably convincing explanation of why Keogh's command is found as it is. My next post will make this clearer. Cheers
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2022 0:19:01 GMT -6
Gall, Crazy Horse, Lame White Man.
All these men have major importance in this battle. Here is why.
Lame White Man
The men in the sweat tepee crawled out and ran to help their families get on their horses and get away. Lame White Man did not have time to get war clothes on. He just wrapped a blanket around his waist and grabbed his moccasins and belt and a gun. He went with Grandmother a little way to the west of some small hills there. Then he turned down below and crossed after the rest of the warriors. White Shield 1908 Cheyenne memories of the Custer fight. Near me I could see only Roan Bear, Bobtail Horse, and one other man. On my side was a man named Mad Wolf (aka Lame White Man) who said “No one should charge yet the soldiers are too many. Just keep shooting at them.” When they got pretty close to the river the Gray Horse Company dismounted and all the others as far back as I could see (sounds like more than two companies to me) dismounted also. It was not long before the Indians began to gather in large numbers where I was.
We know Lame White Man left the Ford D area and moved South to Greasy Grass Ridge and from there lead the attack on Finley Finkle Ridge that destroyed the defence of Calhoun Hill.
Gall
Gall’s family were killed during Reno’s advance in the valley and so Gall took no part in the valley fighting. He was however the leader of the fighting against Company L at Calhoun Hill as referenced by Red Hawk.
Red Hawk These later soldiers were coming down on the ridge in three divisions. They did not come down to the river. The first division came to a point about half a mile or three quarters of a mile from the river. Crazy Horse and Gall and Knife Chief were haranguing the Indians to get together so that they could make another charge on the soldiers. Smithsonian Magazine Thomas Powers ..November 2010 “Gall and three other Indians were watching the same soldiers from a high point on the eastern side of the river. Well out in front were two soldiers. Ten years later, Gall identified them as Custer and his orderly, but more probably it was not. This man he called Custer was in no hurry, Gall said. Off to Gall’s right, on one of the bluffs upriver, some Indians came into sight as Custer approached. Feather Earring, a Minneconjou, said Indians were just then coming up from the south on that side of the river “in great numbers.” When Custer saw them, Gall said, “his pace became slower and his actions more cautious, and finally he paused altogether to await the coming up of his command. This was the nearest point any of Custer’s party ever got to the river.” At that point, Gall went on, Custer “began to suspect he was in a bad scrape. From that time on Custer acted on the defensive.””
This tells us Gall was a leader at the fighting on Calhoun Hill hence an important man in the battle for Calhoun Hill.
Crazy Horse
Crazy Horse left the valley fight shortly after Reno’s charge out of the timber and returned along the river to combat the troopers seen moving towards the North end of the village. Red Hawk locates Crazy Horse with Gall facing the troopers on Calhoun Hill. He did not stay there. Crazy Horse performed what is sometimes called his “Northern Loop”.
Flying Hawk tells us where Crazy went in this loop. He went back down to the river and moved North to Deep ravine and then up Deep Ravine to get behind the troopers on Calhoun Hill. As it happened just as he arrived Keogh had also arrived behind Calhoun Hill.
Flying Hawk Oglalla
Interview with M. I. McCreight, 1928
"Crazy Horse and I left the crowd and rode down along the river. We came to a ravine; then we followed up the gulch to a place in the rear of the soldiers that were making the stand on the hill. Crazy Horse gave his horse to me to hold along with my horse. He crawled up the ravine to where he could see the soldiers. He shot them as fast as he could load his gun. They fell off their horses as fast as he could shoot.
Crazy Horse then led the attack on Keogh. Thus, earning his fame in this battle.
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2022 0:33:34 GMT -6
From the above you can see that Company L was stopped by Gall as they moved South. When Company C arrived they moved to Finley Finkle Ridge to clear the ridge of infiltrating Indians and support Company L right flank. They were quickly "rolled up" by Lame White Man.
Company I arrived last. Keogh was found with his NCO's nearby and also Sgt Bobo from Company C.
Here I insert my opinion:- Bobo had been sent back from Company C to brief Keogh on the situation ahead. Keogh had stopped and called an orders group when he was attacked by Crazy Horse.
Crazy Horse saw the opportunity to use Deep Ravine to go around Company L and hit them from the rear. Instead he ran into Company I, stationary in low ground, and took the opportunity to crush them.
Naturally anyone is free to believe what they wish but this is the only way an experienced officer like Keogh gets caught in that awful arrangement.
Cheers
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Post by noggy on Aug 11, 2022 5:51:59 GMT -6
Naturally anyone is free to believe what they wish but this is the only way an experienced officer like Keogh gets caught in that awful arrangement. How experienced was he, though? He had served during the ACW and done well, so had GAC. Experience from that sort of warfare was not necessarily something which could be transferred to the one on the plains. GAC himself is a good example of that. And ofc every battle is situational. If I am not mistaken here, Keogh was not present during the 7th's major operatons (Washita and Yellowstone), so he was by no means an "Indian Fighter"; I think he often was on elave or otherwise not present in the field post 67-68. All the best, Noggy
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 11, 2022 7:15:25 GMT -6
Mac, You bring to the game a solid thought process, based on solid military strategy and operation. Custer, if he left those three companies behind was not.
Most of the writers mentioned by others above were not there or are too lazy to look beyond the traditional. This is not to discount them, but rather to look beyond poor military actions and to look more deeply into the words of the surviving victors of this action on the Custer portion of the battlefield.
Shear numbers would have dictated the outcome, weapons, training, jaded horses, lack of knowledge of the terrain, and battle space sealed the deal.
Regards, Tom
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2022 19:52:22 GMT -6
mac, maybe its me, but my reading of Foolish Elk's account says something differnt. That said, we can agree on a few basic points. He was to the east of the monument, and that he's clear that Custer did not appear to him to make any stand anywhere except the monument. As for the rest, his descrition of mounted men heading up to high ground, sounds to me like men heading towards LSH from Calhoun. My remembrance of being on the battlefield is that LSH is a little higher than Calhoun, not much, but then it was higher still at the time of the battle, maybe by as much as several feet, the ground having been lowered and levelled off since the battle. I would also add that his description of the men on foot trying to follow the mounted men to higher ground sounds very like the men from I company trying to reach LSH after I companys postion collapsed. He says he was in a gully to the east when he saw the men killed on the side of the hill ~ which is where the bulk of the gravestones lie between Calhoun and LSH, as they marched towards the high ground at the end of the ridge. The word marched indicates to me that he's talking about men on foot rather than mounted me. As with almost all Indian testimony, we have to allow for mistakes in translation, plus compression, probably on the part of the translators, which has left most of us straching our heads ever since. Still, keep up the good work, Shan We have to think about not just where he was, but also when he was. We know that he asked his father if he could go and watch the fighting because his older brother was already fighting. Hence the battle was already under way. He tells us he went North initially and then East to get to the Eastern side of LSH. By this time Custer was fixed on LSH. So he probably saw C,I,L heading towards Calhoun rather than the other way around. Remember too he saw Keogh's end and rode out to get his first gun and when he returned LSH had fallen. This timing,to me, makes the idea of seeing men going up LSH extremely unlikely. I do not believe anyone from C,I,L ever got back to LSH. Red Hawk says they did not; and we need to note that there is a big and distinct gap in the markers between LSH and Battle Ridge. The few men found on LSH from C,I,L were left there after the Northern Valley action when the three groups headed South. Cheers
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2022 20:08:05 GMT -6
Naturally anyone is free to believe what they wish but this is the only way an experienced officer like Keogh gets caught in that awful arrangement. How experienced was he, though? He had served during the ACW and done well, so had GAC. Experience from that sort of warfare was not necessarily something which could be transferred to the one on the plains. GAC himself is a good example of that. And ofc every battle is situational. If I am not mistaken here, Keogh was not present during the 7th's major operatons (Washita and Yellowstone), so he was by no means an "Indian Fighter"; I think he often was on elave or otherwise not present in the field post 67-68. All the best, Noggy Prior to the civil war he had fought for a couple of years in Italy. He was experienced. It is not a matter of Indian fighting but rather just that no officer would ever willingly occupy that ground by choice. I say he was there due to the circumstance of having to escape South. The alternative story is he chose to be there while he was commanding three companies left behind by Custer on Calhoun Hill. No one has ever suggested any militarily sound explanation of why Keogh and his men are bunched, as they are, in the worst possible ground to defend Calhoun Hill. Cheers
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Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 12, 2022 14:03:34 GMT -6
I think we must look at the Keogh markers as the place where his company and some other survivors, finally died, mainly after being forced there by the Indians. Keogh may have had no option but to allow for pressure to coral him in this position.
Funny enough, Keogh died with his NCOs but his XO died in another postion with another group of markers.
One guess is that a position was required on the east side of battle ridge, Calhoun was at one end, Harrington was further west, but no one was guarding the east. If these three companies had to dismount and fight, then all three points would have to be defended. I suppose they thought the other two companies would come up and defend the rear. So maybe they decided by this point that they would have to fight it out.
Ian
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Post by wild on Aug 12, 2022 17:04:50 GMT -6
Just a thought ; If there were troopers from Keogh's battalion found with Custer on LSH it is more likely that in the rush for Lsh they stayed with the rear of Custer's troops rather than dismounting with Keogh. It is also possible that some of Custer troops were forced to remain with Keogh. It is obvious that Custer did not arrive on LSH in parade ground order and that the whole 5 companies were under attack and increasing pressure resulting in units losing order and disintegrating. Yan's observation .... " Keogh died with his NCOs but his XO died in another postion with another group of markers." fits the scenario perfectly.
Best to You Yan hope alls well.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 13, 2022 1:40:34 GMT -6
I am fine Wild, yourself okay? It's too dammed hot!
Ian
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Post by wild on Aug 13, 2022 9:46:51 GMT -6
Still going strong Ian thank you. And yes 5 days now blistering heat.
Further Custer final position on LSH was nearer the village than it was to Keogh's final position. Custer's immediate command was the smallest detachment of the 4 battalions. There is a body of opinion on the board that holds that this situation was due to tactical decisions taken by Custer. To point out a contradiction with this theory consider we have two messengers to the rearward units ordering them to close up with the point units. Custer was in fact trying to concentrate his strenght not as some would hold detaching penny packets of troops to what forlorn purpose? Go back to Benteen's description of the field...no order, no organisation, no reason. As always you must first eliminate the most likely possibility before considering the more complex . I think our problem is that it is more interesting refighting the battle than accepting logic. Best
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 13, 2022 13:10:49 GMT -6
Wild, glad you're doing fine, going strong. And, being the voice of reason. In your opinion how far north of LSH did Custer venture? Do you think Keogh was hit while on the ridge and driven to his final resting place?
Good to see you posting.
Regards, Tom
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Post by noggy on Aug 14, 2022 7:14:39 GMT -6
How experienced was he, though? He had served during the ACW and done well, so had GAC. Experience from that sort of warfare was not necessarily something which could be transferred to the one on the plains. GAC himself is a good example of that. And ofc every battle is situational. If I am not mistaken here, Keogh was not present during the 7th's major operatons (Washita and Yellowstone), so he was by no means an "Indian Fighter"; I think he often was on elave or otherwise not present in the field post 67-68. All the best, Noggy Prior to the civil war he had fought for a couple of years in Italy. He was experienced. It is not a matter of Indian fighting but rather just that no officer would ever willingly occupy that ground by choice. I say he was there due to the circumstance of having to escape South. The alternative story is he chose to be there while he was commanding three companies left behind by Custer on Calhoun Hill. No one has ever suggested any militarily sound explanation of why Keogh and his men are bunched, as they are, in the worst possible ground to defend Calhoun Hill. Cheers I know he saw some action in 60-61 in addition to the ACW. Before LBH, he had however not led a company, or 3 for that matter, in combat for what? 8 years? That was my point, not that he was green. One might say he was "rusty". I too don't think the 3 companies in the Southern parts of BR were necessarily stationary for hours on end, or anything like it. White Bull alludes to skirmish lines (most likely I Company) which he rode between and back during his bravery run before the major attack, but I can't remember what he said about what was going on in the time before his run. Will have to check that out later. All the best, Noggy
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Post by Yan Taylor on Aug 14, 2022 12:56:42 GMT -6
Well, I have always thought that Benteens thoughts about the battle being a rout and throwing a hand full of corn about, was only describing one place on the whole field and that was the Keogh sector, as around 80 men where slaughtered in that place and the markers show them to be spread out.
I can't really use that info by the captain and all he saw was the reamains of three companies in their final death thoes and not in any kind of defense. Benteen also mentioned about no resistance too, but we now know about Calhoun, FFR and cemetary ridge, Benteen missed all those skirmish lines.
So even though Benteen toured the battlefield, I don't take much stock on what he wrote as he missed a lot of data.
Ian
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Post by wild on Aug 14, 2022 13:15:03 GMT -6
Hello Tom missed yours so sorry for the delay in replying. I look in here from time to time more for sentimental reasons than in the hope of finding the old gang engaged in a titanic virtual tactical brawl [no disrespect to present contributers] As regards Keogh and Custer the field would suggest that both went down together .[Keogh lasting a bit longer as he had 3 companies as against Custers 2 companies] I say this because neither appear to have had any time to organise a creditable defence thus indicating that they were victims of a simultaneous counter attack along his entire line. Because Custer could not communicate with detached units it is very unlikely that he detached Calhoun and Keogh as suggested by some of our colleagues'
The tactical situation as of Martin's departure is this : All surprise gone. 1 Battalion Reno engaged on the defensive 1 battalion Benteen recalled no ETA 1 Packs ordered up no ETA Remaining 5 companies in contact with the enemy ,out flanked and outnumbered 10 to 1. Terrain broken not conducive to defence. River major obstruction to attack on village. Time Element; ETA of enemy 3 minutes. Option retreat or make for ridge and high ground . Hold till arrival of reinforcements. outcome 10 minutes too late ...total destruction of command enroute to LSH.
Best
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