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Post by greathunter on Jan 26, 2022 17:03:46 GMT -6
Kinda akways held the assertion tjat if custer would have waited one more day things would have been diffrent
Would live to hear your thoughts from a military perspective on this
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Post by noggy on Jan 27, 2022 2:07:50 GMT -6
Kinda akways held the assertion tjat if custer would have waited one more day things would have been diffrent Would live to hear your thoughts from a military perspective on this Even if he managed to not be detected for a full day while camped in the proximity of a giant village, if he made the excact same decisions on the 26th as on the 25th, it would have gone the same way. It was the actions that led to the 7th getting beaten up, not the lack of a day's rest. Terry would stil larrive on the 27th. GAC could very well have won on the 25th had he held the Regiment together. NB: "Won" can be any number of outcomes. Destroyed village and storages, hostages, killing the pony herd, inflicting large casualties on the "warrior corps" etc. All the best, Noggy |
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 27, 2022 5:10:40 GMT -6
It is hard to determine just what the village knew on the 25th, some say that they were took completly by surprize by Reno's advance and some say that they knew that the soldiers were actually in the area.
Wolftooth mentions about sneaking through the camp guards to look for the soldiers, the camp guards had been given instructions to keep everyone together.
Bottom line is that if they knew that a new column was in the area, why didn't it get the same treatment as Crooks column?
If they didn't know that another column was in the field then why would Wolftooth want to go and find it, he certainly wouldn't leave and break the camp rules without a reason.
Ian
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Post by noggy on Jan 28, 2022 3:08:33 GMT -6
It is hard to determine just what the village knew on the 25th, some say that they were took completly by surprize by Reno's advance and some say that they knew that the soldiers were actually in the area. Wolftooth mentions about sneaking through the camp guards to look for the soldiers, the camp guards had been given instructions to keep everyone together. Bottom line is that if they knew that a new column was in the area, why didn't it get the same treatment as Crooks column? If they didn't know that another column was in the field then why would Wolftooth want to go and find it, he certainly wouldn't leave and break the camp rules without a reason. Ian I think it is a mistake to think all of the Indians knew or had heard of the same things. The village was after all a bunch of different camps made out of several groups. Rumors would circulate mostly among kin and people who knew eachother and within the tribal "circuits". More pressing matters and clear intell like Crook's column would of course reach the "High command" consisting of bigshots like Sitting Bull, Crazy Horse etc. That can explain why some Indians later would say that they knew soldiers where in the area, while others said they were completely taken off-guard. Wolftooth and his buddies probably heard rumors and wanted to check them out, but apparantly it was not generally accepted that this was true. So someone with authority clearly did not believe the rumors, instructing the camp police thereafter. All the best, GGMU, Geir |
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Post by Colt45 on Jan 28, 2022 9:03:17 GMT -6
It would be hard to know if waiting until the 26th would have changed things. If Custer followed the same actions as on the 25th, then no, no difference. The original plan was for Terry, Crook, and Custer to arrive at LBH at the same time. Since Terry didn't arrive until the 27th, most likely the village would have moved by then, as the huge amount of people and horses required frequent moving in order to sustain each.
Waiting until the 26th would give Terry time to get closer and Custer time to do proper recon of the area. Assuming Custer uses the 25th to lay up and do recon, his battle plan might well have changed. He might have decided to send Reno the same way as history shows, but instead of going up the bluffs, he might have crossed behind Reno, which would allow him to followup the situation Reno developed, plus block the Indians from moving south. leaving only west or north as the escape route. With Terry one day closer, if Custer was forced to defend on the west side of the river, the terrain favored defense, plus his whole regiment would be there, instead of scattered all over the place, and Terry would make that defense a short one.
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 28, 2022 14:15:41 GMT -6
The greatest fear Custer and in fact most of the military had would be Indians running before they could be brought to battle, not just at the LBH but in most other campaigns.
There were all kinds of signs a large village was nearby. The size and numbers were not a factor with Custer or any other commander. It was don't let the Indians escape without inflicting damage to them or at least capture the village proper and destroy it and all it's belongings.
Custer was in hot water with President Grant and had to beg Terry to intercede with Grant to allow him on the campaign which Grant relented.
Custer needed a victory, any victory to get back into the spotlight. Terry gave him an "out" to do as he saw fit if he contacted Indians before the rest of the other commanders joined up.
If the Indians got away without any losses then Custer would be blamed and/or humiliated.
Once word came to Custer of "There go your Indians, General, running like the Devil" then Custer's greatest fear came to bear.
All his orders and actions were based on Indians escaping which ended up in his immediate command wiped out and the rest of the 7th suffering heavy losses.
When Terry approached warriors wanted to take him on but elders convinced them they had done enough and left. Obviously the warriors were confident of defeating any army that showed up.
The rest as the saying goes is history which we are still debating now.
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Post by noggy on Jan 28, 2022 15:10:12 GMT -6
The greatest fear Custer and in fact most of the military had would be Indians running before they could be brought to battle, not just at the LBH but in most other campaigns. Yet, time after time this had shown to not be the case. Fetterman, Beecher Island, the aftermath of Washita where women and children taken as hostages may have saved the 7th, stand-offs along the Yellowstone, Platte Bridge, Rosebud (ok, GAC never learned about it) etc should have shown that the NAs fought when they wanted/needed to, not when the soldiers would like them to. For some reason, to this day, the whole "The Indians always ran" thing lives on. No they did not. They fought, but when they had a good chance of winning. If you have a rock and a club, you don't charge an Abraham tank. You wait to the crew get out. All the best, Noggy |
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 29, 2022 8:21:49 GMT -6
Yeah, choosing when to fight and not to fight will probably win you more victories.
Sure there are times when your hand is forced, Reno showing up unannounced forced the Sioux to attack, but this time the Indians knew they had numbers on their side.
If this village had just been one circle then the fighters in the village would just try to block and slow down their attackers, but at the BLBH, their numbers were so large that fighters could counter attack.
We have to take our hat of to the Indians in that village, the foray to stop Crook was well planned and even though it never defeted the soldiers on the field, they won a moral victory because they knocked the column out of the campaign.
Having done this, the fighters in that village were bouyed and full of spirit which stood then good stead when the next column came to the party.
Ian
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Post by crzhrs on Jan 29, 2022 9:26:40 GMT -6
The greatest fear Custer and in fact most of the military had would be Indians running before they could be brought to battle, not just at the LBH but in most other campaigns. Yet, time after time this had shown to not be the case. Fetterman, Beecher Island, the aftermath of Washita where women and children taken as hostages may have saved the 7th, stand-offs along the Yellowstone, Platte Bridge, Rosebud (ok, GAC never learned about it) etc should have shown that the NAs fought when they wanted/needed to, not when the soldiers would like them to. For some reason, to this day, the whole "The Indians always ran" thing lives on. No they did not. They fought, but when they had a good chance of winning. If you have a rock and a club, you don't charge an Abraham tank. You wait to the crew get out. All the best, Noggy Yes, very true, the Indians didn't always run which should have been known to Custer, who supposedly was a veteran "Indian Fighter". It's mind boggling that while Whites knew Indians they never really knew about their culture. Call it racism, bigotry or just plain contempt about "others" who aren't like you! |
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Post by herosrest on Jan 29, 2022 20:17:43 GMT -6
Custer and some of his officers had an idea of the Sioux capabilities as outlined which was fighting on their own terms, and obviously, to delay and obstruct to cover retreat by their camp. That was the 1874 situation which brought the fight on Pease Bottom, which was defeat for the army. The Sioux got away relatively unscathed and defiant.
He chose to attack at LBH, rather than be attacked or stalled by a defence. The result was a classic instruction in what can go wrong with the type of attack he undertook. It was a complete cluster shambles which should be taught to every Officer on day 0ne tactics - 'This can happen, if you attack in this way against superior force strength'.
Detailed scouting was sacrificed to impetus in expectation of surprise by closing rapidly in daylight. The dust columns above the advancing columns were detected in the Sioux and Cheyenne camps and their history on the response is a little fuzzy, like, they weren't bothered at all until the killing began.
Every few years for a while, the Sioux killed a bunch of soldiers and there was a compromise political solution. This was their practice and experience of the advance of progress. They did it again at Little Bighorn.
The best book there is on the battle is a military participant's journal -- an Officer who arrived with Terry in command of the Infantry battalion, who was over the battleground. It's a great read and simply squashes flat a lot of colorful opinion and historical juxtapositioning with what went on.
Custer had a worst case scenario of 1,500 in opposition against his force. I don't know if he would have done what he did and did what he done, against and expected 1,800 or 2,000; but he was happy to launch into 1,500 at which odds one can assume he felt he could cope. In 'We were Soldiers', there is a scene where an NCO tells his Colonel that 'Custer was pussycat', and I'm not so sure that's correct or accurate.
One more day is an interesting consideration since the camps were planning to move on the 25th but delayed it for the following day. Custer's intent for the 26th was a pre-dawn attack - standard tactics. Would that have worked? Good questiopn 'cos it was a big camp. Attacking on the 26th With Brisbin and Gibbon downriver was never considered, never an option and we know it was impossible. I don't know how that village of camps would have coped with a pre-dawn attack and the chaos of panic. They did pretty well with it at noon the day before.
Regards and I hope all are well.
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